Supporting Information

"District Magnitude and Female Representation: Evidence from Argentina and Latin America," by Adrián Lucardi and Juan Pablo Micozzi (forthcoming, *American Journal of Political Science*)
(for online publication only)

(1) Section A1 describes the electoral calendar employed in the Argentine Chamber of Deputies and the legislature of the province of Buenos Aires; shows that the two chambers of the latter differ little except in terms of district magnitude; and summarizes the electoral rules employed in 17 Latin America countries covered by Jones, Alles and Tchintian (2012).

(2) Section A2 presents the results of the balance checks.

(3) Section A3 presents the descriptive statistics.

(4) Section A4 reports the robustness checks.

A1 Electoral calendar

Table A2 lists all districts that elect representatives to the legislature of the province of Buenos Aires and indicates whether they elect more representatives in midterm or concurrent election years. Table A1 does the same for the Argentine Chamber of Deputies. Table A3 lists the electoral rules employed in 17 Latin American countries covered by Jones, Alles and Tchintian (2012) plus those included in the out-of-sample analysis.

Magnitude changes in Latin America. In the Latin American sample, variation in district magnitude comes from three main sources: (a) changes in assembly size in Guatemala, whose legislature switched from 100 members in 1985 to 116 in 1990, 80 in 1994, 113 in 1999, and 158/60 afterwards; (b) the 2006 disappearance of El Salvador's national district, whose 20 seats were divided among the remaining 14 constituencies; and (c) minor reallocations following national censuses in several countries. To the best of our knowledge, district boundaries, which coincide with subnational administrative divisions, did not change during the period of interest. At the very least, district *names* remained constant.

Congruent bicameralism in Buenos Aires. The chambers of the Buenos Aires legislature are extremely similar in terms of both (a) how representatives are elected; and (b) what constitutional powers they have. The only major difference is the magnitude of the districts used to elect deputies and senators.

1. *Electoral rules.* Arts. 56 and 62 of the 1934 provincial constitution (69 and 75 in the 1994 constitution) specify that the lower and upper chamber will have 84 and 42 legislators respectively, though these numbers may be increased up to a maximum of 100 and 50. Arts. 57 and 65 (now 70 and 78) mandate that both deputies and senators will serve four-year terms, but the chambers will be renewed by halves ev-

ery two years. There is a difference in minimum age requirements (22 for deputies, 30 for senators; see arts. 58 and 63, now 71 and 76), but legislators are generally older than 30, so this matters little in practice. Art. 48 (now art. 61) establishes that the legislature must create an unspecified number of electoral districts, which will elect a minimum of 3 senators and 6 deputies. The district boundaries and district magnitudes listed in Table A2 were established in arts. 12-13 (enacted in 1946 and last amended in 1961) of provincial law #5109. Arts. 109-110 of the same law, which regulate the electoral formula and threshold, make no distinctions between the lower and upper chambers.

2. *Legislative powers.* The duration of legislative sessions and quorum requirements are identical for both chambers. As in any conventional *navette* system, they set their own budget and rules, create their own committees, make non-binding resolutions and declarations, and summon members of other branches for questioning (arts. 70-89 of the 1934 provincial constitution, now arts. 83-102). Arts. 90-99 and 192 (now 103-112 and 206) give both chambers identical attributions to introduce and approve bills – there is not even a requirement that the budget be introduced in the lower chamber –, override changes made by the other chamber, or override executive vetoes. A few minor differences can be found in roles like impeachment (the lower chamber prosecutes and the Senate judges) and confirmation powers: executive nominees to the Provincial Board of Education must be ratified by the lower chamber, while the Senate confirms the heads of the Treasury and the General Accountant (see arts. 60, 66 and 69, now 73, 79 and 82).

Table A1: Delegation sizes and district magnitudes in Argentina, 1985-2017

province	in sample?	delegation size	magnitude (midterm)	magnitude (concurrent)
Catamarca La Pampa Neuquén San Luis Santa Cruz	Yes	5	3	2
Chubut Formosa La Rioja Río Negro Tierra del Fuego*	Yes	5	2	3
Jujuy San Juan	No	6	3	3
Chaco	Yes	7	4	3
Corrientes† Misiones Salta Santiago del Estero‡	Yes	7	3	4
Entre Ríos	Yes	9	5	4
Tucumán	Yes	9	4	5
Mendoza	No	10	5	5
Córdoba	No	18	9	9
Santa Fe	Yes	19	9	10
Ciudad de Buenos Aires	Yes	25	13	12
Buenos Aires	No	70	35	35
Total	19/24	257	127	130
mean		10.7	5.3	5.4
median		6.5	3.0	3.0

Midterm years: 1985, 1989, 1993, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2009, 2013 and 2017. Concurrent years: 1987, 1991, 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011 and 2015. (*) Elected only 2 deputies before 1991 (in midterm years). (†) The ordering of midterm and concurrent elections is reversed after 1993, when the subnational electoral calendar changed. (‡) The ordering of midterm and concurrent elections is reversed after 2005, when the subnational electoral calendar changed.

Table A2: Delegation sizes and district magnitudes in Buenos Aires, 1985-2015

district	in sample?	delegation size	magnitude (midterm)	magnitude (concurrent)
sección VIII	Yes	3 (upper) + 6 (lower)	6	3
sección VII	Yes	3 (upper) + 6 (lower)	3	6
sección II	Yes	5 (upper) + 11 (lower)	11	5
sección V	Yes	5 (upper) + 11 (lower)	5	11
sección VI	Yes	6 (upper) + 11 (lower)	11	6
sección IV	Yes	7 (upper) + 14 (lower)	7	14
sección I	Yes	8 (upper) + 15 (lower)	8	15
sección II	Yes	9 (upper) + 18 (lower)	18	9
Total	8/8	46 (upper) + 92 (lower)	69	69
mean		5.75 (upper) + 11.5 (lower)	8.6	8.6
median		5.5 (upper) + 11 (lower)	7.5	7.5

Midterm years: 1985, 1989, 1993, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2009 and 2013. Concurrent years: 1987, 1991, 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011 and 2015.

Table A3: Electoral rules and gender quotas in Latin America

country	chamber	period	quota	# elections	# districts	# obs.[†]
(a) Closed-list PR						
Argentina*	lower	pre-quota: 1985-1991 post-quota: 1993-2017	33%	4 13	5	20 65
Bolivia	lower (upper tier)	post-quota: 2009	50%	1	9	—
	upper	post-quota: 2009-2019	25/50%	3	9	27
Costa Rica	unicameral	post-quota: 2002-2018	40/50%	5	7	35
El Salvador	unicameral	pre-quota: 1994-2012 post-quota: 2015-2018	30%	7 2	14/15	102 28
Guatemala	unicameral	pre-quota: 1985-2019	—	10	24	240
Mexico	lower (upper tier)	post-quota: 2009	40%	1	5	—
Nicaragua	unicameral	pre-quota: 2011	—	1	18	—
Paraguay	upper & lower	pre-quota: 1993 post-quota: 1998-2018	20%[‡]	1 5	18 + 1	18 + 1 90 + 5
Venezuela	unicameral (upper tier)	pre-quota: 2010 post-quota: 2015	50%	1 1	24	24 24
(b) Open-list PR						
Brazil	lower	post-quota: 2010	30%	1	27	—
Chile	upper & lower	pre-quota: 2009	—	1	60 + 9	—
Colombia	upper & lower	pre-quota: 2010	—	1	36 + 2	—
Dom. Republic	lower	post-quota: 2010	33%	1	48	—
Ecuador	unicameral	post-quota: 2009	50%	1	26	—
Honduras	unicameral	post-quota: 2009	30%	1	18	—
Panama	unicameral	post-quota: 2009	30%[‡]	1	39	—
Peru	unicameral	post-quota: 2011	30%	1	26	—
(c) Single-member district plurality (SMDP)						
Bolivia	lower (lower tier)	post-quota: 2009	50%	1	70	—
Dom. Republic	upper	pre-quota: 2010	—	1	32	—
Mexico	lower (lower tier)	post-quota: 2009	40%	1	300	—
Venezuela	unicameral (lower tier)	pre-quota: 2010	—	1	90	—
(d) Other: open-list MMPD (Brazil) and PR with double simultaneous vote (Uruguay)						
Brazil	upper	pre-quota: 2010	—	1	27	—
Uruguay	upper & lower	pre-quota: 2009	—	1	19 + 1	—

All data for countries for which a single election is mentioned comes from Jones, Alles and Tchintian (2012). Remaining data comes from OEP – Bolivia; TSE – Costa Rica; TSE – El Salvador; TSE, Electoral Passport and Asociación de Investigación y Estudios Sociales (2005) – Guatemala; SILPY and TSJE – Paraguay; CNE – Venezuela; and IDEA (2020) for gender quotas. (*) Only provinces with an even number of representatives (see Table A1). (†) Only reported for countries included in the out-of-sample analysis (Table 5). (‡) For primary elections only.

A2 Balance checks

Random sampling implies that districts that elect more representatives in midterm years should not differ systematically from those that have larger magnitudes in concurrent years. To check whether this is the case, we collected data on 40 (for Argentina) or 46 (for Buenos Aires) pre-treatment covariates and examined the difference in means between both groups of districts in each sample.

Tables A4 and A5 display the results for the Argentine and Buenos Aires samples, respectively. We report the means for both groups of districts, as well as the difference between the two and the exact p-values for the sharp null hypothesis that having a larger magnitude in midterm years has no effect for any district, which are also displayed in Figure A1. To calculate these, we sampled 100,000 vectors of eight 1's and ten 0's (or ten 1's and eight 0's), always adding Tierra del Fuego to the ten-province group[1] (for Argentina); or four 1's and four 0's (for Buenos Aires). For every draw we calculated the difference in means for each variable, and saved these values. The p-values are the proportion of draws in which the absolute value of the difference in means in the actual sample was smaller than the absolute value of the simulated differences in means. For example, the p-value of 0.89 for the log of population in Argentina indicates that approximately 89,000 simulations produced a difference in means that was equal to or larger in size than the one we observe in the data.

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[1] This reflects the rules of the original draw that determined whether the deputies elected in 1983 would receive a two- or a four-year term: the number of deputies elected in concurrent and midterm years had to be equal; and the two deputies from Tierra del Fuego had to be elected simultaneously (Dal Bó and Rossi 2011). That is, before Tierra del Fuego became a province there was a group of ten provinces with a higher magnitude in concurrent years, a group of eight with a higher magnitude in midterm years, and a district that elected only two representatives in midterm years. Upon becoming a province, Tierra del Fuego began to elect three additional deputies in concurrent years, thus joining the former group.

Table A4: Covariate balance (1): Argentina

(a) Outcome variables (1983)	large midterm mean	large concurrent mean	difference	p-value
Women elected (%)	2.29	3.12	-0.83	0.72
Women elected (#)	0.25	0.18	0.07	1.00
Woman elected (0/100)	25.00	18.18	6.82	1.00
2+ Women elected (0/100)	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00
(b) Intervening variables (1983)				
# lists seats	2.62	2.18	0.44	0.29
ENPS	2.22	2.07	0.14	0.46
Party magnitude (median)	2.69	3.36	-0.68	0.53
Party magnitude (mean)	2.98	3.39	-0.41	0.69
Party magnitude (mean, wt.)	3.29	3.06	0.23	0.83
Party magnitude (largest)	4.50	3.91	0.59	0.75
(c) Pseudo-outcomes (1983)				
Revenues per capita (log)	7.16	7.09	0.07	0.82
Own revenues (%)	19.56	14.80	4.76	0.62
Royalties (%)	12.78	9.68	3.10	0.72
Automatic transfers (%)	28.50	33.99	-5.50	0.05
Discretionary transfers (%)	38.83	41.00	-2.17	0.80
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000)	35.50	39.52	-4.02	0.37
(d) Electoral outcomes (1983)				
# lists running	11.50	12.00	-0.50	0.68
ENPV	2.69	2.71	-0.02	0.96
Vote first two (%)	84.49	84.99	-0.50	0.93
Gallagher index	7.97	9.38	-1.41	0.47
Vote PJ (%)	38.70	43.01	-4.31	0.32
Vote UCR (%)	44.19	41.98	2.21	0.39
Vote third party (%)	10.05	8.06	1.99	0.67
(e) Demographics (1980)				
Population (log)	12.93	12.99	-0.07	0.89
Population density (per km^2, log)	2.10	1.69	0.41	0.79
Living in poverty (%)	31.00	39.81	-8.81	0.12
(f) Geography and history				
Land area (1,000s km^2)	104.93	106.92	-1.99	0.95
Latitude	35.11	32.52	2.58	0.53
Elevation (m) (log)	6.20	6.17	0.03	0.91
Ocean access (0/100)	37.50	27.27	10.23	1.00
Tropical (%)	20.11	52.64	-32.53	0.09
Average precipitation	55.57	63.80	-8.22	0.62
Average temperature	15.02	16.57	-1.55	0.51
Average wind speed	3.53	3.39	0.14	0.75
Oil and gas fields (1,000s)	33.25	19.00	14.25	0.54
Founding province (0/100)	37.50	54.55	-17.05	0.64
Foreign born in 1914 (%)	31.06	26.68	4.38	0.66
(g) Political representation (1983)				
Delegation size	8.25	7.09	1.16	0.73
Seat/Population ratio	2.18	1.97	0.22	0.75
% seats - % population	0.81	0.46	0.35	0.29

Mean values of pre-treatment covariates for provinces that have a larger magnitude in midterm or concurrent years, respectively (see Table A1). The sample is limited to the 19 provinces that elect an odd number of representatives. The *p*-values correspond to the sharp null hypothesis that the effect of having a larger magnitude in midterm years is zero for all provinces.

(a) Argentine Chamber of Deputies (N = 19)

(b) Legislature of the Province of Buenos Aires (N = 8)


Figure A1: Covariate balance. The dots report the exact *p*-values for the sharp null hypothesis that having a higher magnitude in midterm years has no effect on any district.

Table A5: Covariate balance (2): Province of Buenos Aires

(a) *Outcome variables (1983)*	large midterm mean	large concurrent mean	difference	*p*-value
Women elected (lower) (%)	2.78	1.67	1.11	1.00
Women elected (upper) (%)	2.78	3.12	-0.35	1.00
Women elected (lower) (#)	0.50	0.25	0.25	1.00
Women elected (upper) (#)	0.25	0.25	0.00	1.00
Woman elected (lower) (0/100)	25.00	25.00	0.00	1.00
Woman elected (upper) (0/100)	25.00	25.00	0.00	1.00
2+ Women elected (lower) (0/100)	25.00	0.00	25.00	1.00
2+ Women elected (upper) (0/100)	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00

(b) *Intervening variables (1983)*

	large midterm mean	large concurrent mean	difference	*p*-value
# lists seats (lower)	2.25	2.00	0.25	1.00
# lists seats (upper)	2.00	2.00	0.00	1.00
ENPS (lower)	1.97	1.89	0.08	0.57
ENPS (upper)	1.88	1.89	-0.02	0.91
Party magnitude (median) (lower)	5.50	5.75	-0.25	1.00
Party magnitude (median) (upper)	2.88	2.88	0.00	1.00
Party magnitude (mean) (lower)	5.00	5.75	-0.75	0.63
Party magnitude (mean) (upper)	2.88	2.88	0.00	1.00
Party magnitude (mean, wt.) (lower)	5.21	5.36	-0.15	0.86
Party magnitude (mean, wt.) (upper)	2.75	2.69	0.07	0.97
Party magnitude (largest) (lower)	6.50	7.00	-0.50	0.89
Party magnitude (largest) (upper)	3.50	3.50	0.00	1.00

(c) *Electoral outcomes (1983)*

	large midterm mean	large concurrent mean	difference	*p*-value
# lists running (lower)	14.25	15.00	-0.75	0.43
# lists running (upper)	13.75	14.00	-0.25	1.00
ENPV (lower)	2.38	2.37	0.01	0.86
ENPV (upper)	2.29	2.34	-0.05	0.49
Vote first two (lower) (%)	89.21	89.80	-0.58	0.71
Vote first two (upper) (%)	91.04	90.38	0.66	0.63
Gallagher index (lower)	6.18	7.44	-1.25	0.20
Gallagher index (upper)	6.55	7.77	-1.22	0.17
Vote PJ (lower) (%)	36.38	36.07	0.30	0.86
Vote PJ (upper) (%)	36.91	36.09	0.83	0.69
Vote UCR (lower) (%)	52.84	53.72	-0.89	0.94
Vote UCR (upper) (%)	54.13	54.29	-0.16	0.94
Vote third party (lower) (%)	4.12	3.34	0.78	0.43
Vote third party (upper) (%)	2.80	3.27	-0.47	0.77

(d) *Demographics (1980)*

	large midterm mean	large concurrent mean	difference	*p*-value
Population (log)	13.69	13.62	0.07	0.86
Population density (per km^2, log)	4.33	3.16	1.17	0.37
Urbanization (%)	89.57	81.86	7.71	0.37
Literacy (%)	96.33	95.98	0.35	0.71

(e) *Geography and history*

	large midterm mean	large concurrent mean	difference	*p*-value
Land area (1,000s km^2)	32.88	44.02	-11.14	0.71
Municipalities (#)	13.25	18.00	-4.75	0.46
Delegation size (lower)	11.50	11.50	0.00	1.00

(f) *Political representation (1983)*

	large midterm mean	large concurrent mean	difference	*p*-value
Delegation size (upper)	5.75	5.75	0.00	1.00
Seat/Population ratio (lower)	1.64	1.94	-0.29	0.68
Seat/Population ratio (upper)	1.63	1.92	-0.28	0.74
% seats - % population (lower)	-0.13	0.13	-0.27	0.97
% seats - % population (upper)	-0.13	0.13	-0.27	0.97

Mean values of pre-treatment covariates for districts that have a larger magnitude in midterm or concurrent years, respectively (see Table A2). The *p*-values correspond to the sharp null hypothesis that the effect of having a larger magnitude in midterm years is zero for all districts.

A3 Descriptive statistics

Table A6: Descriptive statistics

(a) Full sample	Argentina					Province of Buenos Aires					Latin America‡				
	N	mean	sd.*	min.	max.	N	mean	sd.*	min.	max.	N	mean	sd.*	min.	max.
Magnitude	321	3.9	2.6	2.0	13.0	128	8.6	4.3	3.0	18.0	679	6.2	7.6	1.0	45.0
Women elected (%)	321	24.6	21.4	0.0	100.0	128	18.3	13.6	0.0	50.0	679	15.5	20.1	0.0	100.0
Women elected (#)	321	1.0	1.2	0.0	7.0	128	1.7	1.5	0.0	6.0	679	1.2	2.2	0.0	13.0
Woman elected (0/100)	321	63.6	48.2	0.0	100.0	128	73.4	44.3	0.0	100.0	679	47.1	50.0	0.0	100.0
2+ Women elected (0/100)	321	20.6	40.5	0.0	100.0	128	47.7	50.1	0.0	100.0	679	23.3	42.3	0.0	100.0
# lists seats	321	2.2	0.8	1.0	7.0	128	2.4	0.8	1.0	5.0	679	3.0	1.6	1.0	18.0
ENPS	321	2.0	0.7	1.0	6.0	128	2.1	0.6	1.0	3.7	679	2.6	1.1	1.0	11.6
Party magnitude (median)	321	1.7	0.8	1.0	5.0	128	3.5	1.5	1.0	9.0	679	1.8	1.7	1.0	20.0
Party magnitude (mean)	321	1.8	0.8	1.0	5.0	128	3.6	1.5	1.5	9.0	679	1.9	1.7	1.0	17.5
Party magnitude (mean, wt.)	321	1.5	0.8	0.4	5.8	128	3.2	1.5	0.7	8.1					
Party magnitude (largest)	321	2.2	1.3	1.0	9.0	128	4.9	2.2	2.0	11.0	679	2.8	3.4	1.0	24.0
(b) Pre-quota (ARG: 1985-1991; PBA: 1985-1995; LatAm: various countries and years)															
Magnitude	74	3.9	2.7	2.0	13.0	48	8.6	4.3	3.0	18.0	405	5.6	6.3	1.0	45.0
Women elected (%)	74	3.9	10.5	0.0	50.0	48	6.9	8.6	0.0	33.3	405	9.9	17.6	0.0	100.0
Women elected (#)	74	0.2	0.5	0.0	3.0	48	0.7	0.9	0.0	3.0	405	0.7	1.4	0.0	10.0
Woman elected (0/100)	74	13.5	34.4	0.0	100.0	48	45.8	50.4	0.0	100.0	405	34.1	47.5	0.0	100.0
2+ Women elected (0/100)	74	4.1	19.9	0.0	100.0	48	14.6	35.7	0.0	100.0	405	13.6	34.3	0.0	100.0
# lists seats	74	2.3	0.6	1.0	4.0	48	2.3	0.7	1.0	4.0	405	3.1	1.7	1.0	18.0
ENPS	74	2.2	0.5	1.0	3.6	48	2.1	0.5	1.0	3.3	405	2.7	1.2	1.0	11.6
Party magnitude (median)	74	1.6	0.7	1.0	4.0	48	3.5	1.3	1.0	7.0	405	1.5	1.3	1.0	17.0
Party magnitude (mean)	74	1.6	0.7	1.0	4.0	48	3.6	1.3	1.5	7.0	405	1.7	1.3	1.0	15.0
Party magnitude (mean, wt.)	74	1.5	0.8	0.7	4.2	48	3.3	1.5	1.2	6.9					
Party magnitude (largest)	74	2.0	1.3	1.0	7.0	48	4.9	2.1	2.0	11.0	405	2.4	2.6	1.0	20.0
(c) Post-quota (ARG: 1993-2017; PBA: 1997-2015; LatAm: various countries and years)															
Magnitude	247	3.9	2.6	2.0	13.0	80	8.6	4.3	3.0	18.0	274	7.1	9.1	1.0	45.0
Women elected (%)	247	30.8	19.9	0.0	100.0	80	25.2	11.2	0.0	50.0	274	23.8	20.7	0.0	100.0
Women elected (#)	247	1.3	1.2	0.0	7.0	80	2.3	1.5	0.0	6.0	274	1.9	2.9	0.0	13.0
Woman elected (0/100)	247	78.5	41.1	0.0	100.0	80	90.0	30.2	0.0	100.0	274	66.4	47.3	0.0	100.0
2+ Women elected (0/100)	247	25.5	43.7	0.0	100.0	80	67.5	47.1	0.0	100.0	274	37.6	48.5	0.0	100.0
# lists seats	247	2.2	0.9	1.0	7.0	80	2.4	0.9	1.0	5.0	274	2.8	1.4	1.0	8.0
ENPS	247	2.0	0.7	1.0	6.0	80	2.1	0.6	1.0	3.7	274	2.4	0.9	1.0	5.7
Party magnitude (median)	247	1.8	0.8	1.0	5.0	80	3.5	1.7	1.5	9.0	274	2.1	2.0	1.0	20.0
Party magnitude (mean)	247	1.8	0.8	1.0	5.0	80	3.6	1.6	1.5	9.0	274	2.2	2.1	1.0	17.5
Party magnitude (mean, wt.)	247	1.5	0.8	0.4	5.8	80	3.1	1.6	0.7	8.1					
Party magnitude (largest)	247	2.3	1.3	1.0	9.0	80	4.8	2.2	2.0	10.0	274	3.4	4.2	1.0	24.0
Women First (%)†	228	17.9	16.1	0.0	83.3										
Women First (%, wt.)†	228	17.5	23.9	0.0	98.1										
Women Second (%)†	228	74.5	23.0	0.0	100.0										
Women Second (%, wt.)†	228	75.1	29.2	0.0	100.0										
Women First Two (%)†	228	46.2	10.4	0.0	66.7										
Women First Two (%, wt.)†	228	46.3	12.4	0.0	85.0										
Women Third (%)†	168	30.6	23.0	0.0	100.0										
Women Third (%, wt.)†	168	27.7	28.4	0.0	100.0										
Women First Three (%)†	168	40.0	6.3	25.0	58.3										
Women First Three (%, wt.)†	168	39.1	8.2	15.8	64.3										

(*) Indicates the within-province standard deviation rather than the sample standard deviation. (†) Data for these variables is only available for the Argentine sample between 1995 and 2017. (‡) Elections held under closed-list PR only. These are the cases for which a valid number of observations is reported in the last column of Table A3a.

(a) *# list seats*

(b) ᴇɴᴘꜱ

(c) *party magnitude* (median)

(d) *party magnitude* (mean)

(b) *party magnitude* (mean, wt.)

(b) *party magnitude* (largest)

Figure A2: Evolution of intermediate variables over time in the Argentine Chamber of Deputies (1985-2017) and the legislature of the Province of Buenos Aires (1985-2015). The broken vertical lines indicate the date of the introduction of gender quotas: between 1991 and 1993 for Argentina, and between 1995 and 1997 for Buenos Aires.

12

(a) Argentina
          (b) Province of Buenos Aires

Figure A3: Probability of electing at least one or two female legislators in a district, conditional on delegation size and district magnitude. The black vertical lines indicate 95% cis, based on robust standard errors clustered by district and assuming a Student's *t*-distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number of districts minus one.

13

(a) Argentine Chamber of Deputies, post-quota (1993-2017)

(b) Legislature of the Province of Buenos Aires, post-quota (1997-2015)

Figure A4: Probability of electing at least one woman, conditional on district magnitude and the number of lists receiving seats. Bar widths are proportional to the number of observations with a given value of *Magnitude*. The black vertical lines indicate 95% CIs, based on robust standard errors clustered by district and assuming a Student's *t*-distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number of districts minus one.

(a) Argentine Chamber of Deputies, post-quota (1993-2017)

(b) Legislature of the Province of Buenos Aires, post-quota (1997-2015)

Figure A5: Probability of electing two or more women, conditional on district magnitude and the number of lists receiving seats. Bar widths are proportional to the number of observations with a given value of *Magnitude*. The black vertical lines indicate 95% CIs, based on robust standard errors clustered by district and assuming a Student's *t*-distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number of districts minus one.

Figure A6: Probability of electing at least one (top) or two (bottom) women, conditional on district magnitude and the number of lists receiving seats – Latin American sample. Bar widths are proportional to the number of observations with a given value of *Magnitude*. The black vertical lines indicate 95% CIS, based on robust standard errors clustered by district and assuming a Student's *t*-distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number of districts minus one.

A4   Robustness checks

(1) *Adding controls and small-magnitude sample.* Panel (a) in Tables A7, A9, A11 and A12 replicates the results reported in panel (a) of Tables 1 to 4, but including the following dummies plus all their possible interactions: concurrency with (a) presidential; (b) Senate; (c) gubernatorial; or (d) local legislative elections; and whether the incumbent governor (e) was allowed to run for re-election at the end of her term, regardless of whether (s)he was actually running; (f) was actually running for reelection; or (g) appeared in the ballot in any way (i.e., as a candidate for the Senate). The specifications in panel (b) do not include controls but restrict the analysis to the ten provinces with a delegation size of 5 or lower (see Table A1).

(2) *Female nomination and mediators.* Table A10 shows the effect of women's position in party lists – measured in six alternative ways: as the percentage of women placed in the first, second, or first two positions of the list, weighting lists both equally and by their vote shares – on the six mediators reported in Table 2. Due to data limitations, the sample is restricted to Argentina between 1995 and 2017.

(3) *Alternative mediators.* Tables A13 and A14 replicate the results in the first two panels of Table 3 but for alternative mediators: (a) the *effective* number of parties in seats (ENPS), which weights parties' seat shares by their squared values (Laakso and Taagepera 1979); and the (b) mean, (c) vote share-weighted mean; and (d) largest values of party magnitude.

(4) *Placebo results for Argentina.* Table A8 displays the effect of *Magnitude* on time-varying outcomes that should not be affected by it, like provincial revenues or the unemployment and infant mortality rates.

17

(5) *Latin American sample.* The last four tables replicate the specifications reported in Table 5, but introducing the following changes: (a) excluding observations from Argentina (Table A15); (b) counting "strong" quotas only, meaning that at least 30% of candidates in general elections must be women, there are placement mandates, and quotas are effectively enforced (Table A16); (c) looking at districts with a magnitude of 5 or less (Table A17); or (d) using alternative mediators (Table A18).

Table A7: Overall effect, adding controls + small provinces (Argentina only)

	Women elected (%)	Women elected (#) (log)‡	Woman elected (0/100)	2+ Women elected (0/100)
(a) Adding controls	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Magnitude† (pre-quota)	2.91 [-0.66:6.49] [-1.09:6.91]	0.14 [-0.12:0.41] [-0.17:0.46]	13.87 [1.53:26.21] [-1.52:29.26]	5.78 [-3.20:14.77] [-6.57:18.14]
Magnitude† (post-quota)	3.32 [-0.02:6.66] [-0.26:6.91]	0.65 [0.48:0.82] [0.47:0.82]	16.24 [5.23:27.26] [3.57:28.91]	11.43 [5.98:16.88] [6.09:16.77]
num. obs	321	321	321	321
(b) Small provinces (delegation size ≤ 5)				
Magnitude† (pre-quota)	0.88 [-7.59:9.36] [-7.81:9.58]	0.09 [-0.27:0.45] [-0.28:0.47]	5.29 [-15.97:26.56] [-16.66:27.25]	-0.00 [-0.00:0.00]
Magnitude† (post-quota)	3.83 [-2.24:9.90] [-3.21:10.87]	0.62 [0.37:0.88] [0.34:0.91]	34.61 [20.74:48.48] [19.02:50.21]	3.29 [-3.21:9.79]
num. obs	168	168	168	168

OLS regression estimates. Panel (a) replicates the specifications in Table 1a, but adding the following dummies plus all their possible interactions: concurrency with (a) presidential; (b) Senate; (c) gubernatorial; or (d) local legislative elections; whether the incumbent governor (e) was allowed to run for re-election at the end of her term, regardless of whether (s)he was actually running; (f) was actually running for reelection; or (g) appeared in the ballot in any way (i.e., as a candidate for the Senate). Panel (b) replicates the specifications in Table 1a but restricting the sample to the ten provinces with a delegation size of 5 or lower. All specifications include district and year fixed effects. 95% CIs based on standard errors clustered by district and adjusted by the number of clusters are reported at the top; wild bootstrapped CIs are reported at the bottom. (†) log(*Magnitude*) in column (2). (‡) We added 1 to the outcome before logging.

Table A8: Placebo outcomes for Argentina, 1985-2011

	revenues per capita (log)	% own revenues	% royalties	% automatic transfers	% discretionary transfers	public employees (per 1,000)	unemployment rate (%)	infant mortality (per 1,000)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
(a) Pooled								
Magnitude†	-0.53	5.80	-1.39	-3.47	-0.72	-4.11	0.28	-0.57
	[-0.85:-0.21]	[2.83:8.77]	[-2.64:-0.15]	[-7.11:0.18]	[-1.24:-0.19]	[-6.55:-1.67]	[-0.23:0.79]	[-1.18:0.03]
	[-0.92:-0.14]	[-3.36:14.96]	[-2.80:0.02]	[-11.83:4.89]	[-1.12:-0.31]	[-7.75:-0.48]	[-0.81:1.38]	[-1.47:0.32]
(b) Fixed-effects								
Magnitude†	-0.02	-0.42	0.02	0.25	0.37	0.04	-0.01	-0.24
	[-0.07:0.03]	[-0.94:0.10]	[-0.57:0.61]	[-0.61:1.10]	[-0.27:1.00]	[-0.94:1.01]	[-0.28:0.26]	[-0.66:0.18]
	[-0.08:0.04]	[-0.95:0.11]	[-0.60:0.64]	[-0.66:1.15]	[-0.30:1.04]	[-0.90:0.98]	[-0.29:0.28]	[-0.68:0.20]
num. obs	245	245	245	245	245	218	263	225

OLS regression estimates. The outcomes are placebos that should not be affected by district magnitude (after accounting for district-specific effects). 95% CIs based on standard errors clustered by district and adjusted by the number of clusters are reported at the top; wild bootstrapped CIs are reported at the bottom. (†) logged value in column (1).

Table A9: Intermediate effect (1), adding controls + small provinces (Argentina only)

	# list seats	ENPS	median	Party magnitude mean	mean, wt.	largest
(a) Adding controls	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Magnitude (pre-quota)	0.07 [−0.13:0.28] [−0.17:0.31]	−0.02 [−0.18:0.14] [−0.21:0.17]	0.39 [0.26:0.53] [0.23:0.56]	0.44 [0.30:0.59] [0.26:0.63]	0.49 [0.38:0.60] [0.35:0.63]	0.74 [0.60:0.89] [0.58:0.90]
Magnitude (post-quota)	0.13 [−0.06:0.32] [−0.08:0.33]	0.06 [−0.08:0.20] [−0.09:0.21]	0.37 [0.23:0.52] [0.21:0.54]	0.41 [0.28:0.54] [0.26:0.56]	0.45 [0.37:0.53] [0.36:0.54]	0.65 [0.53:0.78] [0.51:0.80]
num. obs	321	321	321	321	321	321

	Women in top list positions (%)				
	First	*Second*	*First two*	*Third*	*First three*
Magnitude	0.43 [−4.18:5.04] [−4.70:5.56]	−1.89 [−8.39:4.62] [−9.92:6.15]	−0.73 [−3.30:1.85] [−3.63:2.17]	−8.11 [−13.77:−2.44] [−15.78:−0.43]	−2.05 [−3.71:−0.38] [−4.20:0.11]

	Women in top list positions (%, weighted by vote shares)				
Magnitude	3.48 [−1.95:8.90] [−2.57:9.53]	−7.77 [−13.47:−2.07] [−13.87:−1.67]	−2.15 [−4.06:−0.23] [−4.43:0.13]	−7.31 [−15.18:0.56] [−17.41:2.79]	−3.27 [−5.91:−0.64] [−7.19:0.64]
num. obs	228	228	228	168	168

(b) Small provinces (delegation size ≤ 5)	# list seats	ENPS	median	Party magnitude mean	mean, wt.	largest
Magnitude (pre-quota)	0.21 [−0.04:0.47] [−0.03:0.45]	0.04 [−0.26:0.34] [−0.25:0.33]	0.37 [0.21:0.52] [0.22:0.52]	0.37 [0.21:0.52] [0.22:0.52]	0.41 [0.31:0.52] [0.31:0.51]	0.79 [0.53:1.04] [0.55:1.03]
Magnitude (post-quota)	0.31 [0.10:0.52] [0.10:0.51]	0.18 [−0.04:0.40] [−0.04:0.40]	0.36 [0.16:0.57] [0.17:0.56]	0.36 [0.16:0.57] [0.17:0.56]	0.42 [0.29:0.55] [0.29:0.56]	0.69 [0.48:0.90] [0.49:0.90]
num. obs	168	168	168	168	168	168

	Women in top list positions (%)			*Women in top list positions (%, wt.)*		
	First	*Second*	*First two*	*First*	*Second*	*First two*
Magnitude	−0.48 [−6.76:5.81] [−12.92:11.96]	−2.99 [−10.81:4.83] [−11.23:5.26]	−1.73 [−4.36:0.90] [−5.05:1.59]	3.43 [−6.35:13.20] [−6.95:13.80]	−8.61 [−17.23:0.00] [−18.12:0.90]	−2.59 [−4.53:−0.65] [−4.74:−0.45]
num. obs	120	120	120	120	120	120

OLS regression estimates. Panel (a) replicates the specifications in Table 1a and c, but adding the following dummies plus all their possible interactions: concurrency with (a) presidential; (b) Senate; (c) gubernatorial; or (d) local legislative elections; whether the incumbent governor (e) was allowed to run for re-election at the end of her term, regardless of whether (s)he was actually running; (f) was actually running for reelection; or (g) appeared in the ballot in any way (i.e., as a candidate for the Senate). Panel (b) replicates the specifications in Table 1a and c but restricting the sample to the ten provinces with a delegation size of 5 or lower. All specifications include district and year fixed effects. 95% CIs based on standard errors clustered by district and adjusted by the number of clusters are reported at the top; wild bootstrapped CIs are reported at the bottom.

Table A10: Women's position in lists ⇒ Mediators (Argentina, 1995-2017)

| | # list seats | ENPS | Party magnitude | | | |
			median	mean	mean, wt.	largest
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Women at the top of party lists						
Women first	0.14	0.19	-0.06	-0.02	0.04	-0.18
(%)	[-0.36:0.64]	[-0.31:0.70]	[-0.56:0.43]	[-0.47:0.42]	[-0.26:0.34]	[-0.68:0.32]
	[-0.38:0.66]	[-0.34:0.73]	[-0.56:0.44]	[-0.46:0.41]	[-0.25:0.34]	[-0.71:0.35]
Women in the second position of the party list						
Women second	-0.20	-0.15	0.33	0.28	0.02	0.10
(%)	[-0.68:0.29]	[-0.56:0.26]	[-0.18:0.85]	[-0.22:0.78]	[-0.26:0.30]	[-0.33:0.52]
	[-0.72:0.33]	[-0.58:0.28]	[-0.28:0.94]	[-0.30:0.87]	[-0.26:0.30]	[-0.35:0.54]
Women in the first two positions of party lists						
Women first two	-0.35	-0.12	0.94	0.84	0.14	-0.02
(%)	[-1.94:1.23]	[-1.43:1.20]	[-0.65:2.53]	[-0.67:2.36]	[-0.88:1.16]	[-1.43:1.38]
	[-2.40:1.69]	[-1.62:1.39]	[-1.24:3.11]	[-1.24:2.92]	[-0.93:1.21]	[-1.54:1.49]
Women at the top of party lists, weighted by vote shares						
Women first	-0.08	-0.02	0.28	0.24	0.08	0.02
(%, wt.)	[-0.42:0.26]	[-0.32:0.29]	[-0.14:0.70]	[-0.13:0.62]	[-0.16:0.31]	[-0.31:0.36]
	[-0.45:0.29]	[-0.35:0.32]	[-0.19:0.76]	[-0.20:0.68]	[-0.18:0.34]	[-0.35:0.40]
Women in the second position of the party list, weighted by vote shares						
Women second	-0.06	-0.05	0.09	0.03	-0.04	-0.05
(%, wt.)	[-0.38:0.25]	[-0.37:0.27]	[-0.23:0.41]	[-0.29:0.35]	[-0.30:0.22]	[-0.42:0.33]
	[-0.41:0.28]	[-0.38:0.28]	[-0.30:0.48]	[-0.37:0.42]	[-0.31:0.23]	[-0.46:0.37]
Women in the first two positions of party lists, weighted by vote shares						
Women first two	-0.47	-0.24	1.15	0.81	0.08	-0.10
(%, wt.)	[-1.66:0.73]	[-1.45:0.98]	[0.19:2.11]	[-0.30:1.92]	[-0.92:1.09]	[-1.66:1.46]
	[-1.91:0.97]	[-1.86:1.39]	[-0.15:2.45]	[-0.60:2.22]	[-1.19:1.35]	[-2.77:2.57]
num. obs	228	228	228	228	228	228

OLS regression estimates. Estimates and confidence intervals are multiplied by 100 for presentation purposes. Specifications replicate those from Table 1a, but replacing *Magnitude* with different measures of women's positions in party lists and adding magnitude fixed effects. All specifications include magnitude, district and year fixed effects. The sample is restricted to Argentina between 1995 and 2017. 95% CIs based on standard errors clustered by district and adjusted by the number of clusters are reported at the top; wild bootstrapped CIs are reported at the bottom.

Table A11: Intermediate effect (IIa), adding controls + small provinces (Argentina only)

	Women elected (%)	Women elected (#) (log)‡	Woman elected (0/100)	2+ Women elected (0/100)
(a) Adding controls	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Number of lists receiving seats				
# lists seats† (pre-quota)	-9.95 [-17.37:-2.52] [-19.50:-0.39]	-1.00 [-1.53:-0.46] [-1.71:-0.29]	-30.18 [-51.57:-8.79] [-56.93:-3.44]	-19.69 [-36.77:-2.61] [-40.85:1.47]
# lists seats† (post-quota)	-9.87 [-15.51:-4.23] [-18.10:-1.64]	-0.35 [-0.50:-0.19] [-0.52:-0.17]	-22.36 [-33.36:-11.37] [-35.89:-8.83]	-6.34 [-13.17:0.48] [-12.11:-0.57]
Party magnitude				
Party magnitude (median)‡ (pre-quota)	4.27 [-0.47:9.00] [-0.09:8.62]	-0.20 [-0.48:0.08] [-0.53:0.13]	-0.01 [-19.18:19.17] [-21.58:21.57]	-18.52 [-35.34:-1.69] [-45.73:8.70]
Party magnitude (median)‡ (post-quota)	8.35 [3.65:13.05] [3.10:13.60]	0.46 [0.32:0.59] [0.30:0.61]	17.28 [7.14:27.41] [4.66:29.89]	11.06 [1.39:20.74] [0.77:21.36]
num. obs	321	321	321	321
(b) Small provinces (delegation size ≤ 5)				
Number of lists receiving seats				
# lists seats† (pre-quota)	-6.28 [-20.77:8.20] [-26.23:13.66]	-0.30 [-0.93:0.34] [-2.05:1.46]	-26.82 [-60.57:6.93] [-77.60:23.96]	-1.47 [-7.01:4.07] [-7.84:4.90]
# lists seats† (post-quota)	-12.51 [-23.13:-1.90] [-24.88:-0.14]	-0.33 [-0.57:-0.09] [-0.61:-0.05]	-32.24 [-51.49:-12.99] [-52.26:-12.22]	6.54 [-6.58:19.66] [-10.42:23.50]
Party magnitude				
Party magnitude (median)‡ (pre-quota)	0.70 [-23.03:24.44] [-32.32:33.73]	-0.16 [-0.64:0.32] [-0.77:0.45]	-20.29 [-68.36:27.77] [-73.25:32.67]	-5.88 [-16.29:4.52] [-18.84:7.07]
Party magnitude (median)‡ (post-quota)	9.42 [0.11:18.72] [-1.56:20.40]	0.37 [0.15:0.60] [0.11:0.64]	27.28 [10.08:44.48] [7.14:47.43]	-5.66 [-15.72:4.40] [-17.78:6.46]
num. obs	168	168	168	168

OLS regression estimates. Panel (a) replicates the specifications in Table 3a, but adding the following dummies plus all their possible interactions: concurrency with (a) presidential; (b) Senate; (c) gubernatorial; or (d) local legislative elections; whether the incumbent governor (e) was allowed to run for re-election at the end of her term, regardless of whether (s)he was actually running; (f) was actually running for reelection; or (g) appeared in the ballot in any way (i.e., as a candidate for the Senate). Panel (b) replicates the specifications in Table 3a but restricting the sample to the ten provinces with a delegation size of 5 or lower. All specifications include magnitude, district and year fixed effects. 95% CIs based on standard errors clustered by district and adjusted by the number of clusters are reported at the top; wild bootstrapped CIs are reported at the bottom. (†) log(# *list seats*) in column (2). (‡) log(*party magnitude* (median)) in column (2). (§) We added 1 to the outcome before logging.

Table A12: Intermediate effect (iib), adding controls + small provinces (Argentina only)

	Women elected (%)	Women elected (#) (log)‡	Woman elected (0/100)	2+ Women elected (0/100)
(a) Adding controls	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)

Women at the top of party lists, weighted by vote shares

Women first	0.37	0.18	0.42	0.46
(%, wt.)†	[0.20:0.53]	[0.10:0.26]	[0.19:0.65]	[0.22:0.70]
	[0.18:0.55]	[0.08:0.27]	[0.17:0.68]	[0.17:0.75]

Women in the second position of the party list, weighted by vote shares

Women second	-0.17	-0.08	-0.24	-0.09
(%, wt.)†	[-0.32:-0.01]	[-0.21:0.05]	[-0.43:-0.04]	[-0.39:0.20]
	[-0.33:-0.00]	[-0.22:0.06]	[-0.44:-0.03]	[-0.43:0.24]

Women in the first two positions of party lists, weighted by vote shares

Women first two	0.49	0.13	0.40	1.10
(%, wt.)†	[0.14:0.85]	[-0.05:0.31]	[-0.17:0.97]	[0.26:1.94]
	[0.03:0.95]	[-0.09:0.36]	[-0.34:1.13]	[-0.09:2.29]
num. obs	228	228	228	228

(b) Small provinces (delegation size ≤ 5)				

Women at the top of party lists, weighted by vote shares

Women first	0.39	0.21	0.54	0.36
(%, wt.)†	[0.11:0.68]	[0.07:0.35]	[0.15:0.92]	[0.09:0.64]
	[0.01:0.77]	[0.06:0.37]	[0.09:0.98]	[0.03:0.69]

Women in the second position of the party list, weighted by vote shares

Women second	-0.28	-0.20	-0.32	-0.26
(%, wt.)†	[-0.50:-0.06]	[-0.38:-0.01]	[-0.65:0.01]	[-0.48:-0.03]
	[-0.51:-0.06]	[-0.39:-0.00]	[-0.63:-0.00]	[-0.51:-0.00]

Women in the first two positions of party lists, weighted by vote shares

Women first two	0.61	0.18	1.42	0.58
(%, wt.)†	[-0.02:1.24]	[-0.14:0.50]	[-0.36:3.19]	[-0.27:1.44]
	[-0.10:1.32]	[-0.17:0.52]	[-1.21:4.04]	[-0.36:1.52]
num. obs	120	120	120	120

OLS regression estimates. Panel (a) replicates the specifications in Table 4, but adding the following dummies plus all their possible interactions: concurrency with (a) presidential; (b) Senate; (c) gubernatorial; or (d) local legislative elections; whether the incumbent governor (e) was allowed to run for re-election at the end of her term, regardless of whether (s)he was actually running; (f) was actually running for reelection; or (g) appeared in the ballot in any way (i.e., as a candidate for the Senate). Panel (b) replicates the specifications in Table 4 but restricting the sample to the ten provinces with a delegation size of 5 or lower. All specifications include magnitude, district and year fixed effects. 95% CIs based on standard errors clustered by district and adjusted by the number of clusters are reported at the top; wild bootstrapped CIs are reported at the bottom. (†) Logged value of the (vote share-weighted) number of women in column (2). (‡) We added 1 to the outcome before logging.

Table A13: Intermediate effect (IIa), alternative mediators (Argentina only)

	Women elected (%)	Women elected (#) (log)‡	Woman elected (0/100)	2+ Women elected (0/100)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(a) Effective number of parties in seats				
ENPS[†] (pre-quota)	-7.30 [-12.99:-1.62] [-13.69:-0.92]	-0.67 [-1.15:-0.19] [-1.23:-0.12]	-20.45 [-38.42:-2.48] [-38.38:-2.53]	-14.12 [-31.36:3.12] [-30.27:2.02]
ENPS[†] (post-quota)	-8.79 [-15.06:-2.52] [-17.64:0.06]	-0.27 [-0.46:-0.09] [-0.50:-0.05]	-23.07 [-32.83:-13.30] [-35.46:-10.67]	-1.47 [-11.20:8.27] [-9.65:6.72]
(b) Party magnitude (mean)				
Party magnitude (mean)[†] (pre-quota)	4.08 [-0.71:8.87] [-0.32:8.48]	-0.21 [-0.48:0.07] [-0.53:0.11]	10.83 [-15.59:37.25] [-44.89:66.55]	-17.33 [-43.23:8.58] [-66.06:31.41]
Party magnitude (mean)[†] (post-quota)	7.28 [2.75:11.81] [2.41:12.16]	0.42 [0.27:0.58] [0.25:0.59]	16.07 [8.12:24.03] [7.00:25.15]	8.11 [-2.98:19.20] [-4.30:20.52]
(c) Party magnitude (mean, weighted by vote shares)				
Party magnitude (mean, wt.)[†] (pre-quota)	4.10 [-1.61:9.81] [-2.07:10.26]	-0.17 [-0.43:0.09] [-0.42:0.08]	14.15 [-5.07:33.37] [-12.91:41.21]	-17.74 [-39.60:4.13] [-54.35:18.88]
Party magnitude (mean, wt.)[†] (post-quota)	6.04 [-0.72:12.79] [-3.65:15.72]	0.34 [0.14:0.55] [0.09:0.60]	18.43 [6.25:30.61] [1.00:35.86]	4.74 [-8.10:17.58] [-9.05:18.53]
(d) Party magnitude (largest party)				
Party magnitude (largest)[†] (pre-quota)	3.95 [0.22:7.69] [-0.92:8.82]	-0.06 [-0.25:0.12] [-0.27:0.14]	13.32 [3.72:22.92] [3.40:23.24]	-10.33 [-24.82:4.16] [-34.56:13.89]
Party magnitude (largest)[†] (post-quota)	5.16 [-0.24:10.55] [-2.95:13.27]	0.41 [0.23:0.58] [0.20:0.62]	16.02 [4.52:27.52] [-2.06:34.10]	0.86 [-6.85:8.57] [-5.75:7.47]
num. obs	321	321	321	321

OLS regression estimates. Specifications replicate those in Table 3a, but using alternative mediator variables. All specifications include magnitude, district and year fixed effects. 95% CIs based on standard errors clustered by district and adjusted by the number of clusters are reported at the top; wild bootstrapped CIs are reported at the bottom. (†) Logged value of the mediator in column (2). (‡) We added 1 to the outcome before logging.

Table A14: Intermediate effect (IIa), alternative mediators (Buenos Aires only)

	Women elected (%)	Women elected (#) (log)‡	Woman elected (0/100)	2+ Women elected (0/100)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(a) *Effective number of parties in seats*				
ENPS†	-10.28	-0.80	-8.22	-22.79
(pre-quota)	[-20.19:-0.37]	[-1.15:-0.44]	[-45.52:29.09]	[-55.40:9.82]
	[-25.88:5.33]	[-1.35:-0.25]	[-70.89:54.46]	[-73.73:28.15]
ENPS†	-11.00	-0.42	-27.02	-4.46
(post-quota)	[-16.56:-5.44]	[-0.63:-0.21]	[-48.99:-5.05]	[-14.51:5.59]
	[-18.88:-3.12]	[-0.65:-0.19]	[-63.55:9.50]	[-12.91:3.99]
(b) *Party magnitude* (mean)				
Party magnitude	1.14	-0.08	5.63	-4.91
(mean)†	[-0.98:3.25]	[-0.29:0.13]	[-3.76:15.02]	[-13.89:4.06]
(pre-quota)	[-1.62:3.89]	[-0.31:0.14]	[-2.66:13.91]	[-14.93:5.11]
Party magnitude	3.33	0.57	5.02	4.58
(mean)†	[-0.18:6.84]	[0.30:0.85]	[-5.32:15.36]	[-3.45:12.61]
(post-quota)	[-3.55:10.21]	[-0.03:1.18]	[-14.73:24.77]	[-6.77:15.93]
(c) *Party magnitude* (mean, weighted by vote shares)				
Party magnitude	3.70	0.35	4.72	3.50
(mean, wt.)†	[-0.80:8.20]	[0.01:0.69]	[-10.82:20.26]	[-5.76:12.76]
(pre-quota)	[-1.26:8.67]	[-0.04:0.74]	[-12.47:21.91]	[-5.43:12.43]
Party magnitude	5.24	0.76	1.33	9.69
(mean, wt.)†	[-0.59:11.07]	[0.40:1.11]	[-16.90:19.57]	[-7.23:26.60]
(post-quota)	[-2.30:12.78]	[0.16:1.35]	[-22.44:25.11]	[-16.36:35.73]
(d) *Party magnitude* (largest party)				
Party magnitude	2.12	0.15	8.08	-0.92
(largest)†	[-0.71:4.94]	[-0.20:0.49]	[-4.82:20.97]	[-9.07:7.23]
(pre-quota)	[-1.66:5.89]	[-0.41:0.71]	[-13.76:29.91]	[-16.45:14.61]
Party magnitude	3.18	0.63	5.47	3.06
(largest)†	[-0.45:6.81]	[0.32:0.95]	[-8.60:19.55]	[-4.33:10.45]
(post-quota)	[-3.14:9.50]	[0.10:1.17]	[-19.98:30.92]	[-6.17:12.29]
num. obs	128	128	128	128

OLS regression estimates. Specifications replicate those in Table 3b, but using alternative mediator variables. All specifications include magnitude, district and year fixed effects. 95% CIs based on standard errors clustered by district and adjusted by the number of clusters are reported at the top; wild bootstrapped CIs are reported at the bottom. (†) Logged value of the mediator in column (2). (‡) We added 1 to the outcome before logging.

Table A15: Out-of-sample results: Excluding Argentina

(a) Overall	Women elected (%)	Women elected (#) (log)‡	Woman elected (0/100)	2+ Women elected (0/100)
effect	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Magnitude† (pre-quota)	-0.05 [-0.74:0.63] [-0.73:0.62]	0.28 [0.07:0.50] [0.05:0.52]	0.87 [-1.86:3.59] [-3.22:4.96]	3.59 [0.38:6.81] [-4.13:11.32]
Magnitude† (post-quota)	0.05 [-0.66:0.76] [-0.64:0.74]	0.47 [0.25:0.69] [0.23:0.70]	0.07 [-2.98:3.13] [-4.55:4.69]	3.86 [0.03:7.68] [-3.99:11.70]

(b) Intermediate effect (I): District magnitude ⇒ Mediators

				Party magnitude	
	# list seats	ENPS	median	mean	largest
Magnitude (pre-quota)	0.31 [0.17:0.45] [0.03:0.58]	0.19 [0.08:0.29] [0.01:0.36]	0.05 [-0.02:0.13] [-0.03:0.14]	0.07 [-0.03:0.17] [-0.18:0.33]	0.20 [0.03:0.37] [-0.07:0.47]
Magnitude (post-quota)	0.35 [0.20:0.50] [0.04:0.65]	0.18 [0.07:0.29] [-0.01:0.37]	-0.10 [-0.22:0.01] [-0.30:0.09]	-0.03 [-0.16:0.10] [-0.40:0.33]	0.20 [0.01:0.38] [-0.13:0.53]

(c) Intermediate effect (II): Mediators and female representation

Number of lists receiving seats	Women elected (%)	Women elected (#) (log)‡	Woman elected (0/100)	2+ Women elected (0/100)	
# lists seats† (pre-quota)	-3.05 [-5.20:-0.90] [-5.32:-0.79]	-0.26 [-0.44:-0.09] [-0.45:-0.07]	-6.79 [-12.17:-1.41] [-11.88:-1.70]	-6.30 [-10.55:-2.05] [-10.93:-1.67]	
# lists seats† (post-quota)	-0.57 [-3.09:1.96] [-3.16:2.03]	0.03 [-0.15:0.22] [-0.18:0.24]	-0.65 [-5.94:4.64] [-6.64:5.33]	-0.36 [-7.61:6.88] [-7.36:6.63]	
Party magnitude (median)					
Party magnitude (median)† (pre-quota)	0.75 [-0.63:2.12] [-0.83:2.33]	0.09 [-0.06:0.23] [-0.07:0.25]	2.53 [-0.69:5.75] [-0.43:5.50]	1.61 [-0.95:4.17] [-1.41:4.63]	
Party magnitude (median)† (post-quota)	0.58 [-0.28:1.44] [-0.13:1.29]	0.06 [-0.07:0.18] [-0.09:0.20]	1.19 [-0.73:3.11] [-0.46:2.84]	1.23 [-0.95:3.42] [-0.56:3.03]	
num. obs	594	594	594	594	594

OLS regression estimates. Specifications report those in Table 5, but excluding all observations from Argentina. All specifications include district and country-year fixed effects. Specifications in panel (c) also include magnitude district effects. 95% CIs based on standard errors clustered by district and adjusted by the number of clusters are reported at the top; wild bootstrapped CIs are reported at the bottom. (†) logged value in column (2). (‡) We added 1 to the outcome before logging.

Table A16: Out-of-sample results: Counting strong quotas only

(a) Overall effect

(a) Overall effect	Women elected (%)	Women elected (#) (log)‡	Woman elected (0/100)	2+ Women elected (0/100)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Magnitude† (pre-quota)	-0.04 [-0.73:0.66] [-0.78:0.71]	0.29 [0.07:0.51] [0.04:0.55]	0.72 [-2.09:3.52] [-3.29:4.73]	3.64 [0.36:6.92] [-3.71:11.00]
Magnitude† (post-quota)	0.46 [-0.31:1.23] [-0.40:1.33]	0.91 [0.67:1.15] [0.64:1.18]	-0.20 [-3.17:2.78] [-4.25:3.86]	4.99 [1.43:8.54] [-1.15:11.12]

(b) Intermediate effect (I): District magnitude ⇒ Mediators

	# list seats	ENPS	Party magnitude median	mean	largest
Magnitude (pre-quota)	0.31 [0.18:0.44] [0.05:0.57]	0.19 [0.08:0.29] [0.01:0.36]	0.02 [-0.04:0.09] [-0.06:0.10]	0.05 [-0.02:0.13] [-0.12:0.22]	0.20 [0.03:0.37] [-0.07:0.47]
Magnitude (post-quota)	0.32 [0.18:0.45] [0.07:0.56]	0.19 [0.09:0.30] [0.02:0.37]	0.01 [-0.05:0.08] [-0.07:0.10]	0.06 [-0.02:0.14] [-0.09:0.21]	0.19 [0.01:0.36] [-0.08:0.45]

(c) Intermediate effect (II): Mediators and female representation

Number of lists receiving seats	Women elected (%)	Women elected (#) (log)‡	Woman elected (0/100)	2+ Women elected (0/100)
# lists seats† (pre-quota)	-1.99 [-3.85:-0.12] [-3.81:-0.16]	-0.19 [-0.40:0.02] [-0.44:0.05]	-3.98 [-8.70:0.74] [-8.97:1.02]	-3.07 [-7.83:1.70] [-8.09:1.96]
# lists seats† (post-quota)	-0.93 [-3.29:1.43] [-3.63:1.77]	0.18 [-0.08:0.43] [-0.18:0.53]	-5.17 [-9.73:-0.61] [-11.57:1.23]	-2.14 [-12.58:8.30] [-15.71:11.43]
Party magnitude (median)				
Party magnitude (median)† (pre-quota)	-0.07 [-1.05:0.90] [-1.11:0.97]	-0.05 [-0.19:0.10] [-0.21:0.12]	1.78 [-0.29:3.85] [0.03:3.53]	0.36 [-1.88:2.59] [-1.32:2.03]
Party magnitude (median)† (post-quota)	1.26 [0.31:2.21] [-0.22:2.74]	0.36 [0.22:0.50] [0.14:0.58]	0.08 [-2.55:2.70] [-3.82:3.97]	4.46 [1.01:7.91] [-1.94:10.86]
num. obs	679	679	679	679	679

OLS regression estimates. Specifications report those in Table 5, but only counting "strong" quotas, meaning that at least 30% of candidates in general elections must be women, there are placement mandates, and quotas are effectively enforced. All specifications include district and country-year fixed effects. Specifications in panel (c) also include magnitude district effects. 95% CIS based on standard errors clustered by district and adjusted by the number of clusters are reported at the top; wild bootstrapped CIS are reported at the bottom. (†) logged value in column (2). (‡) We added 1 to the outcome before logging.

Table A17: Out-of-sample results: Small-magnitude districts ($M \leq 5$) only

(a) Overall	Women elected (%)	Women elected (#) (log)‡	Woman elected (0/100)	2+ Women elected (0/100)
effect	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Magnitude† (pre-quota)	-2.14 [-8.19:3.90] [-9.18:4.89]	0.08 [-0.06:0.23] [-0.06:0.23]	2.55 [-11.57:16.67] [-14.83:19.94]	1.72 [-2.67:6.11] [-2.65:6.09]
Magnitude† (post-quota)	2.44 [-4.05:8.93] [-4.90:9.78]	0.46 [0.14:0.78] [0.04:0.88]	20.14 [4.75:35.53] [2.24:38.04]	11.13 [2.72:19.55] [-0.64:22.91]

(b) Intermediate effect (I): District magnitude ⇒ Mediators

			Party magnitude		
	# list seats	ENPS	median	mean	largest
Magnitude (pre-quota)	0.46 [0.31:0.62] [0.27:0.66]	0.40 [0.25:0.55] [0.22:0.57]	0.21 [0.08:0.33] [0.06:0.35]	0.18 [0.10:0.27] [0.08:0.28]	0.32 [0.21:0.43] [0.19:0.45]
Magnitude (post-quota)	0.51 [0.28:0.75] [0.18:0.84]	0.41 [0.20:0.63] [0.14:0.69]	0.14 [-0.07:0.35] [-0.19:0.47]	0.12 [-0.02:0.26] [-0.07:0.31]	0.32 [0.14:0.49] [0.08:0.55]

(c) Intermediate effect (II): Mediators and female representation

Number of lists receiving seats	Women elected (%)	Women elected (#) (log)‡	Woman elected (0/100)	2+ Women elected (0/100)	
# lists seats† (pre-quota)	-3.51 [-8.30:1.28] [-8.91:1.89]	-0.16 [-0.35:0.03] [-0.37:0.05]	-9.14 [-21.14:2.87] [-22.54:4.27]	-2.22 [-5.63:1.20] [-5.64:1.21]	
# lists seats† (post-quota)	-4.71 [-8.40:-1.03] [-8.69:-0.74]	-0.16 [-0.31:-0.01] [-0.34:0.02]	-5.06 [-14.48:4.36] [-16.45:6.33]	-9.21 [-15.77:-2.65] [-15.38:-3.03]	
Party magnitude (median)					
Party magnitude (median)† (pre-quota)	1.99 [-3.69:7.66] [-4.48:8.45]	0.05 [-0.11:0.22] [-0.14:0.24]	2.44 [-11.94:16.83] [-13.27:18.16]	-0.94 [-6.38:4.51] [-6.05:4.18]	
Party magnitude (median)† (post-quota)	6.59 [2.43:10.74] [1.80:11.37]	0.22 [0.10:0.34] [0.09:0.35]	11.84 [3.91:19.76] [3.11:20.56]	14.10 [5.07:23.14] [4.13:24.07]	
num. obs	487	487	487	487	487

OLS regression estimates. Specifications report those in Table 5, but restricting the sample to districts with a magnitude of 5 or less. All specifications include district and country-year fixed effects. Specifications in panel (c) also include magnitude district effects. 95% CIs based on standard errors clustered by district and adjusted by the number of clusters are reported at the top; wild bootstrapped CIs are reported at the bottom. (†) logged value in column (2). (‡) We added 1 to the outcome before logging.

Table A18: Out-of-sample results: Alternative mediators

	Women elected (%)	Women elected (#) (log)‡	Woman elected (0/100)	2+ Women elected (0/100)
ENPS	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ENPS† (pre-quota)	-2.99 [-5.28:-0.70] [-5.48:-0.49]	-0.26 [-0.43:-0.09] [-0.43:-0.08]	-6.93 [-12.21:-1.65] [-11.55:-2.31]	-4.85 [-9.10:-0.60] [-9.21:-0.49]
ENPS† (post-quota)	-1.29 [-4.00:1.43] [-4.15:1.58]	0.07 [-0.10:0.24] [-0.11:0.25]	-3.04 [-8.88:2.79] [-8.78:2.70]	-0.13 [-9.74:9.47] [-12.02:11.76]
Party magnitude (mean)				
Party magnitude (mean)† (pre-quota)	0.14 [-1.40:1.67] [-1.37:1.64]	-0.03 [-0.22:0.16] [-0.25:0.19]	3.66 [0.24:7.08] [0.19:7.12]	-0.69 [-5.06:3.69] [-5.10:3.72]
Party magnitude (mean)† (post-quota)	1.27 [0.30:2.25] [0.36:2.19]	0.30 [0.10:0.49] [0.05:0.55]	1.53 [-1.03:4.08] [-1.37:4.42]	2.53 [-0.88:5.93] [-1.08:6.13]
Party magnitude (largest party)				
Party magnitude (largest)† (pre-quota)	1.23 [-0.10:2.56] [-0.22:2.68]	0.03 [-0.12:0.17] [-0.14:0.19]	5.79 [2.67:8.92] [2.87:8.72]	-0.17 [-3.45:3.11] [-3.57:3.23]
Party magnitude (largest)† (post-quota)	1.85 [0.63:3.06] [0.56:3.13]	0.32 [0.16:0.47] [0.14:0.50]	4.37 [1.43:7.31] [1.57:7.17]	1.37 [-1.69:4.43] [-1.98:4.72]
num. obs	679	679	679	679

OLS regression estimates. Specifications report those in Table 5c, but for a set of alternative mediators. All specifications include magnitude, district and country-year fixed effects. 95% CIs based on standard errors clustered by district and adjusted by the number of clusters are reported at the top; wild bootstrapped CIs are reported at the bottom. (†) logged value in column (2). (‡) We added 1 to the outcome before logging.

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