Online Appendix

"Does the Early Bird always Get the Worm?"
(for online publication only)

(1) Section A1 lists our data sources.

(2) Section A2 presents the descriptive statistics and some additional plots.

(3) Section A3 presents the balance checks and placebo tests.

(4) Section A4 reports additional results and robustness checks.

A1 Data Sources

Presidential elections

- We assembled a list of presidential elections between 1945 and 2020 from the following sources: Bormann and Golder (2013), NELDA (Hyde and Marinov 2012) and V-Dem v.11.1 (Coppedge et al. 2021). Following Hyde and Marinov (2012), we restricted the sample to elections that are minimally competitive, meaning that (a) opposition was allowed; (b) there was more than a single legal party; and (c) there was a choice of candidates in the ballot.
- To identify elections employing a runoff, a couple of research assistants employed the Nohlen handbooks, Bormann and Golder (2013), the Comparative Constitutions Project v2.0 (Elkins, Ginsburg and Melton 2014) and other country-specific sources.
- Election results come from the Nohlen handbooks, *Wikipedia*, and the African Elections Database (https://africanelections.tripod.com/).

Argentina

- Dirección Nacional Electoral (DINE: https://www.argentina.gob.ar/interior/dine).
- *Wikipedia*.
- Tow (N.d.).

Bolivia

- Órgano Electoral Plurinacional (OEP: https://www.oep.org.bo/).

Chile

- *Wikipedia*: https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elecciones_de_gobernadores_regionales_de_Chile_de_2021, and subsequent links.

San Luis Potosí, Mexico

- Vázquez Salguero (2013) for a description of electoral rules.
- *Consejo Estatal Electoral y de Participación Ciudadana de San Luis Potosí* (CEEPAC: http://www.ceepacslp.org.mx/ceepac/) for election outcomes.

Ideology scores

- Wikipedia scores: Herrmann and Döring (forthcoming). These are calculated using an ideal point model on the basis of parties' tags in their Wikipedia pages. The resulting scores map naturally along the Left-Right dimension. By construction, each party's score is constant over time. For subnational elections, we implicitly assumed parties' national ideology scores hold.
- V-Party v.1 dataset: Lührmann et al. (2020). This data is only available for legislative elections, so we used the coding from the previous congressional race when executive and legislative elections were not concurrent. For subnational elections, we implicitly assumed parties' national ideology scores hold.
- *Left-Right score.* `v2parigle`f variable from V-Party. Country experts were asked to classify parties across a seven-point scale ranging from Far-Left to Far-Right, and then a Bayesian IRT measurement model was used to calculate parties' latent ideology scores. This variable has a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1 (in V-Party's entire sample; our subsamples may differ).
- *(Il)Liberalism score.* This captures the extent to which a party employs anti-elite rhetoric, exalts "the people," embraces pluralism and rejects political violence. Measured with a factor score of five variables included in V-Party: `v2paanteli`, `v2papeople`, `v2paopresp`, `v2paplur` and `v2paviol`.
- *Post-Materialism score.* Indicates whether a party advocates secularism and support for women's rights, immigrants and minorities. Measured with a factor score of `v2paminor`, `v2paimmig`, `v2palgbt`, `v2parelig` and `v2pawomlab`.
- Figure A4 shows the correlation between these four scores: both Left-Right measures are highly correlated with each other, and the Left-Right dimension is negatively correlated with the other two.

A2 Descriptive statistics

Descriptive statistics. Tables A1 and A2 show the descriptive statistics for the main variables of interest, disaggregated by sample. The former reports variables measured at the election level, while the latter shows the values corresponding to the first- and second-placed candidates in the first round.

Descriptive by subsample (I): Votes. For the subset of elections requiring a second round, Figure A1 shows the distribution of first-round vote shares for the first three placed candidates (left) and the first vs. second and second vs. third margins (right). Figure A2 plots the relationship between the vote share(s) of the first- and second-placed candidates in the first round.

Descriptive by subsample (II): Ideology. Figure A3 presents the proportion of elections with non-missing data on the ideology scores of the first and second-placed candidate(s) in the first round. For both the first- and second-placed candidates in the first round, Figure A4 presents the correlation between their ideology scores. For the subset of elections in which a second round was needed, Figures A5 through A7 summarize the distribution of (i) our measures of ideological polarization –the absolute value of the difference between the ideology of the first- and second-placed candidate–; and (ii) the Wikipedia and V-Party ideology scores of the first- and second-placed candidates in the first round. Finally, Figures A8 and A9 plot the relationship between the Left-Right ideology of the first- and second-placed candidates in the first round.

Difference-in-means for 2 pp. and 5 pp. bandwidths. For each subsample, Table A3 presents (i) the number of observations within a 2 (or 5) percentage point bandwidth; (ii) the average values of the outcome variables for the first- and second-placed candidates in the first round; and (iii) the difference in means between the two.

Additional RD plots. Figure A10 visualizes the heterogeneous effects using V-Party Left-Right scores instead of the Wikipedia ideology measure. Figures A11 through A13 present the mimicking variance evenly-spaced RD plots showing the effect of first-round advantage on *vote share*$_{R2}$.

Table A1: Descriptive statistics (1): Election-level characteristics

	(a) Full sample					(b) Presidential elections				
	N	mean	SD	min	max	*N*	mean	SD	min	max
margin (1vs2) (0:50)	663	9.81	7.43	0.03	39.06	182	9.96	7.52	0.22	32.81
margin (2vs3) (0:25)	663	13.56	11.52	0.14	48.64	182	11.96	10.18	0.14	46.58
margin (1vs2) (R2) (0:100)	656	14.40	13.80	0.01	100.00	178	16.54	17.22	0.01	100.00
reversion in second round (0/1)	663	0.28	0.45	0.00	1.00	182	0.32	0.47	0.00	1.00
number of candidates (#)	663	8.24	4.46	3.00	39.00	182	11.21	6.36	3.00	39.00
effective number of candidates	663	3.57	1.01	2.04	10.43	182	3.97	1.27	2.12	10.43
|*ideol. distance (1vs2)*| (Left-Right, Wikipedia)	521	0.95	0.57	0.00	2.65	125	1.16	0.65	0.00	2.65
|*ideol. distance (1vs2)*| (Left-Right, V-Party)	453	1.83	1.10	0.00	5.14	123	1.90	1.13	0.00	5.14
|*ideol. distance (1vs2)*| ((Il)Liberalism)	453	0.47	0.44	0.00	2.61	123	0.53	0.64	0.00	2.61
|*ideol. distance (1vs2)*| (Post-Materialism)	453	1.11	0.70	0.00	4.45	123	0.96	0.79	0.00	4.45
incumbent first-placed (0/1)	663	0.15	0.36	0.00	1.00	182	0.24	0.43	0.00	1.00
incumbent second-placed (0/1)	663	0.08	0.26	0.00	1.00	182	0.09	0.28	0.00	1.00
first-placed is experienced (0/1)	391	0.20	0.40	0.00	1.00					
second-placed is experienced (0/1)	391	0.13	0.34	0.00	1.00					
distance b/w first and second round (days)	656	27.43	16.12	7.00	224.00	178	27.49	23.93	7.00	224.00
	(c) Gubernatorial elections					(d) Mayoral elections				
margin (1vs2) (0:50)	140	9.13	7.06	0.12	28.82	341	10.00	7.54	0.03	39.06
margin (2vs3) (0:25)	140	16.81	12.99	0.26	48.64	341	13.09	11.32	0.14	45.61
margin (1vs2) (R2) (0:100)	137	14.41	13.61	0.09	87.56	341	13.27	11.60	0.16	70.86
reversion in second round (0/1)	140	0.29	0.46	0.00	1.00	341	0.26	0.44	0.00	1.00
number of candidates (#)	140	6.65	3.14	3.00	28.00	341	7.30	2.56	3.00	16.00
effective number of candidates	140	3.18	0.73	2.04	5.71	341	3.51	0.87	2.11	9.25
|*ideol. distance (1vs2)*| (Left-Right, Wikipedia)	90	0.85	0.49	0.07	2.10	306	0.90	0.54	0.00	2.60
|*ideol. distance (1vs2)*| (Left-Right, V-Party)	93	1.79	0.98	0.07	3.92	237	1.81	1.13	0.00	5.00
|*ideol. distance (1vs2)*| ((Il)Liberalism)	93	0.43	0.36	0.00	1.80	237	0.46	0.32	0.00	1.80
|*ideol. distance (1vs2)*| (Post-Materialism)	93	1.06	0.63	0.04	2.61	237	1.21	0.67	0.04	4.10
incumbent first-placed (0/1)	140	0.09	0.29	0.00	1.00	341	0.13	0.34	0.00	1.00
incumbent second-placed (0/1)	140	0.07	0.26	0.00	1.00	341	0.07	0.26	0.00	1.00
first-placed is experienced (0/1)	91	0.12	0.33	0.00	1.00	300	0.22	0.42	0.00	1.00
second-placed is experienced (0/1)	91	0.08	0.27	0.00	1.00	300	0.15	0.35	0.00	1.00
distance b/w first and second round (days)	137	28.23	16.77	7.00	196.00	341	27.08	9.48	14.00	43.00
	(e) Subnational (Brazil)					(f) Subnational (outside Brazil)				
margin (1vs2) (0:50)	391	10.12	7.52	0.10	39.06	90	8.11	6.68	0.03	28.82
margin (2vs3) (0:25)	391	13.50	11.59	0.14	48.64	90	17.09	13.01	0.37	45.61
margin (1vs2) (R2) (0:100)	391	13.39	11.46	0.09	70.86	87	14.52	15.16	0.24	87.56
reversion in second round (0/1)	391	0.26	0.44	0.00	1.00	90	0.29	0.46	0.00	1.00
number of candidates (#)	391	7.30	2.48	3.00	16.00	90	6.29	3.62	3.00	28.00
effective number of candidates	391	3.47	0.85	2.04	9.25	90	3.20	0.79	2.11	5.71
|*ideol. distance (1vs2)*| (Left-Right, Wikipedia)	345	0.89	0.54	0.00	2.60	51	0.86	0.46	0.32	1.74
|*ideol. distance (1vs2)*| (Left-Right, V-Party)	283	1.84	1.13	0.00	5.00	47	1.63	0.76	0.59	3.92
|*ideol. distance (1vs2)*| ((Il)Liberalism)	283	0.40	0.32	0.00	1.80	47	0.74	0.28	0.05	1.08
|*ideol. distance (1vs2)*| (Post-Materialism)	283	1.19	0.70	0.04	4.10	47	1.03	0.38	0.35	2.40
incumbent first-placed (0/1)	391	0.14	0.34	0.00	1.00	90	0.04	0.21	0.00	1.00
incumbent second-placed (0/1)	391	0.08	0.27	0.00	1.00	90	0.03	0.18	0.00	1.00
first-placed is experienced (0/1)	391	0.20	0.40	0.00	1.00					
second-placed is experienced (0/1)	391	0.13	0.34	0.00	1.00					
distance b/w first and second round (days)	391	25.40	8.22	14.00	43.00	87	36.41	19.87	7.00	196.00

Only elections in which a second round was needed to determine the winner are included. Unless specifically noted, all variables are measured in the first round or have a common value for both rounds.

Table A2: Descriptive statistics (II): First- and Second-placed candidates

	top placed (first round)					runner-up (first round)				
(a) Full sample	*N*	mean	SD	min	max	*N*	mean	SD	min	max
winner (0/100)	663	71.64	45.11	0.00	100.00	663	28.21	45.03	0.00	100.00
vote share (0:50)	663	39.71	7.01	18.40	49.98	663	29.90	7.46	10.60	49.30
vote share (R2) (0:100)	656	54.27	9.01	14.78	100.00	653	45.76	8.91	0.00	85.22
ideology (Left-Right, Wikipedia)	577	-0.18	0.74	-2.19	1.82	566	-0.19	0.76	-2.27	1.86
ideology (Left-Right, V-Party)	551	0.23	1.38	-2.61	3.24	541	0.26	1.37	-3.36	3.24
ideology ((Il)Liberalism)	551	0.52	0.64	-2.35	1.28	541	0.57	0.63	-2.03	1.28
ideology (Post-Materialism)	551	0.50	0.94	-2.17	2.29	541	0.48	0.97	-2.17	2.55
(b) Presidential elections										
winner (0/100)	182	67.58	46.94	0.00	100.00	182	31.87	46.73	0.00	100.00
vote share (0:50)	182	37.89	7.62	18.40	49.88	182	27.93	7.05	13.83	47.92
vote share (R2) (0:100)	178	54.74	10.97	30.82	100.00	176	45.29	10.67	0.00	69.18
ideology (Left-Right, Wikipedia)	148	-0.05	0.82	-1.86	1.82	142	0.01	0.86	-2.27	1.86
ideology (Left-Right, V-Party)	148	0.04	1.29	-2.27	3.24	145	0.27	1.28	-3.36	2.46
ideology ((Il)Liberalism)	148	0.11	0.82	-2.35	1.19	145	0.14	0.82	-2.03	1.26
ideology (Post-Materialism)	148	0.10	0.92	-2.17	2.29	145	0.03	0.84	-1.84	2.55
(c) Gubernatorial elections										
winner (0/100)	140	70.71	45.67	0.00	100.00	140	29.29	45.67	0.00	100.00
vote share (0:50)	140	41.77	6.34	24.29	49.80	140	32.64	7.61	15.56	49.30
vote share (R2) (0:100)	137	53.62	9.24	14.78	93.78	137	46.38	9.24	6.22	85.22
ideology (Left-Right, Wikipedia)	103	-0.05	0.59	-1.28	1.32	104	-0.20	0.69	-1.28	1.32
ideology (Left-Right, V-Party)	114	0.32	1.34	-2.61	3.24	115	0.14	1.40	-2.61	3.24
ideology ((Il)Liberalism)	114	0.57	0.62	-1.22	1.28	115	0.69	0.55	-1.22	1.28
ideology (Post-Materialism)	114	0.51	0.78	-2.17	2.29	115	0.65	0.94	-2.17	2.29
(d) Mayoral elections										
winner (0/100)	341	74.19	43.82	0.00	100.00	341	25.81	43.82	0.00	100.00
vote share (0:50)	341	39.83	6.70	18.81	49.98	341	29.83	7.28	10.60	47.78
vote share (R2) (0:100)	341	54.28	7.71	25.82	85.43	340	45.75	7.70	14.57	74.18
ideology (Left-Right, Wikipedia)	326	-0.27	0.73	-2.19	1.67	320	-0.27	0.72	-2.19	1.32
ideology (Left-Right, V-Party)	289	0.29	1.43	-2.61	2.39	281	0.31	1.41	-2.61	3.24
ideology ((Il)Liberalism)	289	0.70	0.43	-0.28	1.28	281	0.74	0.41	-1.22	1.28
ideology (Post-Materialism)	289	0.71	0.95	-1.81	2.29	281	0.65	0.98	-2.17	2.29
(e) Subnational (Brazil)										
winner (0/100)	391	73.66	44.11	0.00	100.00	391	26.34	44.11	0.00	100.00
vote share (0:50)	391	40.21	6.68	18.81	49.98	391	30.09	7.32	10.60	49.30
vote share (R2) (0:100)	391	54.12	7.80	25.82	85.43	390	45.91	7.79	14.57	74.18
ideology (Left-Right, Wikipedia)	368	-0.28	0.70	-2.19	1.32	360	-0.32	0.70	-2.19	1.32
ideology (Left-Right, V-Party)	337	0.30	1.43	-2.61	3.24	329	0.17	1.40	-2.61	3.24
ideology ((Il)Liberalism)	337	0.79	0.35	-1.22	1.28	329	0.81	0.38	-1.22	1.28
ideology (Post-Materialism)	337	0.74	0.93	-2.17	2.29	329	0.77	0.95	-2.17	2.29
(f) Subnational (outside Brazil)										
winner (0/100)	90	71.11	45.58	0.00	100.00	90	28.89	45.58	0.00	100.00
vote share (0:50)	90	41.19	6.48	24.29	49.80	90	33.08	7.73	15.56	47.75
vote share (R2) (0:100)	87	53.96	9.74	14.78	93.78	87	46.04	9.74	6.22	85.22
ideology (Left-Right, Wikipedia)	61	0.16	0.58	-1.38	1.67	64	0.10	0.69	-1.38	0.95
ideology (Left-Right, V-Party)	66	0.29	1.26	-2.19	2.21	67	0.71	1.35	-2.19	2.64
ideology ((Il)Liberalism)	66	0.04	0.60	-1.09	1.15	67	0.32	0.55	-1.09	1.15
ideology (Post-Materialism)	66	0.18	0.66	-0.87	1.69	67	0.05	0.77	-1.00	1.69

Only elections in which a second round was needed to determine the winner are included. Unless specifically noted, all variables are measured in the first round or have a common value for both rounds.



Figure A1: First-round vote shares of the first-, second- and third-placed candidates (left), as well as the first-second and second-third margins (right), by subsample. Only elections in which a second round was needed are included.



Figure A2: First-round vote shares of the first- and second-placed candidates, by subsample. Red dots indicate elections in which the first-round result was reversed in the runoff.



Figure A3: % of candidates with non-missing data on ideology, by source, subsample, first-round placement, and whether a second round was needed. Panel (b) reports missingness for the Left-Right V-Party measure, but missingness patterns for illiberalism or post-materialism only differ for a handful of observations.



Figure A4: Pairwise relationship between ideology measures. Points represent observations in the full sample, and the red lines indicate the pairwise correlation for that sample. Broken gray lines indicate the pairwise correlation lines in each sample separately. Solid black lines indicate the perfect (negative) correlation. Only elections in which a second round was needed are included.



Figure A5: Ideological polarization between the first- and second-placed candidates, by subsample. Only elections in which a second round was needed are included.



Figure A6: Distribution of Left-Right ideology scores for the top two placed candidates, by subsample. Only elections in which a second round was needed are included.



Figure A7: Distribution of (Il)Liberalism (left) and Post-Materialism (right) ideology scores for the top two placed candidates, by subsample. Only elections in which a second round was needed are included.



Figure A8: First-round Wikipedia left-right scores of the first- and second-placed candidates, by subsample. Only elections in which a second round was needed are included. Red dots indicate elections in which the first-round result was reversed in the runoff.



Figure A9: First-round V-Party left-right scores of the first- and second-placed candidates, by subsample. Only elections in which a second round was needed are included. Red dots indicate elections in which the first-round result was reversed in the runoff.

Table A3: Differences in means between treatment and control groups, 2 and 5 pp. bandwidths

		DV: *winner* (0/100)			DV: *vote share*$_{R2}$ (0:100)		
(a) 2 pp. bandwidth	$N^-\|N^+$	$\bar{y}^-$	$\bar{y}^+$	diff.	$\bar{y}^-$	$\bar{y}^+$	diff.
full sample	96|96	39.58	60.42	20.83	48.97	51.03	2.05
presidential elections	25|25	52.00	48.00	-4.00	49.95	50.05	0.10
gubernatorial elections	22|22	45.45	54.55	9.09	50.35	49.65	-0.70
mayoral elections	49|49	30.61	69.39	38.78	47.86	52.14	4.28
subnational (Brazil)	57|57	38.60	61.40	22.81	49.05	50.95	1.91
subnational (outside Brazil)	14|14	21.43	78.57	57.14	46.94	53.06	6.11
(b) 5 pp. bandwidth							
full sample	222|222	41.44	58.56	17.12	48.74	51.26	2.52
presidential elections	60|60	51.67	48.33	-3.33	49.09	50.91	1.81
gubernatorial elections	52|52	46.15	53.85	7.69	49.34	50.66	1.33
mayoral elections	110|110	33.64	66.36	32.73	48.27	51.73	3.45
subnational (Brazil)	122|122	36.07	63.93	27.87	48.56	51.44	2.87
subnational (outside Brazil)	40|40	42.50	57.50	15.00	48.77	51.23	2.46

Number of observations, mean outcome values of bare winners and losers, and differences in means, for observations within (a) 2 percentage points; and (b) 5 percentage points of the threshold, by subsample.



Figure A10: Mimicking variance RD plots with quantile-spaced bins (Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik 2015) showing the effect of *first round margin* on the probability of winning the election. Polarized (respectively, close) elections are those in which the absolute ideological distance along the V-Party Left-Right dimension between the top-two vote getters in the first round was larger (smaller) than the median for each sample.



Figure A11: Mimicking variance RD plots with quantile-spaced bins (Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik 2015) showing the effect of *first round margin* on the vote share in the second round. Red lines show third-order polynomials estimated separately at each side of the cutoff, using a uniform kernel.



Figure A12: Mimicking variance RD plots with quantile-spaced bins (Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik 2015) showing the effect of *first round margin* on the vote share in the second round. Polarized (respectively, close) elections are those in which the absolute ideological distance along the Wikipedia Left-Right dimension between the top-two vote getters in the first round was larger (smaller) than the median for each sample. Red lines show third-order polynomials estimated separately at each side of the cutoff, using a uniform kernel.



Figure A13: Mimicking variance RD plots with quantile-spaced bins (Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik 2015) showing the effect of *first round margin* on the vote share in the second round. Polarized (respectively, close) elections are those in which the absolute ideological distance along the V-Party Left-Right dimension between the top-two vote getters in the first round was larger (smaller) than the median for each sample. Red lines show third-order polynomials estimated separately at each side of the cutoff, using a uniform kernel.

A3 Balance checks

RD plots. Figures A14 and A15 show the effect of *first round margin* on a series of outcomes that should not be affected by the treatment: candidates' ideology scores, the presence of missing values for these variables, and candidates' incumbency status.

RD estimates. Tables A4 and A5 report the corresponding MSERD-optimal RD estimates.



Figure A14: Mimicking variance RD plots with quantile-spaced bins (Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik 2015) showing the effect of first-round advantage on candidates' ideology scores. Red lines show third-order polynomials estimated separately at each side of the cutoff, using a uniform kernel.



Figure A15: Mimicking variance RD plots with quantile-spaced bins (Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik 2015) showing the effect of first-round advantage on missingness in ideology scores and candidates' incumbency status. Red lines show third-order polynomials estimated separately at each side of the cutoff, using a uniform kernel.

Table A4: RD estimates: Placebo outcomes (ideology scores)

							power against		
(a) DV: *Left-Right (Wikipedia)* (-2.3:1.9)	estim.	95% CI	*p*-val.	bwd.	$N^-\|N^+$	SD_C	SD_C	$\frac{SD_C}{2}$	$\|\hat{\tau}_{RD}\|$
full sample	-0.20	[-0.57:0.05]	0.11	6.35	234|235	0.77	1.00	0.93	0.43
presidential	-0.37	[-0.92:0.03]	0.07	8.80	74|76	0.87	1.00	0.72	0.57
gubernatorial	-0.09	[-0.70:0.41]	0.61	8.32	59|58	0.72	0.95	0.44	0.07
mayoral	-0.00	[-0.45:0.40]	0.90	9.25	176|180	0.72	1.00	0.64	0.05
subnational (Brazil)	0.01	[-0.34:0.34]	0.99	10.72	212|215	0.69	1.00	0.80	0.05
subnational (¬ Brazil)	0.05	[-0.64:0.74]	0.88	7.44	39|38	0.65	0.74	0.26	0.05
(b) DV: *Left-Right (V-Party)* (-3.4:3.5)									
full sample	-0.26	[-0.90:0.21]	0.22	8.31	285|280	1.35	1.00	0.92	0.25
presidential	-0.59	[-1.42:0.02]	0.06	9.21	82|81	1.26	1.00	0.68	0.62
gubernatorial	-0.28	[-1.58:0.76]	0.49	7.99	60|62	1.44	0.93	0.40	0.10
mayoral	-0.01	[-0.89:0.87]	0.98	10.67	168|167	1.37	0.99	0.58	0.05
subnational (Brazil)	0.13	[-0.61:0.83]	0.76	11.05	201|203	1.36	1.00	0.75	0.08
subnational (¬ Brazil)	-0.85	[-2.49:0.65]	0.25	8.42	40|38	1.23	0.58	0.19	0.33
(c) DV: *(Il)Liberalism (V-Party)* (-2.5:1.3)									
full sample	0.11	[-0.16:0.48]	0.33	5.66	208|204	0.61	1.00	0.75	0.17
presidential	0.22	[-0.39:1.05]	0.37	5.63	59|54	0.74	0.81	0.30	0.14
gubernatorial	-0.20	[-0.75:0.28]	0.37	9.31	66|66	0.61	0.91	0.38	0.19
mayoral	0.09	[-0.16:0.37]	0.43	8.58	148|144	0.45	1.00	0.66	0.15
subnational (Brazil)	0.00	[-0.16:0.19]	0.84	8.15	165|163	0.41	1.00	0.90	0.05
subnational (¬ Brazil)	0.03	[-0.67:0.76]	0.91	7.91	39|38	0.57	0.59	0.20	0.05
(d) DV: *Post-Materialism (V-Party)* (-2.2:2.6)									
full sample	0.22	[-0.14:0.69]	0.20	6.99	249|246	0.96	1.00	0.89	0.32
presidential	0.74	[0.21:1.52]	0.01	5.85	60|55	0.85	0.95	0.44	0.88
gubernatorial	0.06	[-0.53:0.75]	0.74	7.88	60|62	0.98	0.99	0.57	0.06
mayoral	0.04	[-0.58:0.68]	0.88	8.81	152|147	0.94	0.98	0.54	0.05
subnational (Brazil)	-0.03	[-0.48:0.46]	0.97	10.72	196|198	0.90	1.00	0.76	0.05
subnational (¬ Brazil)	0.19	[-0.72:1.00]	0.75	7.68	39|38	0.68	0.60	0.20	0.09

Sharp (conventional) RD estimates, with robust CIs and *p*-values based on the MSE-optimal bandwidth proposed by Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014). The running variable is *first round margin*. Samples are restricted to elections requiring a runoff. Observations are clustered by election. The estimates are calculated by fitting a separate local linear regression at both sides of the threshold, using a triangular kernel. Reported number of observations indicate the *effective* sample size.

Table A5: RD estimates: Placebo outcomes (missingness in ideology scores and incumbency status)

							power against		
(a) DV: *Missing Wikipedia scores* (0/1)	estim.	95% CI	*p*-val.	bwd.	$N^-\|N^+$	SD_C	SD_C	$\frac{SD_C}{2}$	$\|\hat{\tau}_{RD}\|$
full sample	0.00	[-0.10:0.12]	0.89	8.32	338|338	0.34	1.00	0.99	0.05
presidential	0.00	[-0.23:0.22]	0.96	8.70	94|94	0.41	1.00	0.71	0.05
gubernatorial	0.11	[-0.15:0.43]	0.34	9.51	81|81	0.42	0.98	0.51	0.18
mayoral	-0.05	[-0.16:0.04]	0.26	10.19	196|196	0.23	1.00	0.87	0.26
subnational (Brazil)	-0.06	[-0.20:0.05]	0.23	9.64	214|214	0.27	1.00	0.86	0.30
subnational (¬ Brazil)	0.35	[0.04:0.80]	0.03	6.19	46|46	0.40	0.83	0.31	0.71
(b) DV: *Missing V-Party scores* (0/1)									
full sample	0.08	[-0.04:0.21]	0.17	9.40	367|367	0.37	1.00	0.98	0.41
presidential	0.23	[0.04:0.49]	0.02	8.22	90|90	0.34	0.99	0.56	0.79
gubernatorial	-0.09	[-0.37:0.16]	0.43	9.99	86|86	0.40	0.99	0.56	0.16
mayoral	0.09	[-0.07:0.27]	0.23	10.92	203|203	0.37	1.00	0.85	0.33
subnational (Brazil)	0.05	[-0.14:0.22]	0.63	9.77	217|217	0.35	1.00	0.77	0.11
subnational (¬ Brazil)	0.01	[-0.33:0.38]	0.91	7.74	52|52	0.44	0.93	0.40	0.05
(c) DV: *Incumbent Party* (0/1)									
full sample	0.02	[-0.12:0.18]	0.70	9.12	358|358	0.43	1.00	0.97	0.07
presidential	0.05	[-0.27:0.39]	0.72	8.52	93|93	0.43	0.96	0.45	0.07
gubernatorial	0.08	[-0.23:0.46]	0.50	8.92	77|77	0.45	0.96	0.45	0.10
mayoral	-0.01	[-0.22:0.15]	0.70	9.82	193|193	0.41	1.00	0.85	0.06
subnational (Brazil)	0.04	[-0.13:0.23]	0.58	8.88	204|204	0.41	1.00	0.88	0.09
subnational (¬ Brazil)	-0.06	[-0.54:0.44]	0.83	10.06	60|60	0.48	0.78	0.28	0.06
(d) DV: *Incumbent Candidate* (0/1)									
full sample	0.03	[-0.06:0.16]	0.36	6.64	277|277	0.31	1.00	0.97	0.13
presidential	-0.07	[-0.31:0.17]	0.58	9.76	99|99	0.35	0.98	0.51	0.12
gubernatorial	0.06	[-0.15:0.32]	0.46	9.18	77|77	0.29	0.93	0.40	0.11
mayoral	0.04	[-0.07:0.20]	0.36	7.44	156|156	0.27	1.00	0.79	0.12
subnational (Brazil)	0.08	[-0.05:0.27]	0.18	6.13	148|148	0.30	1.00	0.75	0.27
subnational (¬ Brazil)	0.04	[-0.05:0.12]	0.41	5.70	43|43	0.21	1.00	0.92	0.22

Sharp (conventional) RD estimates, with robust CIs and *p*-values based on the MSE-optimal bandwidth proposed by Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014). The running variable is *first round margin*. Samples are restricted to elections requiring a runoff. Observations are clustered by election. The estimates are calculated by fitting a separate local linear regression at both sides of the threshold, using a triangular kernel. Reported number of observations indicate the *effective* sample size.

A4 Robustness checks

Local randomization estimates. Table A6 replicates the results from Table 2 but following a local randomization approach (Cattaneo, Titiunik and Vázquez-Bare 2016) instead of a continuity-based approach.

Sensitivity to bandwidth choice. Figure A16 shows that the findings reported in Table 2 are not overly sensitive to bandwidth choice. Except in the case of very small bandwidths –with the accompanying reduction in the number of observations–, the estimates remain very similar if we double the bandwidth reported in Table 2, cut it by half, employ the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) bandwidth, or increase the bandwidths to up to 34 pp.

Samples with non-missing data on ideology. The specifications in Table A7 remove all observations with missing data on the left-right ideological positioning of the top two placed candidates. This shows that neither the results with controls nor the heterogeneous effects are an artifact of restricting the sample to observations with nonmissing values.

Adding controls. Table A8 replicates the results reported in Table 2, but including controls for the Left-Right Wikipedia ideology, the partisan incumbency status and the individual incumbency status of the top two placed candidates in the first round.

CER-optimal bandwidth. Table A9 replicates the results reported in Table 2 but employing CER-optimal instead of MSE-optimal bandwidths, which may produce different results (de Magalhães et al. 2020).

Second-order polynomials. Table A10 the results reported in Table 2 but employing second-order polynomials instead of a local linear regression.

One candidate per election. The fact that one and only one of the top-two placed candidates in the first round must win raises the possibility that observations may not be independent. To show that this

does not affect the results, in Figure A17 we compare the estimates reported in Table 2 with 500 estimates that result from randomly sampling a single candidate –either the first-placed or the runner-up– in every election.

Heterogeneous effects (I): Visibility. Table A11 reports results for the subsample of open seat races, ie when neither the first- nor the second-placed candidate in the first round was the incumbent. For the Brazilian sample exclusively, Table A12 distinguish between elections in which (i) neither; (ii) neither or both; (iii) the first-placed; or (iv) the second-placed candidate had previous elected experience, respectively. For gubernatorial candidates, being experienced is defined as having served as president, senator or governor at any moment in the past; experienced mayoral candidates are those that had served as either president, senator, governor, federal deputy or mayor.

Heterogeneous effects (II): Ideology. Tables A13 through A15 replicate the results reported in Table 3 but measuring the candidates' ideological distance using V-Party Left-Right, (Il)Liberalism and Post-Materialism dimensions, respectively.

Table A6: RD estimates: Local randomization approach

	diff. in means		KS*		rank sum			
(a) DV: *winner* (0/100)	estim.	*p*-val.	estim.	*p*-val.	estim.	*p*-val.	bwd.	$N^-\|N^+$
full sample	-11.11	0.59	0.11	0.59	0.70	0.59	0.65	27|27
presidential								
gubernatorial	20.00	0.65	0.20	0.65	-0.76	0.65	1.15	10|10
mayoral	52.00	0.00	0.52	0.00	-3.15	0.00	1.15	25|25
subnational (Brazil)	46.67	0.00	0.47	0.00	-3.10	0.00	1.15	30|30
subnational (¬ Brazil)								
(b) DV: *vote share*$_{R2}$ (0:100)								
full sample	-1.54	0.33	0.15	0.94	0.63	0.54	0.65	27|27
presidential								
gubernatorial	2.65	0.13	0.30	0.79	-1.21	0.25	1.15	10|10
mayoral	7.03	0.00	0.60	0.00	-3.46	0.00	1.15	25|25
subnational (Brazil)	5.98	0.00	0.50	0.00	-3.34	0.00	1.15	30|30
subnational (¬ Brazil)								

Sharp local randomization RD estimates, calculated following the procedure proposed by Cattaneo, Titiunik and Vázquez-Bare (2016). Only samples with at least 10 observations at each side of the threshold are included. Exact *p*-values based on 10,000 permutations. The running variable is *first round margin*. The covariates used to determine balance are Left-Right ideology as measured with Wikipedia tags (Herrmann and Döring forthcoming) as well as partisan and individual incumbency status. Samples are restricted to elections requiring a runoff. Reported number of observations indicate the *effective* sample size. (*) Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic.



Figure A16: Sharp (conventional) RD estimates, with robust 95% CIs. The running variable is *first round margin*. Samples are restricted to elections requiring a runoff. To calculate the estimates, we clustered observations by election and fitted a separate local linear regression at both sides of the threshold, using a triangular kernel. The CCT-optimal bandwidth is the (MSE-optimal) bandwidth reported in Table 2.

Table A7: RD estimates: Samples with nonmissing ideology scores

	estim.	95% CI	p-val.	bwd.	$N^-\|N^+$	SD_C	power against SD_C	power against $\frac{\text{SD}_C}{2}$	power against $\lvert\hat{\tau}_{\text{RD}}\rvert$
(a) DV: *winner* (0/100)				Ideology: Wikipedia					
full sample	23.87	[8.80:43.84]	0.00	9.00	285|285	47.92	1.00	0.97	0.97
presidential	-4.99	[-43.44:36.94]	0.87	11.88	82|82	49.34	0.93	0.40	0.06
gubernatorial	8.01	[-36.10:51.07]	0.74	9.25	52|52	48.62	0.87	0.34	0.08
mayoral	43.92	[24.42:71.35]	0.00	8.29	157|157	47.44	1.00	0.80	1.00
subnational (Brazil)	31.89	[13.36:56.47]	0.00	8.95	183|183	47.27	1.00	0.86	0.98
subnational (¬ Brazil)	41.12	[-14.42:106.49]	0.14	7.90	35|35	48.16	0.60	0.20	0.47
(b) DV: *vote share*$_{\text{R2}}$ (0:100)									
full sample	3.01	[1.18:5.57]	0.00	7.17	243|243	6.83	1.00	0.99	0.97
presidential	-0.03	[-4.71:4.15]	0.90	10.93	78|79	8.33	1.00	0.74	0.05
gubernatorial	0.83	[-3.66:6.51]	0.58	8.17	51|51	6.77	0.96	0.45	0.07
mayoral	5.53	[2.81:9.58]	0.00	6.87	136|136	6.34	1.00	0.74	0.99
subnational (Brazil)	4.06	[1.53:7.74]	0.00	6.88	148|148	6.57	1.00	0.83	0.95
subnational (¬ Brazil)	5.98	[-0.88:14.35]	0.08	6.79	33|33	5.38	0.50	0.16	0.59
(c) DV: *winner* (0/100)				Ideology: V-Party					
full sample	6.66	[-11.51:22.47]	0.53	10.89	286|286	47.88	1.00	0.97	0.19
presidential	-25.96	[-69.02:12.35]	0.17	10.99	82|82	50.07	0.93	0.40	0.42
gubernatorial	4.80	[-44.38:50.77]	0.90	9.23	53|53	48.94	0.81	0.30	0.06
mayoral	26.72	[-0.43:51.98]	0.05	11.27	147|147	45.65	1.00	0.68	0.81
subnational (Brazil)	15.61	[-7.51:36.06]	0.20	10.86	171|171	46.62	1.00	0.84	0.51
subnational (¬ Brazil)	40.51	[-12.40:98.48]	0.13	9.83	31|31	47.52	0.66	0.22	0.53
(d) DV: *vote share*$_{\text{R2}}$ (0:100)									
full sample	1.31	[-1.21:4.37]	0.27	9.83	262|262	6.96	1.00	0.93	0.25
presidential	-1.68	[-8.17:4.14]	0.52	10.23	75|75	8.80	0.98	0.51	0.12
gubernatorial	-1.16	[-6.58:5.82]	0.90	7.13	46|46	6.73	0.85	0.32	0.08
mayoral	4.32	[0.72:8.82]	0.02	9.13	128|128	5.68	0.97	0.49	0.84
subnational (Brazil)	1.85	[-1.66:6.05]	0.26	9.60	156|156	6.45	1.00	0.64	0.26
subnational (¬ Brazil)	5.57	[-0.11:14.24]	0.05	6.85	27|27	4.82	0.46	0.15	0.58

Sharp (conventional) RD estimates, with robust CIs and p-values based on the MSE-optimal bandwidth proposed by Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014). The running variable is *first round margin*. Samples are restricted to elections (a) requiring a runoff and with (b) nonmissing data on the Left-Right ideology of the top two placed candidates, measured either using Wikipedia or V-Party. Observations are clustered by election. The estimates are calculated by fitting a separate local linear regression at both sides of the threshold, using a triangular kernel. Reported number of observations indicate the *effective* sample sizes.

Table A8: RD estimates: Including controls

							power against		
(a) DV: *winner* (0/100)	estim.	95% CI	*p*-val.	bwd.	$N^-\|N^+$	SD_C	SD_C	$\frac{\text{SD}_C}{2}$	$\lvert\hat{\tau}_{\text{RD}}\rvert$
full sample	22.24	[7.65:41.92]	0.00	8.55	296|301	48.41	1.00	0.97	0.95
presidential	-5.91	[-42.89:33.13]	0.80	11.99	94|96	48.87	0.95	0.43	0.07
gubernatorial	1.64	[-34.59:37.72]	0.93	8.52	60|58	49.40	0.97	0.48	0.05
mayoral	45.34	[25.80:73.82]	0.00	7.41	147|150	47.54	1.00	0.78	1.00
subnational (Brazil)	31.35	[11.63:57.53]	0.00	8.36	179|184	47.71	1.00	0.83	0.97
subnational (¬ Brazil)	30.78	[-12.23:86.34]	0.14	8.19	42|40	49.15	0.70	0.24	0.34
(b) DV: *vote share*$_{\text{R2}}$ (0:100)									
full sample	2.99	[1.12:5.62]	0.00	6.91	251|256	6.92	1.00	0.99	0.95
presidential	0.68	[-4.23:5.52]	0.79	11.27	90|93	9.30	1.00	0.76	0.07
gubernatorial	0.64	[-3.21:5.72]	0.58	7.14	52|52	6.31	0.97	0.49	0.07
mayoral	5.08	[2.56:8.84]	0.00	7.39	147|150	6.50	1.00	0.81	0.99
subnational (Brazil)	3.46	[1.10:6.95]	0.01	7.45	163|167	6.67	1.00	0.88	0.90
subnational (¬ Brazil)	5.18	[-0.47:12.08]	0.07	6.24	37|35	5.40	0.61	0.20	0.57

Sharp (conventional) RD estimates, with robust CIs and *p*-values based on the MSE-optimal bandwidth proposed by Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014). The running variable is *first round margin*. Samples are restricted to elections (a) requiring a runoff and with (b) nonmissing data on the Wikipedia Left-Right ideology of the top two placed candidates. All specifications control for (a) the Left-Right Wikipedia ideology; (b) partisan incumbency status; and (c) individual incumbency status of the top two placed candidates. The estimates are calculated by fitting a separate local linear regression at both sides of the threshold, using a triangular kernel. Reported number of observations indicate the *effective* sample sizes.

Table A9: RD estimates: CER-optimal bandwidths

							power against		
(a) DV: *winner* (0/100)	estim.	95% CI	*p*-val.	bwd.	$N^-\|N^+$	SD_C	SD_C	$\frac{\text{SD}_C}{2}$	$\lvert\hat{\tau}_{\text{RD}}\rvert$
full sample	15.75	[-0.07:33.13]	0.05	7.38	306|306	49.24	1.00	0.99	0.82
presidential	-10.99	[-48.39:26.49]	0.57	8.89	95|95	49.93	0.98	0.50	0.14
gubernatorial	-12.08	[-44.63:17.44]	0.39	7.43	71|71	49.75	1.00	0.63	0.20
mayoral	41.94	[20.35:67.46]	0.00	6.42	136|136	48.39	1.00	0.87	1.00
subnational (Brazil)	25.78	[4.16:49.79]	0.02	7.89	187|187	48.38	1.00	0.89	0.93
subnational (¬ Brazil)	19.34	[-27.57:70.38]	0.39	7.28	50|50	49.49	0.84	0.31	0.21
(b) DV: *vote share*$_{\text{R2}}$ (0:100)									
full sample	2.03	[-0.21:4.56]	0.07	6.41	269|269	7.37	1.00	1.00	0.72
presidential	0.37	[-5.42:6.10]	0.91	8.25	90|90	9.18	0.99	0.62	0.05
gubernatorial	-1.94	[-6.37:2.64]	0.42	6.03	61|61	6.56	0.97	0.50	0.21
mayoral	4.62	[1.55:8.28]	0.00	5.54	117|117	6.32	1.00	0.83	0.99
subnational (Brazil)	2.19	[-0.70:5.58]	0.13	6.08	147|147	6.59	1.00	0.89	0.56
subnational (¬ Brazil)	4.26	[-0.94:10.45]	0.10	5.33	43|43	5.69	0.84	0.31	0.59

Sharp (conventional) RD estimates, with robust CIs and *p*-values based on the CER-optimal bandwidth proposed by Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014). The running variable is *first round margin*. Samples are restricted to elections requiring a runoff. Observations are clustered by election. The estimates are calculated by fitting a separate local linear regression at both sides of the threshold, using a triangular kernel. Reported number of observations indicate the *effective* sample sizes.

Table A10: RD estimates: Second-order polynomials

							power against		
(a) DV: *winner* (0/100)	estim.	95% CI	*p*-val.	bwd.	$N^-\|N^+$	SD_C	SD_C	$\frac{\text{SD}_C}{2}$	$\lvert\hat{\tau}_{\text{RD}}\rvert$
full sample	18.64	[-0.65:41.59]	0.06	10.70	399|399	48.30	1.00	0.86	0.65
presidential	-11.01	[-57.58:38.66]	0.70	12.64	120|120	49.64	0.77	0.27	0.09
gubernatorial	-16.22	[-55.54:20.59]	0.37	10.01	86|86	49.42	0.94	0.41	0.21
mayoral	47.49	[22.43:78.75]	0.00	11.02	206|206	47.14	0.99	0.59	0.99
subnational (Brazil)	26.74	[0.53:56.51]	0.05	13.05	259|259	47.05	0.99	0.59	0.70
subnational (¬ Brazil)	24.19	[-40.48:90.45]	0.45	11.03	65|65	48.19	0.49	0.16	0.16
(b) DV: *vote share*$_{\text{R2}}$ (0:100)									
full sample	2.35	[-0.52:5.54]	0.10	9.43	365|366	7.46	1.00	0.91	0.55
presidential	0.26	[-6.99:7.00]	1.00	11.70	114|115	9.91	0.96	0.47	0.05
gubernatorial	-2.58	[-7.53:1.60]	0.20	8.69	77|77	7.51	0.99	0.60	0.33
mayoral	5.58	[2.33:9.75]	0.00	11.23	210|210	6.57	0.99	0.60	0.97
subnational (Brazil)	2.42	[-0.51:6.14]	0.10	13.19	261|261	6.98	1.00	0.78	0.47
subnational (¬ Brazil)	4.54	[-3.12:11.29]	0.27	8.24	53|53	6.74	0.72	0.25	0.40

Sharp (conventional) RD estimates, with robust CIs and *p*-values based on the MSE-optimal bandwidth proposed by Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014). The running variable is *first round margin*. Samples are restricted to elections requiring a runoff. Observations are clustered by election. The estimates are calculated by fitting a separate second-order polynomial regression at both sides of the threshold, using a triangular kernel. Reported number of observations indicate the *effective* sample sizes.

(a) DV: *winner* (0/100)



(b) DV: *vote share*$_{R2}$ (0:100)



Figure A17: Results with one candidate per election. The red horizontal lines report the RD estimates and robust 95% confidence intervals reported in Table 2, which include two candidates per election. The blue vertical lines report the same estimates from 500 samples in which we randomly selected one candidate –either the first-placed or the runner-up– from every election. To facilitate comparison, these estimates are ranked form highest to lowest in size.

Table A11: Heterogeneous effects: Open seat races

							power against		
(a) DV: *winner* (0/100)	estim.	95% CI	p-val.	bwd.	$N^-\|N^+$	SD_C	SD_C	$\frac{\text{SD}_C}{2}$	$\lvert\hat{\tau}_{\text{RD}}\rvert$
full sample	11.25	[-5.90:29.49]	0.19	11.36	334|334	47.87	1.00	0.96	0.42
presidential	-14.66	[-53.45:26.85]	0.52	11.33	78|78	49.51	0.93	0.40	0.17
gubernatorial	-24.88	[-65.20:4.58]	0.09	8.75	64|64	49.78	0.98	0.51	0.51
mayoral	37.42	[16.11:64.07]	0.00	9.93	165|165	46.84	1.00	0.77	0.99
subnational (Brazil)	19.09	[-5.97:44.74]	0.13	11.42	195|195	47.61	1.00	0.74	0.55
subnational (¬ Brazil)	21.74	[-22.30:69.01]	0.32	9.79	55|55	47.99	0.83	0.31	0.26
(b) DV: *vote share*$_{\text{R2}}$ (0:100)									
full sample	1.52	[-1.00:4.48]	0.21	9.67	296|297	7.45	1.00	0.96	0.34
presidential	-0.61	[-7.82:6.96]	0.91	11.56	77|78	9.31	0.94	0.42	0.06
gubernatorial	-2.92	[-9.00:3.45]	0.38	8.75	64|64	7.88	0.94	0.42	0.26
mayoral	4.50	[1.59:8.28]	0.00	8.68	151|151	6.36	1.00	0.75	0.96
subnational (Brazil)	1.77	[-1.55:5.60]	0.27	9.71	178|178	6.88	1.00	0.76	0.28
subnational (¬ Brazil)	3.97	[-0.40:10.33]	0.07	6.91	46|46	6.31	0.90	0.37	0.54

Sharp (conventional) RD estimates, with robust CIs and p-values based on the MSE-optimal bandwidth proposed by Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014). The running variable is *first round margin*. Samples are restricted to (i) elections requiring a runoff in which (ii) neither the first- nor the second-placed candidate in the first round was the incumbent at the time of the election. Observations are clustered by election. The estimates are calculated by fitting a separate local linear regression at both sides of the threshold, using a triangular kernel. Reported number of observations indicate the *effective* sample size.

Table A12: Heterogeneous effects: Previous experience (Brazil only)

								power against		
(a) DV: *winner* (0/100)	experienced	estim.	95% CI	*p*-val.	bwd.	$N^-\|N^+$	SD_C	SD_C	$\frac{\text{SD}_C}{2}$	$\|\hat{\tau}_{\text{RD}}\|$
mayoral (brazil)	neither	41.96	[9.74:84.07]	0.01	8.86	96|96	48.08	0.95	0.43	0.88
	neither/both	57.58	[31.67:95.41]	0.00	7.52	91|91	47.27	0.98	0.54	1.00
	first	6.28	[-59.16:79.20]	0.78	12.58	35|35	49.02	0.50	0.17	0.06
	second	-22.49	[-99.09:43.83]	0.45	10.48	23|23	49.90	0.49	0.16	0.14
subnational (Brazil)	neither	16.77	[-13.00:47.30]	0.26	10.49	149|149	48.03	0.99	0.60	0.34
	neither/both	32.99	[10.05:62.15]	0.01	9.22	155|155	47.37	1.00	0.71	0.94
	first	-13.81	[-78.22:49.35]	0.66	13.37	43|43	48.91	0.57	0.19	0.09
	second	-8.65	[-69.23:42.65]	0.64	10.97	30|30	47.95	0.66	0.22	0.07
(b) DV: *vote share*$_{\text{R2}}$ (0:100)										
mayoral (brazil)	neither	5.32	[0.17:12.00]	0.04	8.73	94|94	6.58	0.87	0.34	0.70
	neither/both	6.55	[2.53:12.04]	0.00	8.22	99|99	6.49	0.97	0.47	0.97
	first	-4.18	[-9.52:3.24]	0.33	11.10	33|33	7.07	0.87	0.34	0.44
	second	-2.80	[-16.82:11.39]	0.71	9.50	23|23	7.16	0.29	0.11	0.09
subnational (Brazil)	neither	1.99	[-2.19:7.06]	0.30	9.19	137|137	6.90	0.99	0.54	0.22
	neither/both	3.38	[0.38:7.45]	0.03	8.11	141|141	6.83	1.00	0.76	0.75
	first	-5.66	[-11.37:1.08]	0.11	11.94	38|38	6.74	0.85	0.32	0.71
	second	-0.45	[-9.44:10.10]	0.95	10.00	28|28	6.86	0.49	0.16	0.05

Sharp (conventional) RD estimates, with robust CIs and *p*-values based on the MSE-optimal bandwidth proposed by Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014). The running variable is *first round margin*. Samples are restricted to subnational elections in Brazil requiring a runoff. The experience variable indicates whether the sample was restricted to elections where, respectively, none of the top-two vote getters in the first round had previous elected experience; neither or both had (i.e., none of the was advantaged and disadvantaged in this regard); only the first-placed had; or only the second-placed had, respectively. Observations are clustered by election. The estimates are calculated by fitting a separate local linear regression at both sides of the threshold, using a triangular kernel. Reported number of observations indicate the *effective* sample size.

Table A13: Heterogeneous effects: Left-Right ideological distance (V-Party)

								power against		
(a) DV: *winner* (0/100)	id. distance	estim.	95% CI	*p*-val.	bwd.	$N^-\|N^+$	SD_C	SD_C	$\frac{SD_C}{2}$	$\|\hat{\tau}_{RD}\|$
full sample	polarized	-3.35	[-32.19:23.20]	0.75	11.57	153|153	48.98	1.00	0.69	0.06
	close	17.72	[-8.63:41.40]	0.20	10.65	134|134	46.25	1.00	0.73	0.50
presidential	polarized	-33.13	[-100.84:22.41]	0.21	10.14	40|40	50.57	0.62	0.21	0.32
	close	-19.52	[-57.21:16.24]	0.27	10.64	37|37	49.77	0.96	0.47	0.31
gubernatorial	polarized	-36.99	[-112.68:24.98]	0.21	8.99	28|28	50.79	0.53	0.18	0.32
	close	42.72	[-18.54:110.22]	0.16	8.62	25|25	45.83	0.51	0.17	0.45
mayoral	polarized	22.25	[-15.81:58.03]	0.26	12.51	82|82	45.78	0.93	0.40	0.39
	close	31.35	[-9.21:69.60]	0.13	9.75	64|64	45.32	0.89	0.36	0.60
subnational (Brazil)	polarized	-11.78	[-57.02:23.56]	0.42	10.94	82|82	48.46	0.92	0.38	0.13
	close	46.11	[12.90:85.67]	0.01	7.84	72|72	45.10	0.93	0.40	0.94
subnational (¬ Brazil)	polarized	53.44	[-34.56:147.38]	0.22	8.34	17|17	49.26	0.32	0.12	0.37
	close	21.90	[-78.23:117.26]	0.70	9.45	13|13	48.04	0.28	0.10	0.10
(b) DV: *vote share*$_{R2}$ (0:100)										
full sample	polarized	-0.68	[-4.52:3.74]	0.85	9.86	137|137	6.54	0.99	0.59	0.07
	close	3.52	[-0.64:7.98]	0.09	9.36	120|120	7.02	0.99	0.62	0.62
presidential	polarized	-3.48	[-7.42:-0.56]	0.02	7.49	36|36	6.47	1.00	0.74	0.80
	close	0.93	[-9.66:11.73]	0.85	8.79	30|30	10.53	0.78	0.28	0.06
gubernatorial	polarized	-6.47	[-16.27:3.18]	0.19	10.38	30|30	8.06	0.63	0.21	0.45
	close	3.06	[-0.79:8.45]	0.10	5.70	18|18	4.35	0.74	0.26	0.45
mayoral	polarized	3.66	[-1.86:10.69]	0.17	9.41	67|67	5.52	0.68	0.23	0.37
	close	4.75	[-1.02:10.84]	0.10	9.58	64|64	5.91	0.79	0.28	0.60
subnational (Brazil)	polarized	-0.06	[-5.82:6.90]	0.87	10.95	82|82	6.71	0.83	0.31	0.05
	close	3.65	[-1.49:8.92]	0.16	8.49	77|77	6.51	0.93	0.41	0.49
subnational (¬ Brazil)	polarized	6.57	[-7.80:21.91]	0.35	9.28	17|17	5.78	0.19	0.08	0.23
	close	5.71	[0.38:12.34]	0.04	5.49	10|10	2.86	0.26	0.10	0.75

Sharp (conventional) RD estimates, with robust CIs and *p*-values based on the MSE-optimal bandwidth proposed by Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014). The running variable is *first round margin*. Samples are restricted to elections requiring a runoff. Polarized (respectively, close) elections are those in which the absolute ideological distance along the V-Party Left-Right dimension between the top-two vote getters in the first round was larger (smaller) than the median for each sample. Observations are clustered by election. The estimates are calculated by fitting a separate local linear regression at both sides of the threshold, using a triangular kernel. Reported number of observations indicate the *effective* sample size.

Table A14: Heterogeneous effects: (Il)Liberalism ideological distance

								power against		
(a) DV: *winner* (0/100)	id. distance	estim.	95% CI	*p*-val.	bwd.	$N^-\|N^+$	SD_C	SD_C	$\frac{\text{SD}_C}{2}$	$\|\hat{\tau}_{\text{RD}}\|$
full sample	polarized	-3.46	[-33.13:20.48]	0.64	10.06	126|126	48.76	1.00	0.71	0.06
	close	14.76	[-8.87:39.93]	0.21	9.68	137|137	47.14	1.00	0.76	0.39
presidential	polarized	-51.83	[-126.14:5.27]	0.07	8.95	36|36	50.40	0.57	0.19	0.59
	close	-4.66	[-50.78:48.96]	0.97	11.42	39|39	50.50	0.80	0.29	0.06
gubernatorial	polarized	-4.46	[-77.06:64.92]	0.87	8.91	22|22	50.96	0.51	0.17	0.05
	close	18.82	[-41.69:86.12]	0.50	8.88	31|31	47.52	0.54	0.18	0.13
mayoral	polarized	24.15	[-12.11:57.86]	0.20	11.06	71|71	47.64	0.97	0.47	0.48
	close	28.51	[-5.06:61.97]	0.10	10.60	70|70	44.79	0.96	0.46	0.65
subnational (Brazil)	polarized	5.88	[-31.46:36.30]	0.89	11.01	86|86	47.94	0.98	0.50	0.08
	close	25.82	[-5.98:64.45]	0.10	9.67	80|80	45.55	0.95	0.43	0.53
subnational (¬ Brazil)	polarized	44.44	[-34.19:114.04]	0.29	9.64	14|14	36.31	0.27	0.10	0.38
	close	12.56	[-116.28:130.93]	0.91	9.28	17|17	51.45	0.21	0.09	0.06
(b) DV: *vote share*$_{\text{R2}}$ (0:100)										
full sample	polarized	0.33	[-3.53:4.42]	0.83	10.69	133|133	8.49	1.00	0.84	0.06
	close	2.32	[-1.29:6.79]	0.18	8.35	128|128	6.66	1.00	0.63	0.36
presidential	polarized	-2.90	[-7.11:0.61]	0.10	8.53	35|35	8.25	1.00	0.84	0.55
	close	0.05	[-8.99:8.42]	0.95	11.35	38|38	8.54	0.78	0.27	0.05
gubernatorial	polarized	-3.73	[-12.08:7.82]	0.67	7.49	19|19	8.04	0.61	0.20	0.18
	close	2.74	[-0.43:7.26]	0.08	6.29	26|26	5.63	0.98	0.53	0.51
mayoral	polarized	4.08	[-0.10:8.31]	0.06	10.14	67|67	5.87	0.97	0.49	0.77
	close	4.88	[-0.60:12.08]	0.08	8.05	59|59	5.71	0.70	0.24	0.57
subnational (Brazil)	polarized	-0.12	[-6.08:5.31]	0.90	10.92	85|85	7.68	0.96	0.46	0.05
	close	4.92	[-0.02:11.78]	0.05	7.38	68|68	5.67	0.76	0.27	0.64
subnational (¬ Brazil)	polarized	5.08	[1.14:9.45]	0.01	7.72	12|12	2.47	0.38	0.13	0.92
	close	5.24	[-14.40:27.52]	0.54	9.78	17|17	5.82	0.12	0.07	0.11

Sharp (conventional) RD estimates, with robust CIs and *p*-values based on the MSE-optimal bandwidth proposed by Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014). The running variable is *first round margin*. Samples are restricted to elections requiring a runoff. Polarized (respectively, close) elections are those in which the absolute ideological distance along the (Il)liberalism dimension between the top-two vote getters in the first round was larger (smaller) than the median for each sample. Observations are clustered by election. The estimates are calculated by fitting a separate local linear regression at both sides of the threshold, using a triangular kernel. Reported number of observations indicate the *effective* sample size.

Table A15: Heterogeneous effects: Post-Materialism ideological distance

								power against		
(a) DV: *winner* (0/100)	id. distance	estim.	95% CI	*p*-val.	bwd.	$N^-\|N^+$	SD_C	SD_C	$\frac{\text{SD}_C}{2}$	$\lvert\hat{\tau}_{\text{RD}}\rvert$
full sample	polarized	-6.92	[-39.32:17.10]	0.44	10.03	141|141	48.61	1.00	0.67	0.10
	close	20.36	[-6.21:52.50]	0.12	10.32	132|132	47.04	0.99	0.60	0.49
presidential	polarized	-23.71	[-76.73:27.05]	0.35	11.70	47|47	50.25	0.77	0.27	0.24
	close	-30.16	[-102.85:29.14]	0.27	9.29	30|30	50.74	0.57	0.19	0.24
gubernatorial	polarized	-62.95	[-138.31:-16.85]	0.01	5.81	22|22	51.18	0.65	0.22	0.82
	close	40.97	[-14.47:104.87]	0.14	8.30	22|22	45.58	0.56	0.19	0.48
mayoral	polarized	4.03	[-44.65:40.17]	0.92	9.64	65|65	46.51	0.86	0.33	0.06
	close	45.47	[14.95:83.76]	0.00	9.88	68|68	45.20	0.95	0.44	0.96
subnational (Brazil)	polarized	-16.23	[-60.26:14.94]	0.24	9.44	80|80	48.72	0.95	0.43	0.22
	close	49.76	[23.41:86.67]	0.00	8.46	72|72	45.10	0.98	0.51	0.99
subnational (¬ Brazil)	polarized	-15.76	[-126.13:79.75]	0.66	5.63	14|14	49.72	0.27	0.10	0.07
	close	102.12	[83.86:148.94]	0.00	6.50	10|10	42.16	0.95	0.43	1.00
(b) DV: *vote share*$_{\text{R2}}$ (0:100)										
full sample	polarized	0.48	[-3.05:4.01]	0.79	10.41	143|143	7.23	1.00	0.81	0.07
	close	2.38	[-1.87:7.62]	0.23	9.46	119|119	6.63	0.97	0.49	0.28
presidential	polarized	2.55	[-4.79:9.64]	0.51	10.95	45|45	9.42	0.95	0.44	0.17
	close	-7.68	[-18.45:2.56]	0.14	8.12	27|27	7.34	0.49	0.16	0.53
gubernatorial	polarized	-8.17	[-24.16:4.96]	0.20	8.10	30|30	8.20	0.35	0.12	0.34
	close	2.87	[-0.44:7.61]	0.08	6.25	18|18	4.61	0.89	0.35	0.51
mayoral	polarized	1.38	[-3.81:6.52]	0.61	8.58	56|56	5.48	0.84	0.31	0.11
	close	5.99	[1.29:11.88]	0.01	10.13	68|68	6.20	0.90	0.37	0.88
subnational (Brazil)	polarized	-2.12	[-8.55:3.89]	0.46	10.35	84|84	7.28	0.90	0.37	0.16
	close	6.12	[2.16:11.60]	0.00	8.37	72|72	5.84	0.93	0.40	0.95
subnational (¬ Brazil)	polarized	0.20	[-10.77:10.92]	0.99	6.17	15|15	4.82	0.23	0.09	0.05
	close	13.79	[6.62:27.35]	0.00	5.75	9|9	4.53	0.23	0.09	0.96

Sharp (conventional) RD estimates, with robust CIs and *p*-values based on the MSE-optimal bandwidth proposed by Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014). The running variable is *first round margin*. Samples are restricted to elections requiring a runoff. Polarized (respectively, close) elections are those in which the absolute ideological distance along the Post-Materialism dimension between the top-two vote getters in the first round was larger (smaller) than the median for each sample. Observations are clustered by election. The estimates are calculated by fitting a separate local linear regression at both sides of the threshold, using a triangular kernel. Reported number of observations indicate the *effective* sample size.

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