

# Resignation as Promotion?

## Executive Turnover and Early Departures in the Argentine Congress, 1983-2017\*

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When (and why) do legislators quit their jobs? Previous answers to this question have focused on retirements. Looking at voluntary *resignations* instead, in this paper we argue that leaving congress to assume an elected (executive) office or a position in the (sub)national bureaucracy may be a career-advancing move motivated by progressive ambition. We document this claim with data from Argentina, where roughly 12% of elected deputies leave voluntarily before their term ends, but rarely become unemployed. Consistent with expectations, we show that resignations coincide temporally with instances of executive alternation at the (sub)national level, and are driven by legislators placed at the top of party lists as well as those elected in midterm years.

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In many democracies, a seat in the national legislature is the summum of a normal political career. In legislatures that combine internal seniority rules with substantial influence over policymaking, successful politicians attempt to extend their tenure as long as possible, as attested by the 80-90% renomination rates observed in the us House (Göbel and Munzert [forthcoming](#), Figure 5). Legislative stability, in this sense, offers opportunities to reach powerful positions within the body, gain influence over the agenda, and thus affect policy outcomes. As a consequence, (early) retirements are rare, and often associated with serious health issues (Hibbing [1982](#)) and electoral vulnerability (Groseclose and Krehbiel [1994](#); Hall and Van Houweling [1995](#); Moore and Hibbing [1998](#); Theriault [1998](#); Lawless and Theriault [2005](#)), sometimes aided by politically weakening scandals (Basinger [2013](#)). A similar logic operates parliamentary regimes, where the main career goal, a cabinet post, entails nomination and election as member of Parliament as a necessary condition.

Conversely, in environments where other positions are more prestigious, pay better, or offer more influence over policymaking, ambitious lawmakers will have strong incentives to leave their jobs voluntarily—in fact, they will look forward to it. Even in the us, 58% of the 615 early exits that took place between 1901 and 2018 corresponded to lawmakers who were elected to other offices—such as the Senate—or appointed to the bureaucracy or the judiciary (Rakich [2018](#)). Mike Pompeo, Donald Trump’s last secretary of state, first left his seat in the House of Representatives in January 2017, when the Senate confirmed him as the director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Another prime example is Jeff Sessions, a longstanding Senator from Alabama until he quit in 2017 to become us Attorney General. The same decision was made by Reps. Deb Haaland and Marcia Fudge in March 2021, after being confirmed to Joseph Biden’s cabinet, emulating vice-president Kamala Harris’ resignation to the Senate on January 18th. Legislators more interested in wealth than power often retire to maximize pension and other pecuniary benefits (Grose-

close and Krehbiel 1994; Hall and Van Houweling 1995), or move to a lucrative job in the private sector, usually as lobbyists (Egerod forthcoming; Weschle 2021).

Building on this insight, in this paper we argue that in contexts that combine progressive ambition (Schlesinger 1966) with hierarchically arranged political offices (Cirone, Cox and Fiva 2021), resignations from the national legislature may be best understood as a form of political *promotion*: not an endgame for one’s political career, but an opportunity to continue it in a more desirable office. While the us Congress provides its members with ample opportunities to gain prestige, realize political ambitions, and pass their preferred policies (Fenno 1973), our theoretical framework is most applicable to settings where the assembly is only a weak counterpart of dominant executives (Cox and Morgenstern 2001) and thus offers few resources to legislators. In such a scenario, the most successful lawmakers will be those who leverage their positions into a better political office, like a governorship or a cabinet-level appointment in the national bureaucracy.

Our argument accounts for two central aspects of this phenomenon: *who* resigns and *when* legislators leave congress. First, in contrast to the focus on age, health (Hibbing 1982), job dissatisfaction (Moore and Hibbing 1998; Lawless and Theriault 2005; Kerby and Blidook 2011) and political weakness (Groseclose and Krehbiel 1994; Hall and Van Houweling 1995; Theriault 1998; Basinger 2013; Yildirim and Overby 2019; Raymond and Overby 2020) that has dominated the literature so far, we claim that resignations-as-promotions should be driven by “weightier” legislators: those with previous experience or who were placed at the top of party lists. In this sense, resignations are the flipside of a process of political selection, where elites and citizens privilege the expertise, knowledge, popularity or competence of those already elected over the remaining set of potential candidates. Since it is easier to gather information about individuals in office (Dal Bó and Finan 2018; Gulzar 2021), elected candidates are both better known to voters and closer to party leaders, two valuable considerations for recently elected executives who

have to staff their administrations. We thus join the growing literature on the quality of politicians, and more specifically on how candidate positioning in party lists—in itself an outcome of previous electoral successes—signals and predicts future career advancement (Folke, Persson and Rickne 2016; Fiva and Røhr 2018; Cirone, Cox and Fiva 2021).

The second dimension we highlight is the *timing* of resignations. Our theoretical framework suggests that instances of executive alternation—at either the national or the subnational level—play a crucial role. Recently elected executives have incentives to recruit their staff from the pool of political allies, donors, and friends serving in other offices (Persico, Rodríguez-Pueblita and Silverman 2011). In countries where the bulk of the resources with which to develop a political career and shape policymaking is concentrated in executive offices, a nontrivial fraction of such talent is in the legislature, “warming up” their seats while waiting for an opportunity to jump to a better position. This is especially likely for opposition politicians, who naturally expect little access to valuable appointed positions. We thus expect resignations to be especially common following instances of executive alternation at either the national or the provincial level, as newly elected executives often place friends, close associates and other political allies in the cabinet and other bureaucratic positions (Rosas and Langston 2011; Brassiolo and Estrada 2020; Colonnelli, Prem and Teso forthcoming). These executives further exert strong coattail effects in legislative races (Jones 1997; Samuels 2003; Magar 2012), improving their copartisans’ chances of being elected to other desirable posts. Both effects, we claim, should be especially strong for legislators elected in midterm contests, as they lack the option of finishing their term before assuming a new office (Lucardi and Micozzi 2016).

We examine these claims with data from the Argentine Chamber of Deputies, 12% of whose members truncate their mandates voluntarily—in line with Brazil (17%) but far

Table 1: Future (immediate) positions of deputies who resigned, Argentina, 1983-2017

	elected			appointed	all
	executive	legislative	total		
national position	2 (0.8%)	33 (12.9%)	35 (13.7%)	92 (36.1%)	127 (49.8%)
subnational position	54 (21.2%)	18 (7.1%)	72 (28.2%)	35 (13.7%)	107 (42.0%)
total	56 (22.0%)	51 (20.0%)	107 (42.0%)	127 (49.8%)	234 (91.8%)
retired / no new position immediately after resignation: 21 (8.2%)					

Values indicate the absolute number of deputies who assumed different kinds of positions immediately after resigning from the Chamber of Deputies. % in brackets are calculated over the 255 deputies in the elected sample (i.e., excluding legislators who replaced somebody who died or resigned) who resigned after assuming office.

ahead of Chile (1%), Paraguay (3%) or Peru (5%).<sup>1</sup> Yet as Table 1 shows, few of these leavers put an end to their political career: within 100 days of leaving Congress, most have assumed another office, be it elected (legislator, governor, or mayor) or appointed (such as minister, secretary or judge). Of the 8.2% who failed to do so, a nontrivial share were either ambitious politicians who lost a bid for the provincial governorship—though they had no legal obligation to quit unless they won—or belonged to a far-left coalition whose member parties had agreed to rotate legislative positions. Only a handful invoked personal reasons or alleged being “fed up” with politics.

The ballots papers reproduced in Figure 1 further reinforce this point. The picture on the left shows the 1997 ballot for the main opposition force at the national level, the *Alianza* (Alliance), in the City of Buenos Aires. In an extraordinarily successful election, the *Alianza* captured 9 out of 13 seats. Two years later, when the coalition won the

<sup>1</sup>In Uruguay, 22% of elected legislators leave office at least once during their mandate, but may—and do—return after an ephemeral absence (Chasqueti 2016). Mexican lawmakers cannot formally resign, but their leaves may be considered “permanent” rather than temporary.


(a) *Alianza*, 1997(b) *Unión-PRO*, 2013

Figure 1: Legislative ballots of the main opposition forces in the elections for national deputies in the City of Buenos Aires, 1997 and 2013. The individuals above the horizontal lines were elected (and assumed office). Red circles indicate individuals who resigned after the *Alianza* or *PRO* captured the presidency in 1999 or 2015, respectively.

national presidency, most of these resigned: the most prominent member of the 1997 ballot, Carlos “Chacho” Álvarez, became vice-president, while the second-placed candidate, Rodolfo Terragno, assumed as cabinet chief. The 7th-, 8th- and 9th-placed candidates, meanwhile, became national secretaries. Overall, a total of 15 different individuals occupied the 9 seats elected in 1997. Something similar occurred with the 2013 Unión-PRO list displayed in Figure 1b. After electing 5 out of 13 seats in a highly contested election, even the 13th-placed candidate ended up joining the party delegation in Congress. When a PRO-led alliance captured the presidency in 2015, all deputies elected in 2013 left the Chamber, becoming national ministers (2 cases), head of the Central Bank (1), or national (sub)secretaries (2). These examples illustrate both dimensions of our argument: the weight of resigning legislators and the timing of early departures.

Using data on all individuals who served in the Argentine Chamber of Deputies between 1983 and 2017, we show that these patterns are systematic: early departures are

substantially more likely following instances of executive alternation at either the national or the provincial level, especially when these involve a change in both the *party* and the *individual* occupying the executive office. In line with Table 1, the main difference is that while legislators who resign following alternation in the presidency tend to assume important positions in the cabinet or the bureaucracy, executive alternation at the provincial level leads to legislators resigning to assume elected offices. In addition, deputies elected in midterm years are disproportionately likely to resign following an instance of executive alternation, while individuals who got a better position in their party's lists are more likely to resign to occupy an elected position, but not an appointed one. In sum, voluntary resignations in Argentina do not stem from health considerations, political weakness, or career ceilings, but rather from progressive ambitions—though these require an opportunity, in the form of an executive alternation, to materialize.

## Theoretical Framework: Resignation as Promotion

The claim that politicians often resign in order to *advance* their careers appears surprising at first sight. This is certainly the case when such positions are (relatively) valuable and confer a substantial degree of power, prestige, resources, and/or influence over policy—the foremost motivations for entering politics (Dal Bó and Finan 2018; Gulzar 2021). This depiction certainly describes the US Congress, where incumbents cultivate a personal vote (Mayhew 1974) and the Chambers' internal norms provide strong incentives to acquire and develop policy expertise (Weingast and Marshall 1988). Unsurprisingly, incumbents are reelected at high rates (Göbel and Munzert forthcoming); if they retire (or, less fre-



quently, resign),<sup>2</sup> it is because of bad health (Hibbing 1982), an stagnating career (Hall and Van Houweling 1995; Theriault 1998; Lawless and Theriault 2005), or due to electoral weakness stemming from narrow margins of victory (Groseclose and Krehbiel 1994; Moore and Hibbing 1998) or scandals (Basinger 2013).

When the institutional and political contexts change the locus of power and influence, so do the incentives (not) to develop a legislative career. The current us system is not set in stone; during most of the nineteenth century, the combination of strong party control, centralized candidate selection mechanisms and high rotation in office meant that *“election to the House was often viewed as a temporary stop in an ongoing political career”* (Carson, Engstrom and Roberts 2007, 291). In parliamentary regimes, where power and policy depend on being in government, ambitious politicians seek a legislative position not for its own sake but with the ultimate goal of accessing a cabinet ministry. Party leaders further reinforce this dynamic, using seniority systems and list positions to select and motivate party members (Folke, Persson and Rickne 2016; Fiva and Røhr 2018; Cirone, Cox and Fiva 2021). Thus, in such regimes resignation rates are much higher among members of minority parties and MPs who lack policy influence more generally (Kerby and Blidook 2011; Raymond and Overby 2020; Yildirim and Overby 2019).

In this paper our focus is on legislatures that neither provide an arena for exercising policy influence directly, nor a “springboard” for jumping directly into the parliamentary cabinet. This describes well the Latin American legislatures discussed by Cox and Morgenstern (2001), as well as supranational bodies such as the European Parliament (Meserve, Pemstein and Bernhard 2009; Sieberer and Müller 2017), whose members also resign frequently in order to return to their home country (Daniel and Metzger 2018).

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<sup>2</sup>Voluntary departures from the legislature can take one of two forms: retirement (i.e., not seeking reelection) and resignation (exiting office before the term ends). In this paper we focus on the latter, though admittedly both behaviors may have similar underlying motivations.



To be sure, these bodies are not entirely devoid of political power, and they provide some individual benefits to their members—including a relatively large salary, immunity from prosecution, and a tribune for sponsoring bills and reaching a national audience in some circumstances (e.g., when a controversial law is being discussed). Overall, however, these positions are neither the most prestigious nor the most influential ones, and thus ambitious incumbents often try to leverage them into an executive post that offers both direct control over a budget and more influence over policymaking—as documented in Argentina (Jones et al. 2002; Lucardi and Micozzi 2016; Micozzi and Lucardi 2021), Brazil (Samuels 2003; Pereira and Rennó 2013), and Uruguay (Chasqueti and Micozzi 2014).

Extending this reasoning, we claim that under the right conditions, incumbents in these legislatures may have incentives to depart early in order to promote their political careers. Furthermore, our claims have direct implications regarding *who* should resign and *when* we should observe these resignations. First, in proportional representation (PR) systems where list rank significantly affects the probability of being elected, parties have incentives to place “weightier” candidates—more experienced, better known, and/or more qualified ones—at the top of list positions (Folke, Persson and Rickne 2016; Fiva and Røhr 2018; Cirone, Cox and Fiva 2021), as well as to motivate them to exert effort during campaigns by promising more attractive nominations and better appointments as these become available (Cox et al. forthcoming). Thus, and in stark contrast to the pattern observed in the US Congress, legislators nominated at the top of party lists, who are more visible to voters (see Figure 1), more experienced, less electorally vulnerable, and more closely connected to party leaders, should resign at higher rates. On the one hand, they should be more successful at getting elected to a more valuable office. On the other, having an influential and skilled politician to command the bureaucracy or manage political conflicts can be a huge asset for newly elected executives.

Second, in the same way as ambitious non-incumbents in the United States bid their time until the opportunity to contest an open seat arises (Banks and Kiewiet 1989; Ban, Llaudet and Snyder 2016),<sup>3</sup> opposition politicians in other countries wait in the legislature until they get the opportunity to be elected—or appointed—to an executive post (Pereira and Rennó 2013; Lucardi and Micozzi 2016). The extensively documented influence of presidents and governors over both candidate nomination (Rosas and Langston 2011; De Luca, Jones and Tula 2002; Cherny, Figueroa and Scherlis 2018) and election (Jones 1997; Samuels 2003; Magar 2012) throughout Latin America suggests that such resignations should be more frequent following instances of executive alternation at either the national level or in the legislator’s home district. In contrast, reelected executives should be more likely to keep their teams of collaborators intact. Leaders do not govern alone (Persico, Rodríguez-Pueblita and Silverman 2011); they need an administrative staff that is frequently recruited among friends, supporters, and other political allies (Brassiolo and Estrada 2020; Colonnelli, Prem and Teso forthcoming). In some countries, such talent is in the legislature, in the form of either legislators who run for an executive position and win, or as advisors and political allies of would-be presidents (or governors).

Of course, resigning a seat is not costless, and the cost of leaving may well be higher for more prominent politicians.<sup>4</sup> Nonetheless, if most executive positions are more valuable than legislative ones—as studies of political careers in many developing countries show (Lucardi and Micozzi 2016; Samuels 2003; Chasquetti and Micozzi 2014)—, certain institutional features should reduce these costs, thus making resignations more likely. If incumbents are required to resign in order to run for another office, we should see both fewer resignations—only incumbents who are sufficiently certain of their electoral suc-

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<sup>3</sup>Similarly, the “revolving door” literature has documented that would-be lobbyists are well attuned to potential changes in external circumstances (Egerod forthcoming; Weschle 2021).

<sup>4</sup>We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this possibility.

cess will leave early—and a nontrivial number of resignees who end up with nothing—those who quit in order to run for another office but lost. But if lawmakers can retain their job in case of failure, the cost of trying to jump is substantially lowered. Thus, when incumbents are not required to resign beforehand, most incumbents should seek another office, and resignations should be heavily concentrated among successful candidates—or those appointed to a bureaucratic position.

The other relevant feature is the electoral calendar. When executive and legislative elections are concurrent, ambitious politicians often have to make a choice between running for a more valuable—but riskier—position, and seeking nomination to a less appealing one—especially if there is a ban on simultaneous candidacies to multiple offices. When elections are held on different dates, in contrast, ambitious politicians should seek a “safer” seat in legislative elections, and then run for an executive post afterwards (Lucardi and Micozzi 2016). To the extent that some of these legislators are successful, incumbents elected in midterms should resign at higher rates.

Together, these considerations suggest the following hypotheses:

- $H_1$ . Legislators are more likely to resign following an instance of executive alternation at either the national level or in their home district.
- $H_2$ . This effect should be stronger
  - (a) When executive alternation involves a change in either (i) the individual; or (ii) the party in power (or both); or
  - (b) For more prominent legislators, i.e., meaning those with greater experience and placed higher in their party’s list; or
  - (c) For legislators elected in midterm years.

## Data and Methods

**Case selection.** We investigate these claims in the Argentine Chamber of Deputies, whose members have little interest in developing a long-term legislative career (Jones et al. 2002) and orient their legislative towards “jumping” to better offices (Micozzi 2014; Lucardi and Micozzi 2016). Contrary to the us Congress, Argentina’s national legislature does not offer its members many opportunities to increase their power or significantly influence policy-making. Indeed, as Figure A1 shows, roughly four-fifths of legislative spells—defined as instances in which a given individual occupied an office uninterrupted—last no more than a single term. Governors and mayors are much more likely to serve 2- and 3-term spells than deputies and senators.

Three institutional features further justify the focus on this case. While deputies serve four-year terms, the 257-member Chamber is renewed by halves bi-annually, and thus each of the country’s 24 provinces elects half of its legislative delegation every two years.<sup>5</sup> Hence, there are “concurrent” and “midterm” deputies. The former are elected in the same year (and often on the same date) as the president, the governor and the mayors of their home province. Midterm deputies are only elected concurrently with local legislators and councillors in those provinces that have a staggered electoral calendar. Second, while ambitious politicians have no legal obligation to resign or request a license in order to run for another office, they cannot hold two elected offices simultaneously.<sup>6</sup> Thus, concurrent deputies who win an executive office—or assume a position in a new executive’s cabinet—are often able to finish their mandate, while midterm deputies have

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<sup>5</sup>Electoral districts are coterminous with the country’s provinces. With the exception of Tierra del Fuego (2 deputies until 1989, 5 afterwards), the number of deputies per district has remained constant since 1983.

<sup>6</sup>The only exception are members of constituent assemblies, which meet for a short time while redrafting the country’s (or the province’s) constitution.

little choice but to resign. In addition, while legislators appointed to bureaucratic positions are not required to resign—they may seek a temporary leave of absence instead—they are encouraged to do so by the fact that alternates cannot replace them until they leave permanently. That is, deputies who request a leave of absence are depriving their party from a vote in the Chamber. Finally, provincial governors are powerful players who both intervene directly on candidate nominations (De Luca, Jones and Tula 2002; Cherny, Figueroa and Scherlis 2018) and exert strong coattails effects in provincial elections (Jones 1997), thus playing an oversized role in their copartisans' electoral fates—either by helping them get elected, or by appointing them to bureaucratic positions. Since different provinces experience executive alternation at different moments, legislators from different provinces face different opportunities in every election year.

**Sources.** We combine three data sources. First, the Chamber's website publishes the list of all individual who served as national deputies between 1983 and 2019.<sup>7</sup> Second, we built a list of all successful candidates for national deputy between 1983 and 2013, and collected information about their partisan affiliation, list position, and previous and future political experience.<sup>8</sup> Since this data includes start and end dates for all (sub)national executives, we used it to date instances of presidential and gubernatorial alternation. Lastly, for all deputies who did not assume any of the positions listed in fn. 8 upon resigning, we had a research assistant perform a search to determine what elected or appointed position, if any, they occupied after resignation—such as provincial legislator, national or provincial bureaucrat, or ambassador to a foreign country.

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<sup>7</sup>[https://www.diputados.gob.ar/export/hcdn/secparl/dgral\\_info\\_parlamentaria/dip/archivos/IE\\_103\\_Composicion\\_HCDN.pdf](https://www.diputados.gob.ar/export/hcdn/secparl/dgral_info_parlamentaria/dip/archivos/IE_103_Composicion_HCDN.pdf).

<sup>8</sup> Specifically, for each successful candidate in every election, we have data on whether (s)he (i) had served; or (ii) would serve in the future, as (vice-)president; (vice-)governor; mayor; national minister; national senator; national deputy; and member of the 1994 constitutional convention or the Mercosur Parliament.

**Datasets and variables.** We constructed three separate datasets. First, we aggregated the previous data at the legislator-mandate level. That is, if individual  $i$  was elected to the chamber in 1993 and reelected in 1997, (s)he appears in the data twice, as  $i$ -1993 and  $i$ -1997 respectively.<sup>9</sup> We restricted the sample to deputies that assumed office on December 10th of an election year, i.e. we removed both the handful of deputies who were elected but declined to assume office, and those who assumed after a legislator who was higher in the party list resigned, died, or was expelled from the Chamber. For each observation, we have information on the individual’s district, election year, gender, partisan affiliation, list position, past and future experience, whether (s)he died in office, resigned or was expelled from the chamber,<sup>10</sup> and the exact dates (s)he assumed or left office.

Since our measures of executive alternation (see below) vary within a legislator’s mandate, we first expanded this dataset to the legislator-mandate-day level, i.e. we identified every day a legislator served and whether she resigned or died on each specific date. While we report some robustness checks with this data, the combination of 2.7 million observations for just 255 resignations made it statistically unmanageable. Thus, for most analyses we report results at the legislator-mandate-month level, averaging all variables (except the outcomes) by month. Table A1 in the Appendix presents the descriptive statistics for both the mandate and the monthly data.

We look at three outcomes. *Resignation* is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if a legislator voluntarily quit her position, and 0 otherwise. In the monthly (daily) dataset, this variable takes the value of 1 in the month (day) the legislator resigned, and 0 otherwise. We also examined what kinds of positions resigning deputies assumed within a hundred days of leaving the Chamber. Some of these are quite specific (i.e., president of a publicly-

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<sup>9</sup>Deputies who resign can only return to the chamber if they are elected again.

<sup>10</sup>A supermajority of deputies may expel a colleague who was convicted of a felony or incurred in gross ethical violations, but this only happened twice since 1983, so we ignore this possibility.

owned provincial bank, or director of the pensioners' health affairs office), so we classified them according to two criteria. *Resignation & election* identifies individuals who resigned and assumed an elected office, either at the national or the subnational level. *Resignation & appointment* identifies legislators who resigned to assume an appointed position, including ambassadors, ministers, secretaries, judges, and directors (or board members) of public enterprises and other autonomous agencies.

Our main explanatory variables are dummies indicating whether any given day fell within 30, 60 or 90 days<sup>11</sup> of an instance of executive alternation at either the national or the provincial level. We divide instances of alternation into four categories:

- (1) *Same party, same person*: When the executive completed her mandate and assumed a new one. For example, in December 10th 2011, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner initiated her second consecutive presidential term. In the 30-day window of this variable, all days between November 10th, 2011 and January 9th, 2012 take the value of 1, and 0 otherwise.
- (2) *Same party, different person*: When the person occupying the executive was replaced by a different individual from the same party. For instance, in December 10th, 2007, Néstor Kirchner was succeeded by his wife Cristina Fernández de Kirchner.
- (3) *Different party, different person*: When both the individual and the person occupying the executive office changed, as in December 10th, 2015, when Cristina Fernández de Kirchner was succeeded by her rival Mauricio Macri.
- (4) *No alternation*: When neither of these conditions hold. This also includes cases in which alternation was not driven by elections but rather by the death, resignation or impeachment of the executive.

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<sup>11</sup>That is, 30, 60 or 90 days before or after; deputies who anticipate assuming a ministerial or bureaucratic position may resign a few days before the newly elected executive assumes office.



We created two versions of these variables: a national one, coding cases of alternation in the presidency; and a provincial one, which looks at a legislator’s home province. The first takes the same value for all deputies holding office at any given point in time; the second may differ among legislators from different provinces. This variable is naturally coded at the daily level; for the monthly dataset, we compute the proportion of a month’s days that were “treated” by each type of alternation.

## Results

**Graphical evidence.** The top panel of Figure 2 shows average resignation rates by cohort, with vertical lines indicating midterm cohorts. For elections that took place two years *before* an instance of alternation in the national presidency, we further include a label indicating whether the president elected at  $t + 2$  was the same person (and thus implicitly belonged to the same party), was a different individual from the same party, or was a different politician from a different political force. Consistent with a story in which a nontrivial subset of deputies “warm up” their seats in the expectation of getting a position in the national bureaucracy when a copartisan captures the presidency, resignation rates tend to be higher for midterm cohorts, and two of the highest resignation rates correspond to the 1997 and 2013 cohorts discussed in Figure 1—in both cases following an instance of alternation in both the *party* and the *individual* occupying the presidency.

Even apparent exceptions are consistent with this pattern. The two midterm cohorts with the lowest resignation rates—1993 and 2009—were elected two years before an incumbent president was reelected—Menem in 1995 and Fernández de Kirchner in 2011. Conversely, the two concurrent years with the highest resignation rates—1987 and 1999—preceded an election in which both the president and his party changed hands: before 1995, presidents served for six years, and thus Menem was first elected in 1989




Figure 2: Resignations rates in the Argentine Chamber of Deputies, 1983-2017. The top panel plots mean values for every legislative cohort; labels indicate *future* instances of executive alternation at the national level, indicating whether (i) the incumbent president was reelected; (ii) the incumbent president was replaced by a copartisan; or (iii) a new party and individual took office. Broken vertical lines identify midterm cohorts. The bottom panel reports average resignation rates within a (49-month) legislative term.

(rather than 1987); while De la Rúa resigned halfway through his mandate in December 2001, and was replaced by a senator from an opposition party that had been elected—along with several of his cabinet members—in the October 2001 midterm.

Figure 2b displays average resignation rates within a legislative term. Specifically, we divided each legislator’s mandate into 49 months—from December 10th of year  $t$ , when her mandate began, to December 9th of year  $t + 4$ —and calculated the probability of resignation within each. We see that legislators are disproportionately likely to resign midway through their mandate, especially if they had been elected in a midterm year.

Figure A4 shows the average values of the explanatory variables over a legislative term, distinguishing between midterm and concurrent deputies. The former overwhelmingly experience cases of executive alternation halfway through their mandate, while for the latter the effect is concentrated at the beginning or the end. The latter peak is predictable—it coincides with executive elections at both the national and provincial levels—but the former is an artifact of the fact that days and months may be coded as experiencing alternation up to 90 days after an instance of alternation effectively took place. In other words, some deputies are coded as “treated” at the beginning of their mandate simply because they were elected to the Chamber in an election in which there was alternation at the national or provincial levels. Since this happened before they assumed office, in the analysis we dropped the first 2, 3 or 4 months of a legislator’s mandate from the sample.

Who resigns, and when? Figure 3 shows three patterns. First, the likelihood of resignation in any given day is highest within a 30-day window of an instance of executive alternation in which both the executive and her party change hands. This holds both for instances of alternation in the national presidency or the legislator’s home province. Second, resignation rates are higher among “weightier” legislators, namely those placed at the top of their party’s list (Figure 3a), who are *not* electorally vulnerable—meaning they were not the last in their party to be elected (Figure 3b)<sup>12</sup>—or who have previous political

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<sup>12</sup>For example, if a party elected 5 seats in a district, the first four are coded as not vulnerable, while the 5th is vulnerable; if it elected two, the first placed is not vulnerable, the other is vulnerable.




Figure 3: Probability that a sitting legislator will resign to her seat in the Argentine Chamber of Deputies, conditional on executive alternation at the national or subnational level within a 30-day window, 1983-2017.

experience (Figure 3c). Midterm deputies are substantially more likely to resign as well (Figure 3d). Together with the numbers reported in Table 1, these figures are consistent with a story in which prominent politicians leave the Chamber of Deputies in order to foster rather than hinder their careers—but such resignations are only triggered when a copartisan captures an executive office. Figure A5 further shows that resignation rates are somewhat higher for committee chairs and do not vary that much by political party. Male deputies—who tend to be more prominent politicians (Franceschet and Piscopo 2014)—resign at higher rates than women.

**Main results.** We begin by examining how executive alternation affects the probability that a legislator will resign on any given month. We fit ols specifications with district, period, and mandate-duration fixed effects,<sup>13</sup> as well as a battery of legislator- and list-level controls. The six explanatory variables measure the proportion of a month’s days that fell within a 30-day window of an instance of executive alternation at the national or provincial level. The baseline are months in which no day fell within a 30-day window of an instance of executive alternation of any kind, which comprise the overwhelming majority of observations (see Table A1 and Figure A4). For the reasons mentioned above, we exclude the first two months of a legislator’s mandate from the sample. Robust standard errors are clustered by legislator.

The main estimates of interest are summarized in Figure 4 (see Table A2a for the full set of results). The left panel confirms that Argentine deputies are disproportionately likely to resign following instances of executive alternation involving both the party and the individual occupying the executive office. Furthermore, the effect is large in substantive terms. Since the explanatory variables vary between 0 and 1 and the outcome is a

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<sup>13</sup>We measure the duration of a legislator’s mandate in months, with 0 corresponding to December 10th of year  $t$ —when her mandate began—and 49 to December 9th of year  $t + 4$ —when it was supposed to end.




Figure 4: Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of the effect of (national or provincial) executive alternation on legislators' resignations. All specifications are OLS models with standard errors clustered by legislator. The unit of observation is the legislator-month. The explanatory variables measure the proportion of a month's days that fell 30 days before or after an instance of executive alternation of a given type at the national or provincial level. See Table A2a for the full results and the list of controls.

0/100 dummy, effects can be interpreted as percentage point changes on the probability that a legislator will resign on a given month, if all the month's days fall within 30 days of an instance of executive alternation. Thus, within 30 days that a different individual from a different party captures the presidency, the probability that a legislator will resign goes up by 4 pp.—a remarkable increase considering that the average resignation rate is 12%, and that duration dummies implicitly control for the fact that legislators are disproportionately likely to resign halfway through their term (Figure 2b). Alternatively, Table A1b shows that the average value of *resignation* in the monthly sample is just 0.28; thus, the effect of different party, different person alternation at the national level represents a 14-fold increase over the sample mean.

The effect of (different party, different person) alternation at the *provincial* level is half as large (2 pp.), though also statistically significant. But cases of provincial alternation where the incumbent governor changes even when the incumbent party does not also

increase the probability of resignation by a similar magnitude. In contrast, when the same party and the same person continue in office (i.e., when the sitting executive is reelected), the change in the probability of resignation is very close to zero. This is reassuring, as it indicates that null results are not an artifact of large confidence intervals.

To further understand what is going on, the next two panels of Figure 4 examine whether resigning legislators assume an elected or an appointed office. Here the difference between national and provincial alternation could not be starker. When the identity of the incumbent governor changes, legislators from her home province are substantially more likely to resign in order to assume an elected position. The most likely explanation for this phenomenon are coattails, as gubernatorial candidates feature prominently in a ballot that includes candidates for both national and subnational positions, tracking votes for them in the process. The fact that the effect becomes visible when the individual occupying the governor's mansion changes, even if the incumbent party remains the same, is consistent with this interpretation. In contrast, when alternation occurs at the national level, legislators who resign are substantially more likely to assume an appointed position. In line with the examples presented in Figure 1, newly elected presidents treat Congress as a pool of "unused" talent with which to staff the national bureaucracy. The incumbent party already has such talent inside the government; the opposition, in contrast, has some of its most prominent members and policy wonks lingering in Congress until their opportunity to staff the national bureaucracy arrives.

These results are robust to a wide variety of specifications. Table A2 shows that including legislator- or legislator-mandate fixed effects makes little difference on the results, as does measuring alternation using 60- or 90-days windows, or estimating complementary log-log specifications with mandate-duration fixed effects (which are equivalent to survival models; see Carter and Signorino 2010). Using daily rather than monthly data does not change the gist of the results either (see Table A9).



A potentially more pressing concern is that our specifications resemble two-way fixed effects (TWFE) difference-in-differences specifications,<sup>14</sup> which may be problematic when staggered treatment timing coincides with dynamic or unequal treatment effects (Goodman-Bacon [forthcoming](#); Baker, Larcker and Wang 2021). To guard against this possibility, in Figure 5 we report the event-study results from Callaway and Sant’Anna’s ([forthcoming](#)) double-robust difference-in-differences estimator, which addresses this issue by grouping observations according to the time period in which they were treated. Specifically, observations first “treated” (i.e., exposed to some kind of alternation) during month  $t$  are grouped together and their before-and-after outcomes compared to those of observations that had not received treatment until period  $t$ . Since we have six possible treatments, we estimated the effect of interest separately for each of them. In addition, since legislators necessarily disappear from the sample after their term ends, our measure of time is the month within a legislator’s mandate. Note that given the nature of the outcome variable, legislators who resign are removed from the sample.

Despite these qualifications, the average treatment effects on the treated (ATT) estimates reported in Figure 5 are very much in line with those of Figure 4. Consider the ATT on *resignation* first. The solid lines and grey areas in Figure 5 indicate the point estimates and their bootstrapped 95% CIs in the five months immediately before and after alternation took place. Consistent with the parallel trends assumption, before the treatment takes place the confidence intervals are very narrowly centered around zero. Afterwards, the estimates become noisier, but only in three cases are they statistically significant, and these are the same as in the left panel of Figure 4: when the individual (though not necessarily the party) holding the governorship in the legislator’s home province changes;

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<sup>14</sup>Strictly speaking, the values reported in Figure 4 are not TWFE estimates, as they do not include legislator fixed effects. However, columns (2)-(3), (6)-(7) and (10)-(11) in Table A2 show that adding legislator or legislator-mandate fixed effects produces almost identical results.




Figure 5: Event-study estimates of the effect of executive alternation on resignations in the Argentine Chamber of Deputies, 1983-2017. The grey lines and shaded area indicate point estimates and 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals for the effect of alternation on *resignation*; the points and vertical lines do the same for the effect of alternation on *resignation and election* and *resignation and appointment*, respectively. Each panel corresponds to a different treatment, defined as a combination of alternation *level*—national or provincial—and *type* of change—the incumbent being reelected; the incumbent party being reelected, with a different executive; or a change in both incumbent executive and party. All estimates calculated using the double-robust method proposed by Callaway and Sant’Anna ([forthcoming](#)). The control group is defined as the not-yet-treated group, and standard errors clustered by legislator and using 667 bootstrap iterations.

or when there is a change in both the individual and the party occupying the national presidency. The magnitude of the effects is a bit larger than before, but only for the first month after the alternation window opened; afterwards, it flattens out. This makes sense:

if legislators resign in order to assume an elected position or a bureaucratic appointment, we expect them to do it concurrently with the change in personnel in the executive.<sup>15</sup>

The dots and error bars in Figure 5 show the estimated effects on election and appointment. Again, the findings are similar to those of Figure 4: when alternation occurs at the national level, resigning legislators mostly assume an appointed position, while provincial-level instances of alternation increase the probability that legislators will resign to assume an elected office. As a further check, in the Online Appendix we report estimates in the spirit of the matching difference-in-differences design proposed by Imai, Kim and Wang (2020). Since most of our control and outcome variables are dummies, for all observations treated at a given moment in time we constructed a matched set of all treated observations that had identical values of several control variables plus the outcomes and treatments of interest in the five months immediately preceding treatment. That is, before alternation took place the treatment and control groups were perfectly balanced by construction. We then estimated weighted least squares specifications (with weights indicating an observation’s share of its matched set) of the effect of alternation on from month  $m = 0$  to  $m = 5$ . The results are noisier than before but similar overall (Figure A13), even when we restrict the comparison to legislators from the same party in the same district (Figure A14).

**Heterogeneous effects.** Which deputies are more likely to resign? Figure 6 shows how changing both the individual and the party occupying the executive office affects the probability that different kinds of legislators will resign (see Table A3 for the full set of estimates). We consider seven interacting variables; except a legislator’s *relative* position in the party list, which lies continuously between 0 and 1,<sup>16</sup> all are dummies: whether

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<sup>15</sup>Also, note that legislators who resign are dropped from the sample and thus cannot resign again.

<sup>16</sup>Formally, relative position $_{i,d} = 1 - \frac{P_{i,d}-1}{M_d-1}$ , where  $P_i$  is legislator  $i$ ’s rank number in her party’s list (1, 2, 3, etc) and  $M_d$  is the district’s magnitude (including alternates). The top-placed legislator necessarily gets a




Figure 6: Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of the effect of (national or provincial) executive alternation on legislators' resignations. All specifications are OLS models with standard errors clustered by legislator. The unit of observation is the legislator-month. The explanatory variables measure the proportion of a month's days that fell 30 days before or after an instance of executive alternation of a given type at the national or provincial level. See Table A3 for the full results and the list of controls.

the legislator was electorally vulnerable (as defined in fn. 12); had previous executive or legislative experience; chaired a committee; was elected in a midterm election; was female; or belonged to the PJ (instead of the UCR, Argentina's other main party).<sup>17</sup> In line

value of 1, while the bottom-placed one will get a 0. This addresses the fact that being placed second or third in the list in a district of magnitude 35 is much more valuable than getting the same position in a district of magnitude 2 or 3. We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.

<sup>17</sup>The effect of provincial third parties and "other" parties was also estimated but is not reported.

with expectations, legislators located at or near the top of the party list, who tend to be more prominent political players and also more visible (and, presumably, better known) to voters, are substantially more likely to resign following an instance of executive alternation in which both the individual and the party occupying the executive position changed. This effect is almost entirely driven by legislators who resign in order to assume an elected position, however.

Alternative measures of a legislator's political weight yield similar, though somewhat weaker, results: electorally vulnerable legislators are less likely to resign, while more experienced ones are more likely to do it following alternation at the provincial level. Committee chairs are equally likely to resign as nonchairs. But midterm legislators are much more likely to resign, and assume an appointed position, though only following instances of alternation at the national level: this is entirely consistent with the claim that they are “warming up” their seats until an ally captures an executive position. Female legislators seem to be somewhat less likely to resign than their male peers, though the difference falls short of statistical significance. Party identification—PJ versus UCR—does not make a difference. As before, using 60- or 90-day alternation windows (Tables A4 and A5), adding legislator- or legislator-mandate fixed effects (Tables A6 and A7), estimating survival instead of OLS models (Table A8) or using daily rather than monthly data (Table A10) makes no difference to the results.

## Conclusion

This article accounts for an important puzzle: in some polities, legislative resignations are common and concentrated in the most prominent lawmakers rather than the weakest ones. While previous research has shown that US Representatives sometimes retire when they lack opportunities to run for higher office (Kiewiet and Zeng 1993) or face career

ceilings (Theriault 1998), we offer an alternative account: resignations may rather be the product of opportunity structures. Simply put, Argentine legislators see their seats as transitory positions to be occupied until an event over which they have little control—like the outcome of the next presidential election—offers access to a valuable bureaucratic or elected position. In so doing, we highlight that the reason why some party-centered systems combine “amateur legislators” with “professional politicians” (Jones et al. 2002) lies not only in the electoral rules that place nomination decisions in the hands of party bosses, but also in lawmakers’ progressive aspirations.

Our contribution goes well beyond the Argentine case. First, we highlight the extent to which politicians’ career decisions—and outcomes—are interdependent. Politicians from a given party are bound together through some kind of “linked fate.” While this point is implicit in the literature on coattails (Jones 1997; Magar 2012; Feierherd 2020), the focus so far has been on electoral outcomes rather than career advancement. Recent regression discontinuity studies on mayors’ appointment decisions (Colonnelli, Prem and Teso forthcoming; Brassiolo and Estrada 2020) are a step in this regard, but much remains to be done, specially for higher-level officials.

Second, we also underscore the extent to which nomination decisions are interdependent. When candidates are selected by elites in smoke-filled rooms, chances are that the design of an entire slate of nominees is the product of an agreement in which losing factions or candidates are compensated with nominations to lower-level offices—perhaps sweetened by the promise of being appointed to an attractive bureaucratic position if the party wins the next executive election. Similarly, the election of a new executive may well mean the promotion of an entire network of lower-level bureaucrats (Persico, Rodríguez-Pueblita and Silverman 2011), with potentially important implications for public policy and the geographic distribution of public resources. Yet both theoretical and empirical studies on these issues remains scant.

Lastly, it is worth noting that legislators' perception of their office as a "springboard" from which to jump to more valuable positions—up to, and including, voluntary resignations—turns legislative branches into marginal policymaking bodies (Jones et al. 2002), affects legislators' representative behavior while in office (Egerod forthcoming), and may make the legislature a weak counterpart of dominant executives (Cox and Morgenstern 2001). That said, the overall impact of resignations on voter representation is not straightforward: if the most relevant positions are in executive offices and the bureaucracy, voters' substantive interests may be better served by legislators who resign in order to assume these positions than by those who stay. Indeed, voters may even evaluate legislative candidates based on how they would perform in executive positions. This trade-off between representing voters in Congress versus doing it in an executive or bureaucratic post offers a fascinating avenue for future research.

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# Online Appendix

“Resignation as Promotion? Executive Turnover and Early Departures in the Argentine Congress, 1983-2017” by Adrián Lucardi, Juan Pablo Micozzi and Natán Skigin  
(for online publication only)

- (1) Section **A** presents the descriptive statistics.
- (2) Section **B** reports the tables on which Figures **4** and **6** are based.
- (3) Section **C** reports the robustness checks.

# A Descriptive Statistics

Table A1: Descriptive statistics

	(a) By legislative mandate					(b) By legislator-month*				
	N	mean	sd.	min.	max.	N	mean	sd.	min.	max.
<i>Resignation</i> (0/1) <sup>†</sup>	2126	0.12	0.32	0.00	1.00	90335	0.28	5.27	0.00	100.00
<i>Resignation &amp; election</i> (0/1) <sup>†</sup>	2126	0.05	0.22	0.00	1.00	90335	0.12	3.42	0.00	100.00
<i>Resignation &amp; appointment</i> (0/1) <sup>†</sup>	2126	0.06	0.24	0.00	1.00	90335	0.14	3.72	0.00	100.00
National (30-day): = <i>party</i> , = <i>person</i> (0:1)						90335	0.01	0.09	0.00	1.00
National (30-day): = <i>party</i> , ≠ <i>person</i> (0:1)						90335	0.01	0.09	0.00	1.00
National (30-day): ≠ <i>party</i> , ≠ <i>person</i> (0:1)						90335	0.01	0.11	0.00	1.00
Provincial (30-day): = <i>party</i> , = <i>person</i> (0:1)						90335	0.01	0.10	0.00	1.00
Provincial (30-day): = <i>party</i> , ≠ <i>person</i> (0:1)						90335	0.02	0.12	0.00	1.00
Provincial (30-day): ≠ <i>party</i> , ≠ <i>person</i> (0:1)						90335	0.01	0.09	0.00	1.00
<i>1st in party list</i> (0/1)	2126	0.41	0.49	0.00	1.00	90335	0.41	0.49	0.00	1.00
<i>Relative position in list</i> (0:1)	2126	0.90	0.11	0.50	1.00	90335	0.90	0.11	0.50	1.00
<i>Electorally vulnerable</i> (0/1)	2126	0.42	0.49	0.00	1.00	90335	0.43	0.50	0.00	1.00
<i>Previous experience</i> (0/1)	2126	0.38	0.49	0.00	1.00	90335	0.38	0.49	0.00	1.00
<i>Committee chair</i> (0/1)	2126	0.15	0.29	0.00	1.00	90335	0.16	0.37	0.00	1.00
<i>Elected in midterm</i> (0/1)	2126	0.47	0.50	0.00	1.00	90335	0.47	0.50	0.00	1.00
<i>party: PJ</i> (0/1)	2126	0.45	0.50	0.00	1.00	90335	0.45	0.50	0.00	1.00
<i>party: UCR</i> (0/1)	2126	0.33	0.47	0.00	1.00	90335	0.32	0.47	0.00	1.00
<i>party: provincial 3rd party</i> (0/1)	2126	0.06	0.24	0.00	1.00	90335	0.06	0.24	0.00	1.00
<i>party: other</i> (0/1)	2126	0.16	0.37	0.00	1.00	90335	0.17	0.37	0.00	1.00
<i>Female</i> (0/1)	2126	0.22	0.42	0.00	1.00	90335	0.23	0.42	0.00	1.00
<i>Copartisan president</i> (0/1)	2126	0.40	0.49	0.00	1.00	90335	0.42	0.49	0.00	1.00
<i>Copartisan governor</i> (0/1)	2126	0.43	0.50	0.00	1.00	90335	0.44	0.50	0.00	1.00
<i>Vote share</i> (0:1)	2126	0.38	0.14	0.04	0.80	90335	0.38	0.14	0.04	0.80
<i>Seats captured</i> (#)	2126	6.37	7.65	1.00	37.00	90335	6.16	7.34	1.00	37.00
<i>Position in list</i> (#)	2126	3.71	4.80	1.00	37.00	90335	3.64	4.63	1.00	37.00
<i>Former (vice-)president</i> (0/1)	2126	0.00	0.05	0.00	1.00	90335	0.00	0.05	0.00	1.00
<i>Former (deputy-)governor</i> (0/1)	2126	0.04	0.20	0.00	1.00	90335	0.04	0.19	0.00	1.00
<i>Former mayor</i> (0/1)	2126	0.10	0.30	0.00	1.00	90335	0.10	0.30	0.00	1.00
<i>Former national senator</i> (0/1)	2126	0.02	0.15	0.00	1.00	90335	0.02	0.15	0.00	1.00
<i>Former national deputy</i> (0/1)	2126	0.26	0.44	0.00	1.00	90335	0.26	0.44	0.00	1.00
<i>Former (supra-)national legislator</i> (0/1)	2126	0.04	0.20	0.00	1.00	90335	0.04	0.20	0.00	1.00

(\*) First two months removed from the sample, for the reasons shown in Figure A4.

(†) Multiplied by 100 in panel (b).




Figure A1: Duration of (elective) office spells in Argentina, 1983-2017. An office spell is defined as an instance in which an individual occupied the same office uninterruptedly. Thus, a spell of duration 1 means that a given individual was elected to some office and not reelected; a spell of duration 2 means that the individual in question was reelected once (to the same office), and so on. Vice-presidents and vice-governors who become presidents and governors, respectively, are counted as being reelected, but governors who become presidents are not. Percentages are calculated relative to the total number of spells corresponding to a given office. Note that each spell is only counted once (i.e., longer spells are not counted multiple times).




Figure A2: Career paths of individuals elected to the Argentine Chamber of Deputies (1983-2013), within 4 years of being elected.






Figure A3: Career paths of individuals elected to the Argentine Chamber of Deputies (1983-2013), within 4 years of getting elected (cont.).




Figure A4: Distribution of the explanatory variables within a legislative term, by time of election (midterm vs. concurrent)—Argentine Chamber of Deputies, 1983-2017. Columns indicate the type of alternation—at the national vs. the provincial level; rows show the type of alternation. The lines the average value of the explanatory variable within a month, i.e. a value of would 100 indicate that all deputies experienced the “treatment” of interest during that month. The sample is restricted to elected deputies, and 30-day alternation windows are used overall.






Figure A5: Probability that a sitting legislator will resign to her seat in the Argentine Chamber of Deputies, conditional on executive alternation at the national or subnational level within a 30-day window, 1983-2017 (cont.).

## B Sources for results reported in the text

- (1) *Main results*. Table A2 reports the full estimates for the results reported in Figure 4.
- (2) *Conditional effects*. Table A3 reports the full conditional estimates on which Figure 6 is based.

Table A2: Executive alternation and legislative resignation in Argentina, 1983-2017

	resignation				resignation & election				resignation & app'tment			
(a) 30-day window	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
national:	-0.34	-0.40	-0.43	-0.04	-0.28	-0.30	-0.31	0.22	-0.06	-0.09	-0.11	-60.77
= party, = person	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.56)	(0.29)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.50)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(2.25)
national:	0.86	0.93	0.97	0.28	0.57	0.59	0.59	0.01	0.37	0.39	0.43	1.22
= party, ≠ person	(0.51)	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.42)	(0.42)	(0.42)	(0.42)	(0.66)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.28)	(0.78)
national:	4.02	3.94	3.88	2.07	0.45	0.46	0.45	1.53	3.17	3.08	3.02	3.38
≠ party, ≠ person	(0.67)	(0.66)	(0.65)	(0.31)	(0.37)	(0.37)	(0.36)	(0.83)	(0.54)	(0.53)	(0.52)	(0.44)
provincial:	0.30	0.27	0.29	0.45	0.56	0.55	0.56	0.76	-0.32	-0.34	-0.33	-0.60
= party, = person	(0.49)	(0.49)	(0.48)	(0.46)	(0.44)	(0.44)	(0.43)	(0.57)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(1.23)
provincial:	1.95	1.85	1.84	1.08	1.39	1.35	1.33	1.18	0.67	0.62	0.62	1.17
= party, ≠ person	(0.54)	(0.53)	(0.53)	(0.32)	(0.44)	(0.43)	(0.43)	(0.45)	(0.33)	(0.33)	(0.32)	(0.65)
provincial:	2.15	2.06	1.99	1.12	1.35	1.36	1.33	1.19	0.23	0.15	0.09	0.94
≠ party, ≠ person	(0.73)	(0.71)	(0.71)	(0.41)	(0.56)	(0.55)	(0.55)	(0.54)	(0.41)	(0.40)	(0.39)	(0.79)
(b) 60-day window												
national:	-0.08	-0.14	-0.17	0.21	0.01	-0.01	-0.03	1.14	-0.09	-0.11	-0.12	-65.39
= party, = person	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.44)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.49)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(3.47)
national:	0.62	0.68	0.72	0.36	0.33	0.36	0.35	0.18	0.20	0.22	0.27	0.53
= party, ≠ person	(0.30)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.36)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.69)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.58)
national:	2.21	2.16	2.12	1.86	0.29	0.30	0.30	1.50	1.72	1.66	1.62	2.89
≠ party, ≠ person	(0.36)	(0.35)	(0.35)	(0.27)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.65)	(0.29)	(0.28)	(0.27)	(0.34)
provincial:	0.03	0.00	0.03	0.12	0.15	0.14	0.15	0.00	-0.12	-0.14	-0.13	0.12
= party, = person	(0.25)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.37)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.52)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.80)
provincial:	0.82	0.75	0.75	0.73	0.59	0.56	0.55	0.53	0.33	0.28	0.28	1.16
= party, ≠ person	(0.28)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.40)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.52)
provincial:	1.29	1.22	1.15	0.96	0.65	0.67	0.65	0.60	0.23	0.14	0.08	1.19
≠ party, ≠ person	(0.41)	(0.40)	(0.39)	(0.35)	(0.29)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.49)	(0.24)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.63)
(c) 90-day window												
national:	0.01	-0.05	-0.07	0.36	0.09	0.06	0.05	1.72	-0.06	-0.08	-0.09	-2.37
= party, = person	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.44)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.60)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(1.17)
national:	0.37	0.44	0.48	0.18	0.25	0.28	0.27	0.45	0.09	0.12	0.16	0.11
= party, ≠ person	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.32)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.64)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.52)
national:	1.48	1.44	1.40	1.67	0.24	0.24	0.24	1.58	1.15	1.09	1.05	2.49
≠ party, ≠ person	(0.25)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.26)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.58)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.33)
provincial:	-0.04	-0.07	-0.04	-0.04	0.05	0.05	0.06	-0.25	-0.09	-0.12	-0.11	-0.23
= party, = person	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.34)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.46)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.71)
provincial:	0.55	0.49	0.47	0.60	0.38	0.36	0.35	0.34	0.19	0.14	0.14	0.66
= party, ≠ person	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.24)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.34)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.43)
provincial:	0.95	0.88	0.81	0.91	0.46	0.48	0.46	0.48	0.22	0.13	0.07	1.05
≠ party, ≠ person	(0.29)	(0.28)	(0.27)	(0.31)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.42)	(0.18)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.55)
specification	OLS	OLS	OLS	GLM	OLS	OLS	OLS	GLM	OLS	OLS	OLS	GLM
legislator FE's		x				x				x		
leg.-mandate FE's			x				x				x	
$\sum Y = 1$	252				106				125			

The unit of observation is the legislator-month. Outcome variables in OLS specifications are multiplied by 100 to facilitate interpretation. In panels (a) through (c), the first two, three and four months of each legislator's period have been excluded from the analysis, respectively.  $N_{\text{legislators}} = 1,592-1,598$ ;  $N_{\text{mandates}} = 2,111-2,120$ ;  $N_{\text{obs.}} = 86,100-90,335$ . Robust standard errors clustered by legislator in parentheses. The explanatory variables measure the proportion of a month's days that fell 30, 60 or 90 days before or after an instance of executive alternation of a given type at the national or provincial level. In OLS specifications the outcome variable was multiplied by 100 to facilitate interpretation. GLM (survival) specifications use a cloglog link. All specifications include duration, district and period fixed effects, as well as controls for gender; copartisan governor; copartisan president; elected in midterm; list vote share; log of number of seats captured; committee chair; relative position in list; whether the legislator was vulnerable; and previous experience as (vice-)president, (deputy) governor, mayor, national senator, national deputy, or other (supra-)national legislator.

Table A3: Executive alternation and legislative resignations in Argentina, 1983-2017: Conditional effects

	position in list			elect. vulnerable			previous experience			committee chair			elected in midterm			female			party (ucx/pr)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)
national (30-day): = party, ≠ person × conditional	-0.61 (2.15)	-1.41 (2.07)	0.50 (0.56)	-0.27 (0.40)	-0.28 (0.38)	-0.03 (0.11)	-0.32 (0.31)	-0.22 (0.28)	-0.06 (0.09)	-0.44 (0.31)	-0.31 (0.29)	-0.11 (0.08)	-0.15 (0.21)	-0.32 (0.17)	0.19 (0.10)	-0.19 (0.37)	-0.10 (0.36)	-0.09 (0.08)	-0.25 (0.59)	0.13 (0.57)	-0.39 (0.14)
national (30-day): = party, ≠ person × conditional	1.98 (2.45)	4.48 (2.35)	-2.65 (0.63)	1.58 (0.57)	0.79 (0.54)	0.87 (0.15)	0.44 (0.63)	0.15 (0.61)	0.40 (0.17)	0.79 (0.89)	0.59 (0.85)	0.28 (0.26)	-0.09 (0.60)	-0.08 (0.56)	0.04 (0.19)	1.14 (0.55)	0.79 (0.50)	0.42 (0.20)	0.11 (0.75)	0.04 (0.72)	0.13 (0.19)
national (30-day): = party, ≠ person × conditional	-1.25 (5.82)	-4.31 (5.53)	3.32 (1.89)	-1.61 (0.95)	-0.54 (0.80)	-1.06 (0.53)	0.83 (1.00)	0.76 (0.83)	0.00 (0.58)	0.48 (1.29)	-0.02 (0.98)	0.47 (0.85)	1.75 (0.99)	1.21 (0.84)	0.60 (0.56)	-0.51 (0.90)	-0.38 (0.75)	-0.15 (0.53)	1.46 (1.05)	0.72 (0.83)	0.70 (0.66)
national (30-day): ≠ party, ≠ person × conditional	-5.85 (4.60)	-6.01 (2.29)	0.16 (3.90)	5.15 (1.01)	0.45 (0.56)	4.25 (0.84)	3.13 (0.78)	-0.06 (0.32)	2.79 (0.66)	4.00 (0.74)	0.31 (0.39)	3.25 (0.60)	2.60 (0.72)	0.48 (0.32)	1.74 (0.59)	4.50 (1.78)	0.48 (0.42)	3.56 (0.64)	3.50 (1.02)	0.44 (0.54)	2.83 (0.85)
provincial (30-day): = party, ≠ person × conditional	11.05 (5.28)	7.22 (2.83)	3.37 (4.37)	-2.59 (1.31)	-0.05 (0.75)	-2.42 (1.04)	1.76 (1.42)	0.91 (0.86)	0.84 (1.12)	0.42 (1.82)	0.73 (1.12)	-0.13 (1.43)	2.79 (1.33)	-0.09 (0.75)	2.83 (1.07)	-1.74 (1.39)	0.30 (0.86)	-1.82 (1.08)	0.96 (1.52)	0.47 (0.88)	0.24 (1.21)
provincial (30-day): = party, ≠ person × conditional	3.56 (3.89)	3.78 (3.70)	0.38 (0.97)	0.00 (0.54)	0.43 (0.52)	-0.38 (0.14)	-0.11 (0.53)	0.07 (0.45)	-0.34 (0.13)	0.63 (0.56)	0.80 (0.50)	-0.25 (0.19)	0.77 (0.66)	0.77 (0.57)	-0.23 (0.15)	0.43 (0.58)	0.67 (0.51)	-0.34 (0.21)	0.27 (0.67)	0.19 (0.55)	0.11 (0.39)
provincial (30-day): = party, ≠ person × conditional	-3.69 (4.28)	-3.63 (4.01)	-0.79 (1.17)	0.93 (0.93)	0.33 (0.82)	0.34 (0.30)	0.95 (0.92)	1.15 (0.83)	0.02 (0.32)	-1.66 (0.93)	-1.12 (0.84)	-0.43 (0.31)	-0.93 (0.97)	-0.42 (0.87)	-0.20 (0.33)	-0.51 (0.89)	-0.46 (0.84)	0.10 (0.25)	-0.05 (0.96)	0.78 (0.86)	-0.76 (0.43)
provincial (30-day): = party, ≠ person × conditional	-5.01 (4.14)	-2.11 (3.51)	-2.77 (2.26)	2.04 (0.82)	1.67 (0.65)	0.52 (0.53)	1.25 (0.60)	0.52 (0.43)	0.84 (0.42)	2.39 (0.61)	1.33 (0.48)	1.18 (0.40)	-0.35 (0.33)	0.12 (0.24)	-0.40 (0.20)	2.28 (0.63)	1.73 (0.53)	0.66 (0.37)	1.92 (0.84)	0.98 (0.68)	1.02 (0.53)
provincial (30-day): = party, ≠ person × conditional	7.69 (4.67)	3.88 (3.99)	3.80 (2.55)	-0.36 (1.04)	-0.62 (0.84)	0.20 (0.63)	1.72 (1.14)	2.20 (0.97)	-0.44 (0.65)	-2.39 (1.33)	0.21 (1.17)	-2.62 (0.67)	4.30 (1.05)	2.38 (0.87)	1.99 (0.64)	-1.33 (1.06)	-1.66 (0.79)	0.33 (0.73)	-0.46 (1.18)	0.95 (0.99)	-1.33 (0.69)
provincial (30-day): = party, ≠ person × conditional	-8.82 (4.75)	-9.05 (3.16)	0.96 (3.07)	2.02 (0.96)	1.21 (0.68)	0.08 (0.58)	0.88 (0.70)	0.74 (0.56)	-0.28 (0.30)	2.31 (0.80)	1.62 (0.64)	0.07 (0.40)	1.48 (0.81)	0.80 (0.56)	0.34 (0.53)	2.75 (0.87)	1.60 (0.66)	0.52 (0.51)	2.74 (1.17)	0.99 (0.74)	1.37 (0.84)
outcome Σ Y = 1	R 252	R&E 106	R&A 125	R 252	R&E 106	R&A 125	R 252	R&E 106	R&A 125	R 252	R&E 106	R&A 125	R 252	R&E 106	R&A 125	R 252	R&E 106	R&A 125	R 252	R&E 106	R&A 125

OLS regression estimates. The unit of observation is the legislator-month. The first two months of each legislator's period have been excluded from the analysis.  $N_{\text{legislators}} = 1,598$ ;  $N_{\text{mandates}} = 2,120$ ;  $N_{\text{obs.}} = 90,335$ . Robust standard errors clustered by legislator in parentheses. Outcomes: R: *resignation* (0/100); R&E: *resignation and election* (0/100); R&A: *resignation and appointment* (0/100). The explanatory variables measure the proportion of a month's days that fell 30 days before or after an instance of executive alternation of a given type at the national or provincial level. The "conditional" variables vary by model; they are specified at the top. *position in list* (columns 1-3) is a continuous variable that takes the value of 1 for the legislator placed in the top position of his or her party's list, and 0 for the one located at the bottom; all other conditioning variables are dummies. In column (19)-(21), the baseline party is the ucx, and the conditional effect correspond to the pr; estimates for "third" and "other" parties computed but not reported. All specifications include duration, district and period fixed effects, as well as controls for gender; copartisan governor; copartisan president; elected in midterm; list vote share; log of number of seats captured; committee chair; relative position in list; whether the legislator was vulnerable; and previous experience as (vice-)president, (deputy) governor, mayor, national senator, national deputy, or other (supra-)national legislator.

## C Robustness Checks

- (1) *Conditional specifications.* Tables A4 and A5 reproduce the specifications of Table A3 but measuring the explanatory variable with 60-days and 90-days windows, respectively. Tables A6 and A7 employ 30-day windows but add legislator and legislator-mandate fixed effects, respectively. Table A8 reports survival models with a cloglog link instead of OLS specifications.
- (2) *Daily data.* Tables A9 and A10 replicate the results of Tables A2 and A3, but using the legislator-day rather than the legislator-month as the unit of analysis. Given the estimation issues caused by the huge sample sizes involved, in Table A9 we report OLS specifications only.
- (3) *Callaway and Sant’Anna estimates by subsample.* Figures A6 – A12 report the effect of executive alternation on *resignation* for seven different subsamples, using the difference-in-differences double-robust estimation method proposed by Callaway and Sant’Anna (forthcoming).
- (4) *Difference-in-Differences matching.* Figure A13 reports WLS estimates of the effect of each treatment on the outcomes of interest. In the spirit of Imai, Kim and Wang (2020), the data is pre-processed so that each treated observation is matched with the subset of control observations with identical values of the following variables: (a) party ID; (b) elected in midterm election; (c) district magnitude; (d) number of seats captured by the legislator’s list; (e) position in party list; whether the legislator (f) was electorally *vulnerable*; (g) was a committee chair; (h) had previous executive experience; (i) had previous legislative experience; and (j) was male or female; as well as the lagged values of all (k) outcomes and (l) treatment(s) of interest in the five months immediately prior to treatment. All specifications include matched set fixed effects

and robust standard errors clustered by matched set. Weights are calculated as one over the total number of observations in the matched set. The models in Figure [A14](#) further restrict the matching to legislators from the same district.



Table A4: Executive alternation and legislative resignations in Argentina, 1983-2017: Conditional effects (60-day window)

	position in list			elect. vulnerable			previous experience			committee chair			elected in midterm			female			party (vcs/p)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)
national (60-day): = party, = person × conditional	1.56 (1.24)	1.28 (1.19)	0.13 (0.34)	-0.03 (0.20)	0.05 (0.19)	-0.09 (0.07)	-0.12 (0.15)	-0.03 (0.14)	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.15 (0.16)	-0.04 (0.15)	-0.09 (0.05)	0.19 (0.13)	0.15 (0.10)	0.04 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.19)	0.08 (0.19)	-0.11 (0.05)	-0.16 (0.32)	0.14 (0.31)	-0.30 (0.09)
national (60-day): = party, ≠ person × conditional	-1.80 (1.40)	-1.40 (1.34)	-0.23 (0.37)	-0.12 (0.29)	-0.08 (0.28)	0.00 (0.08)	0.10 (0.33)	0.08 (0.31)	-0.04 (0.09)	0.53 (0.47)	0.35 (0.44)	0.14 (0.16)	-0.49 (0.31)	-0.26 (0.28)	-0.23 (0.11)	-0.05 (0.25)	-0.15 (0.23)	0.08 (0.11)	0.46 (0.39)	0.05 (0.38)	0.38 (0.12)
national (60-day): = party, ≠ person × conditional	-0.54 (3.02)	2.47 (2.82)	-2.27 (0.94)	1.06 (0.45)	0.44 (0.32)	0.55 (0.31)	0.42 (0.35)	0.10 (0.24)	0.14 (0.19)	0.61 (0.33)	0.29 (0.25)	0.20 (0.19)	0.21 (0.30)	0.08 (0.20)	0.00 (0.17)	0.89 (0.40)	0.48 (0.30)	0.25 (0.23)	-0.08 (0.32)	0.01 (0.22)	-0.06 (0.23)
national (60-day): = party, ≠ person × conditional	1.27 (3.36)	-2.36 (3.07)	2.72 (1.19)	-0.98 (0.56)	-0.27 (0.43)	-0.73 (0.32)	0.39 (0.58)	0.43 (0.44)	0.16 (0.35)	0.14 (0.70)	0.23 (0.53)	0.06 (0.44)	0.71 (0.58)	0.45 (0.45)	0.35 (0.33)	-0.65 (0.50)	-0.30 (0.39)	-0.16 (0.30)	1.29 (0.58)	0.45 (0.42)	0.68 (0.39)
provincial (60-day): = party, = person × conditional	-2.95 (2.49)	-3.12 (1.24)	-0.11 (2.06)	2.91 (0.56)	0.28 (0.30)	2.39 (0.46)	1.71 (0.42)	-0.01 (0.17)	1.56 (0.36)	2.13 (0.39)	0.19 (0.21)	1.75 (0.32)	1.73 (0.45)	0.38 (0.23)	1.10 (0.35)	2.48 (0.42)	0.31 (0.23)	1.95 (0.34)	1.82 (0.53)	0.36 (0.31)	1.37 (0.42)
provincial (60-day): = party, ≠ person × conditional	5.78 (2.87)	3.82 (1.53)	2.05 (2.32)	-1.58 (0.71)	0.00 (0.41)	-1.48 (0.55)	1.02 (0.77)	0.58 (0.47)	0.35 (0.60)	0.63 (1.05)	0.62 (0.67)	0.01 (0.79)	0.88 (0.72)	-0.17 (0.40)	1.15 (0.56)	-0.98 (0.76)	0.18 (0.47)	-1.11 (0.56)	0.89 (0.83)	0.22 (0.08)	0.50 (0.65)
provincial (60-day): = party, = person × conditional	1.44 (1.90)	1.25 (1.72)	0.46 (0.74)	-0.11 (0.27)	0.03 (0.24)	-0.09 (0.13)	-0.22 (0.26)	-0.11 (0.22)	-0.16 (0.08)	0.18 (0.28)	0.29 (0.25)	-0.13 (0.10)	0.06 (0.32)	0.18 (0.26)	-0.17 (0.09)	0.14 (0.30)	0.23 (0.26)	-0.12 (0.14)	0.29 (0.43)	0.08 (0.34)	0.25 (0.27)
provincial (60-day): = party, ≠ person × conditional	-1.60 (2.13)	-1.25 (1.91)	-0.66 (0.87)	0.47 (0.48)	0.28 (0.42)	0.06 (0.19)	0.56 (0.48)	0.59 (0.42)	0.07 (0.21)	-0.82 (0.51)	-0.75 (0.39)	-0.01 (0.32)	-0.04 (0.48)	-0.05 (0.41)	0.08 (0.20)	-0.43 (0.42)	-0.34 (0.38)	-0.02 (0.15)	-0.53 (0.55)	0.18 (0.46)	-0.65 (0.29)
provincial (60-day): = party, ≠ person × conditional	-3.07 (2.19)	-1.59 (1.86)	-1.43 (1.20)	0.80 (0.43)	0.69 (0.34)	0.23 (0.29)	0.42 (0.31)	0.12 (0.22)	0.39 (0.22)	1.06 (0.31)	0.57 (0.25)	0.59 (0.21)	-0.57 (0.20)	-0.17 (0.14)	-0.27 (0.12)	1.01 (0.33)	0.78 (0.27)	0.33 (0.20)	0.93 (0.44)	0.35 (0.35)	0.63 (0.29)
provincial (60-day): = party, ≠ person × conditional	4.31 (2.48)	2.41 (2.12)	1.94 (1.35)	-0.04 (0.55)	-0.23 (0.45)	0.14 (0.34)	1.00 (0.61)	1.17 (0.51)	-0.17 (0.35)	-1.42 (0.72)	-0.01 (0.64)	-1.42 (0.36)	2.35 (0.52)	1.28 (0.42)	1.00 (0.31)	-0.77 (0.56)	-0.94 (0.41)	0.18 (0.38)	-0.58 (0.61)	0.43 (0.50)	-0.94 (0.37)
provincial (60-day): = party, ≠ person × conditional	-4.69 (2.75)	-5.00 (1.70)	0.78 (1.73)	1.44 (0.56)	0.64 (0.37)	0.26 (0.36)	0.54 (0.40)	0.29 (0.29)	-0.11 (0.17)	1.40 (0.45)	0.75 (0.33)	0.19 (0.25)	0.83 (0.48)	0.37 (0.30)	0.24 (0.33)	1.64 (0.49)	0.78 (0.34)	0.39 (0.29)	1.32 (0.61)	0.47 (0.40)	0.68 (0.42)
outcome Σ Y = 1	6.61 (3.20)	6.24 (2.10)	-0.62 (1.92)	-0.36 (0.79)	0.02 (0.57)	-0.11 (0.44)	2.14 (0.97)	1.04 (0.68)	0.93 (0.62)	-0.65 (0.96)	-0.58 (0.61)	0.11 (0.67)	0.81 (0.78)	0.49 (0.53)	-0.04 (0.46)	-1.58 (0.72)	-0.69 (0.53)	-0.67 (0.34)	-0.39 (0.88)	0.03 (0.59)	-0.69 (0.57)
ols regression estimates. The unit of observation is the legislator-month. The first three months of each legislator's period have been excluded from the analysis. $N_{legislators} = 1,596$ ; $N_{mandates} = 2,117$ ; $N_{obs.} = 88,216$ . Robust standard errors clustered by legislator in parentheses. Outcomes: r: <i>resignation</i> (0/100); r&e: <i>resignation and election</i> (0/100); r&a: <i>resignation and appointment</i> (0/100). The explanatory variables measure the proportion of a month's days that fell 60 days before or after an instance of executive alternation of a given type at the national or provincial level. The "conditional" variables vary by model; they are specified at the top. <i>position in list</i> (columns 1-3) is a continuous variable that takes the value of 1 for the legislator placed in the top position of his or her party's list, and 0 for the one located at the bottom; all other conditioning variables are dummies. In column (19)-(21), the baseline party is the ucr, and the conditional effect correspond to the p; estimates for "third" and "other" parties computed but not reported. All specifications include duration, district and period fixed effects, as well as controls for gender; copartisan governor; copartisan president; elected in midterm; list vote share; log of number of seats captured; committee chair; relative position in list; whether the legislator was vulnerable; and previous experience as (vice-)president, (deputy) governor, mayor, national senator, national deputy, or other (supra-)national legislator.	r	r&e	r&a	r	r&e	r&a	r	r&e	r&a	r	r&e	r&a	r	r&e	r&a	r	r&e	r&a	r	r&e	r&a
	251	106	124	251	106	124	251	106	124	251	106	124	251	106	124	251	106	124	251	106	124

Table A5: Executive alternation and legislative resignations in Argentina, 1983-2017: Conditional effects (90-day window)

	position in list			elect. vulnerable			previous experience			committee chair			elected in midterm			female			party (vcr/p)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)
national (90-day): = party, = person × conditional	2.53 (1.31)	1.97 (1.28)	0.36 (0.25)	0.05 (0.16)	0.11 (0.15)	-0.07 (0.05)	0.00 (0.12)	0.08 (0.11)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.13)	0.04 (0.12)	-0.07 (0.04)	0.26 (0.16)	0.29 (0.15)	-0.02 (0.05)	0.04 (0.15)	0.13 (0.14)	-0.08 (0.04)	-0.14 (0.22)	0.11 (0.20)	-0.25 (0.07)
national (90-day): = party, ≠ person × conditional	-2.78 (1.42)	-2.08 (1.38)	-0.47 (0.28)	-0.07 (0.23)	-0.04 (0.22)	-0.00 (0.06)	0.04 (0.26)	0.01 (0.25)	-0.04 (0.07)	0.46 (0.38)	0.34 (0.36)	0.07 (0.12)	-0.44 (0.25)	-0.36 (0.23)	-0.08 (0.08)	-0.02 (0.23)	-0.07 (0.21)	0.03 (0.08)	0.49 (0.29)	0.14 (0.28)	0.35 (0.09)
national (90-day): = party, ≠ person × conditional	-0.71 (2.03)	1.47 (1.88)	-1.74 (0.66)	0.72 (0.33)	0.37 (0.23)	0.33 (0.22)	0.30 (0.26)	0.13 (0.18)	0.08 (0.15)	0.36 (0.24)	0.22 (0.17)	0.10 (0.14)	0.04 (0.23)	0.07 (0.16)	-0.09 (0.12)	0.55 (0.28)	0.37 (0.22)	0.10 (0.16)	-0.02 (0.26)	0.13 (0.21)	-0.12 (0.16)
national (90-day): = party, ≠ person × conditional	1.19 (2.27)	-1.34 (2.06)	2.02 (0.82)	-0.74 (0.39)	-0.26 (0.30)	-0.51 (0.22)	0.15 (0.41)	0.22 (0.31)	0.04 (0.25)	0.12 (0.50)	0.20 (0.39)	-0.01 (0.30)	0.58 (0.41)	0.33 (0.32)	0.32 (0.23)	-0.45 (0.36)	-0.25 (0.27)	-0.07 (0.23)	0.81 (0.43)	0.20 (0.32)	0.54 (0.28)
national (90-day): = party, ≠ person × conditional	-1.52 (1.72)	-2.00 (0.83)	0.20 (1.45)	1.93 (0.38)	0.24 (0.20)	1.57 (0.31)	1.11 (0.28)	0.01 (0.12)	1.03 (0.24)	1.43 (0.27)	0.17 (0.14)	1.17 (0.22)	1.15 (0.31)	0.28 (0.16)	0.73 (0.24)	1.69 (0.29)	0.26 (0.16)	1.32 (0.23)	1.17 (0.35)	0.25 (0.20)	0.87 (0.28)
provincial (90-day): = party, = person × conditional	3.37 (1.98)	2.50 (1.04)	1.06 (1.62)	-1.01 (0.48)	-0.03 (0.28)	-0.92 (0.38)	0.77 (0.53)	0.45 (0.32)	0.25 (0.41)	0.42 (0.72)	0.41 (0.45)	-0.01 (0.54)	0.61 (0.48)	-0.09 (0.27)	0.77 (0.38)	-0.81 (0.52)	0.09 (0.31)	-0.89 (0.39)	0.64 (0.56)	0.16 (0.32)	0.41 (0.44)
provincial (90-day): = party, ≠ person × conditional	1.07 (1.34)	0.60 (1.03)	0.70 (0.81)	-0.11 (0.19)	-0.02 (0.15)	-0.05 (0.12)	-0.18 (0.19)	-0.12 (0.14)	-0.10 (0.09)	0.08 (0.19)	0.15 (0.16)	-0.08 (0.09)	-0.00 (0.21)	0.03 (0.15)	-0.10 (0.08)	0.05 (0.21)	0.11 (0.17)	-0.08 (0.11)	0.15 (0.29)	0.04 (0.23)	0.15 (0.19)
provincial (90-day): = party, ≠ person × conditional	-1.26 (1.50)	-0.63 (1.16)	-0.90 (0.89)	0.27 (0.33)	0.19 (0.28)	-0.01 (0.15)	0.31 (0.33)	0.39 (0.27)	-0.00 (0.16)	-0.66 (0.34)	-0.53 (0.24)	-0.08 (0.23)	-0.03 (0.33)	0.06 (0.26)	0.01 (0.16)	-0.32 (0.27)	-0.25 (0.24)	-0.01 (0.12)	-0.39 (0.37)	0.07 (0.31)	-0.44 (0.22)
provincial (90-day): = party, ≠ person × conditional	-2.69 (1.53)	-1.32 (1.27)	-1.05 (0.84)	0.56 (0.30)	0.46 (0.23)	0.12 (0.20)	0.28 (0.22)	0.04 (0.15)	0.23 (0.15)	0.73 (0.22)	0.38 (0.17)	0.37 (0.14)	-0.34 (0.17)	-0.19 (0.10)	-0.16 (0.10)	0.70 (0.23)	0.52 (0.18)	0.19 (0.14)	0.59 (0.30)	0.21 (0.23)	0.42 (0.20)
provincial (90-day): = party, ≠ person × conditional	3.59 (1.74)	1.88 (1.45)	1.37 (0.94)	-0.11 (0.39)	-0.19 (0.31)	0.08 (0.23)	0.66 (0.42)	0.84 (0.35)	-0.11 (0.24)	-1.08 (0.50)	-0.03 (0.44)	-1.00 (0.25)	1.44 (0.37)	0.93 (0.28)	0.55 (0.22)	-0.57 (0.38)	-0.68 (0.28)	0.18 (0.26)	-0.37 (0.43)	0.26 (0.34)	-0.70 (0.26)
provincial (90-day): = party, ≠ person × conditional	-2.65 (2.09)	-3.71 (1.20)	1.44 (1.47)	1.17 (0.41)	0.50 (0.26)	0.32 (0.27)	0.44 (0.29)	0.22 (0.20)	-0.02 (0.14)	1.05 (0.32)	0.52 (0.22)	0.23 (0.19)	0.71 (0.37)	0.24 (0.22)	0.29 (0.26)	1.13 (0.34)	0.56 (0.24)	0.25 (0.20)	1.10 (0.45)	0.42 (0.30)	0.58 (0.32)
provincial (90-day): = party, ≠ person × conditional	3.98 (2.40)	4.61 (1.49)	-1.35 (1.60)	-0.53 (0.55)	-0.09 (0.39)	-0.26 (0.32)	1.43 (0.68)	0.67 (0.47)	0.66 (0.45)	-0.57 (0.69)	-0.36 (0.45)	-0.09 (0.46)	0.42 (0.56)	0.37 (0.37)	-0.13 (0.35)	-0.77 (0.58)	-0.55 (0.36)	-0.05 (0.39)	-0.44 (0.64)	-0.08 (0.43)	-0.56 (0.42)
outcome Σ Y = 1	R 246	R&E 106	R&A 119	R 246	R&E 106	R&A 119	R 246	R&E 106	R&A 119	R 246	R&E 106	R&A 119	R 246	R&E 106	R&A 119	R 246	R&E 106	R&A 119	R 246	R&E 106	R&A 119

OLS regression estimates. The unit of observation is the legislator-month. The first four months of each legislator's period have been excluded from the analysis.  $N_{legislators} = 1,592$ ;  $N_{mandates} = 2,111$ ;  $N_{obs.} = 86,100$ . Robust standard errors clustered by legislator in parentheses. Outcomes: r: *resignation* (0/100); r&E: *resignation and election* (0/100); r&A: *resignation and appointment* (0/100). The explanatory variables measure the proportion of a month's days that fell 90 days before or after an instance of executive alternation of a given type at the national or provincial level. The "conditional" variables vary by model; they are specified at the top. *position in list* (columns 1-3) is a continuous variable that takes the value of 1 for the legislator placed in the top position of his or her party's list, and 0 for the one located at the bottom; all other conditioning variables are dummies. In column (19)-(21), the baseline party is the vcr, and the conditional effect correspond to the p; estimates for "third" and "other" parties computed but not reported. All specifications include duration, district and period fixed effects, as well as controls for gender; copartisan governor; copartisan president; elected in midterm; list vote share; log of number of seats captured; committee chair; relative position in list; whether the legislator was vulnerable; and previous experience as (vice-)president, (deputy) governor, mayor, national senator, national deputy, or other (supra-)national legislator.

Table A6: Executive alternation and legislative resignations in Argentina, 1983-2017: Conditional effects (30-day window with legislator fixed effects)

	position in list			elect. vulnerable			previous experience			committee chair			elected in midterm			female			party (vcs/p)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)
national (30-day):	-1.04	-1.50	0.29	-0.30	-0.29	-0.03	-0.41	-0.23	-0.13	-0.50	-0.32	-0.15	-0.22	-0.34	0.15	-0.28	-0.12	-0.14	-0.28	0.12	-0.37
= party, = person	(2.16)	(2.05)	(0.64)	(0.39)	(0.37)	(0.11)	(0.30)	(0.28)	(0.09)	(0.31)	(0.29)	(0.08)	(0.20)	(0.16)	(0.09)	(0.36)	(0.35)	(0.08)	(0.59)	(0.57)	(0.14)
× conditional	0.71	1.32	-0.41	-0.24	-0.01	-0.16	0.03	-0.19	0.13	0.78	0.18	0.52	-0.34	0.09	-0.47	-0.24	-0.43	0.13	0.26	-0.34	0.54
national (30-day):	(2.45)	(2.33)	(0.72)	(0.57)	(0.54)	(0.15)	(0.63)	(0.61)	(0.17)	(0.87)	(0.83)	(0.25)	(0.60)	(0.56)	(0.19)	(0.55)	(0.49)	(0.21)	(0.74)	(0.71)	(0.19)
= party, ≠ person	1.97	4.29	-2.51	1.68	0.82	0.91	0.58	0.19	0.46	0.86	0.62	0.30	-0.02	-0.05	0.06	1.23	0.82	0.47	0.16	0.09	0.10
× conditional	(5.19)	(4.99)	(1.48)	(0.79)	(0.62)	(0.52)	(0.56)	(0.43)	(0.37)	(0.56)	(0.47)	(0.31)	(0.28)	(0.24)	(0.14)	(0.66)	(0.56)	(0.37)	(0.63)	(0.46)	(0.45)
national (30-day):	-1.16	-4.07	3.20	-1.69	-0.56	-1.11	0.69	0.73	-0.08	0.46	-0.02	0.47	1.75	1.20	0.59	-0.61	-0.41	-0.23	1.40	0.64	0.73
= party, ≠ person	(5.72)	(5.43)	(1.87)	(0.94)	(0.79)	(0.52)	(1.00)	(0.83)	(0.58)	(1.29)	(0.97)	(0.85)	(0.97)	(0.83)	(0.55)	(0.89)	(0.74)	(0.52)	(1.04)	(0.83)	(0.65)
× conditional	-5.77	-5.89	-0.03	5.06	0.47	4.12	3.05	-0.04	2.71	3.94	0.32	3.18	2.52	0.48	1.67	4.41	0.50	3.46	3.49	0.48	2.79
national (30-day):	(4.54)	(2.28)	(3.85)	(0.99)	(0.55)	(0.82)	(0.76)	(0.31)	(0.65)	(0.73)	(0.38)	(0.59)	(0.70)	(0.32)	(0.57)	(0.77)	(0.42)	(0.63)	(1.01)	(0.54)	(0.85)
= party, ≠ person	10.87	7.11	3.48	-2.57	-0.08	-2.32	1.75	0.91	0.83	0.31	0.76	-0.24	2.80	-0.06	2.80	-1.68	0.27	-1.76	0.84	0.42	0.16
× conditional	(5.23)	(2.81)	(4.31)	(1.29)	(0.74)	(1.02)	(1.40)	(0.85)	(1.10)	(1.80)	(1.12)	(1.40)	(1.31)	(0.74)	(1.05)	(1.37)	(0.85)	(1.06)	(1.50)	(0.87)	(1.20)
provincial (30-day):	3.49	3.71	0.45	-0.03	0.42	-0.40	-0.12	0.04	-0.33	0.57	0.77	-0.29	0.64	0.73	-0.28	0.40	0.66	-0.36	0.18	0.18	0.04
= party, = person	(3.90)	(3.72)	(0.96)	(0.54)	(0.52)	(0.14)	(0.52)	(0.44)	(0.12)	(0.56)	(0.50)	(0.19)	(0.66)	(0.58)	(0.14)	(0.58)	(0.51)	(0.21)	(0.68)	(0.56)	(0.39)
× conditional	-3.65	-3.56	-0.89	0.94	0.33	0.34	0.88	1.17	-0.05	-1.51	-1.04	-0.34	-0.76	-0.37	-0.13	-0.54	-0.46	0.08	0.07	0.80	-0.66
provincial (30-day):	(4.28)	(4.02)	(1.16)	(0.93)	(0.82)	(0.30)	(0.92)	(0.83)	(0.32)	(0.92)	(0.83)	(0.32)	(0.97)	(0.87)	(0.33)	(0.89)	(0.84)	(0.24)	(0.96)	(0.86)	(0.42)
= party, ≠ person	-4.94	-2.20	-2.54	1.95	1.61	0.49	1.18	0.47	0.80	2.29	1.29	1.11	-0.50	0.08	-0.49	2.16	1.68	0.59	1.76	0.91	0.90
× conditional	(4.05)	(3.45)	(2.21)	(0.80)	(0.64)	(0.52)	(0.59)	(0.42)	(0.41)	(0.59)	(0.47)	(0.39)	(0.32)	(0.24)	(0.19)	(0.62)	(0.52)	(0.36)	(0.82)	(0.67)	(0.53)
provincial (30-day):	7.51	3.92	3.49	-0.36	-0.59	0.16	1.66	2.19	-0.47	-2.33	0.17	-2.53	4.42	2.39	2.06	-1.25	-1.63	0.40	-0.32	0.98	-1.21
= party, ≠ person	(4.57)	(3.91)	(2.50)	(1.02)	(0.83)	(0.62)	(1.12)	(0.96)	(0.63)	(1.31)	(1.15)	(0.65)	(1.05)	(0.87)	(0.63)	(1.04)	(0.78)	(0.72)	(1.16)	(0.97)	(0.68)
× conditional	-8.81	-9.19	1.10	1.88	1.20	-0.04	0.72	0.74	-0.43	2.20	1.63	-0.03	1.32	0.78	0.21	2.66	1.60	0.44	2.62	0.99	1.27
national (30-day):	(4.72)	(3.15)	(3.02)	(0.94)	(0.67)	(0.56)	(0.67)	(0.55)	(0.25)	(0.79)	(0.63)	(0.38)	(0.78)	(0.56)	(0.48)	(0.86)	(0.66)	(0.49)	(1.12)	(0.74)	(0.79)
= party, ≠ person	12.04	11.68	-1.06	0.37	0.39	0.35	3.87	1.84	1.57	-0.76	-1.34	0.78	1.39	1.11	-0.19	-2.79	-1.28	-1.21	-1.66	0.10	-1.79
× conditional	(5.52)	(3.94)	(3.30)	(1.39)	(1.08)	(0.76)	(1.72)	(1.29)	(1.07)	(1.72)	(1.11)	(1.25)	(1.39)	(1.07)	(0.79)	(1.21)	(0.95)	(0.58)	(1.51)	(1.11)	(0.94)
outcome	R	R&E	R&A	R	R&E	R&A	R	R&E	R&A	R	R&E	R&A	R	R&E	R&A	R	R&E	R&A	R	R&E	R&A
Σ Y = 1	252	106	125	252	106	125	252	106	125	252	106	125	252	106	125	252	106	125	252	106	125

OLS regression estimates. The first two months of each legislator's period have been excluded from the analysis.  $N_{legislators} = 1,598$ ;  $N_{mandates} = 2,120$ ;  $N_{obs.} = 90,335$ . Robust standard errors clustered by legislator in parentheses. Outcomes: R: *resignation and election* (0/100); R&E: *resignation and appointment* (0/100). The explanatory variables measure the proportion of a month's days that fell 30 days before or after an instance of executive alternation of a given type at the national or provincial level. The "conditional" variables vary by model; they are specified at the top. *position in list* (columns 1-3) is a continuous variable that takes the value of 1 for the legislator placed in the top position of his or her party's list, and 0 for the one located at the bottom; all other conditioning variables are dummies. In column (19)-(21), the baseline party is the ucs, and the conditional effect correspond to the pr; estimates for "third" and "other" parties computed but not reported. All specifications include duration, district, period and legislator fixed effects, as well as controls for gender; copartisan governor; copartisan president; elected in midterm; list vote share; log of number of seats captured; committee chair; relative position in list; whether the legislator was vulnerable; and previous experience as (vice-)president, (deputy) governor, mayor, national senator, national deputy, or other (supra-)national legislator.

Table A7: Executive alternation and legislative resignations in Argentina, 1983-2017: Conditional effects (30-day window with legislator-mandate fixed effects)

	position in list			elect. vulnerable			previous experience			committee chair			elected in midterm			female			party (vcr/p)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)
national (30-day):	-1.16	-1.56	0.22	-0.30	-0.27	-0.05	-0.45	-0.25	-0.14	-0.53	-0.33	-0.17	-0.28	-0.35	0.11	-0.31	-0.14	-0.14	-0.25	0.11	-0.33
= party, = person	(2.15)	(2.05)	(0.62)	(0.39)	(0.37)	(0.11)	(0.30)	(0.28)	(0.09)	(0.31)	(0.29)	(0.08)	(0.19)	(0.15)	(0.09)	(0.36)	(0.35)	(0.08)	(0.59)	(0.57)	(0.13)
× conditional	0.81	1.38	-0.35	-0.31	-0.08	-0.16	0.04	-0.19	0.12	0.83	0.18	0.59	-0.30	0.09	-0.42	-0.24	-0.41	0.11	0.19	-0.33	0.45
national (30-day):	(2.44)	(2.34)	(0.69)	(0.57)	(0.54)	(0.15)	(0.63)	(0.61)	(0.16)	(0.89)	(0.84)	(0.25)	(0.59)	(0.55)	(0.18)	(0.54)	(0.49)	(0.20)	(0.74)	(0.72)	(0.18)
= party, ≠ person	2.81	4.72	-2.09	1.66	0.78	0.92	0.59	0.18	0.48	0.91	0.61	0.35	0.08	-0.03	0.14	1.24	0.80	0.49	0.22	0.06	0.19
× conditional	(5.17)	(4.99)	(1.41)	(0.78)	(0.62)	(0.50)	(0.56)	(0.43)	(0.36)	(0.55)	(0.47)	(0.30)	(0.28)	(0.24)	(0.13)	(0.65)	(0.55)	(0.36)	(0.62)	(0.44)	(0.44)
national (30-day):	-2.04	-4.56	2.77	-1.57	-0.49	-1.06	0.73	0.74	-0.04	0.41	-0.01	0.40	1.63	1.14	0.52	-0.48	-0.37	-0.14	1.36	0.68	0.63
= party, ≠ person	(5.69)	(5.43)	(1.80)	(0.93)	(0.79)	(0.51)	(0.98)	(0.82)	(0.56)	(1.25)	(0.97)	(0.79)	(0.96)	(0.82)	(0.53)	(0.89)	(0.74)	(0.51)	(1.03)	(0.82)	(0.63)
× conditional	-6.11	-6.00	-0.24	4.99	0.48	4.05	3.00	-0.04	2.66	3.84	0.31	3.10	2.46	0.49	1.61	4.33	0.49	3.39	3.43	0.48	2.72
national (30-day):	(4.49)	(2.25)	(3.80)	(0.98)	(0.54)	(0.81)	(0.76)	(0.31)	(0.64)	(0.72)	(0.38)	(0.58)	(0.69)	(0.32)	(0.56)	(0.76)	(0.41)	(0.62)	(1.00)	(0.53)	(0.83)
= party, ≠ person	11.18	7.22	3.65	-2.55	-0.10	-2.29	1.70	0.89	0.79	0.44	0.77	-0.14	2.77	-0.08	2.80	-1.63	0.27	-1.73	0.84	0.42	0.17
× conditional	(5.17)	(2.78)	(4.26)	(1.28)	(0.73)	(1.01)	(1.39)	(0.84)	(1.09)	(1.78)	(1.11)	(1.39)	(1.30)	(0.73)	(1.04)	(1.36)	(0.83)	(1.05)	(1.48)	(0.86)	(1.17)
provincial (30-day):	3.48	3.73	0.40	0.00	0.42	-0.37	-0.13	0.05	-0.35	0.59	0.79	-0.29	0.65	0.73	-0.27	0.42	0.66	-0.34	0.18	0.17	0.05
= party, = person	(3.89)	(3.71)	(0.94)	(0.54)	(0.52)	(0.14)	(0.52)	(0.44)	(0.12)	(0.55)	(0.49)	(0.18)	(0.66)	(0.58)	(0.13)	(0.57)	(0.50)	(0.20)	(0.66)	(0.54)	(0.39)
× conditional	-3.61	-3.56	-0.83	0.90	0.35	0.29	0.96	1.18	0.03	-1.48	-1.04	-0.31	-0.75	-0.36	-0.13	-0.51	-0.42	0.07	0.08	0.80	-0.66
provincial (30-day):	(4.27)	(4.02)	(1.13)	(0.92)	(0.82)	(0.29)	(0.91)	(0.82)	(0.31)	(0.92)	(0.84)	(0.31)	(0.97)	(0.87)	(0.32)	(0.88)	(0.83)	(0.24)	(0.95)	(0.86)	(0.41)
= party, ≠ person	-5.08	-2.29	-2.56	1.96	1.59	0.51	1.14	0.46	0.76	2.26	1.27	1.10	-0.53	0.04	-0.47	2.17	1.66	0.62	1.74	0.93	0.87
× conditional	(4.01)	(3.42)	(2.17)	(0.79)	(0.63)	(0.51)	(0.58)	(0.42)	(0.41)	(0.59)	(0.47)	(0.38)	(0.31)	(0.24)	(0.18)	(0.61)	(0.51)	(0.36)	(0.81)	(0.66)	(0.51)
provincial (30-day):	7.65	4.00	3.52	-0.40	-0.59	0.11	1.76	2.19	-0.37	-2.23	0.23	-2.48	4.46	2.43	2.05	-1.36	-1.63	0.29	-0.27	0.94	-1.12
= party, ≠ person	(4.53)	(3.88)	(2.45)	(1.01)	(0.82)	(0.61)	(1.11)	(0.95)	(0.63)	(1.30)	(1.15)	(0.64)	(1.04)	(0.86)	(0.62)	(1.03)	(0.77)	(0.71)	(1.15)	(0.96)	(0.66)
× conditional	-9.08	-9.11	0.70	1.82	1.18	-0.08	0.69	0.73	-0.44	2.11	1.59	-0.09	1.20	0.75	0.13	2.59	1.57	0.40	2.48	0.99	1.14
national (30-day):	(4.70)	(3.12)	(3.00)	(0.93)	(0.67)	(0.55)	(0.67)	(0.55)	(0.25)	(0.78)	(0.63)	(0.38)	(0.79)	(0.57)	(0.48)	(0.85)	(0.65)	(0.49)	(1.12)	(0.74)	(0.78)
= party, ≠ person	12.26	11.56	-0.68	0.34	0.39	0.33	3.76	1.82	1.49	-0.66	-1.26	0.81	1.47	1.13	-0.14	-2.85	-1.25	-1.30	-1.55	0.07	-1.65
× conditional	(5.49)	(3.91)	(3.28)	(1.38)	(1.07)	(0.76)	(1.71)	(1.28)	(1.06)	(1.70)	(1.10)	(1.23)	(1.39)	(1.06)	(0.78)	(1.21)	(0.95)	(0.58)	(1.50)	(1.10)	(0.93)
outcome	R	R&E	R&A	R	R&E	R&A	R	R&E	R&A	R	R&E	R&A	R	R&E	R&A	R	R&E	R&A	R	R&E	R&A
Σ Y = 1	252	106	125	252	106	125	252	106	125	252	106	125	252	106	125	252	106	125	252	106	125

OLS regression estimates. The unit of observation is the legislator-month. The first two months of each legislator's period have been excluded from the analysis.  $N_{legislators} = 1,598$ ;  $N_{mandates} = 2,120$ ;  $N_{obs.} = 90,335$ . Robust standard errors clustered by legislator in parentheses. Outcomes: R: *resignation* (0/100); R&E: *resignation and election* (0/100); R&A: *resignation and appointment* (0/100). The explanatory variables measure the proportion of a month's days that fell 30 days before or after an instance of executive alternation of a given type at the national or provincial level. The "conditional" variables vary by model; they are specified at the top. *position in list* (columns 1-3) is a continuous variable that takes the value of 1 for the legislator placed in the top position of his or her party's list, and 0 for the one located at the bottom; all other conditioning variables are dummies. In column (19)-(21), the baseline party is the ucr, and the conditional effect correspond to the p; estimates for "third" and "other" parties computed but not reported. All specifications include duration, district, period and legislator-mandate fixed effects, as well as (implicitly) controls for gender, copartisan governor, copartisan president; elected in midterm; list vote share; log of number of seats captured; committee chair; relative position in list; whether the legislator was vulnerable; and previous experience as (vice-)president, (deputy) governor, mayor, national senator, national deputy, or other (supra-)national legislator.

Table A8: Executive alternation and legislative resignations in Argentina, 1983-2017: Conditional effects (30-day window, survival models)

	position in list			elect. vulnerable			previous experience			committee chair			elected in midterm			female			party (ucsr/p)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)
national (30-day): = party, ≠ person × conditional	-2.08 (2.14)	-2.04 (4.15)	-67.67 (2.64)	-0.02 (2.08)	0.19 (3.39)	-66.10 (2.50)	-0.56 (2.09)	-0.05 (NaN)	-64.18 (2.52)	-0.02 (2.08)	0.19 (3.39)	-66.10 (2.50)	-52.35 (2.07)	-54.56 (2.90)	-64.15 (2.51)	0.24 (2.07)	0.54 (2.20)	-66.21 (2.09)	-12.84 (5.54)	-31.99 (2.47)	-12.12 (2.47)
national (30-day): = party, ≠ person × conditional	2.21 (7.47)	2.46 (6.87)	-2.00 (6.61)	-0.01 (0.78)	0.03 (0.76)	2.78 (2.33)	0.79 (1.18)	0.40 (1.16)	-2.04 (2.52)	-0.01 (0.78)	0.03 (0.76)	2.78 (2.33)	52.84 (2.49)	55.69 (5.61)	-0.74 (3.02)	-50.42 (0.57)	-48.43 (0.52)	6.54 (2.27)	0.35 (0.78)	0.91 (0.81)	-65.25 (2.48)
national (30-day): = party, ≠ person × conditional	1.58 (7.87)	3.08 (7.19)	-12.31 (6.61)	0.61 (1.16)	0.09 (1.26)	1.76 (1.41)	0.04 (1.34)	-0.34 (1.37)	1.47 (1.39)	0.61 (1.16)	0.09 (1.26)	1.76 (1.41)	-0.35 (2.60)	-0.12 (5.65)	-1.67 (4.24)	0.43 (2.32)	0.27 (4.16)	1.19 (2.44)	-53.88 (3.25)	-55.52 (6.16)	5.79 (4.59)
national (30-day): = party, ≠ person × conditional	-1.37 (3.35)	-3.28 (3.64)	14.08 (8.34)	-0.99 (0.46)	-0.33 (0.67)	-74.76 (0.80)	0.40 (0.64)	0.48 (0.99)	-0.31 (0.91)	-0.99 (0.46)	-0.33 (0.67)	-74.76 (0.80)	0.75 (1.05)	0.21 (1.25)	4.20 (1.72)	-0.16 (0.46)	-0.57 (0.71)	0.33 (0.85)	-0.15 (0.75)	-0.58 (1.17)	0.81 (1.20)
national (30-day): = party, ≠ person × conditional	2.32 (3.66)	-6.24 (3.94)	3.70 (8.58)	2.27 (0.76)	1.50 (0.85)	3.60 (2.41)	2.14 (0.72)	1.01 (0.89)	3.48 (1.12)	2.27 (0.76)	1.50 (0.85)	3.60 (2.41)	3.18 (1.24)	2.00 (1.58)	3.82 (2.11)	2.14 (0.77)	1.53 (1.00)	3.42 (1.26)	1.31 (1.12)	2.35 (1.29)	-62.80 (5.26)
provincial (30-day): = party, ≠ person × conditional	-0.23 (2.14)	8.08 (4.44)	-0.31 (2.69)	-0.53 (0.34)	0.04 (0.93)	-0.80 (0.47)	-0.23 (0.37)	0.76 (0.98)	-0.21 (0.52)	-0.53 (0.34)	0.04 (0.93)	-0.80 (0.47)	-1.55 (2.46)	-0.91 (0.92)	-0.16 (0.86)	-0.05 (0.31)	0.45 (0.88)	-0.13 (0.45)	1.93 (0.45)	1.19 (0.88)	3.21 (0.58)
provincial (30-day): = party, ≠ person × conditional	2.97 (2.28)	8.13 (4.54)	-1386.46 (2.93)	0.02 (0.45)	0.68 (0.69)	-140.79 (0.70)	0.14 (0.43)	0.47 (0.75)	-128.05 (0.60)	0.02 (0.45)	0.68 (0.69)	-140.79 (0.70)	2.29 (0.60)	2.66 (1.17)	-142.64 (1.22)	0.52 (0.60)	0.86 (0.71)	-0.40 (1.43)	0.87 (0.65)	1.22 (1.28)	-0.72 (0.76)
provincial (30-day): = party, ≠ person × conditional	-2.76 (3.04)	-8.01 (4.01)	1386.19 (168.19)	1.06 (0.61)	0.22 (0.68)	141.48 (13.75)	0.51 (0.70)	0.47 (0.84)	128.01 (13.50)	1.06 (0.61)	0.22 (0.68)	141.48 (13.75)	-2.36 (1.08)	-2.51 (1.16)	141.93 (15.84)	-0.40 (0.49)	-129.81 (0.62)	0.87 (1.22)	1.07 (0.61)	1.12 (0.81)	1.12 (1.12)
provincial (30-day): = party, ≠ person × conditional	-0.65 (3.26)	6.09 (4.27)	-3.05 (168.55)	0.91 (0.75)	1.34 (0.89)	0.95 (13.80)	0.93 (0.76)	0.89 (0.88)	1.46 (13.52)	0.91 (0.75)	1.34 (0.89)	0.95 (13.80)	-0.11 (1.17)	0.88 (1.35)	-145.70 (15.97)	1.16 (0.92)	1.33 (0.93)	1.19 (16.75)	-118.11 (19.05)	-41.24 (4.92)	-151.05 (21.23)
provincial (30-day): = party, ≠ person × conditional	1.82 (2.43)	-5.17 (3.54)	4.57 (3.59)	0.43 (0.37)	-0.36 (0.50)	1.12 (0.71)	0.29 (0.43)	0.48 (0.61)	-0.60 (0.79)	0.43 (0.37)	-0.36 (0.50)	1.12 (0.71)	1.06 (1.47)	0.04 (1.51)	146.68 (14.46)	-0.63 (0.34)	-1.09 (0.48)	-0.16 (0.68)	1.40 (0.46)	1.27 (0.67)	1.55 (0.77)
provincial (30-day): = party, ≠ person × conditional	-4.49 (2.55)	-3.99 (3.73)	-1.13 (3.79)	0.79 (0.44)	1.18 (0.56)	0.73 (0.75)	0.70 (0.44)	0.99 (0.58)	-0.21 (0.69)	0.79 (0.44)	1.18 (0.56)	0.73 (0.75)	2.52 (1.51)	2.66 (1.62)	1.81 (13.83)	1.29 (0.59)	1.33 (0.75)	1.24 (1.40)	-0.40 (0.60)	-1.30 (1.21)	0.95 (0.86)
outcome Σ Y = 1	5.96 (3.80)	5.31 (6.70)	2.31 (4.78)	0.90 (0.46)	0.08 (0.60)	1.25 (0.79)	0.82 (0.59)	0.38 (0.74)	1.54 (1.55)	0.90 (0.46)	0.08 (0.60)	1.25 (0.79)	-1.80 (0.73)	-1.96 (1.03)	-1.43 (1.57)	-1.37 (0.43)	-0.95 (0.59)	-114.54 (0.79)	1.90 (0.49)	1.60 (0.71)	2.20 (0.73)

GLM (survival) specifications with a cloglog link. The unit of observation is the legislator-month. The first two months of each legislator's period have been excluded from the analysis.  $N_{legislators} = 1,598$ ;  $N_{mandates} = 2,120$ ;  $N_{obs.} = 90,335$ . Robust standard errors clustered by legislator in parentheses. Outcomes: r: resignation (0/100); r&e: resignation and election (0/100); r&a: resignation and appointment (0/100). The explanatory variables measure the proportion of a month's days that fell 30 days before or after an instance of executive alternation of a given type at the national or provincial level. The "conditional" variables vary by model; they are specified at the top. position in list (columns 1-3) is a continuous variable that takes the value of 1 for the legislator placed in the top position of his or her party's list, and 0 for the one located at the bottom; all other conditioning variables are dummies. In column (19)-(21), the baseline party is the ucr, and the conditional effect correspond to the pr; estimates for "third" and "other" parties computed but not reported. All specifications include duration, district and period fixed effects, as well as controls for gender; copartisan governor; copartisan president; elected in midterm; list vote share; log of number of seats captured; committee chair; relative position in list; whether the legislator was vulnerable; and previous experience as (vice-)president, (deputy) governor, mayor, national senator, national deputy, or other (supra-)national legislator.

Table A9: Executive alternation and legislative resignation in Argentina, 1983-2017  
(Daily data)

	<i>resignation</i>			<i>resignation &amp; election</i>			<i>resignation &amp; app'tment</i>		
(a) 30-day window	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
national:	-0.011	-0.013	-0.014	-0.007	-0.008	-0.009	-0.004	-0.005	-0.005
= <i>party</i> , = <i>person</i>	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
national:	0.030	0.032	0.034	0.020	0.021	0.021	0.012	0.013	0.014
= <i>party</i> , ≠ <i>person</i>	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)
national:	0.129	0.128	0.127	0.021	0.021	0.021	0.093	0.092	0.091
≠ <i>party</i> , ≠ <i>person</i>	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
provincial:	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.013	0.013	0.014	-0.014	-0.014	-0.014
= <i>party</i> , = <i>person</i>	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
provincial:	0.056	0.055	0.055	0.040	0.040	0.040	0.021	0.020	0.020
= <i>party</i> , ≠ <i>person</i>	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
provincial:	0.072	0.070	0.069	0.043	0.043	0.043	0.010	0.008	0.006
≠ <i>party</i> , ≠ <i>person</i>	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
(b) 60-day window									
national:	-0.000	-0.002	-0.003	0.003	0.002	0.002	-0.004	-0.004	-0.005
= <i>party</i> , = <i>person</i>	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
national:	0.021	0.023	0.025	0.013	0.014	0.014	0.005	0.006	0.007
= <i>party</i> , ≠ <i>person</i>	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
national:	0.069	0.069	0.068	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.053	0.052	0.051
≠ <i>party</i> , ≠ <i>person</i>	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
provincial:	-0.002	-0.003	-0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004
= <i>party</i> , = <i>person</i>	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
provincial:	0.025	0.023	0.023	0.018	0.017	0.017	0.011	0.009	0.010
= <i>party</i> , ≠ <i>person</i>	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)
provincial:	0.041	0.040	0.038	0.023	0.024	0.023	0.005	0.002	0.001
≠ <i>party</i> , ≠ <i>person</i>	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)
(c) 90-day window									
national:	-0.001	-0.003	-0.004	0.002	0.001	0.001	-0.003	-0.003	-0.004
= <i>party</i> , = <i>person</i>	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
national:	0.012	0.014	0.015	0.008	0.009	0.009	0.003	0.003	0.005
= <i>party</i> , ≠ <i>person</i>	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
national:	0.048	0.047	0.046	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.037	0.036	0.035
≠ <i>party</i> , ≠ <i>person</i>	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
provincial:	-0.003	-0.004	-0.003	0.001	0.001	0.001	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004
= <i>party</i> , = <i>person</i>	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
provincial:	0.018	0.016	0.016	0.012	0.012	0.011	0.006	0.005	0.005
= <i>party</i> , ≠ <i>person</i>	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
provincial:	0.030	0.029	0.026	0.014	0.015	0.015	0.007	0.004	0.002
≠ <i>party</i> , ≠ <i>person</i>	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)
legislator FE's	x			x			x		
leg.-mandate FE's	x			x			x		
$\sum Y = 1$	252			106			125		

OLS regression estimates. Outcome variables are multiplied by 100 to facilitate interpretation. The unit of observation is the legislator-day. In panels (a) through (c), the first two, three and four months of each legislator's period have been excluded from the analysis, respectively.  $N_{\text{legislators}} = 1,592 - 1,598$ ;  $N_{\text{mandates}} = 2,111 - 2,120$ ;  $N_{\text{obs.}} = 2,579,802 - 2,705,845$ . Robust standard errors clustered by legislator in parentheses. The explanatory variables measure whether a day fell 30, 60 or 90 days before or after an instance of executive alternation of a given type at the national or provincial level. In OLS specifications the outcome variable was multiplied by 100 to facilitate interpretation. GLM (survival) specifications use a cloglog link. All specifications include duration, district and period fixed effects, as well as controls for gender; copartisan governor; copartisan president; elected in midterm; list vote share; log of number of seats captured; committee chair; relative position in list; whether the legislator was vulnerable; and previous experience as (vice-)president, (deputy) governor, mayor, national senator, national deputy, or other (supra-)national legislator.

Table A10: Executive alternation and legislative resignations in Argentina, 1983-2017: Conditional effects (Daily data)

	position in list			elect. vulnerable			previous experience			committee chair			elected in midterm			female			party (ucr/pr)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)
national (30-day): = party, ≠ person × conditional	-0.02 (0.07)	-0.05 (0.07)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.00)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.00)
national (30-day): = party, ≠ person × conditional	0.06 (0.08)	0.16 (0.07)	-0.09 (0.02)	0.05 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.03 (0.00)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.00)	0.03 (0.03)	0.02 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)	0.04 (0.03)	0.03 (0.02)	0.02 (0.01)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.01)
national (30-day): ≠ party, ≠ person × conditional	-0.04 (0.20)	-0.15 (0.19)	0.12 (0.07)	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.02)	0.04 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.05 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.02)
national (30-day): ≠ party, ≠ person × conditional	-0.20 (0.16)	-0.23 (0.08)	0.02 (0.13)	0.16 (0.03)	0.02 (0.02)	0.12 (0.03)	0.09 (0.02)	0.00 (0.01)	0.08 (0.02)	0.12 (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)	0.09 (0.02)	0.10 (0.03)	0.03 (0.02)	0.05 (0.02)	0.14 (0.03)	0.02 (0.01)	0.10 (0.02)	0.11 (0.03)	0.02 (0.02)	0.08 (0.03)
provincial (30-day): = party, ≠ person × conditional	0.09 (0.13)	0.11 (0.13)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.00)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.00)	0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.00)	0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.03)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.01)
provincial (30-day): = party, ≠ person × conditional	-0.10 (0.15)	-0.11 (0.14)	-0.02 (0.04)	0.03 (0.03)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.04 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.04)	0.02 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.01)
provincial (30-day): ≠ party, ≠ person × conditional	0.15 (0.15)	-0.09 (0.12)	-0.10 (0.08)	0.06 (0.03)	0.05 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.03 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.03 (0.01)	0.07 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	0.03 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.07 (0.02)	0.05 (0.02)	0.02 (0.01)	0.05 (0.03)	0.02 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)
provincial (30-day): ≠ party, ≠ person × conditional	0.28 (0.17)	0.14 (0.14)	0.14 (0.09)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.00 (0.02)	0.06 (0.04)	0.07 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.06 (0.05)	0.02 (0.04)	-0.08 (0.02)	0.11 (0.03)	0.06 (0.02)	0.05 (0.02)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.03)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.04)	0.03 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.02)
outcome Σ Y = 1	R 252	R&E 106	R&A 125	R 252	R&E 106	R&A 125	R 252	R&E 106	R&A 125	R 252	R&E 106	R&A 125	R 252	R&E 106	R&A 125	R 252	R&E 106	R&A 125	R 252	R&E 106	R&A 125

OLS regression estimates. The unit of observation is the legislator-day. The first two months of each legislator's period have been excluded from the analysis.  $N_{legislators} = 1,598$ ;  $N_{mandates} = 2,120$ ;  $N_{obs.} = 2,705,845$ . Robust standard errors clustered by legislator in parentheses. Outcomes: R: *resignation* (0/100); R&E: *resignation and election* (0/100); R&A: *resignation and appointment* (0/100). The explanatory variables measure whether a day fell 30 days before or after an instance of executive alternation of a given type at the national or provincial level. The "conditional" variables vary by model; they are specified at the top. *position in list* (columns 1-3) is a continuous variable that takes the value of 1 for the legislator placed in the top position of his or her party's list, and 0 for the one located at the bottom; all other conditioning variables are dummies. In column (19)-(21), the baseline party is the UCR, and the conditional effect correspond to the PR; estimates for "third" and "other" parties are included in the models but not reported. All specifications include duration, district and period fixed effects, as well as controls for gender; copartisan governor; copartisan president; elected in midterm; list vote share; log of number of seats captured; committee chair; relative position in list; whether the legislator was vulnerable; and previous experience as (vice-)president, (deputy) governor, mayor, national senator, national deputy, or other (supra-)national legislator.




Figure A6: Event-study estimates of the effect of executive alternation on resignations in the Argentine Chamber of Deputies, 1983-2017—By (top) position in party list. The grey lines and shaded area indicate the point estimates and 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals for the effect of alternation on *resignation* in the full sample reported in Figure 5; the points and vertical lines do likewise for the subsample of deputies who had (not) been placed at the top of their party’s list. Each panel corresponds to a different treatment, defined as a combination of alternation *level*—national or provincial—and *type* of change—the incumbent being reelected; the incumbent party being reelected, with a different executive; or a change in both incumbent executive and party. All estimates calculated using the double-robust method proposed by Callaway and Sant’Anna ([forthcoming](#)). The control group is defined as the not-yet-treated group, and standard errors clustered by legislator and using 667 bootstrap iterations.






Figure A7: Event-study estimates of the effect of executive alternation on resignations in the Argentine Chamber of Deputies, 1983-2017—By electoral vulnerability. The grey lines and shaded area indicate the point estimates and 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals for the effect of alternation on *resignation* in the full sample reported in Figure 5; the points and vertical lines do likewise for the subsample of deputies who were (not) electorally vulnerable, as defined in the text. Each panel corresponds to a different treatment, defined as a combination of alternation *level*—national or provincial—and *type* of change—the incumbent being reelected; the incumbent party being reelected, with a different executive; or a change in both incumbent executive and party. All estimates calculated using the double-robust method proposed by Callaway and Sant’Anna ([forthcoming](#)). The control group is defined as the not-yet-treated group, and standard errors clustered by legislator and using 667 bootstrap iterations.




Figure A8: Event-study estimates of the effect of executive alternation on resignations in the Argentine Chamber of Deputies, 1983-2017—By previous political experience. The grey lines and shaded area indicate the point estimates and 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals for the effect of alternation on *resignation* in the full sample reported in Figure 5; the points and vertical lines do likewise for the subsample of deputies who did (not) have some kind of executive or legislative experience. Each panel corresponds to a different treatment, defined as a combination of alternation *level*—national or provincial—and *type* of change—the incumbent being reelected; the incumbent party being reelected, with a different executive; or a change in both incumbent executive and party. All estimates calculated using the double-robust method proposed by Callaway and Sant’Anna ([forthcoming](#)). The control group is defined as the not-yet-treated group, and standard errors clustered by legislator and using 667 bootstrap iterations.




Figure A9: Event-study estimates of the effect of executive alternation on resignations in the Argentine Chamber of Deputies, 1983-2017—By committee leadership. The grey lines and shaded area indicate the point estimates and 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals for the effect of alternation on *resignation* in the full sample reported in Figure 5; the points and vertical lines do likewise for the subsample of deputies who were (not) committee chairs when the treatment was administered. Each panel corresponds to a different treatment, defined as a combination of alternation *level*—national or provincial—and *type* of change—the incumbent being reelected; the incumbent party being reelected, with a different executive; or a change in both incumbent executive and party. All estimates calculated using the double-robust method proposed by Callaway and Sant’Anna ([forthcoming](#)). The control group is defined as the not-yet-treated group, and standard errors clustered by legislator and using 667 bootstrap iterations.




Figure A10: Event-study estimates of the effect of executive alternation on resignations in the Argentine Chamber of Deputies, 1983-2017—By time of election (midterm vs. concurrent). The grey lines and shaded area indicate the point estimates and 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals for the effect of alternation on *resignation* in the full sample reported in Figure 5; the points and vertical lines do likewise for the subsample of deputies who had been elected in midterm (concurrent) elections. Each panel corresponds to a different treatment, defined as a combination of alternation *level*—national or provincial—and *type* of change—the incumbent being reelected; the incumbent party being reelected, with a different executive; or a change in both incumbent executive and party. All estimates calculated using the double-robust method proposed by Callaway and Sant’Anna ([forthcoming](#)). The control group is defined as the not-yet-treated group, and standard errors clustered by legislator and using 667 bootstrap iterations.




Figure A11: Event-study estimates of the effect of executive alternation on resignations in the Argentine Chamber of Deputies, 1983-2017—By party ID (PJ vs. UCR). The grey lines and shaded area indicate the point estimates and 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals for the effect of alternation on *resignation* in the full sample reported in Figure 5; the points and vertical lines do likewise for the subsample of deputies who belonged to the PJ (UCR). Each panel corresponds to a different treatment, defined as a combination of alternation *level*—national or provincial—and *type* of change—the incumbent being reelected; the incumbent party being reelected, with a different executive; or a change in both incumbent executive and party. All estimates calculated using the double-robust method proposed by Callaway and Sant’Anna ([forthcoming](#)). The control group is defined as the not-yet-treated group, and standard errors clustered by legislator and using 667 bootstrap iterations.




Figure A12: Event-study estimates of the effect of executive alternation on resignations in the Argentine Chamber of Deputies, 1983-2017—By gender (men vs. women). The grey lines and shaded area indicate the point estimates and 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals for the effect of alternation on *resignation* in the full sample reported in Figure 5; the points and vertical lines do likewise for the subsample of (fe)male deputies. Each panel corresponds to a different treatment, defined as a combination of alternation *level*—national or provincial—and *type* of change—the incumbent being reelected; the incumbent party being reelected, with a different executive; or a change in both incumbent executive and party. All estimates calculated using the double-robust method proposed by Callaway and Sant’Anna ([forthcoming](#)). The control group is defined as the not-yet-treated group, and standard errors clustered by legislator and using 667 bootstrap iterations.




Figure A13: Matching difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of executive alternation on resignations in the Argentine Chamber of Deputies, 1983-2017. The grey lines and shaded area indicate point estimates and 95% confidence intervals for the effect of alternation on *resignation*; the points and vertical lines do the same for the effect of alternation on *resignation and election* and *resignation and appointment*, respectively. Each panel corresponds to a different treatment, defined as a combination of alternation *level* – national or provincial – and *type* of change – the incumbent being reelected; the incumbent party being reelected, with a different executive; or a change in both incumbent executive and party. In the spirit of Imai, Kim and Wang (2020), all treated observations were assigned to a matched set with all other observations that had identical values of the following variables: (a) party ID; (b) elected in midterm election; (c) district magnitude; (d) number of seats captured by the legislator’s list; (e) position in party list; whether the legislator (f) was electorally vulnerable; (g) was a committee chair; (h) had previous executive experience; (i) had previous legislative experience; and (j) was male or female; as well as the lagged values of all (k) outcomes and (l) treatment(s) of interest in the five months immediately prior to treatment. A separate wls was estimated for each outcome in each period, with fixed effects by matched set and robust standard errors clustered by matched set, and weights calculated as one over the total number of observations in the matched set.




Figure A14: Matching difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of executive alternation on resignations in the Argentine Chamber of Deputies, 1983-2017. The grey lines and shaded area indicate point estimates and 95% confidence intervals for the effect of alternation on *resignation*; the points and vertical lines do the same for the effect of alternation on *resignation and election* and *resignation and appointment*, respectively. Each panel corresponds to a different treatment, defined as a combination of alternation *level* – national or provincial – and *type* of change – the incumbent being reelected; the incumbent party being reelected, with a different executive; or a change in both incumbent executive and party. In the spirit of Imai, Kim and Wang (2020), all treated observations were assigned to a matched set with all other observations that had identical values of the following variables: (a) district; (b) party ID; (c) elected in midterm election; (d) district magnitude; (e) number of seats captured by the legislator’s list; (f) position in party list; whether the legislator (g) was electorally vulnerable; (h) was a committee chair; (i) had previous executive experience; (j) had previous legislative experience; and (k) was male or female; as well as the lagged values of all (l) outcomes and (m) treatment(s) of interest in the five months immediately prior to treatment. A separate wls was estimated for each outcome in each period, with fixed effects by matched set and robust standard errors clustered by matched set, and weights calculated as one over the total number of observations in the matched set.