Building Support from Below?

Online Appendix

A Data and variables

Sources. The data comes from the following sources:

- SEIs: Mexico's state electoral institutes. See `http://www.eleccionesenmexico.org.mx/organismos-electorales.php` for a list.
- CIDAC, a think tank that collects data on municipal electoral results (`http://www.cidac.org`). I originally downloaded data for 1985-2011. Tobias Pfütze kindly shared his data on municipal electoral results (also downloaded from CIDAC, but on a different date) for 1980-1985.
- INE (Instituto Nacional Electoral): Mexico's national electoral institute: `http://www.ine.mx`.
- INEGI (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía): Mexico's statistical institute: `http://www.inegi.org.mx`.
- CONAPO (Consejo Nacional de Población, national population council): `http://www.conapo.gob.mx`.

Sample. The unit of observation is the municipal-level election, indexed by municipality m and year t. I estimate separate models for the PAN and PRD. The sample for the PAN covers the 1984-2000 period. The PRD sample is restricted to 1989-2000; the party was

formed in 1989, though I code the FDN mayors elected in 1988 as belonging to the PRD. For both parties, data on federal elections is only available for 1994, 1997 and 2000, as the results for the 1991 elections are used to construct lagged values of some variables.

The PAN and the PRD often presented a common candidate with minor parties like the PT, PVEM, *Convergencia* or *Nueva Alianza*. In those cases, it is impossible to determine (a) whether the candidate was affiliated to the PAN, the PRD or the minor party; and (b) how votes were allocated between the major party and it allies. Thus, I assumed that all votes corresponded to the major party in question.[1] In order to avoid double-counting, whenever the PAN and PRD fielded a common candidate, I coded both parties as receiving zero votes. Nonetheless, Table A1 I show that using an alternative coding rule does not change the results.

In addition, the following elections are excluded from the sample:

- Municipalities belonging to the Federal District, where the first mayoral elections did not take place until 2000.

- Municipalities in the state of Oaxaca that employed the "*Usos y Costumbres*" system. These elect their representatives using local community practices, including (a) non-partisan elections, (b) public voting, and (c) the disfranchisement of women. Around three-fourths of Oaxaca's municipalities have employed *Usos y Costumbres* since 1995 (Benton 2012); these municipalities are excluded from the analysis, though they are taken into account when coding the neighbor variables.

- Whenever there was an extraordinary election, I count the results of the definitive election only; data about the election that was tied and/or nullified is disregarded.

Outcome variables. $Winner_{m,t}$ is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the opposition party of interest won the mayoral election for municipality m in year t. Between 1997 and 2003,

the state of San Luis Potosí employed a runoff system; whenever a second round was needed, the coding is based on the winner of the runoff. Sometimes, an extraordinary election was called, for example if (a) there was a tie for the first place; or (b) the state or the national electoral institute nullified the results. Whenever the necessary information is available, I took into account the results of the extraordinary election only, but I impute them to the year in which the original election took place.

Vote share$_{m,t}$ is the vote share obtained by the party of interest in election m, t. *Winner (federal)*$_{m,t}$ and *Vote share (federal)*$_{m,t}$ are similarly defined for federal elections. In this case, the vote share is measured at the *municipal* level, and *Winner (federal)* takes the value of 1 if the party of interest was the most voted party in the municipality.

Sources: SEIs, CIDAC, IFE.

Main explanatory variables. *Copartisan governor*$_{m,t}$: 1 if municipality m was located in a state governed by the party of interest at the moment of election t, and 0 otherwise.

Copartisan neighbors$_{m,t}$: Proportion of m's neighbors that were governed by the party of interest at the moment of election t. That is, these municipalities must have been captured by the opposition party of interest at $t-1$.[2] Neighboring municipalities are defined in different ways:

(a) Queen contiguity: two municipalities are neighbors if their border share at least one point in common. Source: INEGI.

(b) Nearest-k: m's neighbors are defined as the k municipalities that are closest to it. I set $k = 12$, with closeness defined on the basis of distance between municipality council heads (*cabeceras*). Sources: INEGI, INE.

(c) SMD: two municipalities are neighbors if they were part of the same single-member district (SMD) in federal elections. A few municipalities were coterminous with a single

SMD; these are coded as having no neighbors. When the territory of a municipality comprised multiple SMDs, I counted as neighbors all municipalities belonging to at least one of these SMDs. Source: INE.

Copartisan neighbor (dummy)$_{m,t}$: 1 if at least one neighbor was governed by the party of interest (i.e., if *Copartisan neighbors* > 0), and 0 otherwise.

Control variables. *Incumbency*$_{m,t}$: 1 if the party of interest was the incumbent of municipality m at the moment of election t. Formally, *Incumbency*$_{m,t}$ = *Winner*$_{m,t-1}$. Municipalities employing *Usos y Costumbres* had nonpartisan elections, so *Incumbency* takes the value of 0 for all parties.

Previous vote$_{m,t}$: vote share of the party of interest in municipality m at $t-1$. Municipalities employing *Usos y Costumbres* had nonpartisan elections, and thus all parties are coded as receiving no votes.

Previous winner (federal)$_{m,t}$: 1 if the party of interest had received a plurality of the vote in the municipality in the previous federal election, i.e. *Previous winner (federal)*$_{m,t}$ = *Winner (federal)*$_{m,t-1}$.

Previous vote (federal)$_{m,t}$: vote share of the party of interest in municipality m in the previous federal election.

Vote neighbors$_{m,t}$: average value of *Vote share* among neighboring municipalities.

Alternation$_{m,t}$: 1 if the state in which municipality m is located had already experienced alternation in the past (i.e., if the PRI had already conceded the governorship to *any* opposition party), and 0 otherwise. Source: CIDAC.

Gubernatorial concurrent$_{m,t}$: 1 if the state in which municipality m is located held a gubernatorial election in year t. Sources: SEIs, CIDAC.

Split municipality$_{m,t}$: 1 if the municipality m had been split in the past to create a new municipality. Source: INEGI.

Poverty$_{m,t}$: Factor scores from a single-factor analysis of several measures of economic development taken from the national census, such as the proportion of the population that is illiterate, did not complete primary school, or lives in households that lack basic utilities (sewerage, electricity, running water), etc. This variable is similar to CONAPO's Marginalization Index, a widely used measure of municipal-level poverty, but with two main differences. First, I employ factor analysis rather than principal components. And second, to account for variation over time, I did not estimate a separate analysis for every census year; rather, I calculated the factor scores by pooling data from all census years together, thus accounting for the fact that poverty has been decreasing sharply over time. Source: CONAPO.

Rural$_{m,t}$: 1 if municipality m had a population of $20,000$ in year t, and 0 otherwise (see De Remes 2000:17). Population figures are only available for census years (1980, 1990, 1995 and 2000), so I interpolated values for other years assuming a constant rate of growth. Sources: INEGI, CONAPO.

B Robustness checks

This section shows that the results presented in Tables 3 and 4 are robust to a variety of specifications and/or subsamples. To save space, the table only reports the point estimates and standard errors for *Copartisan governor* or *Copartisan neighbors* variables.

Table A1 presents the results for mayoral elections, while Table A2 focuses on federal elections. In both cases, column 1 reproduces the baseline estimates from Table 3. The models in column 2 add additional controls for *Poverty* and *Rural* municipality. Columns 3 and 4 presents the results for models with nearest-k and SMD neighbors instead of contiguity neighbors. Specifications in column 5 replace *Copartisan neighbors* with *Copartisan neighbor (dummy)*, an indicator that takes the value of one if *Copartisan neighbors* > 0, and zero otherwise. The models in column 6, replace the municipality fixed effects with the lagged dependent variable. Column 7 shows the results for models in which PAN-PRD alliances are counted as being dominated by the PAN or the PRD, respectively. Specifications in column 8 exclude all observations from Oaxaca.

References

Benton, A. L. (2012). Bottom-up challenges to national democracy: Mexico's (legal) subnational authoritarian enclaves. *Comparative Politics*, 44(3):253–271.

De Remes, A. (2000). Municipal electoral processes in latin america and mexico. CIDE Documento de Trabajo #125.

Table A1: Robustness checks (1): Mayoral elections.

	Table 3	add. controls	nearest-k neighbors	SMD neighbors	neighbor dummy	lagged DV	incl. alliances	excl. Oaxaca
(a) PAN (*Winner*)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Copartisan governor	0.07**	0.07**				0.06**	0.06**	0.06**
	(0.02)	(0.02)				(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Copartisan neighbors	0.12**	0.10**	0.15**	0.15**	0.04**	0.12**	0.10**	0.12**
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
(b) PAN (*Vote share*)								
Copartisan governor	0.03**	0.03**				0.04**	0.02**	0.02**
	(0.01)	(0.01)				(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Copartisan neighbors	-0.03*	-0.04**	-0.08**	-0.02	0.00	-0.04**	-0.04**	-0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
# municipalities	2419	2419	2419	2402	2419	2419	2419	1849
# elections	6	6	6	4	6	6	6	6
# observations	11908	11908	11908	8210	11908	11908	11908	10105
(c) PRD (*Winner*)								
Copartisan neighbors	-0.05	-0.05	-0.12	-0.23**	-0.01	-0.00	-0.05	-0.10*
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
(d) PRD (*Vote share*)								
Copartisan neighbors	-0.02	-0.01	-0.06**	-0.06**	-0.01	-0.03*	-0.02	-0.04*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
# municipalities	2415	2415	2415	2402	2415	2415	2415	1849
# elections	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
# observations	8368	8368	8368	8210	8368	8368	8368	7096
municipality FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	no	yes	yes
year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

OLS regression estimates. Except in models 3 and 4, specifications report the estimates for the *Copartisan governor* or *Copartisan neighbors* variables under different specifications and/or alternative samples. Estimates for models 3 and 4 correspond to nearest-k ($k = 12$) and SMD neighbors, respectively. All specifications control for *Previous vote*, the corresponding *Vote neighbors* variable(s), *Gubernatorial concurrent*, *Split municipality* and state election cycles. Robust standard errors (HC3) clustered by municipality in parentheses. *$p < 0.10$; **$p < 0.05$.

Table A2: Robustness checks (2): Federal elections.

	Table 4	add. controls	nearest-k neighbors	SMD neighbors	neighbor dummy	lagged DV	incl. alliances	excl. Oaxaca
(a) PAN (*Winner*)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Copartisan governor	0.15**	0.15**				0.12**		0.15**
	(0.03)	(0.03)				(0.02)		(0.03)
Copartisan neighbors	0.11**	0.10**	0.15**	0.04	0.01	0.09**	0.10**	0.11**
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
(b) PAN (*Vote share*)								
Copartisan governor	0.07**	0.06**				0.05**		0.06**
	(0.01)	(0.01)				(0.00)		(0.01)
Copartisan neighbors	-0.02	-0.02*	-0.03	-0.03	-0.01	-0.03**	-0.02*	-0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
# municipalities	2395	2395	2395	2372	2395	2395	2395	1836
# elections	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
# observations	6146	6146	6146	6043	6146	6146	6146	5302
(c) PRD (*Winner*)								
Copartisan governor	0.14**	0.14**				0.12**		0.14**
	(0.04)	(0.04)				(0.04)		(0.04)
Copartisan neighbors	0.07	0.05	0.16**	0.11**	-0.01	0.10**	0.07	0.11**
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
(d) PRD (*Vote share*)								
Copartisan neighbors	0.12**	0.12**				0.12**		0.12**
	(0.01)	(0.01)				(0.01)		(0.01)
Copartisan neighbors	-0.03*	-0.03*	-0.04*	-0.01	-0.00	-0.02	-0.03*	-0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
# municipalities	2395	2395	2395	2372	2395	2395	2395	1836
# elections	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
# observations	6146	6146	6146	6043	6146	6146	6146	5302
municipality FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	no	yes	yes
year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

OLS regression estimates. Except in models 3 and 4, specifications report the estimates for the *Copartisan governor* or *Copartisan neighbors* variables under different specifications and/or alternative samples. Estimates for models 3 and 4 correspond to nearest-k ($k = 12$) and SMD neighbors, respectively. All specifications control for *Previous vote*, the corresponding *Vote neighbors* variable(s), *Gubernatorial concurrent*, *Split municipality* and state election cycles. Robust standard errors (HC3) clustered by municipality in parentheses. *$p < 0.10$; **$p < 0.05$.