Welcome to my website! I am an Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science (Profesor Asociado de Ciencia Política) at ITAM in México City and Level I researcher at Mexico’s Sistema Nacional de Investigadores (SNI). My main areas of research include elections in authoritarian regimes, electoral systems, and political careers. My work has appeared in the American Journal of Political Science, the Journal of Politics, the British Journal of Political Science, the Journal of Conflict Resolution, Political Science Research and Methods, Legislative Studies Quarterly, Comparative Political Studies, Electoral Studies and the Journal of Politics in Latin America. I am enthusiastic about the use of quantitative methods to answer substantive political questions, and I hope to transmit this interest to my students.
I received my PhD. in Political Science from Washington University in St. Louis in 2016. My dissertation examines government-opposition relations in competitive authoritarian regimes. Specifically, I sought to understand why incumbents in authoritarian regimes sometimes face strong electoral challenges, and how they respond to them. The first two papers of my dissertation study how players’ perceived electoral strength, the degree of institutionalization of the ruling party and short-term economic conditions affect the electoral challenges faced by authoritarian incumbents across the world. The last chapter of my dissertation, published in Comparative Political Studies, examines how subnational elections can empower opposition parties, with special emphasis on the case of Mexico.
Besides authoritarian regimes, I am interested in electoral systems and political careers. I have two forthcoming papers on how Argentine politicians react strategically to the incentives provided by the electoral calendar and why Mexican mayors sometimes decide (not) to mobilize in favor of candidates from their own party. I am currently using data from Argentina and Mexico to identify the causal effect of district magnitude and double-ballot rules on electoral outcomes.