Appendix A

This appendix (a) provides a formal justification for the claim that if $\lambda_1 - \lambda_0 > 0$ and the magnitude of this difference is large enough, P will maximize her expected utility by running in a midterm; and (b) shows that introducing a discount term does not change the gist of the results.

To simplify the exposition, let $\phi_0 = [\lambda_0 \pi_E(\theta_{q+1}, S_2) + (1 - \lambda_0) \pi_E(\theta_q, S_2)]$ be the probability that P wins the executive election conditional on being elected for the legislature at $t=0$, and $\phi_1 = [\lambda_1 \pi_E(\theta_{q+1}, S_1) + (1 - \lambda_1) \pi_E(\theta_q, S_1)]$ be defined in the same way conditional on running for the legislature at $t=1$. With no discount term, P prefers to run in a midterm if

$$\mathrm{E}\,[U_P \mid concurrent] \quad < \quad \mathrm{E}\,[U_P \mid midterm]$$

$$\pi_L(\theta_q)\,[R_L + \phi_0\,R_E] \quad < \quad \pi_L(\theta_q)\,[\tfrac{1}{2}R_L + \phi_1\,(R_E - \tfrac{1}{2}R_L)]$$

$$0 \quad < \quad (\phi_1 - \phi_0)\,R_E - \tfrac{1}{2}\,R_L\,(1 + \phi_1).$$

Thus, running a midterm will only be P's preferred choice if $\phi_1 - \phi_0$ is large enough, which in turn requires $\lambda_1 - \lambda_0$ to be sufficiently large.

Now let introduce a discount term $\delta \in (0, 1)$ such that P discounts her future utility by a factor of δ^t: that is, she discounts the payoffs received at $t=0$, $t=1$, $t=2$ and $t=3$ by $\delta^0 = 1$, δ^1, δ^2 and δ^3, respectively. Therefore, P's discounted payoffs from winning office in a concurrent or midterm election will be

	(concurrent)	(midterm)
$t=0$	$\tfrac{1}{2}R_L$	0
$t=1$	$\delta\,\tfrac{1}{2}R_L$	$\delta\,\tfrac{1}{2}R_L$
$t=2$	$\delta^2\,\tfrac{1}{2}R_E$	$\delta^2\,\tfrac{1}{2}\,(R_E - R_L)$
$t=3$	$\delta^3\,\tfrac{1}{2}R_E$	$\delta^3\,\tfrac{1}{2}R_E$

Then, *P* will prefer to run in a midterm election if

$$E\left[U_P \mid concurrent\right] \quad < \quad E\left[U_P \mid midterm\right]$$

$$\tfrac{1}{2}\,\pi_L(\theta_q)\left[R_L + \delta R_L + \phi_0\,\delta^2 R_E + \phi_0\,\delta^3 R_E\right] \quad < \quad \tfrac{1}{2}\,\pi_L(\theta_q)\left[\delta R_L + \phi_1\,\delta^2(R_E - R_L) + \phi_1\,\delta^3 R_E\right]$$

$$0 \quad < \quad (\phi_1 - \phi_0)\,R_E\,(1 + \delta)\,\delta^2 - (1 + \phi_1\,\delta^2)\,R_L.$$

Although the math is considerably more complicated, the basic insight from the previous result remains: for *P* to prefer to run in a midterm election, $\phi_1 - \phi_0$ must be positive and sufficiently large in magnitude to offset the other advantages of running in a concurrent election. Certainly, an extremely low value of δ (*e.g.*, $\delta=0$) will make *P* prefer to run in a concurrent election, but the point is that introducing a discount factor does not change the basic insight of the model. The reason is pretty simple: since *P* can only run for an executive office at *t=2*, a discount factor makes holding a *legislative* position at *t=0* more valuable, but it cannot affect the value of winning an *executive* position at *t=2*. To the extent that an executive office is sufficiently valuable, introducing a discount term does not change the model's main insight.

Appendix B

Table B1: Descriptive statistics.

Main explanatory variables	(a) Main sample (*n=842*)				(b) 1983 sample (*n=203*)			
	mean	std. dev.	min.	max.	mean	std. dev.	min.	max.
Midterm	0.49	0.50	0.00	1.00	0.50	0.50	0.00	1.00
Lost election	0.14	0.35	0.00	1.00				
Dependent variables (1): Executive experience								
Former executive	0.18	0.38	0.00	1.00				
Former governor	0.03	0.18	0.00	1.00				
Former governor or vice-governor	0.06	0.23	0.00	1.00				
Former mayor	0.13	0.34	0.00	1.00				
Former executive (W)	0.06	0.20	0.00	1.00				
Former executive (W^2)	0.04	0.18	0.00	1.00				
Dependent variables (2): Bill submission								
Bills submitted	76.43	83.87	1.00	570.00	23.83	32.95	1.00	190.00
Bills submitted (first 2 years)	36.25	40.39	1.00	336.00	12.57	13.69	1.00	100.00
Bills, prov. target	14.19	19.50	0.00	173.00	6.18	11.39	0.00	79.00
Bills, prov. target (first 2 years)	7.57	10.18	0.00	78.00	3.44	5.14	0.00	35.00
Bills, muni. target	2.30	4.17	0.00	39.00	1.32	3.67	0.00	41.00
Bills, muni. target (first 2 years)	1.32	2.52	0.00	22.00	0.71	1.53	0.00	10.00
Dependent variables (3): Reelection								
Reelection	0.25	0.43	0.00	1.00	0.33	0.47	0.00	1.00
Reelected	0.18	0.39	0.00	1.00	0.25	0.44	0.00	1.00
Control variables								
Female	0.20	0.40	0.00	1.00	0.04	0.20	0.00	1.00
Magnitude	12.88	13.70	2.00	35.00	27.92	28.33	2.00	70.00
Delegation size	25.66	27.46	2.00	70.00	27.92	28.33	2.00	70.00
Committee chair	0.14	0.28	0.00	1.00	0.10	0.30	0.00	1.00
Copartisan president	0.50	0.50	0.00	1.00	0.50	0.50	0.00	1.00
Copartisan governor	0.48	0.50	0.00	1.00	0.52	0.50	0.00	1.00
PJ bloc	0.49	0.49	0.00	1.00	0.46	0.50	0.00	1.00
UCR bloc	0.30	0.46	0.00	1.00	0.50	0.50	0.00	1.00
Ran for executive	0.18	0.39	0.00	1.00				