

ITAM
Departamento de Ciencia Política

Elección Pública II

Otoño 2022
Lunes y Miércoles 13:00-14:30
Río Hondo, Salón SA-4

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Contacto: Lunes y Miércoles 15:00-16:00 o previa cita vía Canvas

¿Por qué muchas decisiones colectivas son (in)eficientes y/o favorecen a algunos a expensas de otros? ¿De dónde viene la desigualdad en la distribución del poder político? ¿En qué medida la escasez de información sobre las intenciones, acciones o expectativas de los demás genera resultados colectivos subóptimos? Así como hay países (y empresas, y partidos políticos, y clubes de fútbol) que “funcionan bien,” otros parecen estancados en un equilibrio perverso del que (casi) todos se beneficiarían de salir. En este curso explicaremos dicha variación no como consecuencia de la bondad o maldad de los seres humanos, ni como producto del accionar maligno de fuerzas oscuras, sino como resultado de la interacción entre múltiples actores cuyas expectativas pueden diferir, o que pueden tener buenas razones para desconfiar de las intenciones o capacidades de sus pares.

El curso consta de cuatro partes. Comenzaremos viendo en qué medida el comportamiento de los individuos de carne y hueso se ajusta al ideal del *Homo oeconomicus*, y cómo ello afecta la interpretación de los modelos que veremos en el resto de la clase. Luego estudiaremos cómo las asimetrías de información y los problemas de agencia moldean la representación política y el funcionamiento de las instituciones jerárquicas, como las burocracias y las “máquinas” clientelares. En tercer lugar discutiremos el rol de la coordinación de expectativas en fenómenos como las campañas electorales, la adopción y eficacia de normas (in)formales, las protestas ciudadanas, y la obediencia a las autoridades. Concluiremos examinando por qué la dificultad de comprometerse a actuar en contra de los propios intereses suele resultar en instituciones y políticas estables pero colectivamente subóptimas.

Calificación

- **Participación (15%).** Debes leer la bibliografía obligatoria y participar activamente en las discusiones en clase.
- **Reseña (1): Película (34%).** A más tardar el miércoles 19 de octubre a las 13:00hs, deberás entregar un ensayo de hasta 5 páginas, a doble espacio, explicando cómo la película *All the President's Men* refleja (algunos de) los temas vistos en el curso.

- **Reseña (II): Libro (51%).** Debes elegir uno de los libros listados en la siguiente sección y escribir una reseña discutiendo la conexión del mismo con (alguno de) los temas vistos en el curso. La calificación del trabajo final tendrá tres componentes:
 - *Selección.* La fecha límite para elegir el libro a reseñar es el miércoles 24 de agosto a las 23hs. Enviar tu opción a tiempo contará por el 1% de la calificación final.
 - *Síntesis del argumento.* A más tardar el miércoles 9 de noviembre a las 13:00hs deberás entregar un texto de 3-4 páginas, a doble espacio, sintetizando *con tus propias palabras* el argumento del libro elegido. El texto será calificado como (i) bueno (5% de la calificación final); (ii) regular (2.5%); ó (iii) no entregado (0%).
 - *Reseña.* En fecha a definir durante el período de finales deberás entregar un texto de hasta 8 páginas, a doble espacio, analizando el libro elegido a la luz de las lecturas vistas en el curso. La reseña contará el 45% de la calificación final.

Lecturas

Además de la bibliografía correspondiente a cada sesión, para la reseña final debes elegir alguno de los siguientes libros:

- Eugen Weber. *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914.* Stanford University Press, Palo Alto, 1976.
- François-Xavier Guerra. *México: Del Antiguo Régimen a la Revolución. 2 vols.* Fondo de Cultura Económica, México, 2016 [1985]. Solo tienes que leer los capítulos I, III.1, IV.2, V-VI y IX-XI.
- Adam Cohen and Elizabeth Taylor. *American Pharaoh: Mayor Richard J. Daley, His Battle for Chicago and the Nation.* Little, Brown and Company, New York, 2001.
- Peter Heather. *The Fall of the Roman Empire: A New History of Rome and the Barbarians.* Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005 [2007]. (Hay traducción al español: Peter Heather. *La Caída del Imperio Romano.* Crítica, Barcelona, 2005 [2009].)
- Jason Stearns. *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters: The Collapse of the Congo and the Great War of Africa.* PublicAffairs, New York, 2011.
- Christopher Clark. *The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914.* Harper Collins, 2013. (Hay traducción al español: Christopher Clark. *Sonámbulos: Cómo Europa Fue a la Guerra en 1914.* Galaxia Gutenberg, 2013 [2017].)
- Michael J. Klarman. *The Framers' Coup: The Making of the United States Constitution.* Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016.

Todas las lecturas son accesibles a través de Canvas, con la única excepción del libro de Guerra. Las lecturas marcadas con un asterisco (*) incluyen material técnicamente complejo, con el cual puedes no estar familiarizado. Puedes pasar dichas secciones por alto; el foco del curso es la intuición detrás de los modelos, no las demostraciones matemáticas de los mismos.

Integridad académica y plagio

Según el artículo 5 bis del Reglamento de Titulación del ITAM, “la reproducción parcial o total de textos o productos ajenos, de autor conocido o anónimo, publicados por cualquier medio o inéditos, sin entrecomillar los pasajes o elementos reproducidos o sin hacer la referencia bibliográfica pertinente,” constituye plagio o fraude académico. Las citas a otros autores son bienvenidas, pero deben ser reconocidas como tales. El uso de fragmentos y/o traducciones literales de textos ajenos sin la debida atribución será causal para reprobar la materia y merecerá la amonestación oficial al alumno por parte de la Dirección Escolar del Instituto.

Calendario

Sesión 1 (Agosto/8). Introducción

Sesión 2 (Agosto/10). Algunos enigmas

- (1) Ferdinand Lassalle. *¿Qué Es una Constitución?* Ariel, Barcelona, 1862 [2012] (únicamente sec. 1 de la primera conferencia – pp. 31-47 en la edición de elaleph.com).
- (2) James Madison, *Federalist* #51 (varias ediciones).
- (3) *Daron Acemoglu. Why Not a Political Coase Theorem? Social Conflict, Commitment, and Politics. *Journal of Comparative Economics*, 31(4):620–652, 2003 (pp. 620-33 únicamente).

I. Los Jugadores Realmente Existentes

Sesión 3 (Agosto/15). “La razón de la sinrazón que a mi razón se hace...”

- (1) Yusra Murad, “[Majority of Voters Back National Health Plan – Unless It’s Called ‘Single Payer’](#)”, *Morning Consult*.
- (2) Daniel Kahneman. *Thinking, Fast and Slow*. Macmillan, London, 2011, cap. 1.

Lecturas optativas

- (1) Jon Elster. *Explaining Social Behavior: More Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007, cap. 12.
- (2) Jacob K. Goeree and Charles A. Holt. Ten Little Treasures of Game Theory and Ten Intuitive Contradictions. *American Economic Review*, 91(5):1402–1422, 2001.
- (3) Brendan Nyhan. Facts and Myths about Misperceptions. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 34(3):220–236, 2020.
- (4) *Florian Zimmermann. The Dynamics of Motivated Beliefs. *American Economic Review*, 110(2):337–361, 2020.

- (5) *Douglas Almond and Xinming Du. Later Bedtimes Predict President Trump's Performance. *Economics Letters*, 197, 2020.

Sesión 4 (Agosto/17). Errores cognitivos de los votantes (i): "What have you done for me lately?"

- (1) Joseph Alois Schumpeter. *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*. Routledge, London, 1942 [2003], sec. XXI.III ("Human Nature in Politics").
- (2) *John Marshall. Tuning In, Voting Out: News Consumption Cycles, Homicides, and Electoral Accountability in Mexico. Unpublished manuscript, 2022.

Lecturas optativas

- (1) *Andrew Healy and Gabriel S. Lenz. Substituting the End for the Whole: Why Voters Respond Primarily to the Election-Year Economy. *American Journal of Political Science*, 58(1):31–47, 2014.
- (2) Nicolás Ajzenman and Ruben Durante. Salience and Accountability: School Infrastructure and Last-Minute Electoral Punishment. *Economic Journal*, forthcoming.
- (3) Christopher H. Achen and Larry M. Bartels. *Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive Government*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2016, cap. 6.
- (4) *Michael M. Bechtel and Jens Hainmueller. How Lasting Is Voter Gratitude? An Analysis of the Short- and Long-Term Electoral Returns to Beneficial Policy. *American Journal of Political Science*, 55(4):852–868, 2011.

Sesión 5 (Agosto/22). Errores cognitivos de los votantes (ii): Es más complejo

- (1) *Ernesto Dal Bó, Pedro Dal Bó, and Erik Eyster. The Demand for Bad Policy when Voters Underappreciate Equilibrium Effects. *The Review of Economic Studies*, 85(2):964–998, 2018 (pp. 964-982 únicamente).

Lecturas optativas

- (1) *Isabelle Brocas and Juan D. Carrillo. Steps of Reasoning in Children and Adolescents. *Journal of Political Economy*, 129(7):2067–2111, 2021.
- (2) *Helios Herrera, Guillermo Ordoñez, and Christoph Trebesch. Political Booms, Financial Crises. *Journal of Political Economy*, 128(2):507–543, 2020.
- (3) *Scott Morgenstern and Elizabeth Zechmeister. Better the Devil You Know Than the Saint You Don't? Risk Propensity and Vote Choice in Mexico. *The Journal of Politics*, 63(1):93–119, 2001.
- (4) *Rupert Sausgruber and Jean-Robert Tyran. Testing the Mill Hypothesis of Fiscal Illusion. *Public Choice*, 122(1):39–68, 2005.
- (5) *Kenneth R. Ahern and Marco Giacoletti. Robbing Peter to Pay Paul? The Redistribution of Wealth Caused by Rent Control. Working Paper 30083, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2022.

Sesión 6 (Agosto/24). Economía del Comportamiento: Discusión

Elección del libro a reseñar. Subir a Canvas antes de las 23:00.

- (1) Scott Sumner, “[Let’s Not Emphasize Behavioral Economics](#)”, *Econlib*.
- (2) Richard H. Thaler. From Cashews to Nudges: The Evolution of Behavioral Economics. *American Economic Review*, 108(6):1265–1287, 2018.

Lecturas optativas

- (1) Donald P. Green and Ian Shapiro. *Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science*. Yale University Press, New Haven, 1994, cap. 2.
- (2) Robert J. Aumann. A Synthesis of Behavioural and Mainstream Economics. *Nature Human Behaviour*, 3(7):666–670, 2019.
- (3) Shaun Bowler, Todd Donovan, and Jeffrey A. Karp. Why Politicians Like Electoral Institutions: Self-Interest, Values, or Ideology? *The Journal of Politics*, 68(2):434–446, 2006.
- (4) *Ingela Alger and Jörgen W. Weibull. Homo Moralis—Preference Evolution Under Incomplete Information and Assortative Matching. *Econometrica*, 81(6):2269–2302, 2013.
- (5) *Po-Hsuan Lin, Alexander L. Brown, Taisuke Imai, Joseph Tao-yi Wang, Stephanie W. Wang, and Colin F. Camerer. Evidence of General Economic Principles of Bargaining and Trade from 2,000 Classroom Experiments. *Nature Human Behaviour*, 4:917–927, 2020.

Sesión 7 (Agosto/29). La ¿paradoja? del voto

- (1) Donald P. Green and Ian Shapiro. *Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science*. Yale University Press, New Haven, 1994, cap. 4.

Lecturas optativas

- (1) John H. Aldrich. Rational Choice and Turnout. *American Journal of Political Science*, 37(1):246–278, 1993.
- (2) *Alexander Coppock and Donald P. Green. Is Voting Habit Forming? New Evidence from Experiments and Regression Discontinuities. *American Journal of Political Science*, 60(4):1044–1062, 2016.
- (3) Thomas Fujiwara, Kyle Meng, and Tom Vogl. Habit Formation in Voting: Evidence from Rainy Elections. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 8(4):160–188, 2016.
- (4) *Jens Olav Dahlgaard. Trickle-Up Political Socialization: The Causal Effect on Turnout of Parenting a Newly Enfranchised Voter. *American Political Science Review*, 112(3):698–705, 2018.
- (5) *Eli Rau, Radha Sarkar, and Susan Stokes. Explaining the Turnout Deficit in Referendums. Unpublished manuscript.

II. Asimetrías de Información

Sesión 8 (Agosto/31). Principal-Agente: Teoría

- (1) *Joram Mayshar, Omer Moav, and Zvika Neeman. Geography, Transparency, and Institutions. *American Political Science Review*, 111(3):622–636, 2017.

Lecturas optativas

- (1) Daron Acemoglu, David Laibson, and John A. List. *Microeconomics, Global Edition [Second Edition]*. Pearson, 2nd edition, 2019 (secs. 16.1-16.2 únicamente).
- (2) George A. Akerlof. The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 84(3):488–500, 1970.
- (3) *Bengt Hölmstrom. Moral Hazard and Observability. *The Bell Journal of Economics*, 10(1):74–91, 1979.

Sesión 9 (Septiembre/5). “Gaming the system”

- (1) Anuschka de Rohan. Why Dolphins Are Deep Thinkers. *The Guardian*, July 2003.
- (2) Tim Harford. *The Data Detective: Ten Easy Rules to Make Sense of Statistics*. Riverhead Books, New York, 2021, cap. 2 (pp. 55-8) únicamente.
- (3) *Daron Acemoglu, Leopoldo Fergusson, James Robinson, Dario Romero, and Juan F. Vargas. The Perils of High-Powered Incentives: Evidence from Colombia’s False Positives. *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*, 12(3):1–43, 2020.

Lecturas optativas

- (1) *Anandi Mani and Sharun Mukand. Democracy, Visibility and Public Good Provision. *Journal of Development Economics*, 83(2):506–529, 2007.
- (2) Abhijit V. Banerjee, Esther Duflo, and Rachel Glennerster. Putting a Band-Aid on a Corpse: Incentives for Nurses in the Indian Public Health Care System. *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 6(2-3):487–500, 2008.
- (3) *Tim Groseclose and Jeffrey Milyo. Sincere Versus Sophisticated Voting in Congress: Theory and Evidence. *The Journal of Politics*, 72(1):60–73, 2010.
- (4) *Robin Harding and David Stasavage. What Democracy Does (and Doesn’t Do) for Basic Services: School Fees, School Inputs, and African Elections. *The Journal of Politics*, 76(1):229–245, 2014.
- (5) *Thushyanthan Baskaran, Brian Min, and Yogesh Uppal. Election Cycles and Electricity Provision: Evidence from a Quasi-experiment with Indian Special Elections. *Journal of Public Economics*, 126:64–73, 2015.
- (6) *Laurel Eckhouse. Metrics Management and Bureaucratic Accountability: Evidence from Policing. *American Journal of Political Science*, 66(2):385–401, 2022.

Sesión 10 (Septiembre/7). ¿Qué elegimos cuando votamos?

- (1) *James D. Fearon. Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians: Selecting Good Types versus Sanctioning Poor Performance. In Adam Przeworski, Susan C. Stokes, and Bernard Manin, editors, *Democracy, Accountability, and Representation*, pages 55–97. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999.

Lecturas optativas

- (1) *John Ferejohn. Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control. *Public Choice*, 50(1-3):5–25, 1986.
- (2) Burton A. Abrams. How Richard Nixon Pressured Arthur Burns: Evidence from the Nixon Tapes. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 20(4):177–188, 2006.
- (3) *Mark Andreas Kayser and Michael Peress. Benchmarking across Borders: Electoral Accountability and the Necessity of Comparison. *American Political Science Review*, 106(3):661–684, 2012.
- (4) *Daniela Campello and Cesar Zucco. Presidential Success and the World Economy. *The Journal of Politics*, 78(2):589–602, 2016.
- (5) James E. Alt, David D. Lassen, and John Marshall. Credible Sources and Sophisticated Voters: When Does New Information Induce Economic Voting? *The Journal of Politics*, 78(2):327–342, 2016.

Sesión 11 (Septiembre/12). Medios, información, y representación electoral

- (1) *Ruben Enikolopov, Maria Petrova, and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya. Media and Political Persuasion: Evidence from Russia. *American Economic Review*, 101(7):3253–3285, 2011 (secs. I-III únicamente).
- (2) *Florian Foos and Daniel Bischof. Tabloid Media Campaigns and Public Opinion: Quasi-Experimental Evidence on Euroscepticism in England. *American Political Science Review*, 116(1):19–37, 2022.

Lecturas optativas

- (1) *Andrea Prat and David Strömberg. The Political Economy of Mass Media. In Daron Acemoglu, Manuel Arellano, and Eddie Dekel, editors, *Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Volume 2, Applied Economics: Tenth World Congress*, pages 135–187. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013.
- (2) *Filipe R. Campante and Quoc-Anh Do. Isolated Capital Cities, Accountability, and Corruption: Evidence from US States. *American Economic Review*, 104(8):2456–2481, 2014.
- (3) *Horacio A. Larreguy, John Marshall, and James M. Snyder. Leveling the Playing Field: How Campaign Advertising Can Help Non-dominant Parties. *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 16(6):1812–1849, 2018.
- (4) *Mark Andreas Kayser and Michael Peress. Does the Media Cover the Economy Accurately? An Analysis of Sixteen Developed Democracies. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, 16(1):1–33, 2021.

Sesión 12 (Septiembre/14). Burocracia (i): Generando incentivos

- (1) Albert Breton and Ronald Wintrobe. The Bureaucracy of Murder Revisited. *Journal of Political Economy*, 94(5):905–926, 1986.
- (2) Alexander Tabarrok, “The us Government is Digging in the Couch to Find Change to Buy Drugs”.
- (3) Liam Collins, “In 2014, the ‘Decrepit’ Ukrainian Army Hit the Refresh Button. Eight Years Later, It’s Paying Off”.
- (4) David Bandurski, “The Dawn of the Little Red Phone”, *China Media Project*, 13-FEB-2019.

Lecturas optativas

- (1) Friedrich A. Hayek. *The Road to Serfdom. The Definitive Edition*. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1944, cap. 10.
- (2) *Tiberiu Dragu and Mattias Polborn. The Administrative Foundation of the Rule of Law. *The Journal of Politics*, 75(4):1038–1050, 2013.
- (3) *Ryan D. Enos and Eitan D. Hersh. Party Activists as Campaign Advertisers: The Ground Campaign as a Principal-Agent Problem. *American Political Science Review*, 109(2):252–278, 2015.
- (4) Sarah Brierley. Unprincipled Principals: Co-opted Bureaucrats and Corruption in Ghana. *American Journal of Political Science*, 64(2):209–222, 2020.
- (5) *Emanuele Colonnelli, Mounu Prem, and Edoardo Teso. Patronage and Selection in Public Sector Organizations. *American Economic Review*, 110(10):3071–3099, 2020.
- (6) *Jieun Kim. At Your Own Risk: A Model of Delegation with Ambiguous Guidelines. *Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy*, 2(4):483–508, 2022.

Sesión 13 (Septiembre/19). Burocracia (ii): Jugando en la oficina cuando el principal no está

- (1) *Abhijit Banerjee, Rema Hanna, Jordan Kyle, Benjamin A. Olken, and Sudarno Sumarto. Tangible Information and Citizen Empowerment: Identification Cards and Food Subsidy Programs in Indonesia. *Journal of Political Economy*, 126(2):451–491, 2017.

Lecturas optativas

- (1) *Ritva Reinikka and Jakob Svensson. Local Capture: Evidence from a Central Government Transfer Program in Uganda. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 119(2):679–705, 2004.
- (2) *Sarah F. Anzia. Election Timing and the Electoral Influence of Interest Groups. *The Journal of Politics*, 73(2):412–427, 2011.
- (3) Martin J. Williams. The Political Economy of Unfinished Development Projects: Corruption, Clientelism, or Collective Choice? *American Political Science Review*, 111(4):705–723, 2017.

- (4) *Saad Gulzar and Benjamin J. Pasquale. Politicians, Bureaucrats, and Development: Evidence from India. *American Political Science Review*, 111(1):162–183, 2017.

Sesión 14 (Septiembre/21). Por qué el clientelismo funciona (tan mal)

- (1) *Susan C. Stokes, Thad Dunning, Marcelo Nazareno, and Valeria Brusco. *Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism: The Puzzle of Distributive Politics*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013, caps. 2 (hojear), 3 y 4.

Lecturas optativas

- (1) Susan C. Stokes. Political Clientelism. In Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes, editors, *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*, pages 604–627. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007.
- (2) *Chang-Tai Hsieh, Edward Miguel, Daniel Ortega, and Francisco Rodríguez. The Price of Political Opposition: Evidence from Venezuela’s “Maisanta”. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 3(2):196–214, 2011.
- (3) *Horacio Larreguy, Cesar E. Montiel Olea, and Pablo Querubín. Political Brokers: Partisans or Agents? Evidence from the Mexican Teachers’ Union. *American Journal of Political Science*, 61(4):877–891, 2017.
- (4) *Lucas M. Novaes. Disloyal Brokers and Weak Parties. *American Journal of Political Science*, 62(1):84–98, 2018.
- (5) *Francisco Cantú. Groceries for Votes: The Electoral Returns of Vote Buying. *The Journal of Politics*, 81(3):790–804, 2019.

III. Información, Expectativas y Coordinación

Sesión 15 (Septiembre/26). Juegos de coordinación y “common knowledge”

- (1) Michael Suk-Young Chwe. *Rational Ritual. Culture, Coordination, and Common Knowledge*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2001, cap. 1.

Lecturas optativas

- (1) Paul A. David. Clio and the Economics of QWERTY. *American Economic Review*, 75(2):332–337, 1985.
- (2) Richard H. McAdams. A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law. *Virginia Law Review*, 86(8):1649–1729, 2000 (pp. 1649-63 únicamente).
- (3) Kaushik Basu. *The Republic of Beliefs: A New Approach to Law and Economics*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2018, sec. 3.2.
- (4) *Alexander Tabarrok. The Private Provision of Public Goods via Dominant Assurance Contracts. *Public Choice*, 96:345–362, 1998.
- (5) *Robertas Zubrickas. Contingent Wage Subsidy. *Journal of Public Economic Theory*, 22(4):1105–1119, 2020.

Sesión 16 (Septiembre/28). Convenciones, *bullying*, y discriminación (I)

- (1) Klaus Abbink and Gönül Doğan. How to Choose your Victim. *Games and Economic Behavior*, 113:482–496, 2019.
- (2) Gerry Mackie. Ending Footbinding and Infibulation: A Convention Account. *American Sociological Review*, 61(6):999–1017, 1996.

Lecturas optativas

- (1) Benedict Anderson. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. Verso, London, 2nd edition, 1983 [1991]. (Hay traducción al español: Benedict Anderson. *Comunidades Imaginadas. Reflexiones sobre el Origen y la Difusión del Nacionalismo*. Fondo de Cultura Económica, México, 1983 [2007].)
- (2) David D. Laitin. The Tower of Babel as a Coordination Game: Political Linguistics in Ghana. *American Political Science Review*, 88(3):622–634, 1994.
- (3) Adam Baird. Becoming the ‘Baddest’: Masculine Trajectories of Gang Violence in Medellín. *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 50(1):183–210, 2018.
- (4) *Oriana Bandiera, Myra Mohnen, Imran Rasul, and Martina Viarengo. Nation-building Through Compulsory Schooling during the Age of Mass Migration. *The Economic Journal*, 129(617):62–109, 2019.
- (5) *Emilio Depetris-Chauvin, Ruben Durante, and Filipe Campante. Building Nations through Shared Experiences: Evidence from African Football. *American Economic Review*, 110(5):1572–1602, 2020.

Sesión 17 (Octubre/3). Convenciones, *bullying*, y discriminación (II)

- (1) George Akerlof. The Economics of Caste and of the Rat Race and Other Woeful Tales. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 90(4):599–617, 1976 (secs. I y v-vi únicamente).
- (2) *Yannick I. Pengl, Philip Ressler, and Valeria Rueda. Cash Crops, Print Technologies, and the Politicization of Ethnicity in Africa. *American Political Science Review*, 116(1):181–199, 2022 (únicamente pp. 181-94).

Lecturas optativas

- (1) Timur Kuran. *Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1997.
- (2) *Samuel Bowles, Glenn C. Loury, and Rajiv Sethi. Group Inequality. *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 12(1):129–152, 2014.
- (3) *Suresh Naidu, Sung-Ha Hwang, and Samuel Bowles. The Evolution of Egalitarian Sociolinguistic Conventions. *American Economic Review*, 107(5):572–577, 2017.
- (4) *Daniel Indacochea. A Farewell to Army Segregation: The Effects of Racial Integration During the Korean War. Unpublished manuscript, 2019.

Sesión 18 (Octubre/5). Principal-Agente × Coordinación = Corrección Política

- (1) Alexander Tabarrok, “Too much Transparency Makes the World More Opaque”.
- (2) Sandy Maguire, “Why Is the Web So Monotonous? Google.”
- (3) Glenn C. Loury. Self-Censorship in Public Discourse: A Theory of “Political Correctness” and Related Phenomena. *Rationality and Society*, 6(4):428–461, 1994.
- (4) *Leonardo Bursztyn, Georgy Egorov, and Stefano Fiorin. From Extreme to Mainstream: The Erosion of Social Norms. *American Economic Review*, 110(11):3522–3548, 2020.

Lecturas optativas

- (1) Lisa Wedeen. Acting “As If”: Symbolic Politics and Social Control in Syria. *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 40(3):503–523, 1998.
- (2) Stephen Morris. Political Correctness. *Journal of Political Economy*, 109(2):231–265, 2001.
- (3) *Andrea Prat. The Wrong Kind of Transparency. *American Economic Review*, 95(3):862–877, 2005.
- (4) George Orwell. Politics and the English Language. *Horizon*, 13(76):252–265, 1946.

Sesión 19 (Octubre/10). El “gran coordinador”

- (1) Richard H. McAdams. A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law. *Virginia Law Review*, 86(8):1649–1729, 2000 (pp. 1663-1729 únicamente).

Lecturas optativas

- (1) Thomas C. Schelling. *The Strategy of Conflict*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1960, cap. 3.
- (2) Jack Knight. *Institutions and Social Conflict*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992, caps. 3 y 5.
- (3) Timur Kuran. *Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1997, cap. 6.
- (4) Kaushik Basu. *The Republic of Beliefs: A New Approach to Law and Economics*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2018, caps. 2 y 5.
- (5) *David B. Carter and H. E. Goemans. International Trade and Coordination: Tracing Border Effects. *World Politics*, 70(1):1–52, 2018.
- (6) *Mehdi Shadmehr, Sepehr Shahshahani, and Charles Cameron. Coordination and Innovation in Judiciaries: Correct Law versus Consistent Law. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, 17(1):61–89, 2022.

Sesión 20 (Octubre/12). Coordinación electoral (I)

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