Three Is a Crowd
Information and Electoral Coordination in Argentina*

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Successful coordination around a Duvergerian equilibrium requires accurate and consistent information about parties' expected electoral support. In practice, such information is rarely available at the local level, where polls are prohibitively expensive, making voters' coordination difficult. In this paper we leverage Argentina's Open, Mandatory, and Simultaneous Primary Elections as a large-scale survey of voter preferences. Using data from 135 municipalities in the province of Buenos Aires during 2011-2023, we show that a narrower margin between the top-two placed parties in the primary increases turnout and the proportion of positive votes, but decreases electoral fragmentation in the general election. Additionally, while the first-placed party in the primary does not benefit from a "bandwagon" effect, the second-placed one is substantially more likely to win the election than the third-placed one. In line with theoretical predictions, these phenomena are more pronounced (a) in concurrent elections; (b) in smaller municipalities; and (c) when the second-placed party is closer to the first-placed one.

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> ... electors soon realize that their votes are wasted if they continue to give them to the third party: whence their natural tendency to transfer their vote to the less evil of its two adversaries in order to prevent the success of the greater evil.
> — Duverger (1951), quoted by Fey (1997:135-6)

How does information about parties' electoral strength affect voter mobilization and electoral outcomes? Parties, brokers and voters would like to exert more effort in those races in which a few additional votes can make a difference between success and defeat. But if they do not *know* which these races are, they risk spending scarce resources on elections that they are going to lose (or win) anyway (Shachar and Nalebuff 1999). Even if enough people turn out to vote, those who dislike a given option must (implicitly) agree on which alternative to support against it. Otherwise, they may end in a non-Duvergerian equilibrium, splitting their votes between two losing parties that they all prefer to the election winner (Cox 1997; Fey 1997).

In practice, voters, party strategists and donors are hampered by the fact that such information is hard to come by. Surveys can be unreliable (Kenett, Pfeffermann and Steinberg 2018) and their cost means they only make sense in high-level elections (Fredén, Rheault and Indridason 2022). Candidates, brokers and activists may "get a sense" of how well they are doing from what they hear "in the street," but such perceptions are vulnerable to confirmation biases, preference falsification, and information bubbles. Researchers cannot measure these perceptions anyway.

In an ideal world, we would have a systematic, accurate, and authoritative source of voters' electoral preferences measured *before* the election takes place. In this paper we exploit the Open, Mandatory and Simultaneous Primary Elections (henceforth EPAOS, after its Spanish initials) to study how pre-electoral information affects municipal elections in the province of Buenos Aires, Argentina, between 2011 and 2023. These primaries take place 9-11 weeks before the general election and use the same voting roll. Participation is mandatory for both parties and voters, who can only choose

a single list within a single party (including the only official list if a party features no internal competition). All parties that obtain a combined vote total equal or greater than 1.5% of positive votes qualify to participate in the general election. Since barely a quarter of parties field two or more lists, in practice the EPAOS function less as a primary than as a major survey of electoral preferences at the municipal level. We can thus examine, for the first time, whether the availability of systematic and easy-to-interpret information on parties' relative electoral strength matters for political participation and the distribution of electoral support between parties.[1]

We document three main results. First, electoral participation increases more between the primary and the general election when the distance between the leading and trailing parties is small. This increase diminishes as the election becomes less competitive, with an elasticity of approximately -0.02. The proportion of blank and null votes also decreases by around 0.065 for every 1 percentage point reduction in the vote margin between the top two placed parties. Second, the closer the primary result, the more likely voters are to abandon third- and lower-placed parties in favor of the two largest political forces. Third, and consistent with Cox (1997) and Fey (1997), this disproportionately benefits the party that finished second in the primary –which becomes the focal alternative against the leading party. Using a regression discontinuity design, we show that even when the distance between the second- and the third-placed party is small, that finishing second (rather than third) in the primary increases the probability of winning the election by 9 percentage points. In contrast, finishing first rather than second provides no comparable advantage.

These effects are much stronger in concurrent elections –in which the mayor and half of the local council are elected using a fused vote– than in midterm ones –in which only half of the local council is up for election. This is consistent with the expectation that incentives to coordinate and mobilize are stronger under plurality rule and in higher-stakes elections (Cox 1997, ch. 4; Shachar and Nalebuff 1999; Feierherd and Lucardi 2023). Mayors are not only more powerful than councillors; they

[1] Bursztyn et al. (2024) also use real-world polls, but they only have one or two national polls per election and their focus is on referenda, where there are just two choices.

are also elected by plurality rule rather than PR, which greatly increases the importance of finishing in the first place. The results are also stronger in small municipalities, where fewer vote changes are needed to alter the outcome. And consistent with a coordination story, the advantage of finishing second rather than third is larger when the second-placed party is closer to the first-placed one –i.e., when the second-placed party has an actual chance of winning the election.

Unlike Bursztyn et al. (2024), we cannot adjudicate between the relative role of elites *vis-à-vis* voters on mobilization and coordination. However, what evidence there is suggests that voters' role may be relatively more important. Finding stronger results in smaller districts is consistent with voters believing that they are more likely to make a difference in smaller electorates –individuals only have one vote, but elites in larger districts may mobilize a comparable *share* of voters as their peers in smaller places. Furthermore, actions by elites are more likely to affect turnout, which is directly observable, than actual voter behavior, which is secret (Nichter 2008). Yet, the effect of closeness is two to three times larger for positive votes than for turnout. Finally, the fact that few parties drop out between the primary and the general election (contrary what happens in France; see Granzier, Pons and Tricaud 2023)[2] further leans the scale in favor of our results being driven by voters.

Our paper is connected to a large literature on the role of information and electoral rules on voter coordination. In contrast to previous studies that show a first-place effect in the lab (Chun and Larrick 2022), in two-round elections in France (Granzier, Pons and Tricaud 2023) or in municipal elections in Brazil (Lucardi, Micozzi and Vallejo 2023), but in line with previous results from India (Chatterjee and Kamal 2021), Swiss referenda (Bursztyn et al. 2024) or two-round presidential elections around the world (Lucardi, Micozzi and Vallejo 2023), we find no evidence that finishing first in the primary confers an electoral advantage in the general election. However, our finding that finishing in the *second* rather than the third place confers an advantage in the general election

[2]Though there are some prominent examples of elite-driven dropouts. Notably, in Vicente López in 2011 the sitting president tried to forestall a victory by her national rival's cousin: "Cristina bajó al candidato de Scioli en Vicente López," *La Política Online*, 05-SEP-2011.

is consistent with Anagol and Fujiwara's (2016) model, in which anti-incumbent voters face a coordination problem that can be solved by looking at candidate rankings from previous elections. Our results are also consistent with studies showing how information can affect individual voter behavior, both in the lab (Forsythe et al. 1993; Agranov et al. 2018; Fredén, Rheault and Indridason 2022) and in real-world presidential elections in Mexico (Castro Cornejo 2022) or Argentina (Weitz-Shapiro and Winters 2019).

We also contribute to the "closeness and turnout" literature. Intuitively, turnout should be higher when an election is expected to be close, as the chance that an additional vote may make a difference for the outcome is larger (Shachar and Nalebuff 1999). But the *expected* closeness of the election is hard to measure *ex-ante*. Previous authors have taken advantage of prominent national-level polls coupled with mail-in ballots measured at the daily level (Bursztyn et al. 2024), as well as two-round elections in Bavaria (Arnold 2018), France (Fauvelle-Aymar and François 2006; Indridason 2008), Hesse (Garmann 2014), Hungary (Simonovits 2012), Italy (De Paola and Scoppa 2014) and Norway (Fiva and Smith 2017) to show that the closer the margin between the leading and trailing candidate in the first round, the higher the turnout in the runoff. Yet these analyses can only be done when a second round takes place, which restricts the sample to relatively competitive elections and reduces the number of alternatives to two. In contrast, we examine the relationship between closeness and electoral participation for the full set of municipalities in the sample, and in multiparty elections.

Background: Elections in the province of Buenos Aires

With nearly 40% of Argentina's population, the Province of Buenos Aires (PBA) is by far the largest unit in Argentina's federation and plays a pivotal role in national politics. Its 135 municipalities vary significantly in size and influence, with a median and mean number of registered voters of 25.2K and 82.6K in 2011. As in the rest of the country, electoral competition is structured around two parties: the *Partido Justicialista* (PJ) and the *Unión Cívica Radical* (UCR). Since 2015, the UCR has become

part of the *Juntos por el Cambio* ("Together for Change") coalition alongside *Propuesta Republicana*, which has governed the City of Buenos Aires since 2007 and the national presidency in 2015-19. This alliance has increased the UCR's competitiveness in urban areas, though the PJ remains dominant in the *Conurbano*, an industrial belt encircling the City of Buenos Aires (a separate district) that is home to roughly 75% of the provincial population. In contrast, in the so-called Interior –which comprises a rural hinterland and some medium-sized cities– elections are a hard-fought affair between the PJ and the UCR.

Municipalities are governed by a mayor and between 6 and 24 councillors who serve 4-year periods and will first face term limits in 2025, outside the scope of this study. Local councils are renewed by halves every two years: in *concurrent* years (2011, 2015, 2019 and 2023), both the mayor and half of the council are elected simultaneously; two years later, the other half of the council is elected in a *midterm* election (2013, 2017 and 2021). Mayors are elected by plurality rule, whereas council seats are allocated using the largest remainders method with a Hare quota. The combination of small districts (see Figure A1) with a high threshold (one Hare quota) means that the two or three largest parties capture most of the seats. The use of a fused ballot –i.e., it is not possible to vote for a mayor and councillors from different parties– further advantages large parties in concurrent years.

Voting is mandatory; sanctions are rarely enforced, but turnout is generally upwards of 75% (see Figure 2). Since 2005, municipal elections have always taken place in the same day as national and provincial races. Thus, while mayors are well-known and important political players, municipal elections are often shadowed by national (and in particular presidential and gubernatorial) contests. This logic is strengthened by an electoral technology that discourages split-ticket voting (Barnes, Tchintian and Alles 2017): parties print their own ballots, and often distribute very long sheets of paper listing the party's candidates for all offices. While voters may physically cut these in order to



Figure 1: Proportion of parties participating in the primary that contested the general election. "Qualified" means that a party obtained at least 1.5% of positive votes in the primary.

vote for different parties for different offices, many simply vote for all the candidates aligned with the presidential candidate of their choice.[3]

These rules were in place, with occasional discrepancies, between 1983 and 2011. That year, the introduction of the Open, Mandatory and Simultaneous Primaries (EPAOS) significantly altered electoral dynamics at the national, provincial and municipal levels (Vallejo 2024). These are organized by provincial authorities between 9 and 11 weeks before the general election. Only parties whose combined vote share surpassed 1.5% of positive votes (i.e., excluding blank and null ballots) are entitled to contest the general election. Voting is mandatory, with voters restricted to selecting a single party and a single list, including the sole official list if the voter's preferred party features no internal competition.[4] Only the most popular (or the only) list of each party may advance to the general election. Intra-party competition is thus allowed but not mandated: while parties *may* present multiple lists of candidates, in our sample just 23.3% featured a competitive primary, and in those cases the most voted faction usually won by an intra-party margin of 25 percentage points or more. Municipal primaries have always taken place simultaneously with provincial and national ones, which follow similar rules.

[3]Of course, local politicians try to counteract these forces but the effectiveness of these strategies, while electorally significant, is limited (see Feierherd and Lucardi 2023, 9-11).

[4]In some municipalities the number of registered voters varied by between -0.72% and 1.04% between the primary and the general election. Since 2017, the number of registered voters has been identical in both instances.

Roughly a third of parties fail to pass the 1.5% barrier, but these are overwhelmingly small forces whose combined vote share falls below 2.5% of positive votes (see Figure 1). Voluntarily dropping out is rare: just 1.8% of the 4,421 parties that surpassed the threshold withdrew from the race.[5] The EPAOS are thus quite different from runoff systems, in which the election is usually decided in the first round and if not, the second round is often restricted to the top-2 (sometimes the top-3 or top-4) vote getters in the first round. Rather, the EPAOS function more as a comprehensive and easily available pre-election poll than as a mechanism for filtering out parties: the combination of mandatory participation with a structured format serves to forecast the front-runner, the (most) viable challenger, and the distribution of electoral support among parties more generally. Indeed, parties generally retain their primary-election ranking in the general election; when they don't, they generally move just one position up or down (see Figure A3). But this also means that primary results are not fate, and both party elites and voters have room for learning and adjusting their behavior and strategies.

Information, electoral participation and strategic coordination

Seventy years ago, Duverger (1951) noted that voters' awareness of the "mechanical" effect of electoral rules may induce them to abandon parties with little chance of being elected, giving rise to the "psychological" effect of electoral rules. This process is rooted in the desire to avoid wasting votes. Deriving Duverger's propositions from a coordination game, Cox (1997, ch. 4) showed that in single-member districts, a Duvergerian equilibrium in which only the top two parties receive a meaningful number of votes requires four assumptions: (a) that voters whose first preference is for a small party are not indifferent between the top-two placed ones; (b) that parties and voters seek to maximize their seat share in the current election (rather than sometime in the future); (c) that there

[5] A handful of parties participated in the general election despite not surpassing the threshold. In a couple of instances this seems due to a rounding error, but in other cases it is unclear what happened.

is no obvious winner; and (d) that "*the identity of the leading and trailing candidates are common knowledge*" (pp. 76-7).

The first two assumptions are not information-related and are reasonable for a nontrivial proportion of the electorate of the province of Buenos Aires. But assumptions (c) and (d) are highly information-sensitive, especially in small districts or (relatively) low-stakes elections where polling is unfeasible or prohibitively expensive (Fredén, Rheault and Indridason 2022). It is there that the results from a primary election such as the EPAOS in Argentina can make a difference.

Pre-election information may affect electoral outcomes in two ways. First, the perceived *closeness* between the top-placed parties may affect both the incentives to turn out to vote, and to do so strategically. Intuitively, the closer the race, the more likely that the effort of turning out to vote will affect the outcome (Shachar and Nalebuff 1999), and that voting for a second-best alternative will prevent the victory of the most disliked candidate (Cox 1997). The implication is that electoral *participation* should go up, and electoral *fragmentation* should go down, as the competitiveness of the election increases. This suggests the following hypotheses:

- **H_1. Closeness and participation.** A smaller margin between the first and the second-placed party in the primary will increase (a) turnout; and (b) the proportion of positive votes in the general election.
- **H_2. Closeness and electoral concentration.** A smaller margin between the first and the second-placed party in the primary will (a) increase the combined vote share of the top-two placed parties, and (b) decrease the effective number of parties in the general election.

Primary results also provide information about parties' *ranks*: which one is placed first, second, and so on. Ranks matter for three conceptually distinct, but empirically intertwined, reasons. Both experimental (Hix, Hortala-Vallve and Riambau-Armet 2017; Agranov et al. 2018; Chun and Larrick 2022) and observational (Morton et al. 2015; Anagol and Fujiwara 2016; Granzier, Pons and Tricaud 2023; Lucardi, Micozzi and Vallejo 2023) studies document a preference for higher-ranked options,

and often for the *highest-ranked* (i.e., first-placed) one. This could reflect a heuristic through which people perceive higher-ranked alternatives as of inherently "better" quality, even when there is little substantive difference between the nth- and $n+1$th-ranked option (Anagol and Fujiwara 2016).

Another possibility is the so-called "bandwagon effect:" that people simply prefer (to align with) the top-placed alternative, not because they perceive it as better, but due to the benefit of siding with the winning option –be it in term to access to jobs, promotions, and so on, or simply because of the psychological satisfaction of backing the winner. This predicts a positive effect of being placed *first* instead of *second*, but not necessarily for being second instead of third, third instead of fourth, and so on. Observational studies exploiting either variation in vote timing between districts –e.g., if voting is spread over multiple days (Morton et al. 2015)– as well as regression discontinuity estimates from runoff elections (Granzier, Pons and Tricaud 2023; Lucardi, Micozzi and Vallejo 2023), have documented a tendency to favor the top-placed alternative, but such tendency is far from universal (Chatterjee and Kamal 2021; Bursztyn et al. 2024) and weakens or disappears in polarized elections (Granzier, Pons and Tricaud 2023; Lucardi, Micozzi and Vallejo 2023).

Thirdly, rank information may also facilitate voter coordination (Anagol and Fujiwara 2016). When ranks are not determined exogenously but result from voters' own choices, voters may opt to withdraw support from lower-ranked options in favor of better-placed ones, which they perceive as having a higher probability of winning. In particular, voters who prefer the third- or lower-placed option but intensely dislike the top-ranked one may strategically vote for the second-placed alternative (Cox 1997; Fey 1997). This is not because voters believe the second-place party is inherently superior, but rather because it becomes the *focal* alternative: the option that everyone perceives (and perceives that everyone else perceives) as the most viable challenger to the leading party (Anagol and Fujiwara 2016). This strategy will be specially effective if the second-placed party is close enough to the first-placed one for the prospect of changing the outcome to be realistic. Therefore:

- **H_3. Focalness.** The second-placed party in the primary will (a) enjoy an electoral boost in the general election *vis-à-vis* the third-placed one; and (b) this boost will increase as the second-placed party gets closer to the first-placed one.

Finally, there are reasons to expect heterogeneous effects. The predictions from Duverger's (1951) propositions are starkest for plurality elections, in which the incentives to abandon the third-placed party are especially strong. Therefore, we expect larger effects in concurrent elections (simple plurality) rather than midterms (proportional representation). Mayors also have more responsibilities and are more visible political figures than councillors, and the fused vote used in concurrent elections means that councillors often owe their seats to their mayoral candidate. Thus, even if voters are not aware of the incentives provided by the electoral rules, they certainly see the mayoral election as the highest-stakes one, and the implication is the same.

To the extent that the effects we posit are driven by individual voters rather than by party elites, we also expect heterogeneous effects by district size. Intuitively, a single voter is more likely to be pivotal in a small district (Shachar and Nalebuff 1999), and thus voters in those districts should be more sensitive to electoral closeness and parties' rankings. If the increase in voter mobilization is elite-driven, on the other hand, we do not necessarily expect heterogeneous effects by district size, as in larger districts elites may control enough resources to control a large *share* of the vote. Therefore:

- **H_4. Heterogeneous effects.** The relationships predicted in $H_1 - H_3$ should be stronger (a) in concurrent years; as well as (b) in smaller municipalities.

Closeness, coordination and concentration

Graphical analysis. Figure 2 shows the evolution over time of both the two margins of interest (first vs. second and second vs. third) as well as the outcome variables: turnout, the proportion of positive votes, the combined vote share of the two largest parties and the Golosov (2010) index –a



Figure 2: Evolution of the man variables over time: margins between the main parties on top; outcomes in the middle and below. The wider vertical lines indicate concurrent elections.

measure of electoral fragmentation.[6] On average, the leading party surpasses the trailing one by 17 percentage points, though there is substantial variation between municipalities. The difference is somewhat larger in the primary than in the general election. In contrast, the difference between the second- and the third-placed party increases in the general election, especially when the electoral

[6]Table A1 and Figure A2 in the Appendix show the descriptive statistics and the corresponding density plots.



Figure 3: Primary closeness and change in outcome values between the primary and the general.

map was more fragmented and there was more uncertainty about the identity of the second-placed party (2001-2017). Fewer people vote in the primary than in the general election. Roughly 90% of voters cast a positive ballot, but again the proportion is noticeably lower in the primary. Both the combined vote share of the two largest parties and the Golosov index indicate that electoral fragmentation is larger in the primary –again, especially between 2011 and 2017. This suggests that voters use primary results to identify, and vote for, the front-runners.

Figure 3 examines how the margin between the leading and trailing parties in the primary affects the *change* in outcome variables between the primary and the general. A closely fought primary

increases both turnout and the share of positive votes, but while the increase in turnout is only responsive to closeness in concurrent elections, the increase in positive votes is independent of the electoral calendar. Competitive primaries also increase support for larger parties. In concurrent years, the combined vote share of the two largest parties increases by 4.2 percentage points if they received the same number of votes, but this decreases by 0.13 pp. for every percentage point difference between them (see Figure 3c). In concurrent years, the effect is smaller –3.4 and minus 0.093 pp, respectively–, but still substantial. In very close elections there are between 0.33 and 0.38 fewer effective parties, according to the Golosov index, but this number increases by 0.012-0.013 for every percentage-point difference between the frontrunner and the runner-up.

Regression analysis. By measuring the outcome as a *change* between the primary and the general election, the plots in Figure 3 account for the fact that outcome values in a given municipality-year may be abnormally high (or low) for reasons that have already manifested in the primary. An alternative way to account for this is to include municipality and year fixed effects, and thus we estimate models of the form

$$y^{\mathrm{G}}_{m,t} \quad = \quad \beta \cdot \mathrm{margin}^{\mathrm{P}}_{m,t} + \mu_m + \delta_t + \varepsilon_{m,t}, \tag{1}$$

where $y^{\mathrm{G}}_{m,t}$ is the outcome (in levels) measured in the general election in municipality m in election year t, $margin^{\mathrm{P}}_{m,t}$ is the percentage point difference between the leading and the trailing parties in the primary, and μ_m and δ_t are municipality and election year fixed effects. All data comes from the province's electoral authority.[7] Since the set of parties participating in the primary and the general election may differ, when computing vote percentages and victory margins in primary we only include the vote totals of the parties that classified to the general election (i.e., that surpassed the 1.5% threshold) in the denominator. In some specifications we control for the outcome value in the primary, $y^{\mathrm{P}}_{m,t}$. We cluster standard errors by municipality.

[7] *Junta Electoral de la Provincia de Buenos Aires*.

Table 1: Between-party closeness in the primary and general election outcomes

	% *turnout*^{G}		% *positive*^{G}		% *first two*^{G}		*Golosov*^{G}	
(a) Full sample	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
margin^{P}	-0.021	-0.022	-0.065	-0.048	-0.068	-0.122	-0.012	0.007
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.026)	(0.013)	(0.001)	(0.001)
(b) Concurrent vs. Midterm								
margin^{P} (concurrent)	-0.025	-0.025	-0.072	-0.053	-0.103	-0.152	-0.008	0.009
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.029)	(0.014)	(0.001)	(0.001)
margin^{P} (midterm)	-0.011	-0.013	-0.044	-0.032	0.024	-0.043	-0.021	0.002
	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.017)	(0.011)	(0.040)	(0.022)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Municipality FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Outcome in primary	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	945	945	945	945	945	945	945	945

OLS regression estimates. The explanatory variable *margin*^{P} is the difference between the % of votes of the leading and trailing parties in the primary election, including only parties that classified to the general election in the denominator. Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses.

Table 1a shows the results for the full sample. For every percentage point increase in the margin between the leading and trailing parties in the primary, turnout in the general election goes down by 0.021 percentage points –0.022 if controlling for the lagged outcome–, both statistically significant estimates. These effects may seem comparatively small (cf. Fauvelle-Aymar and François 2006; Indridason 2008; Simonovits 2012; De Paola and Scoppa 2014; Garmann 2014; Arnold 2018), but this is likely due to the baseline turnout already being high.[8] The effect on positive votes in columns (3) and (4) is also negative and significant, but between two and three times larger in size.

Where do these additional votes go? Columns (5) and (6) show that for every percentage point increase in the margin between the leading and trailing parties, the combined vote percentage of the two largest parties goes down by between 0.07 and 0.12 percentage points, depending on whether the outcome in the primary is included as a control. Surprisingly, column (7) indicates that this results in a *smaller* Golosov index –that is, lower electoral concentration in the general election

[8]The most credible of these estimates is from Bursztyn et al. (2024), who also find a relative small effect: an increase of just 0.4 percentage points in turnout in each of the three days following the release of a close poll.

as the primary becomes less competitive–, but column (8) shows that accounting for the level of concentration in the primary the sign switches and the effect becomes positive as expected.

Table 1b shows that these effects are driven by concurrent elections, where the estimates are larger in magnitude and statistically significant. In contrast, the estimates for midterm elections are weaker and often insignificant at conventional levels. Using council size as a proxy for municipality size, Table A3d further shows that voters in small districts are more responsive to electoral closeness: in municipalities with 6 councillors, the impact of closeness on turnout is two to three times larger than in the overall sample. This effect diminishes almost monotonically with increasing council size and becomes negligible in municipalities with 16 or more councillors. The relationship between council size and positive votes is less predictable, with the largest estimates occurring in municipalities with 6, 12, or 20 councillors. There is no clear pattern between council size and the magnitude of the estimated effect for the other two outcomes.

Robustness. Table A2 shows that for all variables included in Figure 2, the value observed in the primary is a much better predictor than the values from the two previous general elections. Replicating the results from Table 1 either (a) looking at the *change* in the outcome variable between the primary and the general election (Table A4); (b) measuring vote percentages in the primary without excluding parties that did not pass the 1.5% threshold from the denominator (Table A5); or (c) taking the natural logarithm of raw votes (or the Golosov index) instead of calculating vote percentages (Table A6), does not change our findings.

Party ranks and coordination

Identification. Does the top-placed party enjoy a premium by virtue of finishing first? Are voters more likely to coordinate behind the second-placed party rather than the third? Determining if a party enjoys an advantage in the general election *solely by virtue of having finished in a better-ranked*

position in the primary is problematic insofar as better-ranked parties are more popular, nominate more attractive candidates, or control more resources. We thus employ a regression discontinuity (RD) design, comparing parties who finished first instead of second (or second instead of third) by a small margin. Following Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014), we estimate the effect of finishing first (respectively, second) in the primary non-parametrically, fitting a separate regression at each side of the cutoff point of zero and weighting observations close to the cutoff more heavily. For a given outcome variable, we choose the bandwidth that minimizes the estimates' asymptotic mean squared error. Since we include two observations for every election, both the density of the running variable and all election-specific characteristics are perfectly balanced by design. To account for the dependency across observations, we cluster the standard errors by municipality-year.

Graphical analysis. The RD plots in Figure 4 show the relationship between a party's margin of victory in the primary and its probability of winning (or its vote percentage) in the general election. The plots on the left show that the larger the first-placed party's margin, the more likely it is to win the election and the higher its expected vote share, but there is no visible "jump" at the discontinuity: finishing first in the primary does not confer an electoral advantage of its own in the general election. In contrast, the plot on the top right corner shows that there is an advantage of finishing second rather than third: the third-placed party rarely wins the election, but the second-placed one emerges the winner between 10 and 20% of the time, and the difference begins to show up right at the discontinuity. There is no visible effect for vote shares in the bottom right corner, however. Figures A6 and A7 suggest that these results are driven by concurrent elections and small municipalities.

RD results. Table 2a presents the results for the full sample. Surprisingly, finishing first in the primary has a negative and sizable –minus 9 percentage points– effect on the probability of winning the general election, though this effect is not statistically significant, probably because we have just 20% power to detect an effect of this magnitude (see the rightmost column). In any case, the first-place



Figure 4: Mimicking variance RD plots with quantile-spaced bins (Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik 2015) showing the relationship between the margin in the primary and the probability of winning (top) or the expected vote share (bottom) in the general election.

advantage documented in municipal elections in Brazil (Lucardi, Micozzi and Vallejo 2023) or in legislative elections in France and other European countries (Granzier, Pons and Tricaud 2023) does not extend to Buenos Aires. But consistent with Anagol and Fujiwara's (2016) findings for Brazil, Canada and India, finishing second instead of third provides a 9 pp. increase in the probability of winning the general election (p =0.04). The estimate for vote shares go in the expected direction –a 1.1 pp. decrease and increase, respectively–, though the small effect sizes and insufficient power means that neither effect is significant. Finding stronger effects for winning probabilities than for vote shares is common (see Granzier, Pons and Tricaud 2023; Lucardi, Micozzi and Vallejo 2023):

Table 2: RD estimates: Effect of primary ranking on general election outcomes

									power against		
(a) Full sample	outcome	estim.	95% CI	p-val.	bwd.	N^- | N^+		SD_C	SD_C	$\frac{SD_C}{2}$	$\lvert\hat{\tau}_{RD}\rvert$
1 vs 2	$winner^G$ (0/100)	-9.00	[-36.54 : 8.96]	0.23	13.2	443	443	45.06	1.00	0.78	0.20
2 vs 3	$winner^G$ (0/100)	9.02	[0.66 : 19.14]	0.04	15.6	423	423	13.64	0.98	0.53	0.77
1 vs 2	% $vote^G$ (0:100)	-1.11	[-6.19 : 2.73]	0.45	14.1	469	469	8.75	1.00	0.78	0.11
2 vs 3	% $vote^G$ (0:100)	1.09	[-7.20 : 9.12]	0.82	16.1	439	439	7.09	0.67	0.23	0.07
(b) Concurrent elections											
1 vs 2	$winner^G$ (0/100)	-4.73	[-44.98 : 23.99]	0.55	22.6	339	339	45.12	0.95	0.44	0.07
2 vs 3	$winner^G$ (0/100)	11.15	[-0.71 : 29.34]	0.06	12.7	196	196	14.18	0.74	0.26	0.54
1 vs 2	% $vote^G$ (0:100)	-1.47	[-7.91 : 3.41]	0.44	15.1	249	249	8.48	0.99	0.55	0.11
2 vs 3	% $vote^G$ (0:100)	1.88	[-11.56 : 16.53]	0.73	17.1	247	247	7.69	0.33	0.12	0.07
(c) Midterm elections											
1 vs 2	$winner^G$ (0/100)	-3.51	[-24.62 : 10.27]	0.42	10.5	179	179	44.42	1.00	0.94	0.09
2 vs 3	$winner^G$ (0/100)	2.17	[-8.94 : 8.41]	0.95	8.7	114	114	16.08	1.00	0.73	0.11
1 vs 2	% $vote^G$ (0:100)	0.12	[-2.52 : 2.61]	0.97	8.8	152	152	8.30	1.00	0.99	0.05
2 vs 3	% $vote^G$ (0:100)	-0.64	[-3.64 : 1.67]	0.47	12.8	163	163	6.46	1.00	0.92	0.10

Sharp (conventional) RD estimates, with robust CIs and p-values based on the MSE-optimal bandwidth proposed by Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014), using a triangular kernel and clustering the standard errors by election year. The running variable is the primary election margin between the first- and second-placed parties (odd-numbered rows) or the second- and third-placed ones (even-numbered rows). Only parties that classified to the general election are included in the denominator.

since we focus on instances where the higher- and the lower-ranked parties are nearly indistinguishable, even a small increase in vote shares can significantly impact the probability of victory.

The next two panels of Table 2 show that the second-placed advantage is five times as large in concurrent (11.2 pp.) than in midterm years (2.2 pp.), with a p-value of 0.06 despite the much smaller sample size. In contrast, the (insignificant) effect of finishing first instead of second does not vary with the electoral calendar. The second-place advantage is larger in the Interior and in small municipalities (Table A7), with highly significant effect sizes of 14.5 and 20.3 percentage points, respectively. The results for vote shares are larger in magnitude than in Table 2a, but remain insignificant.

The combination of small point estimates with low power is indeed a major concern throughout. As the rightmost columns of Table 2 show, we generally have enough power to detect an effect as large as a standard deviation of the outcome variable in the control group (SD_C), but the absolute value of the effect we estimate, $|\hat{\tau}_{RD}|$, is often much smaller than that. Reassuringly, we only have close to

80% power to estimate the effect of finishing second instead of third on the probability of winning –the only estimates for which we consistently find a significant effect.

The larger effect for concurrent elections is consistent with theoretical expectations founded on the higher visibility and winner-takes-all nature of mayoral elections *vis-à-vis* midterm ones. The stronger results for small municipalities also make sense, but given the substantial overlap between a municipality's location and its size –the Interior is home to 88% of small municipalities but just 41% of large ones; 74% of the Interior's municipalities (but only 20% of the *Conurbano*'s) are small–, we cannot determine if these results are driven by municipality size *per se*, or rather by the political and demographic differences between the *Conurbano* and the Interior. That said, the effect for the small-municipality sample is stronger than for the Interior sample.

Do the incentives of voters, donors, and party activists to abandon their preferred choice vary according to the likelihood that the second-placed alternative can beat the most voted party? Figure 5 shows that the effect of finishing second instead of third changes as we restrict the sample to very competitive elections and begin adding less competitive races. When the distance between the first- and second-placed parties is small –less than 7 percentage points–, the premium of finishing second rather than third is huge, around 50 pp., rather than the 9 pp. reported in Table 2a. Adding less competitive elections reduces this advantage almost monotonically. Similarly, panel (b) shows that the second-placed party receives a 3-5 pp. boost to its vote share when it is close to the first-placed party, though these estimates are not significant.

Robustness. Calculating the running variable using all parties that contested the primary rather than just the ones surpassing the 1.5% threshold does not change the results, though the reduction in power leads to mostly insignificant estimate (Table A8). Using a CER-optimal instead of a MSE-optimal bandwidth (Table A9) or fitting second-order polynomials instead of local linear regressions (Table A10) produces similar estimates, though the latter can display substantial variability. The effect of finishing first rather than second is sensitive to bandwidth choice: it begins negative at small



Figure 5: Sharp RD estimates (points) and 95% robust CIs (vertical lines) showing the effect of finishing second in the primary on the vote share and the probability of winning the general election, conditioning on the distance between the leading and trailing party in the primary. The red horizontal lines display the RD estimates and CIs reported in Table 2a.

bandwidths and then becomes zero or positive, depending on the outcome, though the estimates are never significant. In contrast, the effect of finishing second rather than third remains pretty stable over bandwidths ranging between 5 and 35 percentage points, though the estimates are sometimes insignificant (Figure A8).

Conclusion

Unlike media coverage, opinion polls, personal networks or simply "vibes," which can be biased, consciously motivated, or manipulated, the EPAOs provide information about parties' electoral strength that is both widely accessible and immune to the distortions commonly found in other coordination tools. In this paper we show that voters in Buenos Aires use the EPAOs to make marginal decisions regarding whether to turn out and cast a positive ballot, as well as for whom to vote.

The effects we find are subject to alternative interpretations regarding both *who* is behind these participation efforts –individual voters vs. political elites– and *whether* they reflect a strategic coordina-

tion or a naive preference for higher-ranked options. While we cannot give a definitive answer, our findings are consistent with the claim that they are driven by (a) *individual voters* (b) *coordinating* behind more viable alternatives. The fact that closeness matters more for turnout in smaller districts and that the effect is stronger for positive votes is consistent with voters', rather than elites, making the relevant decisions. So is the fact that many small hopeless parties contest the primary (Figure 1) and voluntary dropouts are rare. And the finding that the frontrunner in the primary is *dis*advantaged (though the effect is not significant) while the runner-up enjoys a boost, fits nicely with a coordination story. Indeed, individual-level data from the 2015 presidential election, in which voters used primary results to determine the identity of the second-placed candidate (Weitz-Shapiro and Winters 2019) shows that Argentine voters are sufficiently sophisticated to make such calculations.

To be sure, voters pay more attention to presidential than to municipal elections, and the voting technology used in Argentina probably explains why our estimates are relatively small in magnitude. But if so, our results represent a lower bound: if municipal elections took place independently of national and provincial ones, our results would probably be stronger. This introduces the more general issue of the scope conditions of our argument and findings: in what contexts should information matter for electoral engagement and coordination? The existing literature has paid particular attention to electoral rules (Cox, Fiva and Smith 2016; Fiva and Hix 2021; Figueroa 2023) or the degree of polarization between alternatives (Murias Muñoz and Meguid 2021; Granzier, Pons and Tricaud 2023; Lucardi, Micozzi and Vallejo 2023). Our finding suggest that (perceptions of) the distribution of votes between parties also play a crucial role, and highlight the importance of measuring these accurately, for example with high-quality polls (as in Bursztyn et al. 2024, though this work is limited to referenda).

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Online Appendix

Table of Contents

1 Descriptive statistics

Council sizes. Figure A1 shows the distribution of council seats in 2011. Since then, some municipalities have overseen (modest) increases in council size, but we kept the 2011 values to ensure a cleaner within-municipality comparison in the analysis.

Descriptive statistics

- Table A1 presents the descriptive statistics for variables measured at the municipal level: the margin between the first- and second-placed parties, as well as between the second- and third-placed; the % of turnout and positive votes; the Golosov index; and the combined vote share of the top-two and top-three placed parties, as well as the first-, second- and third-placed parties, respectively. The table contains three panels, corresponding to (a) the primary election; (b) the general election; and (c) the difference between the general and the primary election. For each panel, we report separate values for concurrent and midterm elections, on the one hand, and *Conurbano* and Interior municipalities, on the other.
- Figures 2 presents the evolution over time of both the vote margin between the first- and second-placed party, as well as of our four outcomes we use in the closeness models: (a) the proportion of registered votes who turned out; (b) the proportion of voters who cast a positive ballot; (c) the combined vote share of the two largest parties; and (d) the Golosov index. Figure A2 presents the corresponding density plots for the same six variables. In both cases, we distinguish between the primary and the general election; in Figure A2 we further display the *difference* between the value in the primary and the general election.
- *Party ranks.* Figure A3 shows how a party's rank in the primary predicts its rank in the general election.

Scatterplots. We replicate Figure 3 but (a) splitting the sample between "small" (14 councillors or less in 2011; see Figure A1) or "large" (16 or more councillors in 2011) municipalities (Figure A4); or (b) keeping the split between concurrent and midterm elections, but using logged vote totals or margins instead of vote shares (Figure A5).



Figure A1: Number of council seats in 2011. Note that half of council seats are elected every two years.

Table A1: Descriptive statistics (I): Municipality-level outcomes, 2011-2023

	concurrent elections					midterm elections					*Conurbano*					Interior				
(a) Primary election	*N*	mean	SD	min	max	*N*	mean	SD	min	max	*N*	mean	SD	min	max	*N*	mean	SD	min	max
margin 1st vs 2nd (%)	540	19.8	14.7	0.1	71.3	405	14.1	10.4	0.0	63.6	308	19.9	14.3	0.0	67.7	637	16.1	12.7	0.1	71.3
margin 2nd vs 3rd (%)	493	18.2	12.4	0.2	46.3	392	16.6	10.9	0.2	43.4	307	15.7	10.6	0.2	41.8	578	18.5	12.3	0.2	46.3
turnout (%)	540	76.1	5.1	59.7	88.0	405	74.0	6.1	54.4	86.0	308	74.6	5.6	58.3	87.0	637	75.5	5.7	54.4	88.0
positive votes (%)	540	89.4	3.8	72.3	97.3	405	89.9	2.7	79.1	95.7	308	88.2	3.2	72.3	95.1	637	90.3	3.2	74.7	97.3
Golosov index	540	2.3	0.6	1.2	6.0	405	2.8	0.8	1.3	6.4	308	2.6	0.7	1.5	6.4	637	2.4	0.7	1.2	6.2
vote 1st + 2nd (%)	540	83.0	11.4	47.1	100.0	405	75.3	12.0	41.2	100.0	308	76.3	10.2	42.6	100.0	637	81.3	12.9	41.2	100.0
vote 1st + 2nd + 3rd (%)	540	94.4	7.2	63.1	101.5	405	88.5	8.8	56.5	100.0	308	88.8	8.4	57.3	101.5	637	93.4	8.1	56.5	101.4
vote 1st (%)	540	51.4	9.5	24.7	84.6	405	44.7	8.7	22.4	78.2	308	48.1	9.5	23.8	73.3	637	48.7	9.8	22.4	84.6
vote 2nd (%)	540	31.6	9.1	5.6	49.9	405	30.6	7.1	12.2	49.7	308	28.2	8.0	5.6	44.9	637	32.6	8.1	10.0	49.9
vote 3rd (%)	493	12.5	6.9	0.0	32.9	392	13.7	6.3	2.3	29.5	307	12.5	6.0	1.5	27.6	578	13.3	7.0	0.0	32.9
(b) General election																				
margin 1st vs 2nd (%)	540	17.9	13.3	0.0	67.2	405	14.6	10.4	0.0	52.6	308	18.9	13.9	0.1	67.2	637	15.3	11.2	0.0	56.0
margin 2nd vs 3rd (%)	478	20.4	13.3	0.0	47.6	391	18.2	10.9	0.1	45.2	306	17.9	11.5	0.1	45.2	563	20.3	12.7	0.0	47.6
turnout (%)	540	81.2	3.5	68.6	90.1	405	77.9	4.9	60.9	89.2	308	78.9	4.3	64.6	87.0	637	80.2	4.5	60.9	90.1
positive votes (%)	540	91.7	3.2	76.9	97.6	405	93.9	2.2	82.2	97.3	308	92.4	3.1	79.1	97.3	637	92.8	3.0	76.9	97.6
Golosov index	540	2.2	0.4	1.4	3.7	405	2.6	0.7	1.3	6.3	308	2.4	0.5	1.5	4.9	637	2.3	0.6	1.3	6.3
vote 1st + 2nd (%)	540	84.7	11.0	55.9	100.0	405	77.4	11.2	39.4	100.0	308	78.0	9.5	48.9	100.0	637	83.2	12.2	39.4	100.0
vote 1st + 2nd + 3rd (%)	540	95.1	6.6	65.8	100.0	405	89.7	8.0	57.3	100.0	308	89.5	7.7	61.5	100.0	637	94.4	7.2	57.3	100.0
vote 1st (%)	540	51.3	8.1	32.9	73.4	405	46.0	8.0	20.0	76.3	308	48.5	8.2	28.9	73.1	637	49.3	8.6	20.0	76.3
vote 2nd (%)	540	33.4	9.2	6.0	50.0	405	31.4	7.3	15.0	49.5	308	29.6	8.6	6.0	47.5	637	33.9	8.0	13.2	50.0
vote 3rd (%)	478	11.8	7.2	0.0	31.3	391	12.8	5.9	2.0	29.2	306	11.6	5.9	1.8	29.6	563	12.6	7.0	0.0	31.3
(c) Δ: General − Primary																				
margin 1st vs 2nd (%)	540	-1.9	11.4	-57.7	32.3	405	0.5	6.8	-30.5	18.1	308	-1.0	8.3	-36.4	18.8	637	-0.8	10.4	-57.7	32.3
margin 2nd vs 3rd (%)	478	2.7	7.3	-19.9	39.8	391	1.7	5.5	-13.9	19.5	306	2.3	5.2	-12.5	23.7	563	2.3	7.2	-19.9	39.8
turnout (%)	540	5.1	3.1	-1.3	18.0	405	3.9	2.1	1.1	13.2	308	4.3	2.7	-0.1	18.0	637	4.7	2.8	-1.3	13.2
positive votes (%)	540	1.3	2.1	-5.4	13.2	405	2.4	1.7	-7.2	12.5	308	1.7	1.7	-7.2	10.5	637	1.8	2.1	-5.4	13.2
Golosov index	540	-0.1	0.4	-2.8	1.1	405	-0.2	0.4	-1.7	1.1	308	-0.2	0.4	-2.8	0.9	637	-0.1	0.4	-1.7	1.1
vote 1st + 2nd (%)	540	1.6	5.1	-15.1	25.8	405	2.1	4.4	-12.1	14.9	308	1.7	4.3	-13.5	25.6	637	1.9	5.0	-15.1	25.8
vote 1st + 2nd + 3rd (%)	540	0.7	2.6	-10.8	21.1	405	1.2	2.7	-5.8	10.7	308	0.7	2.9	-10.8	21.1	637	1.0	2.5	-6.7	13.9
vote 1st (%)	540	-0.1	6.8	-30.2	18.9	405	1.3	4.5	-18.2	14.1	308	0.3	5.2	-19.3	13.8	637	0.6	6.3	-30.2	18.9
vote 2nd (%)	540	1.7	5.6	-16.6	28.9	405	0.8	3.6	-11.4	12.2	308	1.4	4.1	-9.6	17.1	637	1.3	5.2	-16.6	28.9
vote 3rd (%)	478	-1.0	4.2	-23.6	17.2	391	-0.9	3.3	-12.4	10.4	306	-1.0	2.8	-9.2	9.0	563	-0.9	4.2	-23.6	17.2



Figure A2: Distribution of the municipal-level margins and outcome variables in the primary election, the general, and the difference between the two.



Figure A3: Probability that a party will end up in a given rank in the general election (on the x-axis) conditional on its rank in the primary (on the y-axis). Percentages add up to 100 *by row* (with discrepancies due to rounding). Only parties that contested the general election are included.



Figure A4: Relationship between closeness in the primary (measured as the difference in vote share between the leading and trailing party) and the change in outcome values between the primary and the general election. The gray lines indicate the OLS relationship for the whole sample; green and red lines do so for small (14 councillors or less in 2011) or large (16 or more councillors in 2011) municipalities, respectively.



Figure A5: Relationship between the logged closeness in the primary (measured as the log of the ratio between the vote total of the leading and trailing party) and the log of the ratio between the value in the general and the primary election. The gray lines indicate the OLS relationship for the whole sample; green and red lines do so for concurrent and midterm elections, respectively.

2 Additional results and robustness checks (I): Closeness results

Comparing the predictive power of the primary versus previous general elections. Throughout the paper we measure the outcomes of interest in the general election, and the explanatory and running variables in the primary immediately preceding it. But in principle, we could use data from the previous *general* election, as authors sometimes do when only data from general elections is available. How much do we win by using data from primaries? In Table A2, we regress the six variables listed in Figure 2 (margin between 1st and 2nd; margin between 2nd and 3rd; turnout; share of positive votes; combined vote share of the two largest parties; and Golosov index) on (a) the same variable measured in the primary; (b) the same variable measured in the immediately previous general election, two years before; (c) the same variable measured in the general election that took place four years before (thus accounting for concurrent vs. midterm dynamics); or (d) all three lagged values simultaneously. The explanatory power of the lagged value as measured in the primary is consistently statistically significant and clearly superior to the other two, whether jointly or separately, and regardless of whether we include municipality or municipality and year fixed effects.

Robustness checks

- The first two panels of Table A3 replicate the results from Table 1. Panels (c) and (d) report additional results disaggregating by geographical region (*Conurbano* vs Interior) and council size in 2011, respectively.
- Table A4 replicates the models reported in Table A3, but measuring the outcome variable in first differences, i.e. as the value in the general election minus the value in the primary.
- Table A5 replicates the models reported in Table A3, but including all parties that participated in the primary (instead of only those parties that qualified for the general election) in the denominator when measuring (a) the margin of victory (in all models) and (b) the lagged outcome value (in columns (6) and (8)).
- Table A6 replicates the models reported in Table A3 but using the logged version of the raw vote totals of interest (or of the Golosov index) instead of vote shares. The estimates can thus be interpreted as elasticities.

Table A2: Comparing the predictive power of the primary vs. previous general elections

	% *margin 1 vs. 2*$_G$			% *margin 2 vs. 3*$_G$			% *turnout*$_G$			% *positive*$_G$			% *first two*$_G$			*Golosov*$_G$		
(a) Lag, primary	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)
lagged DV$_P$	0.66	0.64	0.61	0.90	0.88	0.85	0.69	0.60	0.46	0.75	0.75	0.68	0.87	0.82	0.79	0.70	0.68	0.61
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.010)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Observations	945	945	945	869	869	869	945	945	945	945	945	945	945	945	945	945	945	945
R^2	0.51	0.61	0.63	0.73	0.78	0.80	0.77	0.84	0.95	0.62	0.67	0.75	0.85	0.87	0.89	0.75	0.79	0.81
(b) Lag from previous general election $(t-2)$																		
lagged DV$_{G-2}$	0.13	-0.12	-0.06	0.13	-0.09	-0.15	0.39	0.009	0.29	0.17	-0.04	-0.03	0.26	-0.05	-0.02	0.14	-0.06	0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Observations	944	944	944	829	829	829	944	944	944	944	944	944	944	944	944	944	944	944
R^2	0.02	0.25	0.32	0.02	0.24	0.46	0.16	0.39	0.93	0.03	0.19	0.49	0.09	0.38	0.67	0.04	0.31	0.57
(c) Lag from previous concurrent or midterm general election $(t-4)$																		
lagged DV$_{G-4}$	0.22	0.03	0.05	0.24	0.10	0.12	0.75	0.36	0.28	0.30	0.20	0.14	0.44	0.26	0.09	0.30	0.20	0.07
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Observations	942	942	942	824	824	824	943	943	943	943	943	943	943	943	943	943	943	943
R^2	0.05	0.24	0.32	0.06	0.24	0.47	0.34	0.42	0.93	0.11	0.23	0.50	0.29	0.45	0.67	0.22	0.38	0.57
(d) All three lags simultaneously																		
lagged DV$_P$	0.64	0.63	0.61	0.90	0.90	0.85	0.61	0.61	0.43	0.74	0.75	0.68	0.87	0.83	0.80	0.67	0.66	0.62
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
lagged DV$_{G-2}$	0.05	-0.07	-0.06	-0.07	-0.13	-0.10	-0.04	-0.09	0.08	-0.05	-0.10	-0.0004	-0.04	-0.10	-0.08	-0.02	-0.06	-0.05
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
lagged DV$_{G-4}$	0.08	-0.03	0.02	0.04	-0.01	0.01	0.43	0.33	0.10	0.08	0.04	0.04	0.04	-0.01	0.03	0.06	0.03	0.04
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Observations	942	942	942	792	792	792	943	943	943	943	943	943	943	943	943	943	943	943
R^2	0.52	0.62	0.64	0.73	0.79	0.80	0.86	0.88	0.95	0.63	0.68	0.75	0.85	0.88	0.89	0.76	0.80	0.82
Municipality FEs	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Year FEs	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	Y

OLS regression estimates. Each panel-column combination reports a different specification. The outcome is always measured in the general election. The explanatory variables consist of the same indicator, but measured either (a) in the primary election; (b) in the previous general election, two years before; or (c) in the general election four years before (so that concurrency status is kept unchanged). Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses.

Table A3: Between-party closeness in the primary and general election outcomes

	% *turnout*^{G}		% *positive*^{G}		% *first two*^{G}		*Golosov*^{G}	
(a) Full sample	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
margin^{P}	-0.021	-0.022	-0.065	-0.048	-0.068	-0.122	-0.012	0.007
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.026)	(0.013)	(0.001)	(0.001)
(b) Concurrent vs. Midterm								
margin^{P} (concurrent)	-0.025	-0.025	-0.072	-0.053	-0.103	-0.152	-0.008	0.009
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.029)	(0.014)	(0.001)	(0.001)
margin^{P} (midterm)	-0.011	-0.013	-0.044	-0.032	0.024	-0.043	-0.021	0.002
	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.017)	(0.011)	(0.040)	(0.022)	(0.002)	(0.002)
(c) *Conurbano* **vs. Interior**								
margin^{P} (*Conurbano*)	0.003	-0.002	-0.065	-0.043	-0.120	-0.144	-0.014	0.009
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.044)	(0.023)	(0.002)	(0.002)
margin^{P} (Interior)	-0.034	-0.033	-0.065	-0.050	-0.040	-0.110	-0.011	0.006
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.033)	(0.014)	(0.001)	(0.001)
(d) Council size (as measured in 2011)								
margin^{P} (council size = 6)	-0.073	-0.063	-0.108	-0.088	-0.152	-0.165	-0.003	0.006
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.049)	(0.034)	(0.003)	(0.002)
margin^{P} (council size = 10)	-0.045	-0.056	-0.024	-0.043	-0.076	-0.094	-0.005	0.007
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.029)	(0.018)	(0.100)	(0.032)	(0.003)	(0.002)
margin^{P} (council size = 12)	-0.033	-0.026	-0.092	-0.065	-0.051	-0.104	-0.009	0.007
	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.016)	(0.011)	(0.047)	(0.023)	(0.002)	(0.002)
margin^{P} (council size = 14)	-0.023	-0.027	-0.071	-0.051	-0.031	-0.135	-0.013	0.007
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.054)	(0.023)	(0.003)	(0.002)
margin^{P} (council size = 16)	-0.008	-0.009	-0.055	-0.033	-0.011	-0.039	-0.019	0.003
	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.012)	(0.076)	(0.046)	(0.003)	(0.002)
margin^{P} (council size = 18)	-0.009	-0.017	-0.047	-0.034	0.030	-0.146	-0.021	0.007
	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.015)	(0.009)	(0.074)	(0.045)	(0.004)	(0.003)
margin^{P} (council size = 20)	0.004	0.003	-0.089	-0.043	-0.196	-0.169	-0.012	0.010
	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.054)	(0.023)	(0.003)	(0.002)
margin^{P} (council size = 24)	0.007	0.007	-0.041	-0.027	-0.083	-0.129	-0.016	0.009
	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.016)	(0.011)	(0.075)	(0.036)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Municipality FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Outcome in primary	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	945	945	945	945	945	945	945	945

OLS regression estimates. Each panel-column combination reports a different specification. The outcome is always measured in the general election. The explanatory variable *margin*^{P} is the difference between the % of votes of the leading and trailing parties in the primary election, including only parties that classified to the general election in the denominator. Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses.

Table A4: Between-party closeness in the primary and first-differenced outcomes (general − primary)

	Δ *turnout*$^{G-P}$		Δ *positive*$^{G-P}$		Δ *first two*$^{G-P}$		Δ *Golosov*$^{G-P}$	
(a) Full sample	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
margin^{P}	-0.023	-0.022	-0.038	-0.048	-0.135	-0.122	0.015	0.007
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.0010)	(0.001)
(b) Concurrent vs. Midterm								
margin^{P} (concurrent)	-0.026	-0.025	-0.043	-0.053	-0.163	-0.152	0.016	0.009
	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.001)	(0.001)
margin^{P} (midterm)	-0.016	-0.013	-0.025	-0.032	-0.059	-0.043	0.012	0.002
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.002)	(0.002)
(c) *Conurbano* **vs. Interior**								
margin^{P} (*Conurbano*)	-0.009	-0.002	-0.031	-0.043	-0.150	-0.144	0.018	0.009
	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.002)	(0.002)
margin^{P} (Interior)	-0.031	-0.033	-0.043	-0.050	-0.126	-0.110	0.013	0.006
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.0009)	(0.001)
(d) Council size (as measured in 2011)								
margin^{P} (council size = 6)	-0.052	-0.063	-0.078	-0.088	-0.168	-0.165	0.010	0.006
	(0.017)	(0.008)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.041)	(0.034)	(0.002)	(0.002)
margin^{P} (council size = 10)	-0.068	-0.056	-0.054	-0.043	-0.098	-0.094	0.011	0.007
	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.028)	(0.032)	(0.002)	(0.002)
margin^{P} (council size = 12)	-0.019	-0.026	-0.051	-0.065	-0.117	-0.104	0.014	0.007
	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.001)	(0.002)
margin^{P} (council size = 14)	-0.031	-0.027	-0.040	-0.051	-0.158	-0.135	0.015	0.007
	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.025)	(0.017)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.002)	(0.002)
margin^{P} (council size = 16)	-0.010	-0.009	-0.020	-0.033	-0.045	-0.039	0.011	0.003
	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.043)	(0.046)	(0.002)	(0.002)
margin^{P} (council size = 18)	-0.026	-0.017	-0.027	-0.034	-0.186	-0.146	0.018	0.007
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.004)	(0.003)
margin^{P} (council size = 20)	0.002	0.003	-0.018	-0.043	-0.163	-0.169	0.018	0.010
	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.002)	(0.002)
margin^{P} (council size = 24)	0.007	0.007	-0.019	-0.027	-0.140	-0.129	0.018	0.009
	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Municipality FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Outcome in primary	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	945	945	945	945	945	945	945	945

OLS regression estimates. Each panel-column combination reports a different specification. Outcomes values are measured as the value measured in the general election minus the value measured in the primary. The explanatory variable *margin*^{P} is the difference between the % of votes of the leading and trailing parties in the primary election, including only parties that classified to the general election in the denominator. Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses.

Table A5: Between-party closeness in the primary and general election outcomes (Including all parties in the denominator)

	% *turnout*^{G}		% *positive*^{G}		% *first two*^{G}		*Golosov*^{G}	
(a) Full sample	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
margin^{P}	-0.021	-0.022	-0.066	-0.048	-0.069	-0.131	-0.012	0.007
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.026)	(0.013)	(0.001)	(0.001)
(b) Concurrent vs. Midterm								
margin^{P} (concurrent)	-0.025	-0.026	-0.073	-0.054	-0.103	-0.161	-0.008	0.009
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.029)	(0.014)	(0.001)	(0.001)
margin^{P} (midterm)	-0.010	-0.012	-0.048	-0.033	0.022	-0.050	-0.022	0.002
	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.017)	(0.011)	(0.041)	(0.021)	(0.002)	(0.002)
(c) *Conurbano* **vs. Interior**								
margin^{P} (*Conurbano*)	0.004	-0.002	-0.067	-0.043	-0.122	-0.168	-0.014	0.010
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.044)	(0.023)	(0.002)	(0.002)
margin^{P} (Interior)	-0.035	-0.033	-0.066	-0.051	-0.041	-0.111	-0.011	0.006
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.034)	(0.014)	(0.002)	(0.001)
(d) Council size (as measured in 2011)								
margin^{P} (council size = 6)	-0.073	-0.063	-0.108	-0.089	-0.152	-0.166	-0.003	0.006
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.050)	(0.034)	(0.003)	(0.002)
margin^{P} (council size = 10)	-0.045	-0.056	-0.024	-0.044	-0.076	-0.090	-0.005	0.007
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.029)	(0.018)	(0.100)	(0.031)	(0.003)	(0.002)
margin^{P} (council size = 12)	-0.033	-0.026	-0.092	-0.066	-0.051	-0.108	-0.009	0.007
	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.016)	(0.011)	(0.048)	(0.023)	(0.002)	(0.002)
margin^{P} (council size = 14)	-0.023	-0.027	-0.071	-0.051	-0.031	-0.142	-0.013	0.007
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.054)	(0.024)	(0.003)	(0.002)
margin^{P} (council size = 16)	-0.007	-0.009	-0.056	-0.033	-0.012	-0.041	-0.019	0.003
	(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.013)	(0.077)	(0.043)	(0.003)	(0.002)
margin^{P} (council size = 18)	-0.009	-0.017	-0.047	-0.034	0.030	-0.161	-0.021	0.008
	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.015)	(0.009)	(0.074)	(0.047)	(0.004)	(0.003)
margin^{P} (council size = 20)	0.006	0.004	-0.092	-0.045	-0.198	-0.195	-0.012	0.010
	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.054)	(0.023)	(0.003)	(0.002)
margin^{P} (council size = 24)	0.007	0.007	-0.043	-0.027	-0.089	-0.151	-0.016	0.009
	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.076)	(0.036)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Municipality FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Outcome in primary	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	945	945	945	945	945	945	945	945

OLS regression estimates. Each panel-column combination reports a different specification. The outcome is always measured in the general election. The explanatory variable *margin*^{P} is the difference between the % of votes of the leading and trailing parties in the primary election, including all parties that participated in the primary in the denominator. Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses.

Table A6: Between-party closeness in the primary and general election outcomes (in logs of absolute values)

	log(*turnout*^{G})		log(*positive*^{G})		log(*first two*^{G})		log(*Golosov*^{G})	
(a) Full sample	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
log (*margin*^{P})	-0.022	-0.010	-0.045	-0.025	-0.104	-0.085	-0.151	0.115
	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.018)	(0.014)
(b) Concurrent vs. Midterm								
log (*margin*^{P}) (concurrent)	-0.022	-0.010	-0.049	-0.027	-0.123	-0.102	-0.115	0.141
	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.014)	(0.009)	(0.018)	(0.017)
log (*margin*^{P}) (midterm)	-0.022	-0.010	-0.034	-0.020	-0.051	-0.039	-0.250	0.035
	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.011)	(0.005)	(0.023)	(0.013)	(0.030)	(0.021)
(c) *Conurbano* **vs. Interior**								
log (*margin*^{P}) (*Conurbano*)	-0.026	-0.004	-0.049	-0.018	-0.129	-0.091	-0.154	0.100
	(0.009)	(0.003)	(0.010)	(0.004)	(0.023)	(0.013)	(0.029)	(0.022)
log (*margin*^{P}) (Interior)	-0.019	-0.015	-0.042	-0.031	-0.085	-0.081	-0.148	0.127
	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.017)	(0.010)	(0.021)	(0.016)
(d) Council size (as measured in 2011)								
log (*margin*^{P}) (council size = 6)	-0.049	-0.028	-0.090	-0.064	-0.177	-0.138	-0.067	0.151
	(0.023)	(0.009)	(0.025)	(0.014)	(0.027)	(0.017)	(0.059)	(0.050)
log (*margin*^{P}) (council size = 10)	-0.019	-0.029	-0.025	-0.046	-0.081	-0.089	-0.091	0.146
	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.047)	(0.022)	(0.053)	(0.030)
log (*margin*^{P}) (council size = 12)	-0.026	-0.011	-0.057	-0.033	-0.111	-0.084	-0.138	0.142
	(0.013)	(0.004)	(0.016)	(0.006)	(0.023)	(0.015)	(0.028)	(0.026)
log (*margin*^{P}) (council size = 14)	-0.023	-0.016	-0.048	-0.028	-0.096	-0.093	-0.149	0.135
	(0.012)	(0.004)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.028)	(0.020)	(0.040)	(0.029)
log (*margin*^{P}) (council size = 16)	-0.001	-0.004	-0.023	-0.016	-0.056	-0.038	-0.241	0.045
	(0.034)	(0.008)	(0.037)	(0.014)	(0.064)	(0.031)	(0.049)	(0.029)
log (*margin*^{P}) (council size = 18)	-0.008	-0.009	-0.024	-0.020	-0.044	-0.088	-0.226	0.113
	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.013)	(0.005)	(0.038)	(0.028)	(0.058)	(0.048)
log (*margin*^{P}) (council size = 20)	-0.043	-0.005	-0.075	-0.018	-0.178	-0.102	-0.128	0.109
	(0.014)	(0.004)	(0.016)	(0.006)	(0.026)	(0.011)	(0.033)	(0.025)
log (*margin*^{P}) (council size = 24)	-0.013	0.003	-0.028	-0.006	-0.091	-0.068	-0.168	0.078
	(0.010)	(0.003)	(0.010)	(0.004)	(0.028)	(0.017)	(0.046)	(0.031)
Municipality FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Outcome in primary	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	945	945	945	945	945	945	945	945

OLS regression estimates. Each panel-column combination reports a different specification. The (logged) outcome is always measured in the general election. The explanatory variable log(*margin*^{P}) is the difference between the logged vote total of the leading party minus the logged vote total of the trailing party in the primary election. When calculating the (pre-logged) primary outcome control in column (8), only parties that classified to the general election are included in the denominator. Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses.

3 Additional results and robustness checks (II): RD results

RD plots and tables. Figure A6 shows the mimicking variance RD plots for first vs. second and second vs. third parties, comparing midterm and concurrent elections. Figure A7 compares small (14 or fewer councillors in 2011) vs. large municipalities (more than 14 councillors). Table A7 shows the sharp RD estimates for all the specifications in Figures A6 to A7. Altogether, the results suggest that the findings on voter coordination are driven by concurrent elections and municipalities that are either small or located in Buenos Aires' Interior.

Additional results and robustness checks

- Table A8 replicates the models reported in Table A7 but includes all parties that participated in the primary (instead of only those parties that qualified for the general election) in the denominator when measuring the margin of victory for all models.
- Table A9 replicates the results reported in Table A7 but employing CER-optimal instead of MSE-optimal bandwidths, which may produce different results, as suggested by de Magalhães et al. (2020).
- Table A10 replicates the results reported in Table A7 but employs second-order polynomials instead of a local linear regression.
- Figure A8 shows that the findings reported in Table 2 are not overly sensitive to bandwidth choice. The two left panels show the effect of finishing first in the primary instead of second, while the panels on the right show the effect of finishing second instead of third. The figure reports the bandwidths reported in Table 2, their doubles, their halves, and bandwidth manually increased to up to 35 pp.
- Table A11 replicates the models from Table 2 but conducts subsample analysis for three different reference parties. Panel (a) calculates the estimations for incumbent parties, panel (b) for PJ, and panel (c) for UCR.



Figure A6: Concurrent vs. midterm years: Mimicking variance RD plots with quantile-spaced bins (Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik 2015) showing the relationship between the margin in the primary and the probability of winning (top) or the expected vote share (bottom) in the general election.



Figure A7: Large (16 or more councillors in 2011) vs. small (14 or fewer councillors in 2011) municipalities: Mimicking variance RD plots with quantile-spaced bins (Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik 2015) showing the relationship between the margin in the primary and the probability of winning (top) or the expected vote share (bottom) in the general election.

Table A7: RD estimates: Effect of primary ranking on general election outcomes

									power against		
(a) Full sample	outcome	estim.	95% CI	p-val.	bwd.	N^- | N^+	SD_C	SD_C	$\frac{SD_C}{2}$	$\lvert\hat{\tau}_{RD}\rvert$
1 vs 2	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	-9.00	[-36.54 : 8.96]	0.23	13.2	443 | 443	45.06	1.00	0.78	0.20
2 vs 3	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	9.02	[0.66 : 19.14]	0.04	15.6	423 | 423	13.64	0.98	0.53	0.77
1 vs 2	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	-1.11	[-6.19 : 2.73]	0.45	14.1	469 | 469	8.75	1.00	0.78	0.11
2 vs 3	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	1.09	[-7.20 : 9.12]	0.82	16.1	439 | 439	7.09	0.67	0.23	0.07
(b) Concurrent elections										
1 vs 2	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	-4.73	[-44.98 : 23.99]	0.55	22.6	339 | 339	45.12	0.95	0.44	0.07
2 vs 3	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	11.15	[-0.71 : 29.34]	0.06	12.7	196 | 196	14.18	0.74	0.26	0.54
1 vs 2	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	-1.47	[-7.91 : 3.41]	0.44	15.1	249 | 249	8.48	0.99	0.55	0.11
2 vs 3	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	1.88	[-11.56 : 16.53]	0.73	17.1	247 | 247	7.69	0.33	0.12	0.07
(c) Midterm elections										
1 vs 2	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	-3.51	[-24.62 : 10.27]	0.42	10.5	179 | 179	44.42	1.00	0.94	0.09
2 vs 3	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	2.17	[-8.94 : 8.41]	0.95	8.7	114 | 114	16.08	1.00	0.73	0.11
1 vs 2	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	0.12	[-2.52 : 2.61]	0.97	8.8	152 | 152	8.30	1.00	0.99	0.05
2 vs 3	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	-0.64	[-3.64 : 1.67]	0.47	12.8	163 | 163	6.46	1.00	0.92	0.10
(d) *Conurbano*										
1 vs 2	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	-3.75	[-38.03 : 20.32]	0.55	17.8	160 | 160	44.47	0.99	0.56	0.06
2 vs 3	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	0.03	[-4.72 : 3.56]	0.78	7.4	91 | 91	0.00	0.05	0.05	0.05
1 vs 2	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	-0.98	[-3.04 : 0.91]	0.29	20.7	182 | 182	7.66	1.00	1.00	0.28
2 vs 3	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	0.59	[-10.33 : 10.01]	0.97	17.2	172 | 172	6.11	0.38	0.13	0.05
(e) Interior										
1 vs 2	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	-8.76	[-51.82 : 20.52]	0.40	13.3	324 | 324	44.39	0.93	0.40	0.10
2 vs 3	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	14.47	[2.16 : 31.05]	0.02	15.5	264 | 264	16.10	0.87	0.34	0.79
1 vs 2	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	-0.97	[-7.08 : 3.91]	0.57	13.6	330 | 330	9.31	1.00	0.65	0.08
2 vs 3	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	1.42	[-2.07 : 5.15]	0.40	12.0	220 | 220	7.32	1.00	0.80	0.19
(f) Small municipalities										
1 vs 2	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	-9.00	[-39.41 : 10.77]	0.26	12.8	265 | 265	45.66	1.00	0.71	0.17
2 vs 3	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	20.27	[5.04 : 39.26]	0.01	12.0	159 | 159	7.93	0.25	0.10	0.91
1 vs 2	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	-1.44	[-7.39 : 3.46]	0.48	15.6	308 | 308	8.59	0.99	0.59	0.11
2 vs 3	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	2.96	[-2.71 : 8.48]	0.31	13.8	175 | 175	7.12	0.94	0.42	0.31
(g) Large municipalities										
1 vs 2	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	-5.08	[-37.71 : 18.90]	0.51	14.6	189 | 189	45.30	0.99	0.60	0.08
2 vs 3	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	2.00	[-14.23 : 15.27]	0.94	13.9	207 | 207	18.12	0.93	0.40	0.07
1 vs 2	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	0.47	[-4.29 : 5.20]	0.85	18.9	232 | 232	8.70	1.00	0.72	0.06
2 vs 3	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	-0.18	[-10.61 : 9.87]	0.94	14.7	219 | 219	6.88	0.46	0.15	0.05

Sharp (conventional) RD estimates, with robust CIs and p-values based on the MSE-optimal bandwidth proposed by Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014), using a triangular kernel and clustering the standard errors by election year. The running variable is the primary election margin between the first- and second-placed parties (odd-numbered rows) or the second- and third-placed ones (even-numbered rows). Only parties that classified to the general election are included in the denominator. Reported number of observations indicate *effective* sample sizes.

Table A8: RD estimates: Effect of primary ranking on general election outcomes (Including all parties in the denominator)

								power against		
(a) Full sample	outcome	estim.	95% CI	p-val.	bwd.	$N^-\|N^+$	SD_C	SD_C	$\frac{\text{SD}_C}{2}$	$\|\hat{\tau}_{\text{RD}}\|$
1 vs 2	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	-10.02	[-33.76 : 4.96]	0.14	12.2	418 | 418	45.63	1.00	0.90	0.30
2 vs 3	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	8.08	[-0.57 : 18.78]	0.07	21.1	554 | 554	11.94	0.93	0.40	0.64
1 vs 2	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	-1.03	[-6.53 : 3.20]	0.50	14.3	478 | 478	8.79	1.00	0.71	0.09
2 vs 3	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	1.03	[-6.72 : 8.69]	0.80	17.3	471 | 471	7.11	0.72	0.25	0.07
(b) Concurrent elections										
1 vs 2	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	-5.56	[-45.84 : 23.03]	0.52	21.8	339 | 339	45.12	0.95	0.44	0.07
2 vs 3	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	10.38	[-3.87 : 31.41]	0.13	13.9	208 | 208	15.35	0.67	0.23	0.37
1 vs 2	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	-1.49	[-7.97 : 3.63]	0.46	15.0	252 | 252	8.57	0.98	0.54	0.11
2 vs 3	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	1.79	[-11.70 : 16.59]	0.73	17.2	251 | 251	7.67	0.32	0.12	0.06
(c) Midterm elections										
1 vs 2	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	-1.70	[-27.58 : 15.07]	0.57	11.3	201 | 201	43.34	1.00	0.80	0.06
2 vs 3	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	3.24	[-9.57 : 11.64]	0.85	9.9	130 | 130	15.07	0.98	0.50	0.14
1 vs 2	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	0.07	[-2.27 : 2.13]	0.95	9.8	170 | 170	8.30	1.00	1.00	0.05
2 vs 3	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	-0.86	[-4.65 : 2.08]	0.45	11.9	155 | 155	6.52	1.00	0.77	0.11
(d) *Conurbano*										
1 vs 2	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	-3.56	[-38.85 : 21.60]	0.58	16.4	155 | 155	44.92	0.98	0.54	0.06
2 vs 3	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	0.00	[-4.37 : 2.96]	0.71	7.2	90 | 90	0.00	0.05	0.05	0.05
1 vs 2	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	-1.02	[-3.70 : 1.13]	0.30	16.6	156 | 156	7.32	1.00	0.99	0.22
2 vs 3	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	0.61	[-10.40 : 10.14]	0.98	17.1	176 | 176	6.07	0.37	0.13	0.05
(e) Interior										
1 vs 2	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	-8.11	[-49.52 : 20.21]	0.41	13.8	335 | 335	44.55	0.94	0.43	0.10
2 vs 3	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	14.48	[2.15 : 31.14]	0.02	15.1	263 | 263	16.13	0.87	0.34	0.79
1 vs 2	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	-0.85	[-6.94 : 4.02]	0.60	14.4	348 | 348	9.44	1.00	0.67	0.07
2 vs 3	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	1.38	[-2.17 : 5.14]	0.43	11.9	217 | 217	7.33	1.00	0.79	0.18
(f) Small municipalities										
1 vs 2	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	-8.89	[-38.83 : 10.48]	0.26	13.1	272 | 272	45.31	1.00	0.72	0.17
2 vs 3	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	20.24	[2.79 : 41.54]	0.02	12.1	159 | 159	7.93	0.21	0.09	0.83
1 vs 2	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	-1.21	[-6.84 : 3.31]	0.50	17.3	335 | 335	8.88	1.00	0.68	0.10
2 vs 3	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	2.97	[-2.61 : 8.46]	0.30	14.5	185 | 185	6.99	0.94	0.42	0.32
(g) Large municipalities										
1 vs 2	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	-3.64	[-36.35 : 19.89]	0.57	14.7	197 | 197	44.97	0.99	0.60	0.06
2 vs 3	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	2.36	[-11.56 : 15.68]	0.77	14.6	223 | 223	17.48	0.94	0.43	0.08
1 vs 2	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	0.44	[-4.38 : 4.98]	0.90	18.5	232 | 232	8.69	1.00	0.73	0.06
2 vs 3	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	-0.18	[-10.26 : 9.43]	0.93	14.4	222 | 222	6.88	0.49	0.16	0.05

Sharp (conventional) RD estimates, with robust CIs and p-values based on the MSE-optimal bandwidth proposed by Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014), using a triangular kernel and clustering the standard errors by election year. The running variable is the primary election margin between the first- and second-placed parties (odd-numbered rows) or the second- and third-placed ones (even-numbered rows). All parties that participated in the primary are included in the denominator. Reported number of observations indicate *effective* sample sizes.

Table A9: RD estimates: CER-optimal bandwidths

								power against		
(a) Full sample	outcome	estim.	95% CI	p-val.	bwd.	N^- | N^+	SD_C	SD_C	$\frac{SD_C}{2}$	$\lvert\hat{\tau}_{RD}\rvert$
1 vs 2	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	-11.12	[-37.34 : 7.55]	0.19	11.6	399 | 399	46.02	1.00	0.80	0.27
2 vs 3	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	8.99	[0.33 : 18.99]	0.04	13.7	379 | 379	14.39	0.99	0.58	0.77
1 vs 2	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	-1.35	[-6.44 : 2.76]	0.43	12.4	419 | 419	8.78	1.00	0.78	0.13
2 vs 3	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	1.00	[-7.30 : 9.11]	0.83	14.2	385 | 385	7.04	0.67	0.22	0.06
(b) Concurrent elections										
1 vs 2	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	-6.68	[-46.11 : 23.43]	0.52	20.3	317 | 317	45.60	0.96	0.45	0.08
2 vs 3	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	11.91	[-1.06 : 30.18]	0.07	11.5	183 | 183	14.66	0.77	0.27	0.59
1 vs 2	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	-1.91	[-8.16 : 3.05]	0.37	13.6	228 | 228	8.29	0.98	0.53	0.16
2 vs 3	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	2.01	[-11.50 : 16.47]	0.73	15.4	221 | 221	7.58	0.32	0.12	0.07
(c) Midterm elections										
1 vs 2	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	-4.71	[-26.77 : 11.23]	0.42	9.6	161 | 161	45.02	1.00	0.95	0.12
2 vs 3	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	0.87	[-9.82 : 7.41]	0.78	7.9	105 | 105	16.74	1.00	0.76	0.06
1 vs 2	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	0.15	[-2.66 : 2.82]	0.95	8.0	140 | 140	8.20	1.00	0.99	0.05
2 vs 3	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	-0.89	[-3.85 : 1.48]	0.38	11.7	150 | 150	6.48	1.00	0.92	0.15
(d) *Conurbano*										
1 vs 2	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	-5.33	[-40.29 : 21.73]	0.56	15.6	144 | 144	45.92	0.99	0.59	0.08
2 vs 3	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	-0.19	[-4.70 : 3.44]	0.76	6.5	79 | 79	0.00	0.05	0.05	0.05
1 vs 2	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	-0.98	[-3.11 : 1.00]	0.32	18.2	161 | 161	7.41	1.00	1.00	0.28
2 vs 3	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	0.37	[-10.44 : 10.09]	0.97	15.1	154 | 154	5.99	0.37	0.13	0.05
(e) Interior										
1 vs 2	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	-10.94	[-52.95 : 20.04]	0.38	11.7	291 | 291	45.55	0.94	0.42	0.13
2 vs 3	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	15.00	[2.19 : 31.13]	0.02	13.6	243 | 243	16.76	0.90	0.36	0.82
1 vs 2	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	-1.07	[-7.23 : 4.10]	0.59	11.9	295 | 295	9.43	1.00	0.66	0.08
2 vs 3	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	1.48	[-2.17 : 5.34]	0.41	10.5	201 | 201	7.34	1.00	0.80	0.21
(f) Small municipalities										
1 vs 2	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	-10.84	[-40.32 : 10.33]	0.25	11.2	234 | 234	46.93	1.00	0.74	0.22
2 vs 3	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	21.14	[3.82 : 41.35]	0.02	10.5	139 | 139	8.48	0.28	0.11	0.93
1 vs 2	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	-1.56	[-7.55 : 3.58]	0.48	13.7	278 | 278	8.61	0.99	0.60	0.13
2 vs 3	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	2.87	[-2.96 : 8.59]	0.34	12.1	159 | 159	7.30	0.95	0.44	0.30
(g) Large municipalities										
1 vs 2	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	-10.79	[-44.07 : 15.83]	0.36	12.8	163 | 163	44.84	0.99	0.59	0.18
2 vs 3	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	1.40	[-14.61 : 15.15]	0.97	12.2	186 | 186	17.72	0.91	0.38	0.06
1 vs 2	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	0.20	[-4.55 : 4.91]	0.94	16.5	213 | 213	8.72	1.00	0.72	0.05
2 vs 3	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	-0.34	[-10.74 : 9.79]	0.93	12.9	193 | 193	6.81	0.45	0.15	0.05

Sharp (conventional) RD estimates, with robust CIs and p-values based on the CER-optimal bandwidth proposed by Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014), using a triangular kernel and clustering the standard errors by election year. The running variable is the primary election margin between the first- and second-placed parties (odd-numbered rows) or the second- and third-placed ones (even-numbered rows). Only parties that classified to the general election are included in the denominator. Reported number of observations indicate *effective* sample sizes.

Table A10: RD estimates: Second-order polynomials

								power against		
(a) Full sample	outcome	estim.	95% CI	p-val.	bwd.	$N^-\|N^+$	SD_C	SD_C	$\frac{\text{SD}_C}{2}$	$\lvert\hat{\tau}_{\text{RD}}\rvert$
1 vs 2	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	-17.75	[-42.72 : 1.23]	0.06	18.4	573 | 573	43.41	1.00	0.78	0.61
2 vs 3	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	9.31	[-2.27 : 20.83]	0.12	16.0	433 | 433	13.48	0.90	0.37	0.61
1 vs 2	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	-1.15	[-5.89 : 2.84]	0.49	25.6	729 | 729	9.18	1.00	0.83	0.11
2 vs 3	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	0.95	[-7.91 : 9.68]	0.84	21.9	564 | 564	7.24	0.63	0.21	0.06
(b) Concurrent elections										
1 vs 2	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	-26.48	[-63.09 : 4.01]	0.08	16.8	274 | 274	46.78	0.97	0.49	0.59
2 vs 3	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	14.76	[1.00 : 34.83]	0.04	18.0	260 | 260	13.76	0.62	0.20	0.68
1 vs 2	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	-2.32	[-8.98 : 3.09]	0.34	22.2	338 | 338	9.39	0.99	0.58	0.19
2 vs 3	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	2.13	[-12.69 : 17.64]	0.75	23.4	313 | 313	7.86	0.30	0.11	0.07
(c) Midterm elections										
1 vs 2	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	-6.73	[-30.17 : 10.45]	0.34	21.9	319 | 319	38.10	1.00	0.74	0.15
2 vs 3	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	-3.14	[-15.47 : 5.51]	0.35	10.7	138 | 138	14.64	0.97	0.49	0.13
1 vs 2	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	0.16	[-2.85 : 3.16]	0.92	15.2	246 | 246	8.29	1.00	0.97	0.05
2 vs 3	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	-2.05	[-7.28 : 2.26]	0.30	12.5	160 | 160	6.46	0.96	0.47	0.22
(d) *Conurbano*										
1 vs 2	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	-10.14	[-49.90 : 23.79]	0.49	29.1	233 | 233	40.84	0.87	0.34	0.12
2 vs 3	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	0.35	[-5.43 : 5.30]	0.98	9.7	105 | 105	0.00	0.05	0.05	0.05
1 vs 2	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	-2.76	[-7.22 : 1.03]	0.14	17.8	160 | 160	7.43	1.00	0.70	0.46
2 vs 3	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	0.11	[-10.54 : 10.21]	0.97	24.6	233 | 233	6.36	0.40	0.14	0.05
(e) Interior										
1 vs 2	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	-19.11	[-61.84 : 14.23]	0.22	19.5	426 | 426	42.72	0.88	0.34	0.29
2 vs 3	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	17.39	[1.68 : 34.33]	0.03	17.2	291 | 291	15.35	0.74	0.26	0.84
1 vs 2	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	-1.29	[-7.29 : 3.83]	0.54	22.4	468 | 468	9.58	1.00	0.67	0.10
2 vs 3	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	1.51	[-2.90 : 5.78]	0.52	17.6	293 | 293	7.39	1.00	0.66	0.16
(f) Small municipalities										
1 vs 2	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	-14.50	[-43.75 : 8.94]	0.20	23.9	408 | 408	42.16	0.99	0.60	0.33
2 vs 3	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	23.59	[1.30 : 47.74]	0.04	16.1	199 | 199	7.09	0.14	0.07	0.80
1 vs 2	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	-1.65	[-7.48 : 3.66]	0.50	26.3	432 | 432	9.12	0.99	0.62	0.13
2 vs 3	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	2.70	[-4.46 : 9.19]	0.50	17.9	227 | 227	7.14	0.83	0.31	0.20
(g) Large municipalities										
1 vs 2	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	-25.29	[-72.81 : 11.63]	0.16	16.8	214 | 214	44.06	0.82	0.30	0.38
2 vs 3	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	2.00	[-12.28 : 16.04]	0.79	21.2	286 | 286	15.48	0.86	0.33	0.07
1 vs 2	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	-2.57	[-10.60 : 3.71]	0.35	15.3	198 | 198	8.74	0.92	0.39	0.17
2 vs 3	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	-0.22	[-10.66 : 10.20]	0.97	22.2	298 | 298	7.10	0.47	0.16	0.05

Sharp (conventional) RD estimates, with robust CIs and p-values based on the MSE-optimal bandwidth proposed by Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014), using a second-order polynomial with a triangular kernel and clustering the standard errors by election year. The running variable is the primary election margin between the first- and second-placed parties (odd-numbered rows) or the second- and third-placed ones (even-numbered rows). Only parties that classified to the general election are included in the denominator. Reported number of observations indicate *effective* sample sizes.



Figure A8: Sharp (conventional) RD estimates, with robust 95% CIs. The running variable is the margin of victory in the primary. To calculate the estimates, we fitted a separate local linear regression at both sides of the threshold, using a triangular kernel and clustering the standard errors by election year. The CCT-optimal bandwidth is the (MSE-optimal) bandwidth reported in Table 2; to set the bias bandwidth, we use the ρ value used to calculate the original estimates.

Table A11: RD estimates: For different reference parties

								power against		
(a) Incumbent	outcome	estim.	95% CI	p-val.	bwd.	$N^-\|N^+$	SD_C	SD_C	$\frac{\text{SD}_C}{2}$	$\lvert\hat{\tau}_{\text{RD}}\rvert$
1 vs 2	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	-4.63	[-50.71 : 29.61]	0.61	14.1	162 | 268	49.29	0.93	0.40	0.06
2 vs 3	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	15.50	[-17.49 : 53.18]	0.32	7.6	28 | 27	18.90	0.30	0.11	0.22
1 vs 2	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	-2.50	[-10.66 : 3.56]	0.33	12.6	154 | 239	8.88	0.93	0.41	0.16
2 vs 3	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	-0.26	[-8.00 : 7.34]	0.93	10.4	31 | 45	8.10	0.81	0.29	0.05
(b) Reference party: PJ										
1 vs 2	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	-7.00	[-40.06 : 15.51]	0.39	13.4	216 | 183	41.36	0.98	0.54	0.11
2 vs 3	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	0.50	[-21.00 : 24.03]	0.89	16.9	49 | 186	19.99	0.66	0.22	0.05
1 vs 2	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	-0.41	[-5.20 : 5.22]	1.00	18.1	269 | 244	8.10	0.99	0.58	0.06
2 vs 3	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	-0.76	[-6.31 : 5.78]	0.93	7.6	35 | 82	7.01	0.87	0.34	0.06
(c) Reference party: UCR										
1 vs 2	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	-6.31	[-52.73 : 24.17]	0.47	12.8	154 | 202	47.45	0.93	0.40	0.07
2 vs 3	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	7.89	[-4.05 : 17.90]	0.22	10.5	79 | 92	0.00	0.05	0.05	0.48
1 vs 2	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	-2.61	[-10.81 : 3.32]	0.30	12.4	150 | 199	9.14	0.95	0.43	0.18
2 vs 3	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	3.76	[-5.93 : 12.25]	0.50	17.9	101 | 159	7.08	0.55	0.18	0.20

Sharp (conventional) RD estimates, with robust CIs and p-values based on the MSE-optimal bandwidth proposed by Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014), using a triangular kernel and clustering the standard errors by election year. Only pre-determined reference parties (the incumbent party at the moment of the primary, the PJ or the UCR, respectively) are included in the sample. The running variable is the primary election margin between the first- and second-placed parties (odd-numbered rows) or the second- and third-placed ones (even-numbered rows). Only parties that classified to the general election are included in the denominator. Reported number of observations indicate *effective* sample sizes.

Appendix References

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