

ITAM
Departamento de Ciencia Política

Política Comparada I

Otoño 2017
Martes y Jueves 13:00-14:30
Río Hondo, Salón 304

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Oficina: Martes y Jueves 15:00-16:00 o previa cita

Objetivo

Este curso se propone introducir a los alumnos en los “grandes temas” de la ciencia política: la cuestión del orden político, el origen del Estado moderno, las causas y consecuencias de las revoluciones sociales, el papel de las instituciones en el desarrollo económico, y la naturaleza de los regímenes políticos.

A lo largo del curso, responderemos preguntas del tipo: ¿Cómo surgieron los estados nacionales? ¿Por qué el descontento social no siempre se traduce en protestas y revoluciones? ¿Bajo qué circunstancias la movilización de identidades étnicas termina en violencia o guerras civiles? ¿Cuáles son las causas y las consecuencias de la democracia? Si las instituciones son clave para el desarrollo, ¿cómo se explica la supervivencia de instituciones deficientes cuando no directamente nefastas?

Calificación

- **Participación en clase (10%).** Se espera que los alumnos lean la bibliografía obligatoria a fin de participar en clase y/o responder las preguntas formuladas por el profesor. En cada sesión, 3-4 alumnos serán elegidos al azar para responder preguntas sobre la bibliografía correspondiente a dicha sesión.
- **Pregunta fundamentada (10%).** A más tardar el miércoles de cada semana, los alumnos enviarán por correo electrónico una pregunta fundamentada sobre algunos de los textos de la bibliografía obligatoria correspondientes a dicha semana.
- **Reseña (20%).** En la última semana de clase, los estudiantes entregarán un ensayo de no más de 6 páginas, a doble espacio, reseñando alguno de los pares de novelas/películas listados en el temario, y relacionándolos con alguno(s) de los textos incluidos en la bibliografía.
- **Examen parcial (25%).** A mitad del semestre habrá un examen parcial cubriendo los temas vistos hasta entonces.

- **Ensayo final (35%).** La última semana de clases, el profesor entregará una lista de 3-4 preguntas sobre algunos de los temas vistos en clase. Los alumnos deberán elegir una de ellas y responderla con un ensayo de no más de 8 páginas, a doble espacio. El ensayo deberá incluir referencias tanto a la bibliografía obligatoria como a la optativa.

Lecturas

Además de la bibliografía obligatoria y optativa correspondiente a cada sesión, los alumnos elegirán alguno de los siguientes pares de novelas y películas y elaborarán una reseña crítica de los mismos, destacando su conexión (o falta de ella) con algunos de los textos leídos en clase.

- (L): Mario Vargas Llosa. *La Fiesta del Chivo*. Alfaguara-Clarín, Buenos Aires, 2000. (P): *The Last King of Scotland* (2006).
- (L): Arthur Koestler. *Darkness at Noon*. Scribner, New York, 1940. (Hay traducción al español: Arthur Koestler. *El Cero y el Infinito*. DeBolsillo, 1940 [2011].) (P): *La Vida de los Otros* (2006).
- (L): Carlos Fuentes. *La Muerte de Artemio Cruz*. Alfaguara, Madrid, 2008 [1962]. (P): *El Gatopardo* (1963).
- (L): Javier Cercas. *Anatomía de un Instante*. Mondadori, Buenos Aires, 2009. (P): *Trece Días* (2000).
- (L): Harper Lee. *To Kill a Mockingbird [50th Anniversary Edition]*. HarperCollins, New York, 1960. (Hay traducción al español: Harper Lee. *Matar a un Ruiseñor*. Círculo de Lectores, 1960 [2006].) (P): *Z* (1969).

Todas las lecturas obligatorias (y la mayoría de las optativas) se encuentran disponibles en *Google Drive*. Las lecturas marcadas con un asterisco (*) incluyen material técnicamente complejo, con el cual los alumnos pueden no estar familiarizados. Dentro de lo posible, el profesor tratará de explicar la intuición detrás de dicho material en clase, pero el conocimiento del mismo **no** será evaluado, y los alumnos pueden pasar por alto las secciones correspondientes.

Integridad académica

Según el artículo 5bis del Reglamento de Titulación del ITAM, “la reproducción parcial o total de textos o productos ajenos, de autor conocido o anónimo, publicados por cualquier medio o inéditos, sin entrecomillar los pasajes o elementos reproducidos o sin hacer la referencia bibliográfica pertinente” constituye plagio o fraude académico. Las citas a otros autores son bienvenidas, pero deben ser reconocidas como tales. El uso de fragmentos y/o traducciones literales de textos ajenos sin la debida atribución será causal para reprobar la materia y merecerá la amonestación oficial al alumno por parte de la Dirección Escolar del Instituto.

Sesiones

Sesión 1 (Agosto/15). Introducción

Presentación del curso.

I. Inferencia e Inferencia Causal

Sesión 2 (Agosto/17). Comparación e Inferencia

- (1) Barbara Geddes. How the Cases You Choose Affect the Answers You Get: Selection Bias in Comparative Politics. *Political Analysis*, 2:131–150, 1990.
- (2) James D. Fearon. Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science. *World Politics*, 43(2):169–195, 1991.

Lecturas optativas

- (1) Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba. *Designing Social Inquiry. Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1994, caps. 4.3-4.4.
- (2) Jasjeet S. Sekhon. Quality Meets Quantity: Case Studies, Conditional Probability, and Counterfactuals. *Perspectives on Politics*, 2(2):281–293, 2004.
- (3) Robert A. Pape. The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. *American Political Science Review*, 97(3):343–361, 2003.
- (4) *Scott Ashworth, Joshua D. Clinton, Adam Meirowitz, and Kristopher W. Ramsay. Design, Inference, and the Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. *American Political Science Review*, 102(2):269–273, 2008.
- (5) Robert A. Pape. Methods and Findings in the Study of Suicide Terrorism. *American Political Science Review*, 102(2):275–277, 2008.

Sesión 3 (Agosto/22). El Problema Fundamental de la Inferencia Causal

- (1) Joshua Angrist and Jörn-Steffen Pischke. *Mostly Harmless Econometrics. An Empiricist's Companion*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2009, cap. 1.
- (2) Joshua D. Angrist and Jörn-Steffen Pischke. *Mastering 'Metrics. The Path from Cause to Effect*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2015, cap. 1 [no es necesario leer el apéndice].

Lecturas optativas

- (1) Jonathan A. Rodden. Back to the Future. Endogenous Institutions and Comparative Politics. In Mark I. Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman, editors, *Comparative Politics. Rationality, Culture, and Structure*, pages 333–357. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2nd edition, 2009.
- (2) *Joshua Angrist and Jörn-Steffen Pischke. *Mostly Harmless Econometrics. An Empiricist's Companion*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2009, cap. 2.

- (3) *Paul W. Holland. Statistics and Causal Inference. *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 81(396):945–960, 1986.
- (4) *Adam Przeworski. Is the Science of Comparative Politics Possible? In Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes, editors, *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*, pages 147–171. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007.

Sesión 4 (Agosto/24). Inferencia Causal con Datos Observacionales

- (1) Thad Dunning. *Natural Experiments in the Social Sciences: A Design-Based Approach*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012, caps. 1.1-1.3, 2, 3.1-3.2 y 4.

Lecturas optativas

- (1) Donald P. Green and Alan S. Gerber. The Underprovision of Experiments in Political Science. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 589:94–112, 2003.
- (2) *Alberto Abadie, Alexis Diamond, and Jens Hainmueller. Comparative Politics and the Synthetic Control Method. *American Journal of Political Science*, 59(2):495–510, 2015.

II. Estado, Orden Político y Revoluciones

Sesión 5 (Agosto/29). El Estado (I): ¿Bandidos, Mafiosos, o Padres de la Patria?

- (1) Charles Tilly. War Making and State Making as Organized Crime. In Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, editors, *Bringing the State Back In*, pages 169–191. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985.
- (2) Mancur Olson. Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development. *American Political Science Review*, 87(3):567–576, 1993.
- (3) Robert H. Bates. *Prosperity and Violence: The Political Economy of Development*. W. W. Norton & Company, New York and London, second edition, 2009 [2001], cap. 3.

Lecturas optativas

- (1) Joseph R. Strayer. *On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1972.
- (2) Charles Tilly. *Coerción, Capital, y los Estados Europeos 990-1990*. Alianza, Madrid, 1990, caps. 4-5.
- (3) Barnett R. Rubin. Lineages of the State in Afghanistan. *Asian Survey*, 28(11):1188–1209, 1988.
- (4) Oscar Oszlak. The Historical Formation of the State in Latin America: Some Theoretical and Methodological Guidelines for Its Study. *Latin American Research Review*, 16(2):3–32, 1981.
- (5) Jeffrey Herbst. The Creation and Maintenance of National Boundaries in Africa. *International Organization*, 43(4):673–692, 1989.

Agosto/31. APSA

No hay clase.

Sesión 6 (Septiembre/5). El Estado (II): (In)Capacidades Estatales

- (1) Francis Fukuyama. *State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century*. Cornell University Press, Ithaca (NY), 2004, cap. 1.
- (2) Douglass C. North. Una Teoría Neoclásica del Estado. In *Estructura y Cambio en la Historia Económica*, pages 35–48. Alianza, Madrid, 1979 [1984].
- (3) *Daron Acemoglu, Leopoldo Fergusson, James A. Robinson, Darío Romero, and Juan F. Vargas. The Perils of Top-down State Building: Evidence from Colombia's False Positives. Working Paper 22617, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2016.

Lecturas optativas

- (1) Guillermo O'Donnell. On the State, Democratization and Some Conceptual Problems: A Latin American View with Glances at Some Postcommunist Countries. *World Development*, 21(8):1355–1369, 1993.
- (2) Peter Evans. El Estado como Problema y como Solución. *Desarrollo Económico*, 35(140):529–562, 1996.
- (3) Timothy Snyder. *Black Earth: The Holocaust as History and Warning*. Random House, New York, 2015, cap. 9.
- (4) *Daron Acemoglu, Jacob Moscona, and James A. Robinson. State Capacity and American Technology: Evidence from the 19th Century. Working Paper 21932, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2016.

Sesión 7 (Septiembre/7). Revoluciones Sociales (I): Orígenes

- (1) Theda Skocpol. *States and Social Revolutions. A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, & China*. Cambridge University Press, New York, 1979, pp. 3-5, 14-33, 40-51, más el caso de Rusia (pp. 128-40 y 206-35).

Lecturas optativas

- (1) Barrington Moore. *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. Beacon Press, Boston, 1966, cap. IX.
- (2) *Helge Berger and Mark Spoerer. Economic Crises and the European Revolutions of 1848. *The Journal of Economic History*, 61(2):293–326, 2001.
- (3) Erich Weede and Edward N. Muller. Rebellion, Violence and Revolution: A Rational Choice Perspective. *Journal of Peace Research*, 35(1):43–59, 1998.
- (4) *Carles Boix. Economic Roots of Civil Wars and Revolutions in the Contemporary World. *World Politics*, 60(3):390–437, 2008.

Sesión 8 (Septiembre/12). Revoluciones Sociales (II): El Largo Plazo

- (1) Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way. The Durability of Revolutionary Regimes. *Journal of Democracy*, 24(3):5–17, 2013.

- (2) *Melissa Dell. Path Dependence in Development: Evidence from the Mexican Revolution. Unpublished manuscript, 2012.

Lecturas optativas

- (1) *Nam Kyu Kim. Revolutionary Leaders and Mass Killing. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, forthcoming.
- (2) *Daron Acemoglu, Davide Cantoni, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. The Consequences of Radical Reform: The French Revolution. *American Economic Review*, 101(7):3286–3307, 2011.

Sesión 9 (Septiembre/14). Guerras Civiles

- (1) Stathis N. Kalyvas. Civil Wars. In Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes, editors, *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*, pages 416–434. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007.
- (2) *Philip Roessler. The Enemy Within: Personal Rule, Coups, and Civil War in Africa. *World Politics*, 63(2):300–346, 2011.

Lecturas optativas

- (1) Christopher Blattman and Edward Miguel. Civil War. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 48(1):3–57, 2010.
- (2) *Michael L. Ross. A Closer Look at Oil, Diamonds, and Civil War. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 9(1):265–300, 2006.
- (3) *Samuel Bazzi and Christopher Blattman. Economic Shocks and Conflict: Evidence from Commodity Prices. *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics*, 6(4):1–38, 2014.
- (4) Donald L. Horowitz. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. University of California Press, Berkeley, 1985.
- (5) Jason Stearns. *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters: The Collapse of the Congo and the Great War of Africa*. PublicAffairs, New York, 2011.

Sesión 10 (Septiembre/26). Factores Estructurales y Desorden Político

- (1) Samuel P. Huntington. *Political Order in Changing Societies*. Yale University Press, New Haven, 1968, pp. 1-11, 32-59 y 78-92.

Lecturas optativas

- (1) *Carlos Scartascini and Mariano Tommasi. The Making of Policy: Institutionalized or Not? *American Journal of Political Science*, 56(4):787–801, 2012.

Sesión 11 (Septiembre/28). Instituciones y Orden Político

- (1) Samuel P. Huntington. *Political Order in Changing Societies*. Yale University Press, New Haven, 1968, cap. 4.

Lecturas optativas

- (1) *Jack A. Goldstone, Robert H. Bates, David L. Epstein, Ted Robert Gurr, Michael B. Lustik, Monty G. Marshall, Jay Ulfelder, and Mark Woodward. A Global Model for Forecasting Political Instability. *American Journal of Political Science*, 54(1):190–208, 2010.
- (2) *Fabiana Machado, Carlos Scartascini, and Mariano Tommasi. Political Institutions and Street Protests in Latin America. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 55(3):340–365, 2011.
- (3) *Milan W. Svolik. Contracting on Violence: The Moral Hazard in Authoritarian Repression and Military Intervention in Politics. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 57(5):765–794, 2013.

Sesión 12 (Octubre/3). El Problema de la Acción Colectiva (I): Juegos de Cooperación

- (1) Mancur Olson. *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*. Schocken Books, New York, 1965, pp. 5-22 y 33-43.
- (2) Mark I. Lichbach. What Makes Rational Peasants Revolutionary?: Dilemma, Paradox, and Irony in Peasant Collective Action. *World Politics*, 46(3):383–418, 1994.

Lecturas optativas

- (1) Samuel L. Popkin. *The Rational Peasant: The Political Economy of Rural Society in Vietnam*. University of California Press, Berkeley, 1979, caps. 1-2.
- (2) Doug McAdam, Sidney G. Tarrow, and Charles Tilly. Comparative Perspectives on Contentious Politics. In Mark I. Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman, editors, *Comparative Politics. Rationality, Culture, and Structure*, pages 260–290. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2nd edition, 2009.

Sesión 13 (Octubre/5). El Problema de la Acción Colectiva (II): Juegos de Coordinación

- (1) Timur Kuran. Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989. *World Politics*, 44(1):7–48, 1991.
- (2) Joshua A. Tucker. Enough! Electoral Fraud, Collective Action Problems, and Post-Communist Colored Revolutions. *Perspectives on Politics*, 5(3):535–551, 2007.

Lecturas optativas

- (1) Philipp Kuntz and Mark R. Thompson. More than Just the Final Straw: Stolen Elections as Revolutionary Triggers. *Comparative Politics*, 41(3):253–272, 2009.
- (2) Benedict Anderson. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. Verso, London, 2nd edition, 1983 [1991]. (Hay traducción al español: Benedict Anderson. *Comunidades Imaginadas. Reflexiones sobre el Origen y la Difusión del Nacionalismo*. Fondo de Cultura Económica, México, 1983 [2007].)
- (3) Michael Suk-Young Chwe. *Rational Ritual. Culture, Coordination, and Common Knowledge*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2001.
- (4) *Gary King, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret E. Roberts. How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression. *American Political Science Review*, 107(2):326–343, 2013.
- (5) Rory Truex. Focal Points, Dissident Calendars, and Preemptive Repression. SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 2802859, Social Science Research Network, Rochester, NY, 2016.

III. Identidades, Clivajes, Conflicto y Cultura Política

Sesión 14 (Octubre/10). Clivajes Sociales

- (1) Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan. Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments. In Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, editors, *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives*, pages 1–64. The Free Press, New York, 1967 (sólo pp. 1-26).
- (2) Pierre Ostiguy and Kenneth Roberts. Putting Trump in Comparative Perspective: Populism and the Politicization of the Sociocultural Low. *Brown Journal of World Affairs*, XXIII(1), 2017.

Lecturas optativas

- (1) *Kenneth Scheve and David Stasavage. Religion and Preferences for Social Insurance. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, 1(3):255–286, 2006.
- (2) *Ana L. De La O and Jonathan A. Rodden. Does Religion Distract the Poor? *Comparative Political Studies*, 41(4-5):437–476, 2008.
- (3) Pierre Ostiguy. The High and the Low in Politics: A Two-Dimensional Political Space for Comparative Analysis and Electoral Studies. Kellogg Institute Working Paper #360, 2009.
- (4) *Moses Shayo. A Model of Social Identity with an Application to Political Economy: Nation, Class, and Redistribution. *American Political Science Review*, 103(2):147–174, 2009.

Sesión 15 (Octubre/12). El Origen de los Clivajes

- (1) Ronald Rogowski. Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to Trade. *American Political Science Review*, 81(4):1121–1137, 1987.
- (2) Daniel N. Posner. The Political Salience of Cultural Difference: Why Chewas and Tumbukas Are Allies in Zambia and Adversaries in Malawi. *American Political Science Review*, 98(4):529–545, 2004.
- (3) *Gary Miller and Norman Schofield. The Transformation of the Republican and Democratic Party Coalitions in the U.S. *Perspectives on Politics*, 6(3):433–450, 2008.

Lecturas optativas

- (1) Ashutosh Varshney. Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict. In Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes, editors, *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*, pages 274–294. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007.
- (2) Paul Midford. International Trade and Domestic Politics: Improving on Rogowski's Model of Political Alignments. *International Organization*, 47(4):535–564, 1993.
- (3) *Pradeep Chhibber and Mariano Torcal. Elite Strategy, Social Cleavages, and Party Systems in New Democracies: Spain. *Comparative Political Studies*, 30(1):27–54, 1997.
- (4) Stathis N. Kalyvas. From Pulpit to Party: Party Formation and the Christian Democratic Phenomenon. *Comparative Politics*, 30(3):293–312, 1998.
- (5) Darin Self and Allen Hicken. Why Populism? How Parties Shape the Electoral Fortune of Populists. Unpublished manuscript, 2016.

- (6) *Thad Dunning and Lauren Harrison. Cross-Cutting Cleavages and Ethnic Voting: An Experimental Study of Cousinage in Mali. *American Political Science Review*, 104(1):21–39, 2010.
- (7) *Lisa Blaydes and Drew A. Linzer. Elite Competition, Religiosity, and Anti-Americanism in the Islamic World. *American Political Science Review*, 106(2):225–243, 2012.
- (8) Jack Snyder and Karen Ballentine. Nationalism and the Marketplace of Ideas. *International Security*, 21(2):5–40, 1996.

Sesión 16 (Octubre/17). Cultura Política y Capital Social (I): La Visión Optimista

- (1) Robert D. Putnam. *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton University Press, 1993, caps. 1 y 4.
- (2) *Raymond Fisman and Edward Miguel. Cultures of Corruption: Evidence from Diplomatic Parking Tickets. Working Paper 12312, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2006.

Lecturas optativas

- (1) David J. Elkins and Richard E. B. Simeon. A Cause in Search of Its Effect, or What Does Political Culture Explain? *Comparative Politics*, 11(2):127–145, 1979.
- (2) Avner Greif. Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies. *The Journal of Political Economy*, 102(5):912–950, 1994.
- (3) Alberto Alesina and Paola Giuliano. Culture and Institutions. *Journal of Economic Literature*, forthcoming.
- (4) *Guido Tabellini. Culture and Institutions: Economic Development in the Regions of Europe. *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 8(4):677–716, 2010.
- (5) *Jörg L. Spenkuch and Philipp Tillmann. Elite Influence? Religion and the Electoral Success of the Nazis. *American Journal of Political Science*, page forthcoming, forthcoming.

Sesión 17 (Octubre/19). Cultura Política y Capital Social (II): El Lado Oscuro

Último día para elegir el par de libro+película para reseñar

- (1) Sheri Berman. Civil Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic. *World Politics*, 49(3):401–429, 1997.
- (2) *Shanker Satyanath, Nico Voigtlaender, and Hans-Joachim Voth. Bowling for Fascism: Social Capital and the Rise of the Nazi Party in Weimar Germany, 1919–33. Working Paper 19201, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2013.

Lecturas optativas

- (1) William Sheridan Allen. *The Nazi Seizure of Power. The Experience of a Single German Town, 1922–1945 (Revised Edition)*. Franklin Watts, New York, 1965.
- (2) *Nathan Nunn and Leonard Wantchekon. The Slave Trade and the Origins of Mistrust in Africa. *American Economic Review*, 101(7):3221–3252, 2011.
- (3) *Matthew D. Atkinson and Anthony Fowler. Social Capital and Voter Turnout: Evidence from Saint’s Day Fiestas in Mexico. *British Journal of Political Science*, 44(1):41–59, 2014.

Octubre/24. Examen parcial

Examen parcial (en clase).

IV. Instituciones y Regímenes Políticos

Sesión 18 (Octubre/26). El Neo-Institucionalismo

- (1) Douglass C. North. *Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990, caps. 1-2, 4 y 7.
- (2) Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C. R. Taylor. Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms. *Political Studies*, 44(4):936–957, 1996.
- (3) Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson. Paths of Economic and Political Development. In Barry R. Weingast and Donald A. Wittman, editors, *The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy*, pages 673–692. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006.

Lecturas optativas

- (1) Kathleen Thelen. Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 2(1):369–404, 1999.
- (2) *Daron Acemoglu. Why Not a Political Coase Theorem? Social Conflict, Commitment, and Politics. *Journal of Comparative Economics*, 31(4):620–652, 2003.
- (3) *Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson. Political Losers as a Barrier to Economic Development. *American Economic Review*, 90(2):126–130, 2000.
- (4) Douglass C. North, John Joseph Wallis, and Barry R. Weingast. *Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009.
- (5) Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson. *Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty*. Random House, New York, 2012.

Sesión 19 (Octubre/31). Clasificando Regímenes Políticos

- (1) Joseph Alois Schumpeter. *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*. Sublime Books, 2015 [1942], caps. XXI-XXII.
- (2) Adam Przeworski. Minimalist Conception of Democracy: A Defense. In Ian Shapiro and Casiano Hacker-Cordón, editors, *Democracy's Value*. Cambridge University Press, New York, 1999.

Lecturas optativas

- (1) Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl. What Democracy Is... and Is Not. *Journal of Democracy*, 2(3):75–88, 1991.
- (2) Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi. *Democracy and Development. Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000, cap.1.

- (3) Milan W. Svoblik. *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012, cap. 2.
- (4) Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, Frida Andersson, Kyle L. Marquardt, Valeriya Mechkova, Farhad Miri, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Natalia Stepanova, Eitan Tzelgov, and Yi-ting Wang. V-Dem Methodology v5. Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project, 2015.
- (5) Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz. Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A New Data Set. *Perspectives on Politics*, 12(2):313–331, 2014.
- (6) *Michael K. Miller. Democratic Pieces: Autocratic Elections and Democratic Development since 1815. *British Journal of Political Science*, 45(3):501–530, 2015.

Noviembre/2. Asueto

No hay clase.

Sesión 20 (Noviembre/7). Gobiernos Buenos y Gobiernos Malos

- (1) Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow. *The Logic of Political Survival*. The MIT Press, Cambridge, 2003, caps. 1-2.
- (2) Kaahon Gjerlow and Carl Henrik Knutsen. Autocrats and Skyscrapers: Modern White Elephants in Dictatorships. Working Paper #44. V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg, 2017.

Lecturas optativas

- (1) Bruce Bueno de Mesquita. Leopold II and the Selectorate: An Account in Contrast to a Racial Explanation. *Historical Social Research*, 32(4):203–221, 2007.
- (2) *Milan W. Svoblik. Power Sharing and Leadership Dynamics in Authoritarian Regimes. *American Journal of Political Science*, 53(2):477–494, 2009.
- (3) *Shaun Larcom, Mare Sarr, and Tim Willems. Dictators Walking the Mogadishu Line: How Men Become Monsters and Monsters Become Men. *The World Bank Economic Review*, forthcoming.
- (4) Andrew W. Bausch. Coalition Formation and Selectorate Theory: An Experiment. *Political Science Research and Methods*, 5(2):261–275, 2017.

Sesión 21 (Noviembre/9). El Dictador en su Laberinto

- (1) Stephen Haber. Authoritarian Government. In Barry R. Weingast and Donald A. Wittman, editors, *The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy*, pages 693–707. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006.
- (2) Milan W. Svoblik. *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012, cap. 1.

Lecturas optativas

- (1) James T. Quinlivan. Coup-proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East. *International Security*, 24(2):131–165, 1999.
- (2) Ronald Wintrobe. *The Political Economy of Dictatorship*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998, cap. 13.
- (3) *Roger B. Myerson. The Autocrat’s Credibility Problem and Foundations of the Constitutional State. *American Political Science Review*, 102(1):125–139, 2008.
- (4) *Milan W. Svobik. Power Sharing and Leadership Dynamics in Authoritarian Regimes. *American Journal of Political Science*, 53(2):477–494, 2009.
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