

Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México
Departamento de Ciencia Política

Política Comparada I

Agosto-Diciembre 2016
Martes y Jueves 11:30am-1:00pm
Río Hondo, Salón 307

Adrián Lucardi

adrian.lucardi@itam.mx

Oficina: Martes y Jueves 2:00pm-3:00pm o previa cita

Objetivo

Este curso se propone introducir a los alumnos en los “grandes temas” de la ciencia política: el problema del orden político, el origen del Estado moderno, las causas y consecuencias de las revoluciones sociales, el papel de las instituciones en el desarrollo económico, la naturaleza de los regímenes políticos, o el rol del individuo en los procesos sociales.

A lo largo del curso, responderemos preguntas del tipo: ¿Cómo se formaron los estados modernos? ¿Por qué el descontento social sólo se traduce en protestas y revoluciones bajo ciertas circunstancias específicas (y cuáles son dichas circunstancias)? Si las instituciones son clave para el desarrollo, ¿cómo se explica la supervivencia de instituciones deficientes cuando no directamente nefastas? ¿Qué papel juegan los líderes individuales en los procesos políticos? ¿Bajo qué circunstancias la movilización de identidades étnicas termina en violencia o guerras civiles?

Evaluación

- **Participación en clase (10%).** Leer la bibliografía obligatoria es esencial para participar en clase. Además, cada sesión 3-4 alumnos serán elegidos al azar para responder preguntas sobre la bibliografía correspondiente a dicha sesión.
- **Reflexiones breves (15%).** Cada semana, los alumnos presentarán un escrito de no más de una página con (a) un resumen o “abstract”; ó (b) una crítica breve; ó (c) una pregunta fundamentada, sobre de uno de los textos de la bibliografía obligatoria (o algún pasaje del mismo). Los escritos serán entregados por email treinta minutos antes del comienzo de la clase, o en papel al comienzo de la misma; no se admitirán excepciones.
- **Reseña (15%).** Antes de la última semana de clase, los estudiantes entregarán un ensayo de no más de 4-6 páginas, a doble espacio, reseñando alguno de los pares de novelas/películas listados en el temario, y relacionándolos con alguno(s) de los textos incluidos en la bibliografía.
- **Examen parcial (25%).** A mitad del semestre habrá un examen parcial cubriendo los temas vistos hasta entonces.

- **Ensayo final (35%).** La última semana de clases, el profesor entregará una lista de 3-4 preguntas sobre algunos de los temas vistos en clase. Los alumnos deberán elegir una de ellas y responderla con un ensayo de no más de 8 páginas, a doble espacio. El ensayo deberá incluir referencias tanto a la bibliografía obligatoria como a la optativa.

Lecturas

El temario comprende tres tipos de lecturas. En la primera clase de cada semana, leeremos los textos “clásicos” sobre un tema. En la siguiente clase, el foco estará puesto en lecturas más modernas que examinan críticamente dichos clásicos, por lo general contrastando sus afirmaciones con la evidencia empírica. Finalmente, los alumnos elegirán alguno de los siguientes pares de libros de ficción y películas y elaborarán una reseña crítica de los mismos, destacando su conexión (o falta de ella) con algunos de los textos leídos en clase.

- (L): Mario Vargas Llosa. *La Fiesta del Chivo*. Alfaguara-Clarín, Buenos Aires, 2000. (P): *The Last King of Scotland* (2006).
- (L): Arthur Koestler. *Darkness at Noon*. Scribner, New York, 1940. (P): *La Vida de los Otros* (2006).
- (L): Carlos Fuentes. *La Muerte de Artemio Cruz*. Alfaguara, Madrid, 2008 [1962]. (P): *El Gatopardo* (1963).
- (L): Javier Cercas. *Anatomía de un Instante*. Mondadori, Buenos Aires, 2009. (P): *Trece Días* (2000).
- (L): George Orwell. *1984*. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, Boston, 1983 [1949]. (P): *Z* (1969).
- (L): Mariano Azuela. *Los de Abajo*. Fondo de Cultura Económica, México, 2000 [1916]. (P): *Diamante de Sangre* (2006).

Todas las lecturas obligatorias se encuentran disponibles en Comunidad ITAM. Las lecturas marcadas con un asterisco (*) incluyen material técnicamente complejo, con el cual los alumnos pueden no estar familiarizados. Dentro de lo posible, el profesor tratará de explicar la intuición detrás de dicho material en clase, pero el conocimiento del mismo **no** será evaluado, y los alumnos pueden pasar por alto las secciones correspondientes.

Sesiones

Sesión 1 (Agosto/9). Introducción

Presentación del curso.

I. Inferencia e Inferencia Causal

Sesión 2 (Agosto/11). Comparación e Inferencia

- (1) Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba. *Designing Social Inquiry. Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1994, caps. 1.1 y 4.3-4.4.
- (2) Barbara Geddes. How the Cases You Choose Affect the Answers You Get: Selection Bias in Comparative Politics. *Political Analysis*, 2:131-150, 1990.
- (3) Jasjeet S. Sekhon. Quality Meets Quantity: Case Studies, Conditional Probability, and Counterfactuals. *Perspectives on Politics*, 2(2):281-293, 2004.

Lecturas optativas

- (1) Arend Lijphart. Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method. *American Political Science Review*, 65(3):682-693, 1971.
- (2) James D. Fearon. Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science. *World Politics*, 43(2):169-195, 1991.
- (3) James Mahoney and Gary Goertz. A Tale of Two Cultures: Contrasting Quantitative and Qualitative Research. *Political Analysis*, 14(3):227-249, 2006.
- (4) Robert A. Pape. The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. *American Political Science Review*, 97(3):343-361, 2003.
- (5) *Scott Ashworth, Joshua D. Clinton, Adam Meirowitz, and Kristopher W. Ramsay. Design, Inference, and the Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. *American Political Science Review*, 102(2):269-273, 2008.
- (6) Robert A. Pape. Methods and Findings in the Study of Suicide Terrorism. *American Political Science Review*, 102(2):275-277, 2008.

Sesión 3 (Agosto/16). El Problema Fundamental de la Inferencia Causal

- (1) Joshua Angrist and Jörn-Steffen Pischke. *Mostly Harmless Econometrics. An Empiricist's Companion*. Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford, 2009, caps. 1-2.
- (2) Jonathan A. Rodden. Back to the Future. Endogenous Institutions and Comparative Politics. In Mark I. Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman, editors, *Comparative Politics. Rationality, Culture, and Structure*, pages 333-357. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2nd edition, 2009.

Lecturas optativas

- (1) Joshua D. Angrist and Jörn-Steffen Pischke. *Mastering 'Metrics. The Path from Cause to Effect*. Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford, 2015, cap. 1.
- (2) *Paul W. Holland. Statistics and Causal Inference. *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 81(396):945-960, 1986.
- (3) *Adam Przeworski. Is the Science of Comparative Politics Possible? In Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes, editors, *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*, pages 147-171. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007.

Sesión 4 (Agosto/18). Inferencia Causal con Datos Observacionales

- (1) Thad Dunning. *Natural Experiments in the Social Sciences: A Design-Based Approach*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012, caps. 1-4.

Lecturas optativas

- (1) Donald P. Green and Alan S. Gerber. The Underprovision of Experiments in Political Science. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 589:94–112, 2003.
- (2) *Christopher Winship and Stephen L. Morgan. The Estimation of Causal Effects from Observational Data. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 25:659–706, 1999.
- (3) *Alberto Abadie, Alexis Diamond, and Jens Hainmueller. Comparative Politics and the Synthetic Control Method. *American Journal of Political Science*, 59(2):495–510, 2015.

II. Estado, Orden Político y Revoluciones

Sesión 5 (Agosto/23). El Estado (I): ¿Bandidos, Mafiosos, o Padres de la Patria?

- (1) Charles Tilly. War Making and State Making as Organized Crime. In Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, editors, *Bringing the State Back In*, pages 169–191. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985.
- (2) Barnett R. Rubin. Lineages of the State in Afghanistan. *Asian Survey*, 28(11):1188–1209, 1988.
- (3) Mancur Olson. Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development. *American Political Science Review*, 87(3):567–576, 1993.

Lecturas optativas

- (1) Robert H. Bates. *Prosperity and Violence: The Political Economy of Development*. W. W. Norton & Company, New York and London, second edition, 2009 [2001], caps. 3-4.
- (2) Joseph R. Strayer. *On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1972.
- (3) Perry Anderson. *Lineages of the Absolutist State*. Verso, London, 1974, caps. I.1-2 y II.1-2.
- (4) Charles Tilly. *Coerción, Capital, y los Estados Europeos 990-1990*. Alianza, Madrid, 1990.
- (5) Gianfranco Poggi. *The State: Its Nature, Development, and Prospects*. Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1990, caps. 2-4.
- (6) Oscar Oszlak. The Historical Formation of the State in Latin America: Some Theoretical and Methodological Guidelines for Its Study. *Latin American Research Review*, 16(2):3–32, 1981.
- (7) Jeffrey Herbst. The Creation and Maintenance of National Boundaries in Africa. *International Organization*, 43(4):673–692, 1989.

Sesión 6 (Agosto/25). El Estado (II): (In)Capacidades Estatales

- (1) Francis Fukuyama. *State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century*. Cornell University Press, Ithaca (NY), 2004, caps. 1-2.

- (2) Peter Evans. El Estado como Problema y como Solución. *Desarrollo Económico*, 35(140):529–562, 1996.
- (3) *Daron Acemoglu, Jacob Moscona, and James A. Robinson. State Capacity and American Technology: Evidence from the 19th Century. Working Paper 21932, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2016.

Lecturas optativas

- (1) Douglass C. North. A Neoclassical Theory of the State. In *Structure and Change in Economic History*, pages 20–32. Norton, New York, 1981.
- (2) Barbara Geddes. A Game Theoretic Model of Reform in Latin American Democracies. *American Political Science Review*, 85(2):371–392, 1991.
- (3) Guillermo O'Donnell. On the State, Democratization and Some Conceptual Problems: A Latin American View with Glances at Some Postcommunist Countries. *World Development*, 21(8):1355–1369, 1993.
- (4) Anne O. Krueger. The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society. *American Economic Review*, 64(3):291–303, 1974.
- (5) Robert H. Bates. *Markets and States in Tropical Africa. The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies*. The University of California Press, Berkeley, 2005 [1981], caps. 1-2 y 5-6.
- (6) Timothy Snyder. *Black Earth: The Holocaust as History and Warning*. Random House, New York, 2015.

Sesión 7 (Agosto/30). Revoluciones Sociales (I): Orígenes

- (1) Theda Skocpol. *States and Social Revolutions. A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, & China*. Cambridge University Press, New York, 1979, cap. 1 más el caso de Rusia.

Lecturas optativas

- (1) Barrington Moore. *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. Beacon Press, Boston, 1966, cap. IX.
- (2) Erich Weede and Edward N. Muller. Rebellion, Violence and Revolution: A Rational Choice Perspective. *Journal of Peace Research*, 35(1):43–59, 1998.
- (3) *Carles Boix. Economic Roots of Civil Wars and Revolutions in the Contemporary World. *World Politics*, 60(3):390–437, 2008.
- (4) *Helge Berger and Mark Spoerer. Economic Crises and the European Revolutions of 1848. *The Journal of Economic History*, 61(2):293–326, 2001.

Septiembre/1. APSA. No hay clases.

Sesión 8 (Septiembre/6). Revoluciones Sociales (II): El Largo Plazo

- (1) Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way. The Durability of Revolutionary Regimes. *Journal of Democracy*, 24(3):5–17, 2013.
- (2) *Melissa Dell. Path Dependence in Development: Evidence from the Mexican Revolution. Unpublished manuscript, 2012.

Lecturas optativas

- (1) *Nam Kyu Kim. Revolutionary Leaders and Mass Killing. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, forthcoming.
- (2) *Daron Acemoglu, Davide Cantoni, Simon Johnson, and James A Robinson. The Consequences of Radical Reform: The French Revolution. *American Economic Review*, 101(7):3286–3307, 2011.

Sesión 9 (Septiembre/8). Orden y Desorden Político (I): Factores Estructurales

- (1) Samuel P. Huntington. *Political Order in Changing Societies*. Yale University Press, New Haven, 1968, caps. 1 y 4.

Lecturas optativas

- (1) *Jack A. Goldstone, Robert H. Bates, David L. Epstein, Ted Robert Gurr, Michael B. Lustik, Monty G. Marshall, Jay Ulfelder, and Mark Woodward. A Global Model for Forecasting Political Instability. *American Journal of Political Science*, 54(1):190–208, 2010.

Sesión 10 (Septiembre/13). Orden y Desorden Político (II): Por Qué la Gente Sale a la Calle

- (1) Mancur Olson. *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*. Schocken Books, New York, 1965, cap. 1.
- (2) Timur Kuran. Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989. *World Politics*, 44(1):7–48, 1991.
- (3) Joshua A. Tucker. Enough! Electoral Fraud, Collective Action Problems, and Post-Communist Colored Revolutions. *Perspectives on Politics*, 5(3):535–551, 2007.

Lecturas optativas

- (1) Samuel L. Popkin. *The Rational Peasant: The Political Economy of Rural Society in Vietnam*. University of California Press, Berkeley, 1979, caps. 1-2.
- (2) Mark I. Lichbach. What Makes Rational Peasants Revolutionary?: Dilemma, Paradox, and Irony in Peasant Collective Action. *World Politics*, 46(3):383–418, 1994.
- (3) Doug McAdam, Sidney G. Tarrow, and Charles Tilly. Towards an Integrated Perspective on Social Movements and Revolutions. In Mark I. Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman, editors, *Comparative Politics. Rationality, Culture, and Structure*, pages 260–290. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2nd edition, 2009.
- (4) Philipp Kuntz and Mark R. Thompson. More than Just the Final Straw: Stolen Elections as Revolutionary Triggers. *Comparative Politics*, 41(3):253–272, 2009.

Septiembre/15. Asueto. Sin clases.

Sesión 11 (Septiembre/20). Orden y Desorden Político (III): Guerras Civiles

- (1) *Michael L. Ross. A Closer Look at Oil, Diamonds, and Civil War. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 9(1):265–300, 2006.

- (2) *Philip Roessler. The Enemy Within: Personal Rule, Coups, and Civil War in Africa. *World Politics*, 63(2):300–346, 2011.

Lecturas optativas

- (1) Stathis N. Kalyvas. Civil Wars. In Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes, editors, *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*, pages 416–434. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007.
- (2) *Samuel Bazzi and Christopher Blattman. Economic Shocks and Conflict: Evidence from Commodity Prices. *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics*, 6(4):1–38, 2014.
- (3) Jason Stearns. *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters: The Collapse of the Congo and the Great War of Africa*. PublicAffairs, New York, 2011.

Sesión 12 (Septiembre/22). Orden y Desorden Político (IV): Golpes de Estado

- (1) James T. Quinnlivan. Coup-proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East. *International Security*, 24(2):131–165, 1999.
- (2) *George Derpanopoulos, Erica Frantz, Barbara Geddes, and Joseph Wright. Are Coups Good for Democracy? *Research & Politics*, 3(1), 2016.

Lecturas optativas

- (1) Stuart A. Cohen. How to Mount a Successful Coup d'Etat: Lessons from the Bible (II King, 11, II Chronicles 23). *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, 11(3):1–28, 2000.
- (2) Jonathan M. Powell and Clayton L. Thyne. Global Instances of Coups from 1950 to 2010: A New Dataset. *Journal of Peace Research*, 48(2):249–259, 2011.
- (3) *Milan W. Svolik. Contracting on Violence: The Moral Hazard in Authoritarian Repression and Military Intervention in Politics. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 57(5):765–794, 2013.
- (4) *Nam Kyu Kim. Revisiting Economic Shocks and Coups. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 60(1):3–31, 2016.

III. Identidades, Clivajes, Conflicto

Sesión 13 (Septiembre/27). Clivajes Sociales

- (1) Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan. Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments. In Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, editors, *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives*, pages 1–64. The Free Press, New York, 1967.
- (2) Pierre Ostiguy. The High and the Low in Politics: A Two-Dimensional Political Space for Comparative Analysis and Electoral Studies. Kellogg Institute Working Paper #360, 2009.

Lecturas optativas

- (1) *Kenneth Scheve and David Stasavage. Religion and Preferences for Social Insurance. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, 1(3):255–286, 2006.

- (2) *Ana L. De La O and Jonathan A. Rodden. Does Religion Distract the Poor? *Comparative Political Studies*, 41(4-5):437–476, 2008.

Sesión 14 (Septiembre/29). Identidades Nacionales y Étnicas

- (1) Ashutosh Varshney. Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict. In Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes, editors, *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*, pages 274–294. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007.
- (2) Samuel P. Huntington. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. Simon and Schuster, New York, 2007 [1996], caps. 1-2, 9, 12.

Lecturas optativas

- (1) Ernest Gellner. *Nations and Nationalism*. Cornell University Press, Ithaca (NY), 2008 [1983].
- (2) Donald L. Horowitz. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. University of California Press, Berkeley, 1985.
- (3) Ashutosh Varshney. *Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life. Hindus and Muslims in India*. Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2002.
- (4) Stathis N. Kalyvas. Ethnic Defection in Civil War. *Comparative Political Studies*, 41(8):1043–1068, 2008.
- (5) *Erik Meyersson. Islamic Rule and the Empowerment of the Poor and Pious. *Econometrica*, 82(1):229–269, 2014.

Sesión 15 (Octubre/4). El Origen de los Clivajes

- (1) Ronald Rogowski. Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to Trade. *American Political Science Review*, 81(4):1121–1137, 1987.
- (2) Stathis N. Kalyvas. From Pulpit to Party: Party Formation and the Christian Democratic Phenomenon. *Comparative Politics*, 30(3):293–312, 1998.
- (3) Daniel N. Posner. The Political Salience of Cultural Difference: Why Chewas and Tumbukas Are Allies in Zambia and Adversaries in Malawi. *American Political Science Review*, 98(4):529–545, 2004.

Lecturas optativas

- (1) David D. Laitin. Hegemony and Religious Conflict: British Imperial Control and Political Cleavages in Yorubaland. In Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, editors, *Bringing the State Back In*, pages 285–316. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985.
- (2) Paul Midford. International Trade and Domestic Politics: Improving on Rogowski's Model of Political Alignments. *International Organization*, 47(4):535–564, 1993.
- (3) Pradeep Chhibber and Mariano Torcal. Elite Strategy, Social Cleavages, and Party Systems in New Democracies: Spain. *Comparative Political Studies*, 30(1):27–54, 1997.
- (4) Daniele Caramani. *The Nationalization of Politics: The Formation of National Electorates and Party Systems in Western Europe*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004, Introducción y caps. 1-4 y 6.
- (5) *Gary Miller and Norman Schofield. Activists and Partisan Realignment in the United States. *American Political Science Review*, 97(2):245–260, 2003.

Sesión 16 (Octubre/6). El Origen de las Identidades

- (1) Jack Snyder and Karen Ballentine. Nationalism and the Marketplace of Ideas. *International Security*, 21(2):5–40, 1996.
- (2) *Lisa Blaydes and Drew A. Linzer. Elite Competition, Religiosity, and Anti-Americanism in the Islamic World. *American Political Science Review*, 106(2):225–243, 2012.

Lecturas optativas

- (1) Benedict Anderson. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. Verso, London, 2nd edition, 1991.
- (2) Jack Snyder. *From Voting to Violence. Democratization and Nationalist Conflict*. W. W. Norton & Company, New York and London, 2000.
- (3) Steven Wilkinson. *Votes and Violence. Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and London, 2004, caps. 1-2.
- (4) *Moses Shayo. A Model of Social Identity with an Application to Political Economy: Nation, Class, and Redistribution. *American Political Science Review*, 103(2):147–174, 2009.
- (5) *Thad Dunning and Lauren Harrison. Cross-Cutting Cleavages and Ethnic Voting: An Experimental Study of Cousinage in Mali. *American Political Science Review*, 104(1):21–39, 2010.

Sesión 17 (Octubre/11). Examen parcial

Examen parcial.

IV. Instituciones y Regímenes Políticos

Sesión 18 (Octubre/13). El Neo-Institucionalismo

- (1) Douglass C. North. *Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990, caps. 1-8 y 12.
- (2) Kathleen Thelen. Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 2(1):369–404, 1999.
- (3) Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson. Paths of Economic and Political Development. In Barry R. Weingast and Donald A. Wittman, editors, *The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy*, pages 673–692. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006.

Lecturas optativas

- (1) Jack Knight. *Institutions and Social Conflict*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992.
- (2) *Daron Acemoglu. Why Not a Political Coase Theorem? Social Conflict, Commitment, and Politics. *Journal of Comparative Economics*, 31(4):620–652, 2003.
- (3) *Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson. Political Losers as a Barrier to Economic Development. *American Economic Review*, 90(2):126–130, 2000.

- (4) Dani Rodrik. Institutions for High-Quality Growth: What They Are and How to Acquire Them. *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 35(3):3–31, 2000.
- (5) Douglass C. North, John Joseph Wallis, and Barry R. Weingast. *Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009.
- (6) Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson. *Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty*. Random House, New York, 2012.

Sesión 19 (Octubre/18). Clasificando Regímenes Políticos

- (1) Joseph Alois Schumpeter. *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*. Sublime Books, 2015 [1942], caps. XXI-XXII.
- (2) Adam Przeworski. Minimalist Conception of Democracy: A Defense. In Ian Shapiro and Casiano Hacker-Cordon, editors, *Democracy's Value*. Cambridge University Press, New York, 1999.
- (3) Samuel P. Huntington. *The Third Wave. Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. University of California Press, Norman (CA), 1991, cap. 1.
- (4) Milan W. Svoblik. *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012, cap. 2.

Lecturas optativas

- (1) Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl. What Democracy Is... and Is Not. *Journal of Democracy*, 2(3):75–88, 1991.
- (2) Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi. *Democracy and Development. Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000, cap. 1.
- (3) Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, Frida Andersson, Kyle L. Marquardt, Valeriya Mechkova, Farhad Miri, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Natalia Stepanova, Eitan Tzelgov, and Yi-ting Wang. V-Dem Methodology v5. Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project, 2015.
- (4) Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz. Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A New Data Set. *Perspectives on Politics*, 12(2):313–331, 2014.
- (5) Monty G. Marshall, Ted Robert Gurr, and Keith Jagers. Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2015. Dataset User's Manual. Technical report, Center for Systemic Peace, 2015.
- (6) *Michael K. Miller. Democratic Pieces: Autocratic Elections and Democratic Development since 1815. *British Journal of Political Science*, 45(3):501–530, 2015.

Sesión 20 (Octubre/20). Regímenes autoritarios (I): Dilemas

- (1) Stephen Haber. Authoritarian Government. In Barry R. Weingast and Donald A. Wittman, editors, *The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy*, pages 693–707. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006.

- (2) Milan W. Svobik. *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012, caps. 1 y *6.

Lecturas optativas

- (1) Robert Barro. *Constitutionalism and Dictatorship: Pinochet, the Junta, and the 1980 Constitution*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002.
- (2) Jason Brownlee. Hereditary Succession in Modern Autocracies. *World Politics*, 59(4):595–628, 2007.
- (3) Beatriz Magaloni. Credible Power-Sharing and the Longevity of Authoritarian Rule. *Comparative Political Studies*, 41(4-5):715–741, 2008.
- (4) Ora John Reuter and Thomas F. Remington. Dominant Party Regimes and the Commitment Problem: The Case of United Russia. *Comparative Political Studies*, 42(4):501–526, 2009.

Sesión 21 (Octubre/25). Regímenes autoritarios (II): Autoritarismos Competitivos

- (1) Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way. The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism. *Journal of Democracy*, 13(2):51–65, 2002.
- (2) Yonatan L. Morse. The Era of Electoral Authoritarianism. *World Politics*, 64(1):161–198, 2012.
- (3) Javier Corrales. Hugo Boss. *Foreign Policy*, (152):32–40, 2006.
- (4) *Chang-Tai Hsieh, Edward Miguel, Daniel Ortega, and Francisco Rodriguez. The Price of Political Opposition: Evidence from Venezuela's "Maisanta". *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 3(2):196–214, 2011.

Lecturas optativas

- (1) Fareed Zakaria. The Rise of Illiberal Democracy. *Foreign Affairs*, 76(6):22–43, 1997.
- (2) Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way. *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010, caps. 1-2.
- (3) Alberto Simpser. *Why Governments and Parties Manipulate Elections: Theory, Practice, and Implications*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013.
- (4) *Paul J. Schuler, Dimitar Gueorguiev, and Francisco Cantú. Risk and Reward: The Differential Impact of Authoritarian Elections on Regime Decay and Breakdown. Unpublished manuscript, 2015.
- (5) *Aleksandar Matovski. Our Brand is Crisis: Political, Economic and Security Upheavals and the Rise of Electoral Authoritarianism. Unpublished manuscript, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, 2016.
- (6) Beatriz Magaloni. *Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and Its Demise in Mexico*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006.
- (7) Kenneth F. Greene. *Why Dominant Parties Lose: Mexico's Democratization in Comparative Perspective*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007.
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V. Individuos, Cultura Política y Capital Social

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- (2) Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow. *The Logic of Political Survival*. The MIT Press, Cambridge, 2003, caps. 1-2.
- (3) Bruce Bueno de Mesquita. Leopold II and the Selectorate: An Account in Contrast to a Racial Explanation. *Historical Social Research*, 32(4):203–221, 2007.

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- (2) *Pablo Querubín. Family and Politics: Dynastic Persistence in the Philippines. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, 11(2):151–181, 2016.

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- (2) Avner Greif. Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies. *The Journal of Political Economy*, 102(5):912–950, 1994.
- (3) Alberto Alesina and Paola Giuliano. Culture and Institutions. *Journal of Economic Literature*, forthcoming.
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