

Online Appendix

“Resignation as Promotion? Executive Turnover and Early Departures in the Argentine Congress, 1983-2017” by Adrián Lucardi, Juan Pablo Micozzi and Natán Skigin
(for online publication only)

- (1) Section A presents the descriptive statistics.
- (2) Section B reports the tables on which Figures 4 and 6 are based.
- (3) Section C reports the robustness checks.

A Descriptive Statistics

Table A1: Descriptive statistics

	(a) By legislative mandate					(b) By legislator-month*				
	N	mean	sd.	min.	max.	N	mean	sd.	min.	max.
<i>Resignation (0/1)[†]</i>	2126	0.12	0.32	0.00	1.00	90335	0.28	5.27	0.00	100.00
<i>Resignation & election (0/1)[†]</i>	2126	0.05	0.22	0.00	1.00	90335	0.12	3.42	0.00	100.00
<i>Resignation & appointment (0/1)[†]</i>	2126	0.06	0.24	0.00	1.00	90335	0.14	3.72	0.00	100.00
National (30-day): = <i>party</i> , = <i>person</i> (0:1)						90335	0.01	0.09	0.00	1.00
National (30-day): = <i>party</i> , ≠ <i>person</i> (0:1)						90335	0.01	0.09	0.00	1.00
National (30-day): ≠ <i>party</i> , ≠ <i>person</i> (0:1)						90335	0.01	0.11	0.00	1.00
Provincial (30-day): = <i>party</i> , = <i>person</i> (0:1)						90335	0.01	0.10	0.00	1.00
Provincial (30-day): = <i>party</i> , ≠ <i>person</i> (0:1)						90335	0.02	0.12	0.00	1.00
Provincial (30-day): ≠ <i>party</i> , ≠ <i>person</i> (0:1)						90335	0.01	0.09	0.00	1.00
<i>1st in party list (0/1)</i>	2126	0.41	0.49	0.00	1.00	90335	0.41	0.49	0.00	1.00
<i>Relative position in list (0:1)</i>	2126	0.90	0.11	0.50	1.00	90335	0.90	0.11	0.50	1.00
<i>Electorally vulnerable (0/1)</i>	2126	0.42	0.49	0.00	1.00	90335	0.43	0.50	0.00	1.00
<i>Previous experience (0/1)</i>	2126	0.38	0.49	0.00	1.00	90335	0.38	0.49	0.00	1.00
<i>Committee chair (0/1)</i>	2126	0.15	0.29	0.00	1.00	90335	0.16	0.37	0.00	1.00
<i>Elected in midterm (0/1)</i>	2126	0.47	0.50	0.00	1.00	90335	0.47	0.50	0.00	1.00
<i>party: pj (0/1)</i>	2126	0.45	0.50	0.00	1.00	90335	0.45	0.50	0.00	1.00
<i>party: ucr (0/1)</i>	2126	0.33	0.47	0.00	1.00	90335	0.32	0.47	0.00	1.00
<i>party: provincial 3rd party (0/1)</i>	2126	0.06	0.24	0.00	1.00	90335	0.06	0.24	0.00	1.00
<i>party: other (0/1)</i>	2126	0.16	0.37	0.00	1.00	90335	0.17	0.37	0.00	1.00
<i>Female (0/1)</i>	2126	0.22	0.42	0.00	1.00	90335	0.23	0.42	0.00	1.00
<i>Copartisan president (0/1)</i>	2126	0.40	0.49	0.00	1.00	90335	0.42	0.49	0.00	1.00
<i>Copartisan governor (0/1)</i>	2126	0.43	0.50	0.00	1.00	90335	0.44	0.50	0.00	1.00
<i>Vote share (0:1)</i>	2126	0.38	0.14	0.04	0.80	90335	0.38	0.14	0.04	0.80
<i>Seats captured (#)</i>	2126	6.37	7.65	1.00	37.00	90335	6.16	7.34	1.00	37.00
<i>Position in list (#)</i>	2126	3.71	4.80	1.00	37.00	90335	3.64	4.63	1.00	37.00
<i>Former (vice-)president (0/1)</i>	2126	0.00	0.05	0.00	1.00	90335	0.00	0.05	0.00	1.00
<i>Former (deputy-)governor (0/1)</i>	2126	0.04	0.20	0.00	1.00	90335	0.04	0.19	0.00	1.00
<i>Former mayor (0/1)</i>	2126	0.10	0.30	0.00	1.00	90335	0.10	0.30	0.00	1.00
<i>Former national senator (0/1)</i>	2126	0.02	0.15	0.00	1.00	90335	0.02	0.15	0.00	1.00
<i>Former national deputy (0/1)</i>	2126	0.26	0.44	0.00	1.00	90335	0.26	0.44	0.00	1.00
<i>Former (supra-)national legislator (0/1)</i>	2126	0.04	0.20	0.00	1.00	90335	0.04	0.20	0.00	1.00

(*) First two months removed from the sample, for the reasons shown in Figure A4.

(†) Multiplied by 100 in panel (b).






Figure A1: Duration of (elective) office spells in Argentina, 1983-2017. An office spell is defined as an instance in which an individual occupied the same office uninterruptedly. Thus, a spell of duration 1 means that a given individual was elected to some office and not reelected; a spell of duration 2 means that the individual in question was reelected once (to the same office), and so on. Vice-presidents and vice-governors who become presidentes and governors, respectively, are counted as being reelected, but governors who become presidents are not. Percentages are calculated relative to the total number of spells corresponding to a given office. Note that each spell is only counted once (i.e., longer spells are not counted multiple times).


(a) By position in party list



(b) By electoral vulnerability



(c) By previous experience



(d) By time of election (midterm vs. concurrent)






Figure A2: Career paths of individuals elected to the Argentine Chamber of Deputies (1983-2013), within 4 years of being elected.

(e) By leadership position within the Chamber



(f) By partisan affiliation



(g) By gender




Figure A3: Career paths of individuals elected to the Argentine Chamber of Deputies (1983-2013), within 4 years of getting elected (cont.).






Figure A4: Distribution of the explanatory variables within a legislative term, by time of election (midterm vs. concurrent)—Argentine Chamber of Deputies, 1983-2017. Columns indicate the type of alternation—at the national vs. the provincial level; rows show the type of alternation. The lines the average value of the explanatory variable within a month, i.e. a value of would 100 indicate that all deputies experienced the “treatment” of interest during that month. The sample is restricted to elected deputies, and 30-day alternation windows are used overall.

(e) By leadership position within the Chamber



(f) By partisan affiliation



(g) By gender




Figure A5: Probability that a sitting legislator will resign to her seat in the Argentine Chamber of Deputies, conditional on executive alternation at the national or subnational level within a 30-day window, 1983-2017 (cont.).

B Sources for results reported in the text

- (1) *Main results.* Table A2 reports the full estimates for the results reported in Figure 4.
- (2) *Conditional effects.* Table A3 reports the full conditional estimates on which Figure 6 is based.

C Robustness Checks

- (1) *Conditional specifications.* Tables A4 and A5 reproduce the specifications of Table A3 but measuring the explanatory variable with 60-days and 90-days windows, respectively. Tables A6 and A7 employ 30-day windows but add legislator and legislator-mandate fixed effects, respectively. Table A8 reports survival models with a cloglog link instead of ols specifications.
- (2) *Daily data.* Tables A9 and A10 replicate the results of Tables A2 and A3, but using the legislator-day rather than the legislator-month as the unit of analysis. Given the estimation issues caused by the huge sample sizes involved, in Table A9 we report ols specifications only.
- (3) *Callaway and Sant'Anna estimates by subsample.* Figures A6 – A12 report the effect of executive alternation on *resignation* for seven different subsamples, using the difference-in-differences double-robust estimation method proposed by Callaway and Sant'Anna ([forthcoming](#)).
- (4) *Difference-in-Differences matching.* Figure A13 reports wls estimates of the effect of each treatment on the outcomes of interest. In the spirit of Imai, Kim and Wang ([2020](#)), the data is pre-processed so that each treated observation is matched with the subset of control observations with identical values of the following variables: (a) party id; (b) elected in midterm election; (c) district magnitude; (d) number of seats captured by the legislator's list; (e) position in party list; whether the legislator (f) was electorally *vulnerable*; (g) was a committee chair; (h) had previous executive experience; (i) had previous legislative experience; and (j) was male or female; as well as the lagged values of all (k) outcomes and (l) treatment(s) of interest in the five months immediately prior to treatment. All specifications include matched set fixed effects

and robust standard errors clustered by matched set. Weights are calculated as one over the total number of observations in the matched set. The models in Figure A14 further restrict the matching to legislators from the same district.

Table A9: Executive alternation and legislative resignation in Argentina, 1983-2017
(Daily data)

	resignation			resignation & election			resignation & app'tment		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
(a) 30-day window									
national:	-0.011	-0.013	-0.014	-0.007	-0.008	-0.009	-0.004	-0.005	-0.005
= party, = person	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
national:	0.030	0.032	0.034	0.020	0.021	0.021	0.012	0.013	0.014
= party, ≠ person	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)
national:	0.129	0.128	0.127	0.021	0.021	0.021	0.093	0.092	0.091
≠ party, ≠ person	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
provincial:	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.013	0.013	0.014	-0.014	-0.014	-0.014
= party, = person	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
provincial:	0.056	0.055	0.055	0.040	0.040	0.040	0.021	0.020	0.020
= party, ≠ person	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
provincial:	0.072	0.070	0.069	0.043	0.043	0.043	0.010	0.008	0.006
≠ party, ≠ person	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
(b) 60-day window									
national:	-0.000	-0.002	-0.003	0.003	0.002	0.002	-0.004	-0.004	-0.005
= party, = person	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
national:	0.021	0.023	0.025	0.013	0.014	0.014	0.005	0.006	0.007
= party, ≠ person	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
national:	0.069	0.069	0.068	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.053	0.052	0.051
≠ party, ≠ person	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
provincial:	-0.002	-0.003	-0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004
= party, = person	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
provincial:	0.025	0.023	0.023	0.018	0.017	0.017	0.011	0.009	0.010
= party, ≠ person	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)
provincial:	0.041	0.040	0.038	0.023	0.024	0.023	0.005	0.002	0.001
≠ party, ≠ person	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)
(c) 90-day window									
national:	-0.001	-0.003	-0.004	0.002	0.001	0.001	-0.003	-0.003	-0.004
= party, = person	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
national:	0.012	0.014	0.015	0.008	0.009	0.009	0.003	0.003	0.005
= party, ≠ person	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
national:	0.048	0.047	0.046	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.037	0.036	0.035
≠ party, ≠ person	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
provincial:	-0.003	-0.004	-0.003	0.001	0.001	0.001	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004
= party, = person	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
provincial:	0.018	0.016	0.016	0.012	0.012	0.011	0.006	0.005	0.005
= party, ≠ person	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
provincial:	0.030	0.029	0.026	0.014	0.015	0.015	0.007	0.004	0.002
≠ party, ≠ person	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)
legislator FE's	x			x			x		
leg.-mandate FE's		x			x			x	
$\sum Y = 1$	252			106			125		

OLS regression estimates. Outcome variables are multiplied by 100 to facilitate interpretation. The unit of observation is the legislator-day. In panels (a) through (c), the first two, three and four months of each legislator's period have been excluded from the analysis, respectively. $N_{\text{legislators}} = 1,592 - 1,598$; $N_{\text{mandates}} = 2,111 - 2,120$; $N_{\text{obs.}} = 2,579,802 - 2,705,845$. Robust standard errors clustered by legislator in parentheses. The explanatory variables measure whether a day fell 30, 60 or 90 days before or after an instance of executive alternation of a given type at the national or provincial level. In OLS specifications the outcome variable was multiplied by 100 to facilitate interpretation. GLM (survival) specifications use a cloglog link. All specifications include duration, district and period fixed effects as well as controls for gender; copartisan governor; copartisan president; elected in midterm; list vote share; log of number of seats captured; committee chair; relative position in list; whether the legislator was vulnerable; and previous experience as (vice-)president, (deputy) governor, mayor, national senator, national deputy, or other (supra-)national legislator.

Table A10: Executive alternation and legislative resignations in Argentina, 1983-2017: Conditional effects (Daily data)

position in list			elect. vulnerable			previous experience			committee chair			elected in midterm			female		party (ucr/pj)				
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	
national (30-day):	-0.02	-0.05	0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	
$= party, = person$	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.00)	
\times conditional	0.01	0.04	-0.02	-0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.03	0.01	0.02	-0.01	0.00	-0.01	-0.02	0.00	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	
national (30-day):	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.00)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.00)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	
$= party, \neq person$	0.06	0.16	-0.09	0.05	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.04	0.03	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.00	
\times conditional	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	
national (30-day):	-0.04	-0.15	0.12	-0.05	-0.01	-0.04	0.04	0.03	0.01	0.01	-0.00	0.01	0.04	0.03	0.01	-0.03	0.01	-0.02	-0.01	0.05	0.02
(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
$\neq party, \neq person$	-0.20	-0.23	0.02	0.16	0.02	0.12	0.09	0.00	0.08	0.12	0.01	0.09	0.10	0.03	0.14	0.02	0.10	0.11	0.02	0.08	
\times conditional	(0.16)	(0.08)	(0.13)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	
provincial (30-day):	0.09	0.11	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.02	-0.01	0.03	0.03	-0.01	0.01	0.02	-0.01	0.00	0.01	
$= party, = person$	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.00)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.00)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	
\times conditional	-0.10	-0.11	-0.02	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.04	0.04	0.00	-0.05	-0.03	-0.01	-0.05	-0.03	-0.01	-0.05	-0.03	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02	
provincial (30-day):	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.03)	
$= party, \neq person$	-0.20	-0.09	-0.10	0.06	0.05	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.03	0.07	0.04	0.03	-0.02	-0.00	-0.01	0.07	0.05	0.02	0.05	0.02	
\times conditional	0.28	0.14	0.14	-0.02	0.00	0.06	0.07	-0.02	-0.06	0.02	-0.08	0.11	0.06	0.05	-0.05	-0.06	0.01	-0.01	0.03	-0.04	
provincial (30-day):	(0.17)	(0.14)	(0.09)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	
$\neq party, = person$	-0.33	-0.33	-0.01	0.08	0.04	0.01	0.02	0.02	-0.01	0.07	0.05	0.00	0.08	0.03	0.09	0.05	0.02	0.08	0.03	0.04	
\times conditional	0.44	0.41	0.02	-0.01	0.01	-0.00	0.14	0.06	0.06	-0.01	-0.04	0.03	-0.01	0.02	-0.03	-0.09	-0.04	-0.05	-0.04	-0.05	
outcome	R	R&E	R&A	R	R&E	R&A	R	R&E	R&A	R	R&E	R&A	R	R&E	R&A	R	R&E	R&A	R&E	R&A	
$\sum Y = 1$	252	106	125	252	106	125	252	106	125	252	106	125	252	106	125	252	106	125	252	106	125

ous regression estimates. The unit of observation is the legislator-day. The first two months of each legislator's period have been excluded from the analysis. *N*legislators = 1,598; *N*mandates = 2,120; *N*obs. = 2,705,845. Robust standard errors clustered by legislator in parentheses. Outcomes: R: *resignation* (0/100); R&E: *resignation and election* (0/100); R&A: *resignation and appointment* (0/100). The explanatory variables measure whether a day fell 30 days before or after an instance of executive alternation of a given type at the national or provincial level. The “conditional” variables vary by model; they are specified at the top. *position in list* (columns 1-3) is a continuous variable that takes the value of 1 for the legislator placed in the top position of his or her party's list, and 0 for the one located at the bottom; all other conditioning variables are dummies. In column (19)-(21), the baseline party is the ucr, and the conditional effect correspond to the pj; estimates for “third” and “other” parties are included in the models but not reported. All specifications include duration, district and period fixed effects, as well as controls for gender; copartisan governor; copartisan president; elected in midterm; list vote share; log of number of seats captured; committee chair; relative position in list; whether the legislator was vulnerable; and previous experience as (vice-)president, (deputy) governor, mayor, national senator, national deputy, or other (supra-)national legislator.




Figure A6: Event-study estimates of the effect of executive alternation on resignations in the Argentine Chamber of Deputies, 1983-2017—By (top) position in party list. The grey lines and shaded area indicate the point estimates and 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals for the effect of alternation on *resignation* in the full sample reported in Figure 5; the points and vertical lines do likewise for the subsample of deputies who had (not) been placed at the top of their party's list. Each panel corresponds to a different treatment, defined as a combination of alternation *level*—national or provincial—and *type* of change—the incumbent being reelected; the incumbent party being reelected, with a different executive; or a change in both incumbent executive and party. All estimates calculated using the double-robust method proposed by Callaway and Sant'Anna ([forthcoming](#)). The control group is defined as the not-yet-treated group, and standard errors clustered by legislator and using 667 bootstrap iterations.




Figure A7: Event-study estimates of the effect of executive alternation on resignations in the Argentine Chamber of Deputies, 1983-2017—By electoral vulnerability. The grey lines and shaded area indicate the point estimates and 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals for the effect of alternation on *resignation* in the full sample reported in Figure 5; the points and vertical lines do likewise for the subsample of deputies who were (not) electorally vulnerable, as defined in the text. Each panel corresponds to a different treatment, defined as a combination of alternation *level*—national or provincial—and *type* of change—the incumbent being reelected; the incumbent party being reelected, with a different executive; or a change in both incumbent executive and party. All estimates calculated using the double-robust method proposed by Callaway and Sant’Anna ([forthcoming](#)). The control group is defined as the not-yet-treated group, and standard errors clustered by legislator and using 667 bootstrap iterations.




Figure A8: Event-study estimates of the effect of executive alternation on resignations in the Argentine Chamber of Deputies, 1983-2017—By previous political experience. The grey lines and shaded area indicate the point estimates and 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals for the effect of alternation on *resignation* in the full sample reported in Figure 5; the points and vertical lines do likewise for the subsample of deputies who did (not) have some kind of executive or legislative experience. Each panel corresponds to a different treatment, defined as a combination of alternation *level*—national or provincial—and *type* of change—the incumbent being reelected; the incumbent party being reelected, with a different executive; or a change in both incumbent executive and party. All estimates calculated using the double-robust method proposed by Callaway and Sant’Anna ([forthcoming](#)). The control group is defined as the not-yet-treated group, and standard errors clustered by legislator and using 667 bootstrap iterations.




Figure A9: Event-study estimates of the effect of executive alternation on resignations in the Argentine Chamber of Deputies, 1983-2017—By committee leadership. The grey lines and shaded area indicate the point estimates and 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals for the effect of alternation on *resignation* in the full sample reported in Figure 5; the points and vertical lines do likewise for the subsample of deputies who were (not) committee chairs 0when the treatment was administered. Each panel corresponds to a different treatment, defined as a combination of alternation *level*—national or provincial—and *type* of change—the incumbent being reelected; the incumbent party being reelected, with a different executive; or a change in both incumbent executive and party. All estimates calculated using the double-robust method proposed by Callaway and Sant’Anna ([forthcoming](#)). The control group is defined as the not-yet-treated group, and standard errors clustered by legislator and using 667 bootstrap iterations.




Figure A10: Event-study estimates of the effect of executive alternation on resignations in the Argentine Chamber of Deputies, 1983-2017—By time of election (midterm vs. concurrent). The grey lines and shaded area indicate the point estimates and 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals for the effect of alternation on *resignation* in the full sample reported in Figure 5; the points and vertical lines do likewise for the subsample of deputies who had been elected in midterm (concurrent) elections. Each panel corresponds to a different treatment, defined as a combination of alternation *level*—national or provincial—and *type* of change—the incumbent being reelected; the incumbent party being reelected, with a different executive; or a change in both incumbent executive and party. All estimates calculated using the double-robust method proposed by Callaway and Sant’Anna ([forthcoming](#)). The control group is defined as the not-yet-treated group, and standard errors clustered by legislator and using 667 bootstrap iterations.




Figure A11: Event-study estimates of the effect of executive alternation on resignations in the Argentine Chamber of Deputies, 1983-2017—By party ID (PJ vs. UCR). The grey lines and shaded area indicate the point estimates and 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals for the effect of alternation on *resignation* in the full sample reported in Figure 5; the points and vertical lines do likewise for the subsample of deputies who belonged to the PJ (UCR). Each panel corresponds to a different treatment, defined as a combination of alternation *level*—national or provincial—and *type* of change—the incumbent being reelected; the incumbent party being reelected, with a different executive; or a change in both incumbent executive and party. All estimates calculated using the double-robust method proposed by Callaway and Sant'Anna ([forthcoming](#)). The control group is defined as the not-yet-treated group, and standard errors clustered by legislator and using 667 bootstrap iterations.




Figure A12: Event-study estimates of the effect of executive alternation on resignations in the Argentine Chamber of Deputies, 1983-2017—By gender (men vs. women). The grey lines and shaded area indicate the point estimates and 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals for the effect of alternation on *resignation* in the full sample reported in Figure 5; the points and vertical lines do likewise for the subsample of (fe)male deputies. Each panel corresponds to a different treatment, defined as a combination of alternation *level*—national or provincial—and *type* of change—the incumbent being reelected; the incumbent party being reelected, with a different executive; or a change in both incumbent executive and party. All estimates calculated using the double-robust method proposed by Callaway and Sant’Anna ([forthcoming](#)). The control group is defined as the not-yet-treated group, and standard errors clustered by legislator and using 667 bootstrap iterations.




Figure A13: Matching difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of executive alternation on resignations in the Argentine Chamber of Deputies, 1983-2017. The grey lines and shaded area indicate point estimates and 95% confidence intervals for the effect of alternation on *resignation*; the points and vertical lines do the same for the effect of alternation on *resignation and election* and *resignation and appointment*, respectively. Each panel corresponds to a different treatment, defined as a combination of alternation *level* – national or provincial – and *type* of change – the incumbent being reelected; the incumbent party being reelected, with a different executive; or a change in both incumbent executive and party. In the spirit of Imai, Kim and Wang (2020), all treated observations were assigned to a matched set with all other observations that had identical values of the following variables: (a) party ID; (b) elected in midterm election; (c) district magnitude; (d) number of seats captured by the legislator's list; (e) position in party list; whether the legislator (f) was electorally vulnerable; (g) was a committee chair; (h) had previous executive experience; (i) had previous legislative experience; and (j) was male or female; as well as the lagged values of all (k) outcomes and (l) treatment(s) of interest in the five months immediately prior to treatment. A separate WLS was estimated for each outcome in each period, with fixed effects by matched set and robust standard errors clustered by matched set, and weights calculated as one over the total number of observations in the matched set.




Figure A14: Matching difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of executive alternation on resignations in the Argentine Chamber of Deputies, 1983-2017. The grey lines and shaded area indicate point estimates and 95% confidence intervals for the effect of alternation on *resignation*; the points and vertical lines do the same for the effect of alternation on *resignation and election* and *resignation and appointment*, respectively. Each panel corresponds to a different treatment, defined as a combination of alternation *level* – national or provincial – and *type* of change – the incumbent being reelected; the incumbent party being reelected, with a different executive; or a change in both incumbent executive and party. In the spirit of Imai, Kim and Wang (2020), all treated observations were assigned to a matched set with all other observations that had identical values of the following variables: (a) district; (b) party ID; (c) elected in midterm election; (d) district magnitude; (e) number of seats captured by the legislator's list; (f) position in party list; whether the legislator (g) was electorally vulnerable; (h) was a committee chair; (i) had previous executive experience; (j) had previous legislative experience; and (k) was male or female; as well as the lagged values of all (l) outcomes and (m) treatment(s) of interest in the five months immediately prior to treatment. A separate wls was estimated for each outcome in each period, with fixed effects by matched set and robust standard errors clustered by matched set, and weights calculated as one over the total number of observations in the matched set.