

ITAM
Departamento de Ciencia Política

Elección Pública II

Primavera 2020
Martes y Jueves 13:00-14:30
Río Hondo, Salón B-5

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Oficina: Martes 15:00-16:30 y Jueves 16:00-17:30 o previa cita

¿Por qué muchas decisiones colectivas son (in)eficientes y/o favorecen a algunos a expensas de otros? ¿A qué se debe que algunos individuos tengan mucha más influencia que otros en la toma de decisiones comunes? ¿En qué medida la disponibilidad de información sobre las intenciones, acciones o expectativas de los demás genera resultados colectivos Pareto-subóptimos? Así como hay países (y empresas, y partidos políticos, y clubes de fútbol) que “funcionan bien,” otros parecen estancados en un equilibrio perverso del que (casi) todos se beneficiarían de salir. En este curso explicaremos dicha variación no como consecuencia de la bondad o maldad de los seres humanos, ni como producto del accionar maligno de fuerzas oscuras, sino como resultado de la interacción entre múltiples actores que pueden tener buenas razones para desconfiar de las intenciones, capacidades o expectativas de sus pares.

El curso consta de cuatro partes. Comenzaremos viendo en qué medida el comportamiento de los individuos de carne y hueso se ajusta al ideal del *Homo œconomicus*. Luego estudiaremos cómo las asimetrías de información y los problemas de agencia moldean la representación política y el funcionamiento de las instituciones jerárquicas, como las burocracias y las “máquinas” clientelares. En tercer lugar pasaremos revista al rol de la coordinación de expectativas en fenómenos como la obediencia a la autoridad, las protestas ciudadanas, el respeto de las normas legales, o las campañas electorales. Por último examinaremos por qué la dificultad de comprometerse a actuar en contra de los propios intereses suele resultar en instituciones y políticas estables pero subóptimas.

Calificación

- **Participación en clase (15%).** Debes leer la bibliografía obligatoria y participar activamente en las discusiones en clase.
- **Reseña (1): Película (27%).** A más tardar el martes 31 de marzo deberás entregar un ensayo de hasta 5 páginas, a doble espacio, explicando cómo la película *Thirteen Days* refleja (algunos de) los temas vistos en el curso. La película será transmitida en la biblioteca del 18 al 20 de marzo.

- **Reseña (II): Libro (58%).** Debes elegir uno de los libros listados en la siguiente sección y escribir una reseña discutiendo la conexión del mismo con (alguno de) los temas vistos en el curso. La calificación del trabajo final tendrá tres componentes:
 - *Selección.* La fecha límite para elegir el libro a reseñar es el jueves 6 de febrero. Enviar tu opción a tiempo contará por el 1% de la calificación final.
 - *Síntesis del argumento.* A más tardar el jueves 16 de abril deberás entregar un texto de hasta 5 páginas, a doble espacio, (i) sintetizando el argumento del libro elegido *con tus propias palabras*; y (ii) formulando y justificando una pregunta conectada con la elección pública que te surja de leer el libro. Dicho texto contará por el 17% de la calificación final.
 - *Reseña.* El jueves 4 de junio a las 10:00am deberás entregar un texto de no más de 8 páginas, a doble espacio, analizando el libro elegido a la luz de las lecturas vistas en el curso. La reseña contará el 40% de la calificación final.

Lecturas

Además de la bibliografía correspondiente a cada sesión, para la reseña final debes elegir alguno de los siguientes libros:

- Eugen Weber. *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914.* Stanford University Press, Palo Alto, 1976.
- Peter Heather. *The Fall of the Roman Empire: A New History of Rome and the Barbarians.* Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005 [2007]. (Hay traducción al español: Peter Heather. *La Caída del Imperio Romano.* Crítica, Barcelona, 2005 [2009].)
- Frank Dikötter. *Mao's Great Famine: The History of China's Most Devastating Catastrophe, 1958-1962.* Bloomsbury Press, New York, 2010 [2018]. (Hay traducción al español: Frank Dikötter. *La Gran Hambruna en la China de Mao: Historia de la Catástrofe más Devastadora de China (1958-1962).* Acantilado, Barcelona, 2010 [2011].)
- Ian Kershaw. *The End: The Defiance and Destruction of Hitler's Germany, 1944-1945.* Penguin, London, 2011. (Hay traducción al español: Ian Kershaw. *El Final: Alemania 1944-1945.* Península, Barcelona, 2011 [2013].)
- Jason Stearns. *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters: The Collapse of the Congo and the Great War of Africa.* PublicAffairs, New York, 2011.
- Stephen R. Platt. *Autumn in the Heavenly Kingdom: China, the West, and the Epic Story of the Taiping Civil War.* Knopf, New York, 2012.
- Christopher Clark. *The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914.* Harper Collins, 2013. (Hay traducción al español: Christopher Clark. *Sonámbulos: Cómo Europa Fue a la Guerra en 1914.* Galaxia Gutenberg, 2013 [2017].)

Del 18 al 20 de marzo veremos la película *Thirteen Days*, de Roger Donaldson (2000). La misma será transmitida en distintos horarios en la biblioteca; si optas por no asistir, deberás procurarte una copia por tu cuenta.

Todas las lecturas se encuentran disponibles en [Google Drive](#). Las lecturas marcadas con un asterisco (*) incluyen material técnicamente complejo, con el cual puedes no estar familiarizado. Puedes pasar dichas secciones por alto; el foco del curso es la intuición detrás de los modelos, no las demostraciones matemáticas de los mismos.

Integridad académica

Según el artículo 5 bis del Reglamento de Titulación del ITAM, “la reproducción parcial o total de textos o productos ajenos, de autor conocido o anónimo, publicados por cualquier medio o inéditos, sin entrecomillar los pasajes o elementos reproducidos o sin hacer la referencia bibliográfica pertinente,” constituye plagio o fraude académico. Las citas a otros autores son bienvenidas, pero deben ser reconocidas como tales. El uso de fragmentos y/o traducciones literales de textos ajenos sin la debida atribución será causal para reprobar la materia y merecerá la amonestación oficial al alumno por parte de la Dirección Escolar del Instituto.

Calendario

Sesión 1 (Enero/21). Introducción + Enigma #1: ¿Importan las Instituciones?

- (1) Tyler Cowen, “[How Fake News Would Affect a U.S.-Iran War](#)”, *Bloomberg.com*.
- (2) William H. Riker. Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions. *American Political Science Review*, 74(2):432–446, 1980 (pp. 442-5 únicamente).

Sesión 2 (Enero/23). Enigmas #2 y #3: ¿Por qué el clientelismo es tan ineficiente? ¿Quién custodia a los custodios?

- (1) Susan C. Stokes, Thad Dunning, Marcelo Nazareno, and Valeria Brusco. *Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism: The Puzzle of Distributive Politics*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013, cap. 2 (hojear).
- (2) James Madison, *Federalist* #51 (varias ediciones).
- (3) Ferdinand Lassalle. *¿Qué Es una Constitución?* Ariel, Barcelona, 1862 [2012] (únicamente sec. 1 de la primera conferencia – pp. 30-47 en la edición de elaleph.com).
- (4) *Daron Acemoglu. Why Not a Political Coase Theorem? Social Conflict, Commitment, and Politics. *Journal of Comparative Economics*, 31(4):620–652, 2003 (pp. 620-33 únicamente).

i. Los Jugadores Realmente Existentes

Sesión 3 (Enero/28). “La razón de la sinrazón que a mi razón se hace...”

- (1) Yusra Murad, “Majority of Voters Back National Health Plan – Unless It’s Called ‘Single Payer’”, *Morning Consult*.
- (2) Joseph Alois Schumpeter. *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*. Routledge, London, 1942 [2003], sec. XXI.III (“Human Nature in Politics”).
- (3) Daniel Kahneman. *Thinking, Fast and Slow*. Macmillan, London, 2011, cap. 1.

Lecturas optativas

- (1) Scott Sumner, “Let’s Not Emphasize Behavioral Economics”, *Econlib*.
- (2) Jon Elster. *Explaining Social Behavior: More Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007, cap. 12.
- (3) Richard H. Thaler. From Cashews to Nudges: The Evolution of Behavioral Economics. *American Economic Review*, 108(6):1265–1287, 2018.
- (4) Jacob K. Goeree and Charles A. Holt. Ten Little Treasures of Game Theory and Ten Intuitive Contradictions. *American Economic Review*, 91(5):1402–1422, 2001.
- (5) *Scott Morgenstern and Elizabeth Zechmeister. Better the Devil You Know Than the Saint You Don’t? Risk Propensity and Vote Choice in Mexico. *The Journal of Politics*, 63(1):93–119, 2001.
- (6) *Ernesto Dal Bó, Pedro Dal Bó, and Erik Eyster. The Demand for Bad Policy when Voters Underappreciate Equilibrium Effects. *The Review of Economic Studies*, 85(2):964–998, 2018.

Sesión 4 (Enero/30). “What Have You Done for Me Lately?”

- (1) *John Marshall. Tuning In, Voting Out: News Consumption Cycles, Homicides, and Electoral Accountability in Mexico. Unpublished manuscript, 2019.

Lecturas optativas

- (1) *Michael M. Bechtel and Jens Hainmueller. How Lasting Is Voter Gratitude? An Analysis of the Short- and Long-Term Electoral Returns to Beneficial Policy. *American Journal of Political Science*, 55(4):852–868, 2011.
- (2) *Deniz Aksoy. Elections and the Timing of Terrorist Attacks. *The Journal of Politics*, 76(4):899–913, 2014.
- (3) *Andrew Healy and Gabriel S. Lenz. Substituting the End for the Whole: Why Voters Respond Primarily to the Election-Year Economy. *American Journal of Political Science*, 58(1):31–47, 2014.
- (4) Christopher H. Achen and Larry M. Bartels. *Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive Government*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2016, cap. 6.

- (5) Nicolás Ajzenman and Ruben Durante. Saliency and Accountability: School Infrastructure and Last-Minute Electoral Punishment. Working Paper #238, European Bank of Reconstruction and Development, 2019.

Sesión 5 (Febrero/4). La ¿paradoja? del voto

- (1) Donald P. Green and Ian Shapiro. *Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science*. Yale University Press, New Haven, 1994, cap. 4.

Lecturas optativas

- (1) John H. Aldrich. Rational Choice and Turnout. *American Journal of Political Science*, 37(1):246–278, 1993.
- (2) *Alexander Coppock and Donald P. Green. Is Voting Habit Forming? New Evidence from Experiments and Regression Discontinuities. *American Journal of Political Science*, 60(4):1044–1062, 2016.
- (3) Thomas Fujiwara, Kyle Meng, and Tom Vogl. Habit Formation in Voting: Evidence from Rainy Elections. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 8(4):160–188, 2016.
- (4) *Daniel de Kadt. Voting Then, Voting Now: The Long-Term Consequences of Participation in South Africa’s First Democratic Election. *The Journal of Politics*, 79(2):670–687, 2017.
- (5) Ryan D. Enos and Eitan D. Hersh. Campaign Perceptions of Electoral Closeness: Uncertainty, Fear and Over-Confidence. *British Journal of Political Science*, 47(3):501–519, 2017.

Sesión 6 (Febrero/6). La (participación) política como subproducto

Fecha límite día para elegir el libro a reseñar.

- (1) Tyler Cowen, “[Move On – This Isn’t True Here](#)”.
- (2) Robin Hanson, “[Politics Isn’t about Policy](#)”.
- (3) Eitan Hersh. Political Hobbyism: A Theory of Mass Behavior. Unpublished manuscript, 2017.

Lecturas optativas

- (1) Pierre Ostiguy. The High and the Low in Politics: A Two-Dimensional Political Space for Comparative Analysis and Electoral Studies. Working paper #360, Working Paper #360, Hellen Kellogg Institute, University of Notre Dame, Hellen Kellogg Institute, University of Notre Dame, 2009. Kellogg Institute Working Paper #360.
- (2) *Anthony Fowler. Partisan Intoxication or Policy Voting? *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, forthcoming.
- (3) *Noah Carl, Lindsay Richards, and Anthony Heath. Preference for Realistic Art Predicts Support for Brexit. *The British Journal of Sociology*, 70(4):1128–1134, 2019.

- (4) David E. Broockman, Gregory Ferenstein, and Neil Malhotra. Predispositions and the Political Behavior of American Economic Elites: Evidence from Technology Entrepreneurs. *American Journal of Political Science*, 63(1):212–233, 2019.
- (5) John Marshall. Signaling Sophistication: How Social Expectations Can Increase Political Information Acquisition. *The Journal of Politics*, 81(1):167–186, 2019.

II. Asimetrías de Información

Sesión 7 (Febrero/11). Principal-Agente: Teoría

- (1) Anuschka de Rohan. Why Dolphins Are Deep Thinkers. *The Guardian*, July 2003.
- (2) *Joram Mayshar, Omer Moav, and Zvika Neeman. Geography, Transparency, and Institutions. *American Political Science Review*, 111(3):622–636, 2017.

Lecturas optativas

- (1) *Bengt Hölmstrom. Moral Hazard and Observability. *The Bell Journal of Economics*, 10(1):74–91, 1979.
- (2) *Andrea Prat. The Wrong Kind of Transparency. *American Economic Review*, 95(3):862–877, 2005.
- (3) *Ethan Bueno de Mesquita and Matthew C. Stephenson. Regulatory Quality Under Imperfect Oversight. *American Political Science Review*, 101(3):605–620, 2007.

Sesión 8 (Febrero/13). Cuando los políticos “game the system”

- (1) *Thushyanthan Baskaran, Brian Min, and Yogesh Uppal. Election Cycles and Electricity Provision: Evidence from a Quasi-experiment with Indian Special Elections. *Journal of Public Economics*, 126:64–73, 2015.
- (2) *Sarah F. Anzia. Election Timing and the Electoral Influence of Interest Groups. *The Journal of Politics*, 73(2):412–427, 2011.

Lecturas optativas

- (1) Burton A. Abrams. How Richard Nixon Pressured Arthur Burns: Evidence from the Nixon Tapes. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 20(4):177–188, 2006.
- (2) *Anandi Mani and Sharun Mukand. Democracy, Visibility and Public Good Provision. *Journal of Development Economics*, 83(2):506–529, 2007.
- (3) *Tim Groseclose and Jeffrey Milyo. Sincere Versus Sophisticated Voting in Congress: Theory and Evidence. *The Journal of Politics*, 72(1):60–73, 2010.
- (4) *Robin Harding and David Stasavage. What Democracy Does (and Doesn't Do) for Basic Services: School Fees, School Inputs, and African Elections. *The Journal of Politics*, 76(1):229–245, 2014.

Sesión 9 (Febrero/18). ¿Qué elegimos cuando votamos?

- (1) Alexander Tabarrok, “Too much Transparency Makes the World More Opaque”.
- (2) *James D. Fearon. Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians: Selecting Good Types versus Sanctioning Poor Performance. In Adam Przeworski, Susan C. Stokes, and Bernard Manin, editors, *Democracy, Accountability, and Representation*, pages 55–97. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999.

Lecturas optativas

- (1) *John Ferejohn. Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control. *Public Choice*, 50(1-3):5–25, 1986.
- (2) *Ernesto Dal Bó and Frederico Finan. Progress and Perspectives in the Study of Political Selection. *Annual Review of Economics*, 10(1):541–575, 2018.
- (3) *Mark Andreas Kayser and Michael Peress. Benchmarking across Borders: Electoral Accountability and the Necessity of Comparison. *American Political Science Review*, 106(3):661–684, 2012.
- (4) *Daniela Campello and Cesar Zucco. Presidential Success and the World Economy. *The Journal of Politics*, 78(2):589–602, 2016.
- (5) Alberto Chong, Ana L. De La O, Dean Karlan, and Leonard Wantchekon. Does Corruption Information Inspire the Fight or Quash the Hope? A Field Experiment in Mexico on Voter Turnout, Choice, and Party Identification. *The Journal of Politics*, 77(1):55–71, 2015.
- (6) James E. Alt, David D. Lassen, and John Marshall. Credible Sources and Sophisticated Voters: When Does New Information Induce Economic Voting? *The Journal of Politics*, 78(2):327–342, 2016.
- (7) Claudio Ferraz and Frederico Finan. Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the Audits of Local Governments. *American Economic Review*, 101(4):1274–1311, 2011.

Sesión 10 (Febrero/20). Información y representación electoral

- (1) *Claudio Ferraz and Frederico Finan. Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effects of Brazil’s Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 123(2):703–745, 2008 (pp. 703-28 únicamente).
- (2) *Filipe R. Campante and Quoc-Anh Do. Isolated Capital Cities, Accountability, and Corruption: Evidence from US States. *American Economic Review*, 104(8):2456–2481, 2014.

Lecturas optativas

- (1) *Timothy Besley and Robin Burgess. The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence from India. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 117(4):1415–1451, 2002.
- (2) *James M. Snyder and David Strömberg. Press Coverage and Political Accountability. *Journal of Political Economy*, 118(2):355–408, 2010.

- (3) *Ruben Enikolopov, Maria Petrova, and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya. Media and Political Persuasion: Evidence from Russia. *American Economic Review*, 101(7):3253–3285, 2011 (solo secs. I-III únicamente).
- (4) *Maria Petrova. Newspapers and Parties: How Advertising Revenues Created an Independent Press. *American Political Science Review*, 105(4):790–808, 2011.
- (5) *Horacio A. Larreguy, John Marshall, and James M. Snyder. Leveling the Playing Field: How Campaign Advertising Can Help Non-dominant Parties. *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 16(6):1812–1849, 2018.
- (6) *Jörg L. Spenkuch and David Toniatti. Political Advertising and Election Results. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 133(4):1981–2036, 2018.

Sesión 11 (Febrero/25). Subordinados ¿leales?

- (1) Albert Breton and Ronald Wintrobe. The Bureaucracy of Murder Revisited. *Journal of Political Economy*, 94(5):905–926, 1986.
- (2) Anonymous, [“I Am Part of the Resistance Inside the Trump Administration”](#), *The New York Times*, 05-SEP-2018.

Lecturas optativas

- (1) Friedrich A. Hayek. *The Road to Serfdom. The Definitive Edition*. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1944, cap. 10.
- (2) Stephen Morris. Political Correctness. *Journal of Political Economy*, 109(2):231–265, 2001.
- (3) *Georgy Egorov, Sergei Guriev, and Konstantin Sonin. Why Resource-Poor Dictators Allow Freer Media: A Theory and Evidence from Panel Data. *American Political Science Review*, 103(4):645–668, 2009.
- (4) *Tiberiu Dragu and Mattias Polborn. The Administrative Foundation of the Rule of Law. *The Journal of Politics*, 75(4):1038–1050, 2013.
- (5) *Ryan D. Enos and Eitan D. Hersh. Party Activists as Campaign Advertisers: The Ground Campaign as a Principal-Agent Problem. *American Political Science Review*, 109(2):252–278, 2015.

Sesión 12 (Febrero/27). Los límites al control “desde arriba”

- (1) David Bandurski, [“The Dawn of the Little Red Phone”](#), *China Media Project*.
- (2) *Robert Powell. Why Some Persistent Problems Persist. *American Political Science Review*, 113(4):980–996, 2019 (ignorar pp. 984-6).
- (3) *Abhijit Banerjee, Rema Hanna, Jordan Kyle, Benjamin A. Olken, and Sudarno Sumarto. Tangible Information and Citizen Empowerment: Identification Cards and Food Subsidy Programs in Indonesia. *Journal of Political Economy*, 126(2):451–491, 2017.

Lecturas optativas

- (1) *Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast. Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control. *Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization*, 3(2):243–277, 1987.
- (2) *Ritva Reinikka and Jakob Svensson. Local Capture: Evidence from a Central Government Transfer Program in Uganda. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 119(2):679–705, 2004.
- (3) *Daron Acemoglu, Leopoldo Fergusson, James A. Robinson, Darío Romero, and Juan F. Vargas. The Perils of Top-down State Building: Evidence from Colombia’s False Positives. Working Paper 22617, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2016.
- (4) *Jennifer Pan and Kaiping Chen. Concealing Corruption: How Chinese Officials Distort Upward Reporting of Online Grievances. *American Political Science Review*, 112(3):602–620, 2018.
- (5) *Hernán Flom. State Regulation of Organized Crime: Politicians, Police, and Drug Trafficking in Argentina. *Latin American Politics and Society*, 61(3):104–128, 2019.

Sesión 13 (Marzo/3). Por qué el clientelismo funciona (tan mal)

- (1) *Susan C. Stokes, Thad Dunning, Marcelo Nazareno, and Valeria Brusco. *Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism: The Puzzle of Distributive Politics*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013, caps. 3-4.

Lecturas optativas

- (1) Susan C. Stokes. Political Clientelism. In Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes, editors, *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*, pages 604–627. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007.
- (2) *Horacio Larreguy, Cesar E. Montiel Olea, and Pablo Querubin. Political Brokers: Partisans or Agents? Evidence from the Mexican Teachers’ Union. *American Journal of Political Science*, 61(4):877–891, 2017.
- (3) *Lucas M. Novaes. Disloyal Brokers and Weak Parties. *American Journal of Political Science*, 62(1):84–98, 2018.
- (4) *Francisco Cantú. Groceries for Votes: The Electoral Returns of Vote Buying. *The Journal of Politics*, 81(3):790–804, 2019.

III. Información, Expectativas y Coordinación

Sesión 14 (Marzo/5). Juegos de coordinación y “common knowledge”

- (1) Michael Suk-Young Chwe. *Rational Ritual. Culture, Coordination, and Common Knowledge*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2001, cap. 1.
- (2) Paul A. David. Clio and the Economics of QWERTY. *American Economic Review*, 75(2):332–337, 1985.

Lecturas optativas

- (1) Richard H. McAdams. A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law. *Virginia Law Review*, 86(8):1649–1729, 2000 (solamente pp. 1649-63).
- (2) Ken Binmore and Larry Samuelson. The Evolution of Focal Points. *Games and Economic Behavior*, 55(1):21–42, 2006.
- (3) Kaushik Basu. *The Republic of Beliefs: A New Approach to Law and Economics*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2018, sec. 3.2.
- (4) *Todd C. Lehmann and Yuri M. Zhukov. Until the Bitter End? The Diffusion of Surrender Across Battles. *International Organization*, 73(1):133–169, 2019.

Sesión 15 (Marzo/10). Normas e identidades sociales

- (1) *Suresh Naidu, Sung-Ha Hwang, and Samuel Bowles. The Evolution of Egalitarian Sociolinguistic Conventions. *American Economic Review*, 107(5):572–577, 2017.
- (2) *Eric Arias. How Does Media Influence Social Norms? Experimental Evidence on the Role of Common Knowledge. *Political Science Research and Methods*, 7(3):561–578, 2019.

Lecturas optativas

- (1) Kaushik Basu and Jorgen W. Weibull. Punctuality: A Cultural Trait as Equilibrium.
- (2) *Daron Acemoglu and Matthew O. Jackson. Social Norms and the Enforcement of Laws. *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 15(2):245–295, 2017.
- (3) Benedict Anderson. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. Verso, London, 2nd edition, 1983 [1991]. (Hay traducción al español: Benedict Anderson. *Comunidades Imaginadas. Reflexiones sobre el Origen y la Difusión del Nacionalismo*. Fondo de Cultura Económica, México, 1983 [2007].)
- (4) David D. Laitin. The Tower of Babel as a Coordination Game: Political Linguistics in Ghana. *American Political Science Review*, 88(3):622–634, 1994.
- (5) *Emilio Depetris-Chauvin, Ruben Durante, and Filipe R. Campante. Building Nations Through Shared Experiences: Evidence from African Football. Working Paper 24666, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2018.
- (6) *Oriana Bandiera, Myra Mohnen, Imran Rasul, and Martina Viarengo. Nation-building Through Compulsory Schooling during the Age of Mass Migration. *The Economic Journal*, forthcoming.

Sesión 16 (Marzo/12). Bullying, discriminación, y otros equilibrios perversos

- (1) Klaus Abbink and Gönül Doğan. How to Choose your Victim. *Games and Economic Behavior*, 113:482–496, 2019.
- (2) George Akerlof. The Economics of Caste and of the Rat Race and Other Woeful Tales. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 90(4):599–617, 1976 (secs. I y V-VI únicamente).

Lecturas optativas

- (1) Timur Kuran. *Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1997.
- (2) *Basu, Kaushik. Discrimination as a Coordination Device: Markets and the Emergence of Identity.
- (3) Duha T. Altindag, Deokrye Baek, Hong Lee, and Jessica Merkle. Free Lunch for All? The Impact of Universal School Lunch on Student Misbehavior. Unpublished manuscript, 2019.

Sesión 17 (Marzo/19). Película

Thirteen Days (Donaldson, 2000). En la biblioteca.

Sesión 18 (Marzo/24). El “gran coordinador”

- (1) Kaushik Basu. *The Republic of Beliefs: A New Approach to Law and Economics*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2018, secs. 2.2 y 2.4.
- (2) Richard H. McAdams. A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law. *Virginia Law Review*, 86(8):1649–1729, 2000 (solamente pp. 1663-1729).

Lecturas optativas

- (1) Thomas C. Schelling. *The Strategy of Conflict*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1960, cap. 3.
- (2) Jack Knight. *Institutions and Social Conflict*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992, caps. 3 y 5.
- (3) Kaushik Basu. *The Republic of Beliefs: A New Approach to Law and Economics*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2018, cap. 5.
- (4) *David B. Carter and H. E. Goemans. International Trade and Coordination: Tracing Border Effects. *World Politics*, 70(1):1–52, 2018.

Sesión 19 (Marzo/26). Coordinación electoral

- (1) Gary W. Cox. *Making Votes Count. Strategic Coordination in the World’s Electoral Systems*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997, caps. 2 y 4 (sólo pp. 69-80).
- (2) Rodrigo Castro Cornejo. ¿Son las Encuestas una Forma de Primera Vuelta Electoral? Sobre el Voto Útil (Estratégico) en México. *Nexos*, February 2018.

Lecturas optativas

- (1) Gary W. Cox. *Making Votes Count. Strategic Coordination in the World’s Electoral Systems*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997, caps. 1 y 13.
- (2) *Thomas Fujiwara. A Regression Discontinuity Test of Strategic Voting and Duverger’s Law. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, 6(3-4):197–233, 2011.
- (3) *Santosh Anagol and Thomas Fujiwara. The Runner-Up Effect. *Journal of Political Economy*, 124(4):927–991, 2016.

Sesión 20 (Marzo/31). La (des)obediencia como juego de coordinación

Reseña de *Thirteen Days*. Entregar antes del comienzo de la clase.

- (1) Lee Drutman, “If Republicans Ever Turn On Trump, It’ll Happen All At Once”, *fivethirtyeight.com*.
- (2) Ferdinand Lassalle. *¿Qué Es una Constitución?* Ariel, Barcelona, 1862 [2012] (únicamente la parte de la denegación de impuestos – sec. II.2 de la *segunda* conferencia, pp. 77-85 en la edición de elaleph.com).
- (3) Kaushik Basu. *The Republic of Beliefs: A New Approach to Law and Economics*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2018, cap. 3.

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- (1) Randall L. Calvert. Leadership and Its Basis in Problems of Social Coordination. *International Political Science Review*, 13(1):7–24, 1992.
- (2) Michael Suk-Young Chwe. *Rational Ritual. Culture, Coordination, and Common Knowledge*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2001, cap. 2.
- (3) Lisa Wedeen. Acting “As If”: Symbolic Politics and Social Control in Syria. *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 40(3):503–523, 1998.
- (4) *Ashlea Rundlett and Milan W. Svobik. Deliver the Vote! Micromotives and Macrobehavior in Electoral Fraud. *American Political Science Review*, 110(1):180–197, 2016.
- (5) *Dimitri Landa and Scott A. Tyson. Coercive Leadership. *American Journal of Political Science*, 61(3):559–574, 2017.

Sesión 21 (Abril/2). Custodiando a los custodios

- (1) Barry R. Weingast. The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law. *American Political Science Review*, 91(2):245–263, 1997.

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- (1) *Roger B. Myerson. The Autocrat’s Credibility Problem and Foundations of the Constitutional State. *American Political Science Review*, 102(1):125–139, 2008.
- (2) *James D. Fearon. Self-Enforcing Democracy. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 126(4):1661–1708, 2011.
- (3) *Milan W. Svobik. When Polarization Trumps Civic Virtue: Partisan Conflict and the Subversion of Democracy by Incumbents. Unpublished manuscript, 2018.
- (4) Mila Versteeg, Timothy Horley, Anne Meng, Mauricio Guim, and Marilyn Guirguis. The Law and Politics of Presidential Term Limit Evasion. *Columbia Law Review*, forthcoming (hojear secs. IV y V únicamente).

Abril/7 y Abril/9. Semana Santa

No hay clases.

Sesión 22 (Abril/14). Desobediencia masiva (I): Ejemplos

- (1) Timur Kuran. Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989. *World Politics*, 44(1):7–48, 1991.
- (2) *Gary King, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret E. Roberts. How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression. *American Political Science Review*, 107(2):326–343, 2013.

Lecturas optativas

- (1) Joshua A. Tucker. Enough! Electoral Fraud, Collective Action Problems, and Post-Communist Colored Revolutions. *Perspectives on Politics*, 5(3):535–551, 2007.
- (2) Philipp Kuntz and Mark R. Thompson. More than Just the Final Straw: Stolen Elections as Revolutionary Triggers. *Comparative Politics*, 41(3):253–272, 2009.
- (3) Alberto Simpser. *Why Governments and Parties Manipulate Elections: Theory, Practice, and Implications*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013, caps. 4* y 6.
- (4) *Rory Truex. Focal Points, Dissident Calendars, and Preemptive Repression. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 63(4):1032–1052, 2019.
- (5) Juan S. Morales. Perceived Popularity and Online Political Dissent: Evidence from Twitter in Venezuela. *The International Journal of Press/Politics*, 25(1):5–27, 2020.

Sesión 23 (Abril/16). Desobediencia masiva (II): Teoría

- (1) Timur Kuran. Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989. *World Politics*, 44(1):7–48, 1991.
- (2) *Gary King, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret E. Roberts. How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression. *American Political Science Review*, 107(2):326–343, 2013.

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- (1) Joshua A. Tucker. Enough! Electoral Fraud, Collective Action Problems, and Post-Communist Colored Revolutions. *Perspectives on Politics*, 5(3):535–551, 2007.
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- (4) *Rory Truex. Focal Points, Dissident Calendars, and Preemptive Repression. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 63(4):1032–1052, 2019.
- (5) Juan S. Morales. Perceived Popularity and Online Political Dissent: Evidence from Twitter in Venezuela. *The International Journal of Press/Politics*, 25(1):5–27, 2020.

iv. Problemas de Credibilidad

Sesión 24 (Abril/21). Políticas ineficientes

Síntesis del argumento del libro. Entregar *antes* del comienzo de la clase.

- (1) *Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson. Inefficient Redistribution. *American Political Science Review*, 95(3):649–661, 2001.

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- (1) Donald Wittman. Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results. *Journal of Political Economy*, 97(6):1395–1424, 1989.
- (2) *Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson. Political Losers as a Barrier to Economic Development. *American Economic Review*, 90(2):126–130, 2000.
- (3) Stephen Haber, Armando Razo, and Noel Maurer. *The Politics of Property Rights: Political Instability, Credible Commitments, and Economic Growth in Mexico, 1876-1929*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, cap. 5.
- (4) Pablo T. Spiller and Mariano Tommasi. *The Institutional Foundations of Public Policy in Argentina*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007, Introducción y caps. 1, 6 y 7.
- (5) *Martin J. Williams. The Political Economy of Unfinished Development Projects: Corruption, Clientelism, or Collective Choice? *American Political Science Review*, 111(4):705–723, 2017.

Sesión 25 (Abril/23). Partidos políticos

- (1) *James R Hollyer, Marko Klašnja, and Rocío Titiunik. Parties as Disciplinarians: The Electoral Strategies of Centrist Parties. Unpublished manuscript, 2019.

Lecturas optativas

- (1) John H. Aldrich. *Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America*. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1995, cap. 2.
- (2) Noam Lupu. Brand Dilution and the Breakdown of Political Parties in Latin America. *World Politics*, 66(4):561–602, 2014.
- (3) *Alberto Díaz-Cayeros. *Federalism, Fiscal Authority, and Centralization in Latin America*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006, pp. 35-97.
- (4) Ora John Reuter. *The Origins of Dominant Parties: Building Authoritarian Institutions in Post-Soviet Russia*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017, caps. 2 y 5.

Sesión 26 (Abril/28). Transiciones a la democracia

- (1) Ferdinand Lassalle. *¿Qué Es una Constitución?* Ariel, Barcelona, 1862 [2012] (únicamente secs. II-III de la primera conferencia, pp. 47-64 en la edición de elaleph.com).
- (2) Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson. *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005, cap. 2.

Lecturas optativas

- (1) *Toke S. Aidt and Raphael Franck. Democratization under the Threat of Revolution: Evidence from the Great Reform Act of 1832. *Econometrica*, 83(2):505–547, 2015.
- (2) Todd A. Eisenstadt. Mexico's *Concertaciones*: The Rise and Fall of a Substitutive Informal Institution. In Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky, editors, *Informal Institutions and Democracy: Lessons from Latin America*, pages 227–248. Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD, 2006.
- (3) Beatriz Magaloni. The Game of Electoral Fraud and the Ousting of Authoritarian Rule. *American Journal of Political Science*, 54(3):751–765, 2010.
- (4) *Michael Albertus and Victor Menaldo. Dealing with Dictators: Negotiated Democratization and the Fate of Outgoing Autocrats. *International Studies Quarterly*, 58(3):550–565, 2014.

Abril/30. Asueto

No hay clase.

Sesión 27 (Mayo/5). El *trade-off* entre competencia y lealtad

- (1) *Alexei V. Zakharov. The Loyalty-Competence Trade-Off in Dictatorships and Outside Options for Subordinates. *The Journal of Politics*, 78(2):457–466, 2016.

Lecturas optativas

- (1) *Milan W. Svoblik. Power Sharing and Leadership Dynamics in Authoritarian Regimes. *American Journal of Political Science*, 53(2):477–494, 2009.
- (2) *Carles Boix and Milan W. Svoblik. The Foundations of Limited Authoritarian Government: Institutions, Commitment, and Power-Sharing in Dictatorships. *The Journal of Politics*, 75(2):300–316, 2013.
- (3) *Daniel Krmaric. Should I Stay or Should I Go? Leaders, Exile, and the Dilemmas of International Justice. *American Journal of Political Science*, 62(2):486–498, 2018.
- (4) *Shaun Larcom, Mare Sarr, and Tim Willems. Dictators Walking the Mogadishu Line: How Men Become Monsters and Monsters Become Men. *The World Bank Economic Review*, 32(3):584–609, 2018.

Sesión 28 (Mayo/7). Derechos de propiedad

- (1) Diego Cabot. Aerolíneas: Un Engaño que Terminó en un Papelón Argentino. *La Nación*, Junio 2019.
- (2) *David Stasavage. When Distance Mattered: Geographic Scale and the Development of European Representative Assemblies. *American Political Science Review*, 104(4):625–643, 2010.

Lecturas optativas

- (1) Douglass C. North and Barry R. Weingast. Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England. *The Journal of Economic History*, 49(4):803–832, 1989.
- (2) Mancur Olson. Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development. *American Political Science Review*, 87(3):567–576, 1993.
- (3) Stephen Haber, Armando Razo, and Noel Maurer. *The Politics of Property Rights: Political Instability, Credible Commitments, and Economic Growth in Mexico, 1876-1929*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, caps. 2-3.
- (4) Édgar Gutiérrez. Guatemala Fuera de Control. La CICIG y la Lucha contra la Impunidad. *Nueva Sociedad*, (263):81–95, 2016.
- (5) *Guillermo Trejo and Camilo Nieto-Matiz. Containing Large-Scale Criminal Violence through Internationalized Prosecution: How the CICIG Contributed to the Reduction of Guatemala’s Murder Rate. In *Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association*, Washington, DC, 2019.

Junio/4. Trabajo final

Enviar por mail antes de las 10:00am.