

Online Appendix for “Strength in Expectation”

- Section A presents an overview of the Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014) dataset and documents how I extended it until 31 December 2015.
- Section B lists all authoritarian regimes included in the sample, specifying how they ended according to Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014).
- Section C lists all regimes that broke down in a year in which there was an election, distinguishing between elections that occurred *before* the breakdown (and thus are included in the analysis) or *after* it (and thus are excluded).
- Section D explains how I coded EARs and closed regimes.
- Section E presents the descriptive statistics.
- Section F reports the full results from Tables 1 and 2 as well as the robustness checks.

A Extending the Autocratic Regimes dataset

Description. The Autocratic Regimes dataset (Geddes, Wright and Frantz 2014; henceforth GWF) is a dataset of authoritarian regimes around the world between 1946 and 2010. The sample is restricted to countries that (a) had at least one autocratic country-year between 1946 and 2010; and (b) had at least one million inhabitants in 2009.

GWF define a *regime* as “a set of formal and/or informal rules for choosing leaders and policies. An important element of this set of rules is the identity of the group from which leaders can be chosen (e.g., in a professionalized military regime, the group from which leaders can be chosen is officers of very high rank).” (Geddes, Wright and Frantz 2014:codebook) Each regime has a specific start and end dates. A regime may be replaced by another regime of a different kind (i.e., a democracy) or by another authoritarian regime. The codebook provides a brief description of the events that led to each authoritarian regime’s establishment and breakdown.

A regime qualifies as authoritarian if either

- (1) The executive achieves power through nondemocratic means and changes the rules for choosing leaders and policies. The executive is considered to have been chosen democratically if (a) she is directly elected by voters, and at least 10 percent of the total population is eligible to vote; or (b) she is chosen indirectly by a body of which at least 60 of its members were elected; or (c) she is the constitutional successor of a directly elected executive, even if the latter was removed undemocratically; and (d) elections are reasonably free and fair, meaning that all major parties are allowed to participate, there is no systematic harassment of opposition leaders or supporters, international observers do not report extensive vote fraud, and the incumbent does not “so dominate political resources and the media that observers do not consider elections fair;” or
- (2) An executive that achieved power through democratic means subsequently changes the formal or informal rules for getting into office so that these cease to be democratic. This includes actions

such as closing the legislature unconstitutionally, banning major opposition parties, annulling unfavorable electoral results, or engaging in systematic vote fraud; or

- (3) Elections are democratic, but the military (or some other unelected body) prevents major parties/candidates from competing, or dictates policy in major areas.

A regime is not authoritarian if either

- (1) It is democratic; or
- (2) It has a provisional government in charge of holding democratic elections and withdrawing from office afterwards. A government is only coded as provisional if (a) the majority of its top members were not part of an immediately preceding authoritarian regime; (b) the government actually holds democratic elections; and (c) the elections are held and the winner(s) take office; or
- (3) It is not independent or is under foreign occupation; or
- (4) No government controls most of the resources of the state.

An authoritarian regime may break down for one of the following reasons:

- (1) Insiders change rules of regime; or
- (2) Electoral defeat; or
- (3) Transitional election in which no high-ranking member of the regime runs for office; or
- (4) Popular uprising; or
- (5) Military coup; or
- (6) Military defeat by insurgents, revolutionaries, or combatants fighting a civil war; or
- (7) Foreign invasion; or
- (8) A new autocratic leader changes the rules for gaining office; or
- (9) The state ceases to exist, or loses control of most of the country's territory.

Extension. The dataset only covers the 1946-2010 period, so I followed the authors' coding rules to extend it until 31 December 2015. I changed the authors' original coding in a few instances in which I found reasons to document that a democratic regime had become authoritarian. Below I present a brief description of the episodes that led to the establishment or demise of a new regime; if a country does not appear in this list, it means that I simply extended GWF's original coding until 2015.

Provisional governments

Burkina Faso (2014-2015)

Start: 10/30/2014 President Blaise Compaoré removed by the military, who handed over power to a civilian-led transitional government shortly afterwards.

End: 11/29/2015 Competitive presidential election won by Roch Marc Christian Kaboré.

Central African Republic (2013-)

Start: 03/24/2013 President Bozizé removed by insurgents, who handed over power to a civilian-led transitional government shortly afterwards. The new government held presidential elections in 2015 (with a second round in 2016), with the incumbent president barred from running as a candidate.

End: Regime continued in power as of December 31, 2015.

Czechoslovakia (1989-1990)

Start: 12/04/1989 Resignation of the communist regime leadership in response to massive demonstrations and strikes.

End: 06/08/1990 Multiparty legislative elections in which the anti-Communist opposition won by a landslide.

Egypt (2011-2012)

Start: 02/11/2011 President Hosni Mubarak resigned and handed over power to a provisional military government.

End: 06/16/2012 Second round of the presidential election, won by Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Guinea (2010-2013)

End: 09/28/2013 Multiparty legislative elections in which the incumbent party fell short of an absolute majority of seats.

Guinea-Bissau (2012-2014)

Start: 04/12/2012 Interim president Raimundo Pereira ousted in a military coup.

End: 05/18/2014 Second round of the presidential election, won by José Mário Vaz of the PAIGC.

Kyrgyzstan (2010-2011)

Start: 04/08/2010 Ouster of Bakiyev in popular uprising (Economist 2010, 44).

End: 10/30/2011 Competitive presidential election, completing the transition.

Madagascar (1991-1993)

Start: 10/30/1991 President Didier Ratsiraka signed the Panorama Convention, which stripped him of most of his powers and placed executive authority in the High State Authority (HAE) and the Committee for Economic and Social Recovery (CRES).

End: 2/10/1993 Second round of the presidential election.

Mali (2012-2013)

Start: 03/22/2012 President Amadou Toumani Touré was ousted by a military coup.

End: 08/11/2013 Second round of the free and fair elections in which the incumbent president did not participate.

Niger (2010-2011)

Start: 02/18/2010 The military ousted the incumbent president in a coup.

End: 03/12/2011 Second round of the free and fair elections in which the incumbent president did not participate.

Tunisia (2011-2011)

Start: 02/27/2011 The long-ruling dictator, Ben-Ali, resigned in response to massive popular protests on January 14, 2011. He was succeeded briefly by his PM, but all members of the cabinet associated with the former ruling party resigned on February 27, 2011, ending the regime.

End: 12/12/2011 The newly elected Constituent Assembly selected Moncef Marzouki as the country's new president.

Authoritarian regimes

Afghanistan (2009-2014)

End: 04/05/2014 Incumbent president Karzai could neither run nor impose a successor in the presidential election.

Bolivia (2009-)

Start: 02/07/2009 Promulgation of a new constitution that violated established rules. In particular, (a) opposition candidates were prevented from attending the Congressional session that submitted the new constitution to voters; (b) Congress had to submit contentious issues to a referendum, *after* which the Constituent Assembly would submit the final draft of the constitution to voters, but instead sent everything at the same time; (c) the agreement with the opposition to approve the new constitution with a two-thirds majority of the Assembly was not respected – a secret meeting in which opposition members were not present changed the rules to single majority; the government later backtracked and established a two-thirds majority, but in the end avoided the requirement by allowing Congress to decide contentious issues (i.e., those without a two-thirds majority in the Assembly) by simple majority – ; and (d) Congress initiated impeachment proceedings against the members of the Constitutional Tribunal, thus preventing the opposition from having its complaints heard (Lehoucq 2008; see also Levitsky and Way 2010, ch. 4). The Morales government also arrested or threatened to arrest several opposition politicians (Levitsky and Way 2010, ch. 4; Lansdorf 2012).

End: Regime continued in power as of December 31, 2015.

Burkina Faso (1987-2014)

End: 10/30/2014 Popular protests following president Blaise Compaoré's decision to change the constitution and run for an additional term ended with the military taking power. Compaoré left the presidency and fled to Ivory Coast.

Central African Republic (2003-2013)

End: 03/24/2013 Rebel troops entered the capital, forcing president Bozizé to resign.

Ecuador (2007-)

Start: 01/15/2007 The newly elected president called a constituent assembly with sweeping powers; when Congress tried to restrict the assembly's powers, the electoral authority responded by sacking a majority of legislators (57 over 100), replacing them with their substitutes, who complied with the president's wishes. Once elected, the constituent assembly – which was controlled by the president's party – suspended Congress and sacked several officials appointed by it. Subsequently, president Correa restricted media freedoms, giving unfair advantages to state-owned (and in practice government-controlled) media over their private counterparts, and ensured that the electoral authority favored the ruling party *vis-à-vis* the opposition (Conaghan 2008; see also Levitsky and Way 2010, ch. 4, de la Torre 2013 and Sánchez-Sibony 2017:131-4).

End: Regime continued in power as of December 31, 2015.

Egypt (2012-2013)

Start: 11/22/2012 Elected president Mohamed Morsi issued a temporary constitutional declaration that granted him unlimited powers. Although he later restricted some of these, he maintained that his original declaration would stand.

End: 07/03/2013 President Mohamed Morsi removed in a military coup.

Egypt (2013-)

Start: 07/03/2013 President Mohamed Morsi removed in a military coup.

End: Regime continued in power as of December 31, 2015.

Ivory Coast (2000-2011)

End: 04/11/2011 President Gbagbo, who had refused to concede electoral defeat in the 2010 election, finally lost control of the capital and was taken into custody.

Libya (1969-2011)

End: 08/23/2011 Qaddafi and his sons fled the Libya capital as insurgents approached.

Madagascar (2009-2013)

End: 12/20/2013 Second round of the free and fair elections in which the incumbent president did not participate.

Myanmar (2010-)

Start: 11/07//2010 Competitive but flawed election in which the military-sponsored party won by a landslide and obtained a supermajority of seats. The new regime is coded as indirect military rather than EAR because the 2008 constitution establishes that the army will retain control of the home, defense and border-affairs ministers, plus the armed forces and the civil service, regardless of electoral outcomes. The constitution also bars Aung San Suu Kyi, the main opposition leader, from becoming president because her former husband and children are foreigners, and allows the army to legally seize power in “emergency” situations. Furthermore, the army is guaranteed control of 25% of parliamentary seats, enough to block a constitutional reform. Thus, despite the NLD’s landslide victory in the 2015 general election, the military retained control of several crucial policy areas (“A charter for thugocracy,” *The Economist*, 6 September 2007; “Myanmar’s awful choice,” *The Economist*, 23 April 2008; “Still the generals’ election,” *The Economist*, 31 October 2015; “A new era,” *The Economist*, 14 November 2015; “A strange new world,” *The Economist*, 6 February 2016; “Why Myanmar’s path to democracy will be bumpy,” *The Economist*, 3 April 2016; Steinberg 2011; Than 2011, 2013; Hlaing 2012).

End: Regime continued in power as of December 31, 2015.

Nicaragua (2008-)

Start: 11/09//2008 The flawed municipal elections indicate the point at which the Ortega government crossed the line from democracy to dictatorship. Since the previous months, the government had increasingly indicated that it would not hold a free and fair election: it banned two opposition parties (some of which may have captured votes from the ruling FSLN) on flimsy grounds; harassed independent journalists; and refused to allow international observers. On election day, the head of the Supreme Electoral Council, the body in charge of organizing the elections, accompanied Daniel Ortega to the voting booth, and the government did nothing to dispel allegations of fraud in several strategic races, including the capital Managua (“Tearing up the rules,” *The Economist*, 14 August 2008; “How to steal an election,” *The Economist*, 13 November 2008; and “The new Somoza,” *The Economist*, 19 February 2009, for the allegations that the municipal elections were fraudulent; and Anderson and Dodd 2009 for the claims about growing authoritarianization at the national-level).

End: Regime continued in power as of December 31, 2015.

Niger (2009-2010)

Start: 06/26/2009 Date in which president Mamadou Tandja assumed special powers. The constitution barred Tandja to run for a third term after his second mandate expired in December. Unable to muster enough votes in parliament to remove term limits, he proposed a new constitution that would be approved directly by voters in a referendum. After the Constitutional Court declared the proposal unconstitutional, Tandja (who had already, and constitutionally, dissolved the National Assembly) announced that he was assuming emergency powers and dissolved the Constitutional Court a few days later. On 4 August 2009 the referendum passed by a huge margin, temporarily extending the president’s term by three years. A few months later, the president’s party won a two-thirds majority of seats in the National Assembly on the face of an opposition boycott (Muller et al. 2011).

End: 02/18/2010 The military ousted president Tandja in a coup.

Thailand (2014-)

Start: 05/22/2014 The military ousted the incumbent prime minister in a coup.

End: Regime continued in power as of December 31, 2015.

Yemen (1978-2015)

End: 01/22/2015 President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi resigned as rebels took over the presidential palace. Subsequently, civil war ensued.

B Regimes included in the sample

Table A1 presents a list of the 258 authoritarian regimes included in the analysis. Regimes for which there is no data on economic growth (e.g., East Germany) are not included in the analysis and thus do not appear in the table. For each regime, the table indicates:

- (1) Regime name/ID.
- (2) The year the regime was originally established. Note that regimes appear in the data the year after they were established.
- (3) The year the regime broke down, if applicable. Since data on economic growth is only available until 2011, regimes that broke down after that date are coded as having survived.
- (4) Whether the regime was coded as closed authoritarian and/or EAR during at least a fraction of its lifetime (during the country-years included in the sample).
- (5) A brief description of how the regime ended, if applicable. Note that when a regime ended due to a popular uprising or a military coup, the coup or the uprising may have been a direct consequence of an election.

Table A1: Authoritarian regimes included in the analysis

regime ID	begin year	end year	closed auth.	EAR	how ended	regime ID	begin year	end year	closed auth.	EAR	how ended
Afghanistan 29-73	1929	1973	1	0	military coup	Burkina Faso 87-14	1987	2014	1	1	popular uprising
Afghanistan 73-78	1973	1978	1	0	military coup	Burundi 62-66	1962	1966	1	0	military coup
Afghanistan 78-92	1978	1992	1	0	insurgency/revolution	Burundi 66-87	1966	1987	1	0	military coup
Afghanistan 96-01	1996	2001	1	0	foreign invasion	Burundi 87-93	1987	1993	1	0	electoral defeat
Albania 44-91	1944	1991	1	0	popular uprising	Burundi 96-03	1996	2003	1	0	rule change (election)
Algeria 62-92	1962	1992	1	0	military coup	Cambodia 53-70	1953	1970	1	1	military coup
Algeria 92-NA	1992	1	1	N/A	N/A	Cambodia 70-75	1970	1975	1	1	insurgency/revolution
Angola 75-NA	1975	1	1	N/A	N/A	Cambodia 75-79	1975	1979	1	0	foreign invasion
Argentina 51-55	1951	1955	0	1	military coup	Cambodia 79-NA	1979	1	1	N/A	N/A
Argentina 55-58	1955	1958	1	0	military coup	Cameroon 60-83	1960	1983	1	1	rule change (continuity)
Argentina 66-73	1966	1973	1	0	rule change (election)	Cameroon 83-NA	1983	1	1	N/A	N/A
Argentina 76-83	1976	1983	1	0	rule change (election)	Cen. Af. Rep. 60-65	1960	1965	1	0	military coup
Armenia 94-98	1994	1998	0	1	popular uprising	Cen. Af. Rep. 65-79	1966	1979	1	0	foreign invasion
Armenia 98-NA	1998	0	1	N/A	N/A	Cen. Af. Rep. 79-81	1979	1981	1	0	military coup
Azerbaijan 93-NA	1993	0	1	N/A	N/A	Cen. Af. Rep. 81-93	1981	1993	1	0	electoral defeat
Bangladesh 71-75	1971	1975	0	1	military coup	Cen. Af. Rep. 03-13	2003	2013	1	1	insurgency/revolution
Bangladesh 75-82	1975	1982	1	1	military coup	Chad 60-75	1960	1975	1	0	military coup
Bangladesh 82-90	1982	1990	1	1	popular uprising	Chad 75-79	1975	1979	1	0	insurgency/revolution
Bangladesh 07-08	2007	2008	1	0	rule change (election)	Chad 82-90	1982	1990	1	0	insurgency/revolution
Belarus 91-94	1991	1994	1	0	electoral defeat	Chad 90-NA	1990	1	1	N/A	N/A
Belarus 94-NA	1994	1	1	N/A	N/A	Chile 73-89	1973	1989	1	0	rule change (election)
Benin 60-63	1960	1963	0	1	popular uprising	China 49-NA	1949	1	0	N/A	N/A
Benin 63-65	1963	1965	1	0	military coup	Colombia 49-53	1949	1953	0	1	military coup
Benin 65-67	1965	1967	1	0	military coup	Colombia 53-58	1953	1958	1	0	rule change (election)
Benin 67-69	1967	1969	1	0	military coup	Congo 60-63	1960	1963	1	0	popular uprising
Benin 69-70	1969	1970	1	0	rule change (election)	Congo 63-68	1963	1968	1	0	military coup
Benin 72-90	1972	1990	1	0	popular uprising	Congo 68-91	1968	1991	1	0	popular uprising
Bolivia 09-NA	1929	0	1	N/A	N/A	Congo 97-NA	1997	1	1	N/A	N/A
Bolivia 51-52	1951	1952	1	0	insurgency/revolution	Costa Rica 48-49	1948	1949	1	0	rule change (no election)
Bolivia 52-64	1952	1964	0	1	military coup	Cuba 52-59	1952	1959	1	1	insurgency/revolution
Bolivia 64-69	1964	1969	1	1	military coup	Cuba 59-NA	1959	1	1	0	N/A
Bolivia 69-71	1969	1971	1	0	military coup	Czechoslovakia 48-89	1948	1989	1	0	popular uprising
Bolivia 71-79	1971	1979	1	0	rule change (election)	DR Congo 60-97	1960	1997	1	0	insurgency/revolution
Bolivia 80-82	1980	1982	1	0	popular uprising	DR Congo 97-NA	1997	1	1	N/A	N/A
Botswana 66-NA	1966	0	1	N/A	N/A	Dom. Republic 30-62	1930	1962	1	1	military coup
Brazil 64-85	1964	1985	1	1	electoral defeat	Dom. Republic 63-65	1963	1965	1	0	insurgency/revolution
Bulgaria 44-90	1944	1990	1	0	rule change (no election)	Dom. Republic 66-78	1966	1978	0	1	electoral defeat
Burkina Faso 60-66	1960	1966	1	0	popular uprising	Ecuador 63-66	1963	1966	1	0	popular uprising
Burkina Faso 66-80	1966	1980	1	1	military coup	Ecuador 70-72	1970	1972	1	0	military coup
Burkina Faso 80-82	1980	1982	1	0	military coup	Ecuador 72-79	1972	1979	1	0	rule change (election)
Burkina Faso 82-87	1982	1987	1	0	military coup	Ecuador 07-NA	1973	1973	0	1	N/A

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regime ID	begin year	end year	closed auth.	EAR	how ended	regime ID	begin year	end year	closed auth.	EAR	how ended
Egypt 22-52	1922	1952	1	0	military coup	Ivory Coast 00-11	2000	2010	0	1	insurgency/revolution
Egypt 52-11	1952	2010	1	1	popular uprising	Jordan 46-NA	1946	1	1	0	N/A
El Salvador 31-48	1931	1948	1	0	military coup	Kazakhstan 91-NA	1991	1	1	1	N/A
El Salvador 48-82	1948	1982	1	1	foreign invasion	Kenya 63-02	1963	2002	1	1	electoral defeat
Ethiopia 1889-1974	1889	1974	1	0	popular uprising	Kuwait 61-NA	1961	1	0	0	N/A
Ethiopia 74-91	1974	1991	1	0	insurgency/revolution	Kyrgyzstan 91-05	1991	2005	1	1	popular uprising
Gabon 60-NA	1960	1	1	N/A		Kyrgyzstan 05-10	2005	2010	0	1	popular uprising
Gambia 65-94	1965	1994	0	1	military coup	Laos 59-60	1959	1960	1	0	military coup
Gambia 94-NA	1994	1	1	N/A	popular uprising	Laos 60-62	1960	1962	1	0	foreign invasion
Georgia 92-03	1992	2003	0	1	military coup	Laos 75-NA	1975	1	0	0	N/A
Ghana 60-66	1960	1966	1	1	rule change (election)	Lesotho 70-86	1970	1986	1	1	military coup
Ghana 66-69	1966	1969	1	0	rule change (election)	Lesotho 86-93	1986	1993	1	0	rule change (election)
Ghana 72-79	1972	1979	1	0	rule change (election)	Liberia 44-80	1944	1980	1	1	military coup
Ghana 81-00	1981	2000	1	1	electoral defeat	Liberia 80-90	1980	1990	1	1	insurgency/revolution
Greece 67-74	1967	1974	1	0	rule change (election)	Liberia 97-03	1997	2003	0	1	insurgency/revolution
Guatemala 54-58	1954	1958	1	0	electoral defeat	Libya 51-69	1951	1969	1	0	military coup
Guatemala 63-66	1963	1966	1	0	electoral defeat	Libya 69-11	1969	2011	1	0	insurgency/revolution
Guatemala 70-85	1970	1985	1	0	rule change (election)	Madagascar 60-72	1960	1972	1	1	popular uprising
Guinea 58-84	1958	1984	1	0	military coup	Madagascar 72-75	1972	1975	1	0	rule change (continuity)
Guinea 84-08	1984	2008	1	1	military coup	Madagascar 75-91	1975	1993	1	0	rule change (no election)
Guinea 08-10	2008	2010	1	0	rule change (election)	Madagascar 09-13	2009	2013	1	0	rule change (election)
Guinea-Bissau 74-80	1974	1980	1	0	military coup	Malawi 64-94	1964	1994	1	0	electoral defeat
Guinea-Bissau 80-99	1980	1999	1	1	insurgency/revolution	Malaysia 57-NA	1957	0	1	1	N/A
Guinea-Bissau 02-03	2002	2003	0	1	military coup	Mali 60-68	1960	1968	1	0	military coup
Haiti 50-56	1950	1956	1	0	popular uprising	Mali 68-91	1968	1991	1	0	popular uprising
Haiti 57-86	1957	1986	1	1	popular uprising	Mauritania 60-78	1960	1978	1	0	military coup
Haiti 86-88	1986	1988	1	0	military coup	Mauritania 78-05	1978	2005	1	1	military coup
Haiti 88-90	1988	1990	1	0	rule change (election)	Mauritania 05-07	2005	2007	1	0	rule change (election)
Haiti 91-94	1991	1994	1	0	rule change (election)	Mauritania 08-NA	2008	1	0	0	N/A
Haiti 99-04	1999	2004	0	1	foreign invasion	Mexico 15-00	1915	2000	0	1	electoral defeat
Honduras 33-56	1933	1956	1	1	insurgency/revolution	Mongolia 21-93	1921	1993	1	1	electoral defeat
Honduras 63-71	1963	1971	1	1	military coup	Morocco 56-NA	1956	1	1	0	N/A
Honduras 72-81	1972	1981	1	0	rule change (election)	Mozambique 75-NA	1975	1	1	0	rule change (election)
Hungary 47-90	1947	1990	1	0	electoral defeat	Myanmar 58-60	1958	1960	0	1	rule change (election)
Indonesia 49-66	1949	1966	1	0	military coup	Myanmar 62-88	1962	1988	1	0	popular uprising
Indonesia 66-99	1966	1999	1	0	electoral defeat	Myanmar 88-10	1988	2010	1	0	rule change (no election)
Iran 25-79	1925	1979	1	0	popular uprising	Namibia 90-NA	1990	0	1	1	N/A
Iraq 32-58	1932	1958	1	0	military coup	Nepal 51-91	1951	1991	1	0	electoral defeat
Iraq 58-63	1958	1963	1	0	military coup	Nepal 02-06	2002	2006	1	0	popular uprising
Iraq 63-68	1963	1968	1	0	military coup	Nicaragua 36-79	1936	1979	1	1	insurgency/revolution
Iraq 68-79	1968	1979	1	0	rule change (continuity)	Nicaragua 08-NA	1944	0	1	1	N/A
Iraq 79-03	1979	2003	1	0	foreign invasion	Nicaragua 79-90	1979	1990	1	1	electoral defeat
Iraq 10-NA	2009	0	1	N/A		Niger 60-74	1960	1974	1	0	military coup
Ivory Coast 60-99	1960	1999	1	1	military coup	Niger 09-10	1962	1992	0	1	popular uprising
Ivory Coast 99-00	1999	2000	1	0	popular uprising	Niger 74-91	1974	1991	1	0	popular uprising

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regime ID	begin year	end year	closed auth.	EAR	how ended	regime ID	begin year	end year	closed auth.	EAR	how ended
Niger 96-99	1996	1999	0	1	rule change (election)	Sudan 58-64	1958	1964	1	0	popular uprising
Nigeria 66-79	1966	1979	1	0	rule change (election)	Sudan 69-85	1969	1985	1	0	popular uprising
Nigeria 83-93	1983	1993	1	0	rule change (continuity)	Sudan 85-86	1985	1986	1	0	rule change (election)
Nigeria 93-99	1993	1999	1	0	rule change (election)	Sudan 89-NA	1989	1	1	0	N/A
North Korea 48-NA	1948	1	0	N/A		Swaziland 68-NA	1968	1	1	0	N/A
Oman 71-NA	1971	1	0	N/A		Syria 5L-54	1951	1954	1	0	military coup
Pakistan 58-71	1958	1971	1	0	popular uprising	Syria 57-58	1957	1958	0	1	state disappearance
Pakistan 75-77	1975	1977	0	1	military coup	Syria 63-NA	1963	1	1	0	N/A
Pakistan 77-88	1977	1988	1	0	rule change (election)	Taiwan 49-00	1949	2000	1	1	electoral defeat
Pakistan 99-08	1999	2008	1	0	rule change (no election)	Tajikistan 91-NA	1991	1	1	1	N/A
Panama 49-51	1949	1951	1	0	military coup	Tanzania 64-NA	1964	1	1	1	N/A
Panama 53-55	1953	1955	0	1	rule change (no election)	Thailand 47-57	1947	1957	1	0	military coup
Panama 68-82	1968	1982	1	0	military coup	Thailand 57-73	1957	1973	1	1	popular uprising
Panama 82-89	1982	1989	1	0	foreign invasion	Thailand 76-88	1976	1988	1	1	electoral defeat
Paraguay 39-48	1939	1948	1	0	military coup	Thailand 91-92	1991	1992	1	0	popular uprising
Paraguay 48-54	1948	1954	1	0	military coup	Thailand 06-07	2006	2007	1	0	electoral defeat
Paraguay 54-93	1954	1993	1	1	rule change (no election)	Togo 60-63	1960	1963	1	0	military coup
Peru 48-56	1948	1956	1	0	electoral defeat	Togo 63-NA	1963	1	1	1	N/A
Peru 62-63	1962	1963	1	0	rule change (election)	Tunisia 56-11	1956	2010	1	1	popular uprising
Peru 68-80	1968	1980	1	0	rule change (election)	Turkey 23-30	1923	1950	0	1	electoral defeat
Peru 92-00	1992	2000	0	1	rule change (no election)	Turkey 57-60	1957	1960	0	1	military coup
Philippines 72-86	1972	1986	1	1	popular uprising	Turkey 60-61	1960	1961	1	0	rule change (election)
Poland 44-89	1944	1989	1	0	electoral defeat	Turkey 80-83	1980	1983	1	0	electoral defeat
Portugal 26-74	1926	1974	1	0	military coup	Turkmenistan 91-NA	1991	1	1	0	N/A
Romania 45-89	1945	1989	1	0	popular uprising	UAE 71-NA	1971	1	1	0	N/A
Russia 93-NA	1993	0	1	N/A		Uganda 66-71	1966	1971	1	1	military coup
Rwanda 62-73	1962	1973	1	1	military coup	Uganda 71-79	1971	1979	1	0	foreign invasion
Rwanda 73-94	1973	1994	1	0	insurgency/revolution	Uganda 80-85	1980	1985	0	1	military coup
Rwanda 94-NA	1994	1	1	N/A		Uganda 86-NA	1986	1	1	1	N/A
Saudi Arabia 27-NA	1927	1	0	N/A		Uruguay 73-84	1973	1984	1	0	rule change (election)
Senegal 60-00	1960	2000	1	1	electoral defeat	Uzbekistan 91-NA	1991	1	1	0	N/A
Serbia 91-00	1991	2000	0	1	popular uprising	Venezuela 45-58	1948	1958	1	0	popular uprising
Sierra Leone 67-68	1967	1968	1	0	military coup	Venezuela 45-NA	2005	0	1	1	N/A
Sierra Leone 68-92	1968	1992	1	1	military coup	Vietnam 54-NA	1954	1	1	0	N/A
Siera Leone 92-96	1992	1996	1	0	rule change (election)	Yemen 18-62	1918	1962	1	0	military coup
Siera Leone 97-98	1997	1998	1	0	foreign invasion	Yemen 62-67	1962	1967	1	0	military coup
Singapore 65-NA	1965	0	1	N/A		Yemen 67-74	1967	1974	1	0	military coup
Somalia 69-91	1969	1991	1	0	insurgency/revolution	Yemen 74-78	1974	1978	1	0	rule change (continuity)
Korea, South 48-60	1948	1960	0	1	popular uprising	Yemen 78-15	1978	2015	1	1	insurgency/revolution
Korea, South 61-87	1961	1987	1	1	popular uprising	Yugoslavia 45-90	1945	1990	1	0	state disappearance
Soviet Union 17-91	1917	1991	1	0	state disappearance	Zambia 67-91	1967	1991	1	1	electoral defeat
Spain 39-76	1939	1976	1	0	rule change (no election)	Zambia 96-11	1996	2010	0	1	electoral defeat
Sri Lanka 78-94	1978	1994	0	1	electoral defeat	Zimbabwe 80-NA	1980	0	1	1	N/A

C Breakdowns in election years

Table A2: Regimes that broke down in years with competitive executive elections

Election included in analysis			Election not included in analysis		
regime ID	end date	type	regime ID	end date	type
Albania 44-91	1991-06-01	closed	Argentina 55-58	1958-02-23	closed
Belarus 91-94	1994-07-10	closed	Argentina 66-73	1973-03-11	closed
Bulgaria 44-90	1990-08-01	closed	Argentina 76-83	1983-10-30	closed
Burundi 87-93	1993-06-01	closed	Armenia 94-98	1998-02-04	EAR
Central African Republic 79-81	1981-09-01	closed	Bangladesh 07-08	2008-12-29	closed
Central African Republic 81-93	1993-09-19	closed	Benin 69-70	1970-05-07	closed
Chile 73-89	1989-12-14	closed	Bolivia 71-79	1979-07-01	closed
Dominican Republic 66-78	1978-05-16	EAR	Colombia 53-58	1958-05-10	closed
Ghana 81-00	2000-12-28	EAR	Dominican Republic 30-62	1962-01-16	closed
Guatemala 63-66	1966-05-10	closed	Ecuador 72-79	1979-04-29	closed
Honduras 33-56	1956-10-21	closed	El Salvador 48-82	1982-03-28	closed
Hungary 47-90	1990-04-08	closed	Ghana 66-69	1969-08-29	closed
Indonesia 66-99	1999-06-07	closed	Ghana 72-79	1979-07-09	closed
Ivory Coast 99-00	2000-10-26	closed	Greece 67-74	1974-07-23	closed
Kenya 63-02	2002-12-27	EAR	Guatemala 54-58	1958-02-02	closed
Korea, South 48-60	1960-04-27	EAR	Guatemala 70-85	1985-12-08	closed
Laos 59-60	1960-08-09	closed	Guinea-Bissau 80-99	1999-05-07	EAR
Malawi 64-94	1994-05-17	closed	Haiti 86-88	1988-09-17	closed
Mexico 15-00	2000-07-02	EAR	Haiti 88-90	1990-03-10	closed
Mongolia 21-93	1993-06-06	EAR	Honduras 63-71	1971-03-28	EAR
Nicaragua 79-90	1990-02-25	EAR	Honduras 72-81	1981-11-29	closed
Pakistan 75-77	1977-07-05	EAR	Korea, South 61-87	1987-06-29	EAR
Peru 48-56	1956-06-17	closed	Kyrgyzstan 05-10	2010-04-08	EAR
Peru 92-00	2000-11-21	EAR	Kyrgyzstan 91-05	2005-03-24	EAR
Philippines 72-86	1986-02-25	EAR	Lesotho 86-93	1993-03-27	closed
Senegal 60-00	2000-03-19	EAR	Mauritania 05-07	2007-03-25	closed
Serbia 91-00	2000-10-05	EAR	Myanmar 58-60	1960-02-06	EAR
Sri Lanka 78-94	1994-11-09	EAR	Myanmar 88-10	2010-11-07	closed
Taiwan 49-00	2000-03-18	EAR	Nepal 51-91	1991-05-12	closed
Thailand 76-88	1988-07-24	EAR	Niger 96-99	1999-11-24	EAR
Thailand 91-92	1992-05-20	closed	Nigeria 66-79	1979-08-11	closed
Turkey 23-50	1950-05-14	EAR	Nigeria 93-99	1999-02-27	closed
Zambia 67-91	1991-10-31	closed	Pakistan 77-88	1988-11-16	closed
Zambia 96-11	2011-09-20	EAR	Paraguay 54-93	1993-05-09	EAR
			Peru 62-63	1963-06-09	closed
			Peru 68-80	1980-05-18	closed
			Sierra Leone 92-96	1996-03-15	closed
			Sudan 85-86	1986-04-12	closed
			Syria 51-54	1954-02-25	closed
			Thailand 06-07	2007-12-23	closed
			Thailand 47-57	1957-09-16	closed
			Tunisia 56-11	2011-02-27	EAR
			Turkey 60-61	1961-10-15	closed
			Turkey 80-83	1983-11-06	closed
			Uruguay 73-84	1984-11-25	closed
			Venezuela 48-58	1958-01-23	closed

D EARs and closed regimes

Conceptualization. As explained in the text, the argument is based upon a basic distinction between two kinds of authoritarian regimes. Electoral authoritarian regimes or EARs are those in which both the executive and the legislature are chosen in formally competitive elections with universal (male) suffrage. In other words, in such regimes political institutions are formally democratic, though in practice election quality may fall (well) below minimally acceptable democratic standards, for example if the ruling party monopolizes access to the media, harasses opposition leaders and supporters with impunity, or resorts to widespread fraud. Thus, my classification is very similar to that of Levitsky and Way (2010), though unlike these authors I do *not* distinguish between “competitive” authoritarian regimes – in which elections are meaningful even if manipulated – and “hegemonic” ones, in which elections are little more than a façade. The rationale for this decision is twofold. Since both competitive and hegemonic regimes employ similar *formal* institutions, the distinction between the two must be made on the basis of other criteria, such as vote shares. For example, a regime may qualify as hegemonic if the ruling party obtained more than 70% of the vote in the last election, and competitive otherwise; yet such thresholds are not theory-driven. Furthermore, observed vote shares reflect *equilibrium outcomes* rather than fundamental institutional differences: a regime may receive 70% of the vote not because it will not accept a lower vote share, but rather because insiders are waiting for a suitable opportunity to defect. The case of the Mexican PRI – Miguel De la Madrid obtained 71% of the vote in 1982, but Carlos Salinas barely (and suspiciously) crossed the 50% mark after a massive defection six years later – illustrates this point clearly, as do regimes that become less competitive over time as it becomes evident that the incumbent cannot be effectively challenged at the polls – with Belarus under Lukashenka as a prime example.

In addition to EARs, there are three other types of authoritarian regimes (see Table A3). *Competitive oligarchies* are similar to EARs except for the fact that the franchise is severely restricted, as in South Africa under *apartheid* (Levitsky and Way 2010, ch. 1). These regimes were quite common

Table A3: Classifying authoritarian regime types

criterion	democracy	closed authoritarian	competitive oligarchy	indirect regime	electoral authoritarian
Elected executive and legislature	✓	✗/✓	✓	✓	✓
All elections formally competitive	✓	✗	✓	✓	✓
Elections free and fair	✓	N/A	✓	✗/✓	✗
Universal (male) sufrage	✓	✗/✓	✗	✓	✓
Elected authorities effectively govern	✓	N/A	✓	✗	✓

during the late XIXth and the early XXth century, but have almost vanished after 1946 (Miller 2015).

As noted in fn. 21, I exclude them from the sample both due to their rarity and because the issue with such regimes is not that electoral alternation is precluded, but rather that a large subset of the population has no say in the electoral process. In contrast, *indirect regimes* are those in which there are formal democratic institutions – and elections may even qualify as minimally democratic – but effective political power resides in some unelected body and/or official, such as the military (as in Guatemala in the early 1980s), an individual dictator (Panama under Noriega) or a religious council (Iran since the Revolution). Thus, while elections in such regimes may be contested and informative, electoral alternation is not enough to dislodge the actual rulers from power, as seen in Iran between 1997 and 2005 (Brownlee 2007, ch. 5). In contrast, in EARs the actual ruler of the country is the elected executive, and thus electoral turnover means dislodging him from office.

Finally, I classify as *closed authoritarian* all those regimes that do not qualify as democratic, electoral authoritarian, competitive oligarchies, or indirect (see Table A3). Such regimes are a diverse bunch: they include autocracies in which there are no national elections at all, either because the executive is a monarch (Saudi Arabia), because the military acquired power in a coup and never institutionalized it (Argentina 1976-83, Uruguay 1973-84), or because the ruling party selects its

leaders in a different way (China); Communist regimes that hold single-party elections (Cuba, the Soviet Union); and autocracies that hold competitive elections for the legislature only (Jordan, Morocco).¹ Despite their differences, all such regimes share a crucial characteristic: they do not allow the opposition to access executive power by winning an election, *even in principle*. Thus, the claims made in this paper about elections' potential to foster coordination do not make sense in closed autocracies.

Of course, competitive elections are just one dimension around which autocracies may be classified. Other possibilities include coding the degree of military intervention in politics (Svolik 2012), or whether the regime is military, personalist, party-based, monarchic, or some combination of these (Geddes, Wright and Frantz 2014). The reason why I distinguish between closed regimes and EARs is theoretical: since the argument is about the impact of elections on authoritarian survival, the relevant criteria is whether elections are held, and if so, what characteristics they have. Alternative classifications are concerned with other criteria: although monarchies and military regimes generally qualify as closed, single-party and personalist regimes may be either closed or EARs.

Coding. $EAR_{r,t}$ is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if regime r qualified as electoral authoritarian at the beginning of year t , and 0 otherwise. To code this variable, I proceeded in the following way:

- (1) I relied on GWF's coding scheme to identify all indirect regimes and competitive oligarchies, which I excluded from the sample (though the results in Table A29 show that coding indirect regimes as EARs and competitive oligarchies as closed does not change the results).
- (2) Since GWF provide no data on authoritarian institutions, I turned to the Democracy and Dictatorship (DD) dataset (Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland 2010), which provides information on whether (a) the executive was elected (`exselec` variable); (b) the legislature was elected (`legselec`) and (c) open (`closed`), (d) multiple parties were legally allowed (`de jure`) and (e) did exist in

¹Regimes that hold competitive elections for the executive but not for the legislature are theoretically possible but extremely rare in practice. In any case, they almost always correspond to short transitional periods in which the executive has been already elected but the legislature has not.

practice (*defacto2*). I extended the data until 2015 (the dataset ends in 2008) and took into account the fact that DD reports a country's status on December 31 of a given year, while I am interested in what happened on January 1st.

- (3) After crossing GWF's data with DD, I cross-checked it with NELDA to confirm that the executive and the legislature had been elected in minimally competitive elections, as defined by Hyde and Marinov (2012).

To check the robustness of the results, I constructed two additional variables. *EAR (LIED)*_{r,t} is similarly defined but constructed using data from the Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy (LIED; see Skaaning, Gerring and Bartusevičius 2015). This variable takes the value of 1 if and only if

- (1) There is an elected legislature (`legislative_elections = 1`) AND
- (2) There is an elected executive (`executive_elections = 1`) AND
- (3) Opposition is formally allowed (`multiparty_legislative_elections = 1`) AND
- (4) There is universal male or female suffrage (`male_suffrage = 1` or `female_suffrage = 1`).²

Alternatively, *EAR (V-Dem)*_{r,t} is constructed using data from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project (Coppedge et al. 2017). I proceeded in two steps. First, I coded a regime as having a legislature elected in formally competitive elections if:

- (1) There is male or universal suffrage (`v2elsuffrage ≥ 50`
 $\vee [v2elgvsuflvl_imp = 6 \vee v2elgvsuflvl_imp = 8]$) AND
- (2) The legislature is elected (`v2xlg_elecreg = 1`)
- (3) In formally multiparty elections (`v2elmulpal_ord_leg_imp ≥ 2`).

²Again, I took into account the fact that LIED, like DD, reports a country's status on December 31 of a given year.

EAR (*V-Dem*)_{r,t} takes the value of 1 if the legislature had been elected in formally competitive elections AND

(1) The regime is parliamentary, meaning that

- (a) The head of government (HOG) was directly appointed by the legislature ($v2ex_legconhog = 1$) AND
- (b) The HOG is different from the head of state (HOS) ($v2exhoshog = 0$) AND
- (c) The HOG has more powers than the HOS ($v2ex_hosw < 0.5$)

OR

(2) The regime is presidential, and the executive was directly elected in formally multiparty elections:

- (a) The HOG and the HOS are the same ($vdem_hos = 1$) AND
- (b) The HOS is directly elected ($v2ex_elechos = 1$) AND
- (c) Elections are formally multiparty ($v2elmulpar_ord_ex_imp \geq 3$).³

³As before, I updated the data to reflect that V-Dem report values for December 31 of a given year.

Table A4: Agreement between alternative EAR classifications

	main			LIED			V-Dem		
(a) Main sample	closed	EAR	NA's	closed	EAR	NA's	closed	EAR	NA's
closed	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.94	0.06	0.00	0.90	0.09	0.01
EAR	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.09	0.91	0.00	0.24	0.76	0.00
(b) LIED sample									
closed	0.96	0.04	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.91	0.08	0.01
EAR	0.13	0.87	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.26	0.74	0.00
(c) V-Dem sample									
closed	0.90	0.10	0.00	0.89	0.11	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00
EAR	0.22	0.78	0.00	0.20	0.80	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00

The values indicate the proportion of observations coded as closed (or EAR) in one sample that are also coded as closed (or EAR) in another.

Table A4 reports the proportion of country-years classified as closed or EARs according to one dataset that are coded as closed or EARs by the others.⁴ The agreement between the three measures is high, especially with respect to closed regimes. Indeed, Tables A30 and A31 show that replacing $EAR_{r,t}$ with either $EAR (LIED)_{r,t}$ or $EAR (V\text{-}Dem)_{r,t}$ does not change the gist of the results.

⁴There are also some missing values, mostly because V-Dem has no data for the United Arab Emirates.

E Descriptive statistics

Table A5: Descriptive statistics

	pooled sample		within-regime		min.	max.
	mean	std. dev.	mean	std. dev.		
<i>breakdown</i> _t	0.05	0.22	0.2	0.29	0	1
<i>end (insider)</i> _t	0.02	0.13	0.08	0.11	0	1
<i>end (outsider)</i> _t	0.02	0.14	0.06	0.1	0	1
<i>end (voluntary)</i> _t	0.01	0.1	0.05	0.06	0	1
<i>other autocracy</i> _{t+1}	0.02	0.15	0.1	0.14	0	1
<i>democracy</i> _{t+1}	0.02	0.15	0.09	0.13	0	1
<i>protest</i> _t	0.19	0.39	0.23	0.28	0	1
<i>violent protest</i> _t	0.05	0.22	0.07	0.08	0	1
<i>coup attempt</i> _t	0.06	0.23	0.16	0.24	0	1
<i>successful coup</i> _t	0.03	0.17	0.11	0.17	0	1
<i>unsuccessful coup</i> _t	0.03	0.17	0.06	0.13	0	1
<i>growth</i> _{t-1} (Maddison)	0.02	0.06	0.01	0.05	-0.61	0.59
<i>growth</i> _{t-1} (PWT v9.0)	0.02	0.08	0.01	0.05	-0.67	1.98
<i>growth</i> _{t-1} (WDI)	0.02	0.06	0.02	0.05	-0.65	0.92
<i>recession</i> _{t-1} (Maddison)	0.09	0.29	0.11	0.21	0	1
<i>EAR</i> _t	0.27	0.44	0.28	0.12	0	1
<i>EAR (LIED)</i> _t	0.28	0.45	0.3	0.14	0	1
<i>EAR (V-Dem)</i> _t	0.26	0.44	0.33	0.18	0	1
<i>executive (competitive)</i> _t	0.07	0.25	0.08	0.16	0	1
<i>executive (non-competitive)</i> _t	0.04	0.18	0.03	0.08	0	1
<i>legislative (competitive)</i> _t	0.04	0.2	0.04	0.1	0	1
<i>executive (competitive) (this year)</i> _t	0.06	0.23	0.07	0.15	0	1
<i>executive (competitive) (other year)</i> _t	0.22	0.41	0.23	0.17	0	1
<i>executive (non-competitive) (this year)</i> _t	0.03	0.18	0.03	0.07	0	1
<i>executive (non-competitive) (other year)</i> _t	0.17	0.38	0.15	0.15	0	1
<i>legislative only (competitive) (this year)</i> _t	0.04	0.19	0.04	0.09	0	1
<i>legislative only (competitive) (other year)</i> _t	0.21	0.41	0.04	0.09	0	1
<i>GDP per capita</i> _{t-1} (th. 1990 Int. GK\$)	2.87	3.36	2.26	0.5	0.2	30.93
<i>oil and gas per capita</i> _{t-1} (th. 2000 dollars)	0.77	3.55	0.35	0.27	0	60.64
<i>prop. democratic neighbors</i> _t	0.22	0.22	0.27	0.06	0	1
<i>party-based regime</i>	0.48	0.5	0.29	0	0	1
<i>poor country</i>	0.69	0.46	0.72	0	0	1

The unit of observation is the country-year. The (Maddison) sample covers the 1948-2011 period. Observations: 4,061; regimes: 258; countries: 115.

F Robustness checks

Main results

- (1) *Full results.* Table A6 presents the full set of coefficients (except for the fixed effects and the duration polynomials) for the models reported in Table 1. In turn, Table A7 reports similar results but discriminating between (a) regimes that do not hold elections at all; (b) regimes that hold single-party (executive) elections only; and (c) EARs.
- (2) *Alternative outcomes.* Tables A8 through A17 and the accompanying figures present the full set of coefficients (except for the fixed effects and the duration polynomials) for the models reported in Table 2. The values reported in Table 2 correspond to the marginal effects of $(growth_{t-1}|election_t)$ for the models reported in columns 4 and 7.
- (3) *Electoral manipulation.* The models in Table A18 restrict the sample to *competitive* elections for an *executive* office to examine whether economic performance affects electoral manipulation. Manipulation is measured with four alternative indicators: from NELDA, (i) a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the government harassed the opposition (nelda15); and from V-Dem, continuous measures of the extent to which (ii) the election can be considered free and fair (v2elfrfair); (iii) there were voting irregularities (v2elirreg); or (iv) the government intimidated the opposition (v2elintim). Note that the sign of the last two variables was reversed so higher values indicate *more* irregularities and *higher* levels of intimidation. Panel (a) focuses on $growth_{t-1}$ exclusively, while panel (b) analyses whether the effect of economic conditions is different in breakdown years.

Alternative specifications

- (1) *Additional controls.* Tables A19 and A21 to A23 and the accompanying figures replicate the results of Table A6, but controlling for *GDP per capita_{t-1}* (log), *oil and gas per capita_{t-1}* (log), *proportion of democratic neighbors_t* and all three variables simultaneously, respectively. Table A20 and Figure A13 replicate the results in Table A6 but restricting the sample to observations for which data on *oil and gas per capita_{t-1}* is available.
- (2) *Alternative breakdown dates.* Table A24 and Figure A17 replicate the results of Table 1, but employing a more restrictive definition of regime breakdown. Specifically, a breakdown is coded when a regime first begins a move towards liberalization or democratization (e.g., by calling a

constituent assembly), even if that happens years in advance of the actual devolution of power or if the incumbent actually runs in the election. For example, in Indonesia the fall of Suharto did not immediately dislodge the ruling party from power, and indeed Golkar participated in the legislative election of June 1999; thus, GWF code the transition as occurring in that date (Geddes, Wright and Frantz 2014:codebook, p. 69). Using a more restrictive of breakdown, however, the regime's demise is coded as occurring on the day of Suharto's resignation (see Schuler, Gueorguiev and Cantú 2017).

- (3) *Survival models (cloglog)*. Table A25 reports the results of a series of generalized linear models with a cloglog link, which are equivalent to Cox survival model with discrete time (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004; Carter and Signorino 2010). Survival models cannot accommodate regime fixed effects, so I control for $GDP \text{ per capita}_{t-1}$ (log) as well as dummies for regime types (*party-based, military, personal or monarchy*) as defined by Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014), region and year fixed effects, and a duration polynomial of order 3. Figure A18 reports the corresponding marginal effects for the linear term.
- (4) *Survival models (probit)*. The models in Table A26 are identical save for the fact that they employ a probit rather than a cloglog link. The models in Table A27 also add unit means for all time-varying variables (including the interaction terms; see Wooldridge 2010, ch. 15.8). Figures A19 and A20 report the corresponding marginal effects.
- (5) *Country fixed effects*. Table A28 replicates the results of Table A6 but employing country instead of regime fixed effects.

Alternative measures of regime type

- (1) *Indirect regimes and competitive oligarchies*. Table A29 replicates the results of Table 1 but adding indirect authoritarian regimes (coded as EARs) and competitive oligarchies (coded as closed authoritarian). See fn. 21 and Appendix D for a description of these regime types.
- (2) *LIED coding*. Table A30 replicates the results of Table 1 but using the LIED data (Skaaning, Gerring and Bartusevičius 2015) to code EARs and closed regimes (see Appendix D for details).
- (3) *V-Dem coding*. Table A31 replicates the results of Table 1 but using the V-Dem data (Coppedge et al. 2017) to code EARs and closed regimes (see Appendix D for details).

Alternative economic indicators

- (1) *Recession dummy.* Table A32 and Figure A25 replicate the specifications of Table A6 but replacing $growth_{t-1}$ with a $recession_{t-1}$ dummy that takes the value of 1 if $growth_{t-1} < -0.05$, and 0 otherwise. Note that $recession_{t-1}$ should have a positive rather than a negative effect on $breakdown_t$.
- (2) *PWT data.* Table A33 and Figure A26 replicate the specifications of Table A6 but measuring $growth_{t-1}$ using the Penn World Tables (PWT) v9.0⁵ rather than Maddison data. These sources do not overlap perfectly, so the analysis covers 229 regimes in 106 countries between 1952 and 2015.
- (3) *WDI data.* Table A34 and Figure A27 replicate the specifications of Table A6 but measuring $growth_{t-1}$ using the World Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI)⁶ rather than Maddison data. These sources do not overlap perfectly, so the analysis covers 202 regimes in 104 countries between 1962 and 2015.

Split samples

- (1) *Party-based regimes.* Tables A35 and A36 and the accompanying figures replicate the specifications of Table A6 but restricting the sample to regimes that Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014) code as party-based (including party-personal, party-military and party-military-personal regimes) or not, respectively.
- (2) *Regimes in poor vs. rich countries.* Tables A37 and A38 and the accompanying figures replicate the specifications of Table A6 but restricting the sample to *countries* located below or above the median value of *GDP per capita* in the year they first enter the sample (or the first year data is available), respectively.

⁵<http://www.rug.nl/ggdc/productivity/pwt/>.

⁶<http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators>.

Table A6: Elections, economic performance and authoritarian breakdown, 1948-2011: Full results

	actual elections						scheduled elections						non-competitive			legislative	
	growth only	election only	growth × election		growth × el. × EAR		growth × el. × EAR	election only	growth × election		growth × election		actual	sched.	actual	sched.	
			(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)			(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	
$growth_{t-1}$	-0.15 (0.06)		-0.12 (0.06)	-0.12 (0.06)	-0.13 (0.06)	-0.11 (0.06)			-0.12 (0.06)	-0.12 (0.06)	-0.16 (0.07)	-0.17 (0.07)	-0.14 (0.06)	-0.14 (0.06)	-0.11 (0.06)		
$election_t$	0.07 (0.02)		0.09 (0.02)	0.10 (0.05)	0.10 (0.05)	0.10 (0.03)			0.12 (0.03)	0.12 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.05)	0.02 (0.05)	0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)		
$growth_{t-1} \times election_t$			-0.74 (0.36)	-0.31 (0.76)	0.03 (0.83)				-1.15 (0.43)	-0.93 (0.45)	0.41 (0.58)	-0.27 (0.37)	-0.06 (0.19)	-0.27 (0.19)	-0.41 (0.27)		
$growth_{t-1} \times EAR_t$				-0.01 (0.17)	0.05 (0.17)						-0.01 (0.17)	-0.01 (0.17)	-0.11 (0.18)	-0.11 (0.18)			
$growth_{t-1} \times election_t$ × EAR_t				-0.66 (0.90)	-0.90 (0.97)						-0.22 (0.59)				0.38 (0.35)		
EAR_t				0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)						0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)		
$election_t \times EAR_t$				-0.01 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.06)						-0.03 (0.05)				-0.04 (0.03)		
$election (other year)_t$						-0.00 (0.02)			-0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)		-0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)		
$growth_{t-1}$ × $election (other year)_t$							-0.08 (0.14)		0.12 (0.15)		0.18 (0.15)		0.08 (0.14)		0.08 (0.14)		
$election$								-0.00 (0.14)							0.14 (0.14)		
$(executive + legislative)_t$									-0.00 (0.14)						-1.22 (0.04)		
$growth_{t-1} \times election$										-0.00 (0.06)							
$(executive + legislative)_t$											-0.00 (0.02)						
$GDP per capita_{t-1} (\log)$												-0.00 (0.02)					
$oil and gas$												-0.00 (0.01)					
$per capita_{t-1} (\log)$												-0.00 (0.01)					
$proportion of$												0.14 (0.06)					
$democratic neighbors_t$												0.15 (0.06)					
observations	4061	4061	4061	4061	3823	4061	4061	3823	4061	4061	4061	4061	4061	4061	4061		
regimes	258	258	258	258	244	258	258	244	258	258	258	258	258	258	258		
countries	115	115	115	115	114	115	115	114	115	115	115	115	115	115	115		


OLS regression estimates. The dependent variable is *breakdown*. All specifications include regime and year fixed effects, as well as a duration polynomial of order 3. Robust standard errors clustered by regime in parentheses.

Table A7: Including competitive and non-competitive elections simultaneously


	actual elections					scheduled elections		
	growth only	election only	growth × election	growth × el. × EAR	growth × el. × EAR	election only	growth × election	growth × election
(a) Closed, no elections	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$growth_{t-1}$	-0.15 (0.06)		-0.13 (0.06)	-0.13 (0.06)	-0.13 (0.07)		-0.13 (0.06)	-0.12 (0.07)
(b) EARs: Elections are formally competitive								
$election_t$		0.07 (0.02)	0.09 (0.02)	0.10 (0.05)	0.10 (0.05)	0.11 (0.03)	0.13 (0.03)	0.13 (0.03)
$growth_{t-1} \times election_t$			-0.73 (0.36)	-0.25 (0.76)	0.09 (0.84)		-1.14 (0.43)	-0.93 (0.45)
$growth_{t-1} \times EAR_t$				-0.00 (0.17)	0.05 (0.18)			
$growth_{t-1} \times election_t$ × EAR_t					-0.72 (0.90)	-0.97 (0.98)		
EAR_t					0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)		
$election_t \times EAR_t$					-0.01 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.06)		
$election (other year)_t$						0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)
$growth_{t-1}$ × $election (other year)_t$							0.09 (0.14)	0.13 (0.15)
(c) Closed regimes with single-party elections								
$election_t$		-0.02 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	0.00 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.05)	0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)
$growth_{t-1} \times election_t$			0.18 (0.14)	0.42 (0.58)	0.43 (0.60)		-0.31 (0.37)	-0.24 (0.37)
$growth_{t-1} \times EAR_t$				-0.01 (0.17)	-0.05 (0.18)			
$growth_{t-1} \times election_t$ × EAR_t					-0.27 (0.59)	-0.25 (0.62)		
EAR_t					0.04 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)		
$election_t \times EAR_t$					-0.04 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.06)		
$election (other year)_t$						0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
$growth_{t-1}$ × $election (other year)_t$							0.12 (0.15)	0.07 (0.16)
(d) Control variables								
$GDP per capita_{t-1}$ (log)					-0.00 (0.02)		-0.00 (0.02)	
$oil and gas$ $per capita_{t-1}$ (log)					-0.00 (0.01)		-0.00 (0.01)	
$proportion of$ $democratic neighbors$					0.15 (0.06)		0.15 (0.06)	
observations	4061	4061	4061	4061	3823	4061	4061	3823
regimes	258	258	258	258	244	258	258	244
countries	115	115	115	115	114	115	115	114

OLS regression estimates. The dependent variable is $breakdown_t$. All specifications include regime and year fixed effects, as well as a duration polynomial of order 3. Robust standard errors clustered by regime in parentheses.

(a) $growth_{t-1} \mid election_t$



(b) $election_t \mid growth_{t-1}$ (single-party electoral)



(c) $election_t \mid growth_{t-1}$ (EARs)





Figure A1: Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of the marginal effects of $growth_{t-1}$ or $election_t$ on the probability of $breakdown_t$, based on the results reported in Table A7. Panel (a) is based on models 4 and 5 (for actual elections) or 7 and 8 (for scheduled elections); panel (b), on models 4b and 7b; and the results reported in panel (c) correspond to models 4a and 7a, respectively.

Table A8: Alternative outcomes (1): Insider-driven end


	actual elections						scheduled elections			non-competitive			legislative	
	growth only	election only	growth × election		growth × el. × EAR		election only	growth × election		growth × election	actual	sched.	(11)	(12)
			(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)		(5)	(6)					
$growth_{t-1}$	-0.04 (0.03)		-0.03 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)		-0.04 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)	
$election_t$		-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)		0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.02 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.01)	
$growth_{t-1} \times election_t$		-0.12 (0.12)	-0.41 (0.28)	-0.10 (0.11)	-0.10 (0.20)	-0.21 (0.18)		-0.21 (0.20)	-0.01 (0.18)	0.42 (0.49)	-0.34 (0.30)	-0.25 (0.14)	-0.14 (0.09)	
$growth_{t-1} \times EAR_t$			0.02 (0.07)	0.04 (0.07)	0.02 (0.07)	0.04 (0.07)				-0.01 (0.13)	-0.07 (0.13)	0.02 (0.06)		
$growth_{t-1} \times election_t$ × EAR_t			0.45 (0.28)	0.17 (0.13)						-0.32 (0.50)	0.28 (0.50)			
EAR_t				-0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)				0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)		
$election_t \times EAR_t$			0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)				-0.05 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.02)		
$election (other year)_t$						-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	
$growth_{t-1}$ × $election (other year)_t$							0.06 (0.05)	0.07 (0.05)	0.07 (0.05)	0.03 (0.12)	0.03 (0.12)	0.06 (0.05)	0.06 (0.05)	
$election$ $(executive + legislative)_t$												0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	
$growth_{t-1} \times election$ $(executive + legislative)_t$												0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	
$GDP per capita_{t-1} (\log)$										-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	
$oil and gas$ $per capita_{t-1} (\log)$										-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.06 (0.05)	0.06 (0.05)	
$proportion of$ $democratic neighbors_t$										-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	
observations	4052	4052	4052	4052	3814	4052	4052	3814	4052	4052	4052	4052	4052	
regimes	257	257	257	257	243	257	257	243	257	257	257	257	257	
countries	115	115	115	115	114	115	115	114	115	115	115	115	115	

OIS regression estimates. Specifications replicate those reported in Table 1, but using $end (insider)_t$ as the outcome variable. All specifications include regime and year fixed effects, as well as a duration polynomial of order 3. Robust standard errors clustered by regime in parentheses.

(a) $growth_{t-1} | election_t$ (main results)



(b) $growth_{t-1} | election_t$ (non-competitive and legislative)



(c) $election_t | growth_{t-1}$ (main results)





Figure A2: Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of the marginal effects of $growth_{t-1}$ or $election_t$ on the probability of $end (insider)_t$, based on the results reported in Table A8. Panel (a) is based on models 4 and 5 (for actual elections) or 7 and 8 (for scheduled elections); panel (b), on models 4, 9 and 11 (actual) or 7, 10 and 12 (scheduled); while results in panel (c) correspond to models 4 and 7, respectively.

Table A9: Alternative outcomes (2): Outsider-driven end


	actual elections						scheduled elections						non-competitive			legislative		
	growth only	election only	growth × election		growth × el. × EAR		growth × el. × EAR	election only	growth × election		growth × election		actual	sched.	actual	sched.	actual	sched.
			(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)			(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)		
$growth_{t-1}$	-0.11 (0.05)		-0.09 (0.04)	-0.07 (0.03)	-0.07 (0.04)		-0.06 (0.03)		-0.06 (0.03)	-0.12 (0.05)	-0.12 (0.05)	-0.08 (0.04)	-0.08 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.03)				
$election_t$	0.07 (0.02)	0.08 (0.02)	0.09 (0.04)	0.09 (0.04)	0.11 (0.02)	0.12 (0.02)	0.12 (0.03)	0.12 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.01)	-0.04 (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	0.05 (0.02)				
$growth_{t-1} \times election_t$	-0.57 (0.35)	0.00 (0.68)	-0.01 (0.82)	-0.01 (0.82)	-0.01 (0.42)	-0.01 (0.42)	-0.90 (0.45)	-0.90 (0.45)	-0.87 (0.45)	-0.12 (0.18)	-0.12 (0.18)	-0.04 (0.17)	0.08 (0.08)	-0.34 (0.25)				
$growth_{t-1} \times EAR_t$			-0.09 (0.14)	-0.09 (0.15)	-0.07 (0.15)		-0.07 (0.11)		-0.07 (0.11)	0.02 (0.11)	0.02 (0.11)	-0.18 (0.16)		-0.18 (0.16)				
$growth_{t-1} \times election_t \times EAR_t$			-0.88 (0.84)	-0.88 (0.97)	-0.80 (0.97)		-0.80 (0.97)		-0.80 (0.97)	0.19 (0.19)	0.19 (0.19)	0.27 (0.28)						
EAR_t			0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.03 (0.01)		0.03 (0.01)		0.03 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.03 (0.01)	0.03 (0.01)	0.03 (0.01)	0.03 (0.01)	0.03 (0.01)	0.03 (0.01)	0.03 (0.01)
$election_t \times EAR_t$			0.00 (0.05)	0.00 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.05)		-0.01 (0.05)		-0.01 (0.05)	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
$election (other year)_t$										0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)
$growth_{t-1} \times election (other year)_t$										-0.04 (0.12)	-0.04 (0.12)	-0.02 (0.12)	0.09 (0.10)	0.09 (0.10)	-0.04 (0.12)			
$election (executive + legislative)_t$																		
$growth_{t-1} \times election (executive + legislative)_t$																		
$GDP per capita_{t-1} (\log)$										0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)						
$oil and gas per capita_{t-1} (\log)$										-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)						
$proportion of democratic neighbors_t$										0.08 (0.05)	0.08 (0.05)	0.08 (0.05)						
observations	4052	4052	4052	4052	4052	3814	4052	4052	4052	3814	4052	4052	4052	4052	4052	4052	4052	4052
regimes	257	257	257	257	257	243	257	257	257	243	257	257	257	257	257	257	257	257
countries	115	115	115	115	115	114	115	115	115	114	115	115	115	115	115	115	115	115

OIS regression estimates. Specifications replicate those reported in Table 1, but using $end(\text{outsider})_t$ as the outcome variable. All specifications include regime and year fixed effects, as well as a duration polynomial of order 3. Robust standard errors clustered by regime in parentheses.

(a) $growth_{t-1} | election_t$ (main results)



(b) $growth_{t-1} | election_t$ (non-competitive and legislative)



(c) $election_t | growth_{t-1}$ (main results)





Figure A3: Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of the marginal effects of $growth_{t-1}$ or $election_t$ on the probability of $end (outsider)_t$, based on the results reported in Table A9. Panel (a) is based on models 4 and 5 (for actual elections) or 7 and 8 (for scheduled elections); panel (b), on models 4, 9 and 11 (actual) or 7, 10 and 12 (scheduled); while results in panel (c) correspond to models 4 and 7, respectively.

Table A10: Alternative outcomes (3): Voluntary end


	actual elections						scheduled elections						non-competitive			legislative	
	growth only	election only	growth × election		growth × el. × EAR		growth × el. × EAR	election only	growth × election		growth × election		actual	sched.	actual	sched.	
			(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)			(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	
$growth_{t-1}$	-0.00 (0.02)		-0.00 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)		
$election_t$		0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)		
$growth_{t-1} \times election_t$			-0.05 (0.09)	0.11 (0.23)	0.16 (0.28)				-0.03 (0.09)	-0.03 (0.10)	-0.03 (0.10)	-0.18 (0.23)	0.09 (0.08)	0.09 (0.08)	0.05 (0.06)		
$growth_{t-1} \times EAR_t$					0.11 (0.23)	0.16 (0.28)											
$growth_{t-1} \times election_t$ × EAR_t					0.06 (0.05)	0.08 (0.05)											
EAR_t							0.06 (0.05)	0.08 (0.05)									
$election_t \times EAR_t$									-0.23 (0.26)	-0.28 (0.31)							
$election_t \times election_t$										-0.23 (0.26)	-0.28 (0.31)						
$oil and gas$												-0.20 (0.24)					
$per capita_{t-1} (\log)$													-0.00 (0.00)				
$proportion of$														-0.00 (0.00)			
$democratic neighbors_t$															-0.01 (0.01)		
observations	4052	4052	4052	4052	4052	3814	4052	4052	3814	4052	4052	4052	4052	4052	4052	4052	
regimes	257	257	257	257	257	243	257	257	243	257	257	257	257	257	257	257	
countries	115	115	115	115	115	114	115	115	114	115	115	115	115	115	115	115	

OLS regression estimates. Specifications replicate those reported in Table 1, but using $end(voluntary)_t$ as the outcome variable. All specifications include regime and year fixed effects, as well as a duration polynomial of order 3. Robust standard errors clustered by regime in parentheses.

(a) $growth_{t-1} | election_t$ (main results)



(b) $growth_{t-1} | election_t$ (non-competitive and legislative)



(c) $election_t | growth_{t-1}$ (main results)





Figure A4: Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of the marginal effects of $growth_{t-1}$ or $election_t$ on the probability of $end (voluntary)_t$, based on the results reported in Table A10. Panel (a) is based on models 4 and 5 (for actual elections) or 7 and 8 (for scheduled elections); panel (b), on models 4, 9 and 11 (actual) or 7, 10 and 12 (scheduled); while results in panel (c) correspond to models 4 and 7, respectively.

Table A11: Alternative outcomes (4): Protest(s)


	actual elections						scheduled elections						non-competitive						legislative	
	growth only	election only	growth × election		growth × el. × EAR		growth × only	growth × election		growth × election		growth × only	growth × election		growth × only	actual		sched.		
			(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)		(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)		(9)	(10)		(11)	(12)	(11)	(12)	
$growth_{t-1}$	-0.39 (0.12)		-0.38 (0.12)	-0.38 (0.13)	-0.43 (0.14)		-0.38 (0.13)	-0.43 (0.14)		-0.43 (0.14)	-0.49 (0.13)		-0.49 (0.13)	-0.37 (0.13)		-0.37 (0.13)	-0.37 (0.13)			
$election_t$	0.07 (0.03)	0.07 (0.04)	0.05 (0.06)	0.05 (0.06)	0.04 (0.05)	0.05 (0.05)		0.05 (0.05)	0.04 (0.05)	0.05 (0.05)	0.04 (0.05)		0.07 (0.07)	0.07 (0.07)		0.04 (0.05)	0.04 (0.05)	0.03 (0.05)	0.02 (0.05)	
$growth_{t-1} \times election_t$	-0.18 (0.53)	0.21 (0.83)	0.21 (0.83)	0.10 (1.03)	0.10 (1.03)	0.12 (0.41)		0.12 (0.41)	0.24 (0.44)	0.24 (0.44)	0.24 (0.82)		1.74 (0.82)	1.74 (0.82)		-0.27 (0.62)	-0.27 (0.62)	-1.33 (0.63)		
$growth_{t-1} \times EAR_t$			0.02 (0.33)	0.02 (0.33)	0.14 (0.33)		0.02 (0.33)	0.14 (0.33)		0.02 (0.24)	0.55 (0.24)		0.55 (0.24)	0.11 (0.32)		0.11 (0.32)	0.11 (0.32)			
$growth_{t-1} \times election_t$			-0.85 (1.07)	-0.85 (1.25)	-0.83 (1.25)		-0.85 (1.07)	-0.83 (1.25)		-0.85 (1.25)	-2.22 (1.04)		-2.22 (1.04)	-1.41 (0.91)						
EAR_t			-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)		-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)		-0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)		0.02 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)		-0.00 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.03)			
$election_t \times EAR_t$			0.06 (0.07)	0.06 (0.07)	0.06 (0.07)		0.06 (0.07)	0.06 (0.07)		0.06 (0.07)	-0.08 (0.09)		-0.08 (0.09)	-0.08 (0.08)						
$election (other year)_t$							-0.03 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)		-0.03 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.04)		-0.03 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)		0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.03)		
$growth_{t-1} \times election (other year)_t$										-0.07 (0.36)	0.03 (0.37)		0.03 (0.37)	0.67 (0.22)		0.67 (0.22)	0.67 (0.22)	0.20 (0.34)	0.20 (0.34)	
$election (executive + legislative)_t$																		0.03 (0.05)	0.03 (0.05)	
$growth_{t-1} \times election (executive + legislative)_t$																		-0.30 (0.44)	-0.30 (0.44)	
$GDP per capita_{t-1} (\log)$												0.00 (0.04)	0.00 (0.04)							
$oil and gas per capita_{t-1} (\log)$												-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)							
$proportion of democratic neighbors_t$												0.29 (0.10)	0.29 (0.10)							
observations	3538	3538	3538	3538	3538	3538	3309	3538	3538	3309	3538	3309	3538	3538	3538	3538	3538	3538	3538	
regimes	233	233	233	233	233	233	219	233	233	219	233	219	233	233	233	233	233	233	233	
countries	115	115	115	115	115	115	114	115	115	114	115	115	115	115	115	115	115	115	115	

OLS regression estimates. Specifications replicate those reported in Table 1, but using protest_t as the outcome variable. All specifications include regime and year fixed effects, as well as a duration polynomial of order 3. Robust standard errors clustered by regime in parentheses.

(a) $growth_{t-1} | election_t$ (main results)



(b) $growth_{t-1} | election_t$ (non-competitive and legislative)



(c) $election_t | growth_{t-1}$ (main results)





Figure A5: Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of the marginal effects of $growth_{t-1}$ or $election_t$ on the probability of $protest_t$, based on the results reported in Table A11. Panel (a) is based on models 4 and 5 (for actual elections) or 7 and 8 (for scheduled elections); panel (b), on models 4, 9 and 11 (actual) or 7, 10 and 12 (scheduled); while results in panel (c) correspond to models 4 and 7, respectively.

Table A12: Alternative outcomes (5): Violent protest(s)


	actual elections				scheduled elections				non-competitive				legislative		
	growth only	election only	growth × election		growth × el. × EAR		election only	growth × election	growth × election	actual	sched.	(11)	(12)		
			(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)									
$growth_{t-1}$	-0.10 (0.06)		-0.06 (0.06)	-0.06 (0.06)	-0.13 (0.06)	-0.07 (0.06)		-0.13 (0.06)	-0.11 (0.07)	-0.10 (0.07)	-0.08 (0.07)	-0.06 (0.07)			
$election_t$	0.05 (0.02)		0.06 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.05 (0.04)	0.03 (0.02)		0.04 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.03)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)		
$growth_{t-1} \times election_t$			-0.86 (0.34)	-0.81 (0.54)	-0.92 (0.64)	-0.56 (0.35)		-0.42 (0.34)	0.68 (0.53)	-0.10 (0.24)	-0.14 (0.51)	-0.40 (0.38)			
$growth_{t-1} \times EAR_t$				0.03 (0.11)	0.07 (0.11)				0.08 (0.15)			-0.03 (0.13)			
$growth_{t-1} \times election_t$ × EAR_t				-0.20 (0.79)	0.11 (0.83)				-0.91 (0.61)			-0.24 (0.64)			
EAR_t				-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)				0.01 (0.02)			-0.00 (0.02)			
$election_t \times EAR_t$				0.03 (0.04)	0.02 (0.05)				-0.00 (0.04)			-0.04 (0.04)			
$election (other year)_t$						-0.01 (0.02)		-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)		0.00 (0.02)			
$growth_{t-1}$ × $election (other year)_t$								-0.01 (0.13)	0.03 (0.13)	0.01 (0.18)		-0.04 (0.14)			
$election$												0.04 (0.04)			
$(executive + legislative)_t$													(0.03)		
$growth_{t-1} \times election$													-0.57 (0.39)		
$(executive + legislative)_t$ $(executive + legislative)_t$															
$GDP per capita_{t-1} (\log)$													0.03 (0.03)		
$oil and gas$ $per capita_{t-1} (\log)$													-0.01 (0.01)		
$proportion of$ $democratic neighbors_t$													0.03 (0.03)		
observations	3538	3538	3538	3538	3309	3538	3538	3309	3538	3538	3538	3538	3538	3538	
regimes	233	233	233	233	219	233	233	219	233	233	233	233	233	233	
countries	115	115	115	115	0	115	115	0	115	115	115	115	115	115	

OIS regression estimates. Specifications replicate those reported in Table 1, but using $violent protest_t$ as the outcome variable. All specifications include regime and year fixed effects, as well as a duration polynomial of order 3. Robust standard errors clustered by regime in parentheses.

(a) $growth_{t-1} | election_t$ (main results)



(b) $growth_{t-1} | election_t$ (non-competitive and legislative)



(c) $election_t | growth_{t-1}$ (main results)





Figure A6: Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of the marginal effects of $growth_{t-1}$ or $election_t$ on the probability of *violent protest*, based on the results reported in Table A12. Panel (a) is based on models 4 and 5 (for actual elections) or 7 and 8 (for scheduled elections); panel (b), on models 4, 9 and 11 (actual) or 7, 10 and 12 (scheduled); while results in panel (c) correspond to models 4 and 7, respectively.

Table A13: Alternative outcomes (6): Coup attempt


	actual elections				scheduled elections				non-competitive		legislative	
	growth only	election only	growth ×	growth ×	election only	growth ×	growth ×	actual	sched.	actual	sched.	
			el. × EAR	el. × EAR		el. × EAR	el. × EAR					
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	
$growth_{t-1}$	-0.18 (0.09)	-0.17 (0.09)	-0.13 (0.10)	-0.15 (0.10)	-0.13 (0.10)	-0.14 (0.10)	-0.19 (0.10)	-0.19 (0.10)	-0.14 (0.10)	-0.14 (0.10)	-0.13 (0.10)	
$election_t$	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.00 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.05)	0.02 (0.05)	0.02 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.03)	
$growth_{t-1} \times election_t$	-0.19 (0.20)	-0.33 (0.39)	-0.33 (0.34)	-0.02 (0.38)	-0.70 (0.40)	-0.52 (0.40)	-0.58 (0.38)	-0.16 (0.38)	-0.16 (0.38)	-0.01 (0.25)	-0.33 (0.41)	
$growth_{t-1} \times EAR_t$			-0.16 (0.23)	-0.13 (0.23)				0.01 (0.20)	0.01 (0.20)	-0.12 (0.19)		
$growth_{t-1} \times election_t$ × EAR_t			0.15 (0.46)	-0.16 (0.43)				0.94 (1.09)		-0.64 (0.68)		
EAR_t			-0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)				0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)		
$election_t \times EAR_t$			0.05 (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)				-0.04 (0.05)		-0.01 (0.04)		
$election (other year)_t$					-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)		0.00 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)		
$growth_{t-1}$ × $election (other year)_t$						-0.08 (0.22)	-0.05 (0.22)		0.12 (0.19)	-0.01 (0.18)		
$election$										0.03 (0.03)		
$(executive + legislative)_t$										-0.94 (0.48)		
$growth_{t-1} \times election$												
$(executive + legislative)_t$												
$GDP per capita_{t-1} (\log)$												
$oil and gas$												
$per capita_{t-1} (\log)$												
$proportion of$												
$democratic neighbors_t$												
observations	4037	4037	4037	3817	4037	4037	3817	4037	4037	4037	4037	
regimes	255	255	255	244	255	255	244	255	255	255	255	
countries	115	115	115	114	115	115	114	115	115	115	115	

OIS regression estimates. Specifications replicate those reported in Table 1, but using $coup attempt_t$ as the outcome variable. All specifications include regime and year fixed effects, as well as a duration polynomial of order 3. Robust standard errors clustered by regime in parentheses.

(a) $growth_{t-1} | election_t$ (main results)



(b) $growth_{t-1} | election_t$ (non-competitive and legislative)



(c) $election_t | growth_{t-1}$ (main results)





Figure A7: Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of the marginal effects of $growth_{t-1}$ or $election_t$ on the probability of $coup attempt_t$, based on the results reported in Table A13. Panel (a) is based on models 4 and 5 (for actual elections) or 7 and 8 (for scheduled elections); panel (b), on models 4, 9 and 11 (actual) or 7, 10 and 12 (scheduled); while results in panel (c) correspond to models 4 and 7, respectively.

Table A14: Alternative outcomes (7): Successful coup


	actual elections				scheduled elections				non-competitive				legislative		
	growth only	election only	growth × election		growth × el. × EAR		growth × only		election	growth × election		actual	sched.	actual	sched.
			(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)		(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
$growth_{t-1}$	-0.07 (0.05)		-0.07 (0.05)	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.05)		-0.06 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.05)		-0.05 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.05)	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.05)	
$election_t$	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)		0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)		-0.01 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	0.02 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
$growth_{t-1} \times election_t$	-0.11 (0.13)	-0.42 (0.30)	-0.13 (0.17)	-0.13 (0.17)	-0.43 (0.38)		-0.55 (0.40)	-0.43 (0.40)		0.49 (0.52)	-0.57 (0.36)	-0.19 (0.17)	-0.11 (0.17)	-0.11 (0.11)	
$growth_{t-1} \times EAR_t$			-0.02 (0.13)	-0.02 (0.13)	-0.02 (0.14)		-0.02 (0.14)	-0.02 (0.14)		-0.18 (0.16)	-0.18 (0.16)	-0.18 (0.16)	-0.02 (0.13)	-0.02 (0.13)	
$growth_{t-1} \times election_t$ × EAR_t			0.47 (0.32)	0.19 (0.22)	0.47 (0.22)		0.19 (0.22)	0.19 (0.22)		-0.31 (0.53)	-0.31 (0.53)	-0.31 (0.53)	0.29 (0.21)		
EAR_t			-0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)		0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)		0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)
$election_t \times EAR_t$			0.01 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)		0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)		-0.03 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
$election (other year)_t$							-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)		-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)
$growth_{t-1}$ × $election (other year)_t$										0.08 (0.07)	0.09 (0.08)	0.09 (0.08)	-0.07 (0.15)	-0.07 (0.15)	0.09 (0.07)
$election$															0.02 (0.02)
$(executive + legislative)_t$															-0.77 (0.48)
$growth_{t-1} \times election$															
$(executive + legislative)_t$ $(executive + legislative)_t$															
$GDP \text{ per capita}_{t-1} (\log)$															
$oil \text{ and gas}$															
$\text{per capita}_{t-1} (\log)$															
$\text{proportion of democratic neighbors}_t$															
observations	4037	4037	4037	4037	3817	4037	4037	3817	4037	4037	4037	4037	4037	4037	4037
regimes	255	255	255	255	244	255	255	244	255	255	255	255	255	255	255
countries	115	115	115	115	114	115	115	114	115	115	115	115	115	115	115

OLS regression estimates. Specifications replicate those reported in Table 1, but using *successful coup_t* as the outcome variable. All specifications include regime and year fixed effects, as well as a duration polynomial of order 3. Robust standard errors clustered by regime in parentheses.

(a) $growth_{t-1} | election_t$ (main results)



(b) $growth_{t-1} | election_t$ (non-competitive and legislative)



(c) $election_t | growth_{t-1}$ (main results)





Figure A8: Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of the marginal effects of $growth_{t-1}$ or $election_t$ on the probability of *successful coup_t*, based on the results reported in Table A14. Panel (a) is based on models 4 and 5 (for actual elections) or 7 and 8 (for scheduled elections); panel (b), on models 4, 9 and 11 (actual) or 7, 10 and 12 (scheduled); while results in panel (c) correspond to models 4 and 7, respectively.

Table A15: Alternative outcomes (8): Unsuccessful coup


	actual elections				scheduled elections				non-competitive				legislative		
	growth only	election only	growth × election	growth × el. × EAR	growth × el. × EAR	election only	growth × election	growth × el. × EAR	actual	sched.	actual	sched.	actual	sched.	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)			
$growth_{t-1}$	-0.11 (0.08)	-0.11 (0.08)	-0.08 (0.09)	-0.10 (0.09)	-0.08 (0.09)	-0.10 (0.09)	-0.13 (0.09)	-0.14 (0.09)	-0.09 (0.09)	-0.09 (0.09)	-0.09 (0.09)	-0.09 (0.09)			
$election_t$	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.04)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)	0.00 (0.02)		
$growth_{t-1} \times election_t$	-0.10 (0.16)	0.08 (0.26)	0.08 (0.30)	-0.16 (0.19)	-0.06 (0.19)	-0.06 (0.19)	-1.01 (1.00)	-1.01 (0.33)	0.21 (0.16)	0.21 (0.40)	-0.21 (0.16)	-0.21 (0.40)			
$growth_{t-1} \times EAR_t$			-0.10 (0.20)	-0.07 (0.20)	-0.10 (0.20)	-0.07 (0.20)	-0.07 (0.17)	0.07 (0.17)	-0.06 (0.15)	-0.06 (0.15)	-0.06 (0.15)	-0.06 (0.15)			
$growth_{t-1} \times election_t$ × EAR_t			-0.31 (0.34)	-0.32 (0.38)	-0.31 (0.34)	-0.32 (0.38)	1.29 (1.05)	1.29 (1.05)	-0.98 (0.63)	-0.98 (0.63)					
EAR_t			-0.02 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)			
$election_t \times EAR_t$			0.03 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)	
$election (other year)_t$							-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	
$growth_{t-1}$ × $election (other year)_t$							-0.13 (0.20)	-0.13 (0.20)	-0.11 (0.21)	-0.11 (0.21)	0.15 (0.15)	0.15 (0.15)	-0.06 (0.16)	-0.06 (0.16)	
$election$ (executive + legislative) _t													0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	
$growth_{t-1} \times election$ (executive + legislative) _t													-0.18 (0.02)	-0.18 (0.02)	
$GDP \text{ per capita}_{t-1} (\log)$							-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)			-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	
$oil \text{ and gas}$ $\text{per capita}_{t-1} (\log)$							-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)			-0.06 (0.16)	-0.06 (0.16)	
proportion of $\text{democratic neighbors}_t$							0.04 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)			0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	
observations	4037	4037	4037	4037	3817	4037	4037	3817	4037	4037	4037	4037	4037	4037	
regimes	255	255	255	255	244	255	255	244	255	255	255	255	255	255	
countries	115	115	115	115	114	115	115	114	115	115	115	115	115	115	

OLS regression estimates. Specifications replicate those reported in Table 1, but using *unsuccessful coup* as the outcome variable. All specifications include regime and year fixed effects, as well as a duration polynomial of order 3. Robust standard errors clustered by regime in parentheses.

(a) $growth_{t-1} | election_t$ (main results)



(b) $growth_{t-1} | election_t$ (non-competitive and legislative)



(c) $election_t | growth_{t-1}$ (main results)





Figure A9: Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of the marginal effects of $growth_{t-1}$ or $election_t$ on the probability of *unsuccessful coup_t*, based on the results reported in Table A15. Panel (a) is based on models 4 and 5 (for actual elections) or 7 and 8 (for scheduled elections); panel (b), on models 4, 9 and 11 (actual) or 7, 10 and 12 (scheduled); while results in panel (c) correspond to models 4 and 7, respectively.

Table A16: Alternative outcomes (9): Another autocracy at $t + 1$


	actual elections						scheduled elections						non-competitive			legislative	
	growth only	election only	growth \times election	growth \times el. \times EAR	growth \times el. \times EAR	only	election	growth \times election	growth \times election	actual	sched.	actual	sched.	(11)	(12)		
			(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(11)	(12)	
$growth_{t-1}$	-0.07 (0.04)		-0.08 (0.04)	-0.08 (0.05)	-0.08 (0.05)		-0.08 (0.05)	-0.08 (0.05)	-0.08 (0.05)	-0.07 (0.04)	-0.07 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.07 (0.05)		
$election_t$		-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)		-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.03 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	
$growth_{t-1} \times election_t$		0.11 (0.08)	0.15 (0.08)	0.15 (0.15)	0.17 (0.16)		0.17 (0.09)	0.17 (0.09)	0.17 (0.10)	0.20 (0.10)	0.56 (0.56)	-0.28 (0.31)	-0.21 (0.31)	-0.36 (0.14)	-0.36 (0.25)	-0.36 (0.25)	
$growth_{t-1} \times EAR_t$				-0.01 (0.10)	0.00 (0.11)					-0.10 (0.13)		-0.10 (0.13)		-0.02 (0.10)	-0.02 (0.10)	-0.02 (0.10)	
$growth_{t-1} \times election_t$ $\times EAR_t$				-0.06 (0.18)	-0.07 (0.19)					-0.37 (0.57)				0.37 (0.23)			
EAR_t				-0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)					0.01 (0.01)		0.01 (0.01)		-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	
$election_t \times EAR_t$				0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)					-0.06 (0.05)				-0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	
$election (other year)_t$						-0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)		0.00 (0.01)		0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	
$growth_{t-1}$ $\times election (other year)_t$							-0.03 (0.11)	-0.03 (0.11)	-0.02 (0.11)		-0.03 (0.12)		-0.03 (0.12)	0.01 (0.10)	0.01 (0.10)	0.01 (0.10)	
$election$														-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	
$(executive + legislative)_t$																	
$growth_{t-1} \times election$																	
$(executive + legislative)_t$ $(executive + legislative)_t$																	
$GDP per capita_{t-1} (\log)$														-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	
$oil and gas$														-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.01 (0.01)	
$per capita_{t-1} (\log)$																	
$proportion of$																	
$democratic neighbors_t$														0.01 (0.03)	0.24 (0.11)	0.00 (0.01)	
observations	4061	4061	4061	4061	3823	4061	4061	3823	4061	4061	4061	4061	4061	4061	4061	4061	
regimes	258	258	258	258	244	258	258	244	258	258	258	258	258	258	258	258	
countries	115	115	115	115	114	115	115	114	115	115	115	115	115	115	115	115	

OLS regression estimates. Specifications replicate those reported in Table 1, but using *other autocracy* _{$t+1$ as the outcome variable. All specifications include regime and year fixed effects, as well as a duration polynomial of order 3. Robust standard errors clustered by regime in parentheses.}

(a) $growth_{t-1} | election_t$ (main results)



(b) $growth_{t-1} | election_t$ (non-competitive and legislative)



(c) $election_t | growth_{t-1}$ (main results)





Figure A10: Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of the marginal effects of $growth_{t-1}$ or $election_t$ on the probability of $other autocracy_{t+1}$, based on the results reported in Table A16. Panel (a) is based on models 4 and 5 (for actual elections) or 7 and 8 (for scheduled elections); panel (b), on models 4, 9 and 11 (actual) or 7, 10 and 12 (scheduled); while results in panel (c) correspond to models 4 and 7, respectively.

Table A17: Alternative outcomes (10): Democracy (or provisional government) at $t + 1$


	actual elections						scheduled elections						non-competitive			legislative	
	growth only	election only	growth \times election		growth \times el. \times EAR		growth \times el. \times EAR only	election		growth \times election		growth \times election		actual	sched.	actual	sched.
			(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)		(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)			
$growth_{t-1}$	-0.07 (0.04)		-0.03 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.03)		-0.03 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.08 (0.05)	-0.10 (0.05)	-0.10 (0.05)	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.03)	
$election_t$	0.09 (0.02)	0.10 (0.02)	0.12 (0.04)	0.12 (0.04)	0.10 (0.04)		0.10 (0.03)	0.13 (0.03)	0.12 (0.03)	0.12 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	
$growth_{t-1} \times election_t$	-0.87 (0.35)	-0.45 (0.74)	-0.45 (0.82)	-0.12 (0.40)	-1.20 (0.42)		-1.20 (0.42)	-0.99 (0.42)	-0.99 (0.42)	-0.99 (0.42)	-0.18 (0.19)	-0.18 (0.19)	-0.18 (0.19)	0.10 (0.10)	0.10 (0.10)	-0.09 (0.14)	
$growth_{t-1} \times EAR_t$		0.03 (0.13)	0.08 (0.13)		0.08 (0.13)						0.07 (0.11)	0.07 (0.11)	0.07 (0.11)	-0.05 (0.14)	-0.05 (0.14)		
$growth_{t-1} \times election_t \times EAR_t$		-0.64 (0.89)	-0.89 (0.96)								0.19 (0.21)	0.19 (0.21)	0.19 (0.21)	0.02 (0.23)	0.02 (0.23)		
EAR_t		0.01 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)		0.01 (0.01)						0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)		
$election_t \times EAR_t$		-0.01 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.05)		-0.01 (0.05)						0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.02)		
$election (other year)_t$					0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)				0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)		
$growth_{t-1} \times election (other year)_t$							0.11 (0.08)	0.15 (0.09)	0.15 (0.09)	0.15 (0.09)	0.18 (0.10)	0.18 (0.10)	0.18 (0.10)	0.07 (0.10)	0.07 (0.10)		
$election (executive + legislative)_t$														0.14 (0.14)	0.14 (0.14)		
$growth_{t-1} \times election (executive + legislative)_t$														-1.29 (0.46)	-1.29 (0.46)		
$GDP \text{ per capita}_{t-1} (\log)$											0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)		
$oil \text{ and gas per capita}_{t-1} (\log)$											-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.07 (0.10)	0.07 (0.10)		
$proportion \text{ of democratic neighbors}_t$											0.09 (0.04)	0.09 (0.04)	0.10 (0.04)	0.14 (0.04)	0.14 (0.04)		
observations	4061	4061	4061	3823	4061	4061	3823	4061	4061	4061	4061	4061	4061	4061	4061	4061	
regimes	258	258	258	258	244	244	258	258	258	244	244	258	258	258	258	258	
countries	115	115	115	115	114	114	115	115	115	114	114	115	115	115	115	115	

OIS regression estimates. Specifications replicate those reported in Table 1, but using $democracy'_{t+1}$ as the outcome variable. All specifications include regime and year fixed effects, as well as a duration polynomial of order 3. Robust standard errors clustered by regime in parentheses.

(a) $growth_{t-1} | election_t$ (main results)



(b) $growth_{t-1} | election_t$ (non-competitive and legislative)



(c) $election_t | growth_{t-1}$ (main results)




Figure A11: Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of the marginal effects of $growth_{t-1}$ or $election_t$ on the probability of $democracy_{t+1}$, based on the results reported in Table A17. Panel (a) is based on models 4 and 5 (for actual elections) or 7 and 8 (for scheduled elections); panel (b), on models 4, 9 and 11 (actual) or 7, 10 and 12 (scheduled); while results in panel (c) correspond to models 4 and 7, respectively.

Table A18: Alternative Outcomes (11): Electoral manipulation

	harassment (NELDA)			free and fair (V-Dem)			irregularities (V-Dem)			intimidation (V-Dem)			
(a) growth _{t-1} only	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	
growth _{t-1}	-1.29 (1.52)	-0.84 (1.61)	0.58 (0.84)	2.08 (1.87)	0.89 (1.61)	0.22 (0.72)	-3.11 (2.07)	-0.73 (1.15)	0.27 (0.73)	-0.53 (1.56)	0.64 (1.53)	-0.40 (0.71)	
GDP per capita _{t-1} (log)		-0.17 (0.17)		0.29 (0.12)			-0.46 (0.17)			-0.28 (0.13)			
oil and gas		-0.04 (0.04)		-0.08 (0.04)			0.10 (0.05)			0.03 (0.03)			
proportion of democratic neighbors _t		-0.04 (0.78)		0.59 (0.74)			-1.19 (0.72)			-0.67 (0.66)			
party-based regime		0.11 (0.28)		-0.05 (0.24)			-0.08 (0.21)			0.28 (0.24)			
military regime		0.28 (0.31)		-0.37 (0.29)			0.43 (0.26)			0.17 (0.26)			
personalist regime		0.48 (0.29)		-0.71 (0.25)			0.79 (0.22)			0.71 (0.26)			
Cold War _t		-0.10 (0.33)		-0.29 (0.26)			-0.20 (0.26)			-0.09 (0.27)			
(Intercept)	-0.32 (0.11)	1.19 (1.46)		-0.76 (0.13)	-2.86 (1.08)		0.97 (0.13)	4.79 (1.39)		0.88 (0.11)	2.97 (1.06)		
(b) Conditioning on breakdown _t													
growth _{t-1}	-1.69 (1.69)	-1.77 (1.90)	0.55 (0.89)	3.50 (1.95)	2.58 (1.61)	0.35 (0.70)	-4.38 (2.25)	-2.08 (1.17)	0.28 (0.76)	-1.50 (1.65)	-0.72 (1.57)	-0.41 (0.70)	
breakdown _t		-0.27 (0.25)	-0.45 (0.29)	-0.04 (0.13)	1.07 (0.22)	1.04 (0.22)	0.77 (0.27)	-0.93 (0.21)	-0.95 (0.19)	-0.34 (0.21)	-0.82 (0.19)	-0.82 (0.18)	-0.46 (0.24)
growth _{t-1} × breakdown _t		1.34 (4.23)	3.80 (4.78)	0.25 (2.51)	-3.42 (3.68)	-4.66 (3.73)	4.08 (3.01)	3.21 (3.42)	2.85 (3.24)	-3.33 (2.75)	1.67 (2.94)	3.82 (3.59)	-3.88 (3.74)
GDP per capita _{t-1} (log)		-0.18 (0.18)		0.31 (0.13)			-0.47 (0.17)			-0.29 (0.13)			
oil and gas		-0.04 (0.04)		-0.07 (0.04)			0.09 (0.05)			0.02 (0.03)			
proportion of democratic neighbors _t		-0.04 (0.77)		0.57 (0.61)			-1.16 (0.62)			-0.65 (0.55)			
party-based regime		0.13 (0.29)		-0.05 (0.19)			-0.10 (0.20)			0.28 (0.22)			
military regime		0.32 (0.31)		-0.45 (0.24)			0.49 (0.24)			0.23 (0.24)			
personalist regime		0.47 (0.30)		-0.61 (0.21)			0.67 (0.20)			0.62 (0.26)			
Cold War _t		-0.13 (0.33)		-0.17 (0.22)			-0.31 (0.23)			-0.18 (0.24)			
(Intercept)	-0.28 (0.12)	1.38 (1.51)		-0.93 (0.13)	-3.33 (1.10)		1.11 (0.14)	5.19 (1.40)		1.01 (0.12)	3.35 (1.04)		
specification	probit	probit	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	
region FE	no	yes	no	no	yes	no	no	yes	no	no	yes	no	
regime FE	no	no	yes	no	no	yes	no	no	yes	no	no	yes	
observations	268	254	268	267	253	267	267	253	267	267	253	267	
regimes	105	105	105	104	104	104	104	104	104	104	104	104	
countries	80	80	80	79	79	79	79	79	79	79	79	79	


The dependent variables are alternative measures of electoral manipulation: (i) whether there is evidence that the government harassed the opposition (from NELDA); (ii) whether elections qualify as “free and fair;” (iii) the extent to which there is evidence of *intentional* irregularities by either government or opposition parties; and (iv) whether the government intimidated the opposition (from V-Dem). The sample is restricted to competitive elections for the executive office in autocracies. Robust standard errors clustered by regime in parentheses.

Table A19: Adding controls (1): $GDP \text{ per capita}_{t-1} (\log)$


	actual elections						scheduled elections						non-competitive			legislative	
	growth only	election only	growth \times		growth \times		election only	growth \times		growth \times		actual	sched.	actual	sched.	(11)	(12)
			el.	EAR	el.	EAR		el.	EAR	el.	EAR						
$growth_{t-1}$	-0.16 (0.06)		-0.12 (0.06)	-0.12 (0.06)	-0.13 (0.06)	-0.11 (0.06)		-0.12 (0.06)	-0.12 (0.06)	-0.16 (0.07)	-0.17 (0.07)	-0.14 (0.06)	-0.11 (0.06)				
$election_t$	0.07 (0.02)		0.09 (0.02)	0.10 (0.05)	0.10 (0.05)	0.10 (0.03)		0.12 (0.03)	0.12 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.05)	0.02 (0.05)	0.01 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)				
$growth_{t-1} \times election_t$			-0.74 (0.36)	-0.31 (0.76)	0.03 (0.83)			-1.15 (0.43)	-0.93 (0.45)	0.41 (0.58)	-0.27 (0.37)	-0.06 (0.19)	-0.41 (0.27)				
$growth_{t-1} \times EAR_t$				-0.01 (0.17)	0.05 (0.17)					-0.01 (0.17)	-0.01 (0.17)	-0.11 (0.18)					
$growth_{t-1} \times election_t$ $\times EAR_t$				-0.66 (0.90)	-0.90 (0.97)					-0.22 (0.59)		0.38 (0.35)					
EAR_t				0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)					0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)				
$election_t \times EAR_t$				-0.01 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.06)					-0.03 (0.05)		-0.04 (0.03)					
$election (other year)_t$						-0.00 (0.02)		-0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)		-0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)		0.00 (0.02)			
$growth_{t-1}$ $\times election (other year)_t$								0.08 (0.14)	0.12 (0.15)		0.18 (0.15)		0.08 (0.14)				
$election (executive + legislative)_t$														0.14 (0.04)			
$growth_{t-1} \times election$														-1.22 (-1.22)			
$(executive + legislative)_t$															0.51 (0.51)		
$GDP \text{ per capita}_{t-1} (\log)$	0.00 (0.01)		-0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.02)		0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)				
$oil \text{ and } gas$															0.08 (0.08)		
$\text{per capita}_{t-1} (\log)$																	
$\text{proportion of democratic neighbors}_t$																	
observations	4061	4061	4061	4061	3823	4061	4061	3823	4061	4061	4061	4061	4061	4061	4061	4061	
regimes	258	258	258	258	244	258	258	244	258	258	258	258	258	258	258	258	
countries	115	115	115	115	114	115	115	114	115	115	115	115	115	115	115	115	

OIS regression estimates. The dependent variable is $breakdown_t$. Specifications replicate those reported in Table 1, but controlling for $GDP \text{ per capita}_{t-1} (\log)$. All specifications include regime and year fixed effects, as well as a duration polynomial of order 3. Robust standard errors clustered by regime in parentheses.

(a) $growth_{t-1} | election_t$ (main results)



(b) $growth_{t-1} | election_t$ (non-competitive and legislative)



(c) $election_t | growth_{t-1}$ (main results)





Figure A12: Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of the marginal effects of $growth_{t-1}$ or $election_t$ on the probability of $breakdown_t$, based on the results reported in Table A19. Panel (a) is based on models 4 and 5 (for actual elections) or 7 and 8 (for scheduled elections); panel (b), on models 4, 9 and 11 (actual) or 7, 10 and 12 (scheduled); while results in panel (c) correspond to models 4 and 7, respectively.

Table A20: Adding controls (2): oil and gas per capita_{t-1} sample


	actual elections						scheduled elections						non-competitive					
	growth only	election only	growth × election		growth × el. × EAR		growth × el. × EAR	election only	growth × election		growth × election		actual	sched.	actual	sched.	(11)	(12)
			(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)			(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)		
<i>growth_{t-1}</i>	-0.15 (0.06)		-0.12 (0.06)	-0.13 (0.06)	-0.13 (0.06)	-0.13 (0.06)			-0.13 (0.06)	-0.12 (0.06)	-0.12 (0.06)	-0.15 (0.07)	-0.16 (0.07)	-0.14 (0.07)	-0.13 (0.06)			
<i>election_t</i>		0.07 (0.02)	0.08 (0.02)	0.10 (0.05)	0.10 (0.05)	0.11 (0.03)	0.12 (0.03)		0.12 (0.03)	0.12 (0.03)	0.12 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.05)	0.01 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.05)	-0.00 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)		
<i>growth_{t-1} × election_t</i>		-0.59 (0.37)	0.05 (0.83)	0.05 (0.83)	0.03 (0.83)	0.03 (0.83)	-0.94 (0.45)		-0.94 (0.45)	-0.93 (0.45)	-0.93 (0.45)	0.42 (0.59)	-0.18 (0.37)	0.04 (0.37)	-0.32 (0.16)	0.29 (0.29)		
<i>growth_{t-1} × EAR_t</i>				0.04 (0.17)	0.05 (0.17)	0.04 (0.17)	0.05 (0.17)					-0.03 (0.17)	-0.03 (0.17)	-0.05 (0.18)	-0.05 (0.18)			
<i>growth_{t-1} × election_t</i> × EAR _t				-0.93 (0.98)	-0.90 (0.97)	-0.93 (0.97)	-0.90 (0.97)					-0.19 (0.61)	-0.19 (0.61)	0.40 (0.42)				
<i>EAR_t</i>				0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)					0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)			
<i>election_t × EAR_t</i>				-0.02 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.06)					-0.03 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)			
<i>election (other year)_t</i>						0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)					-0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)		
<i>growth_{t-1}</i> × <i>election (other year)_t</i>									0.12 (0.14)	0.12 (0.14)	0.12 (0.15)	0.12 (0.15)	0.13 (0.16)	0.13 (0.16)	0.12 (0.15)			
<i>election</i> <i>(executive + legislative)_t</i>																0.14 (0.14)		
<i>growth_{t-1} × election</i> <i>(executive + legislative)_t</i>																-0.93 (0.54)		
<i>GDP per capita_{t-1} (log)</i>																		
<i>oil and gas</i> <i>per capita_{t-1} (log)</i>																		
<i>proportion of</i> <i>democratic neighbors_t</i>																		
observations	3823	3823	3823	3823	3823	3823	3823	3823	3823	3823	3823	3823	3823	3823	3823	3823		
regimes	244	244	244	244	244	244	244	244	244	244	244	244	244	244	244	244		
countries	115	115	115	115	115	114	115	115	114	115	115	115	115	115	115	115		

OIS regression estimates. The dependent variable is *breakdown_t*. Specifications replicate those reported in Table 1, but restricting the sample to observations for which there is data for oil and gas per capita_{t-1}. All specifications include regime and year fixed effects, as well as a duration polynomial of order 3. Robust standard errors clustered by regime in parentheses.

(a) $growth_{t-1} | election_t$ (main results)



(b) $growth_{t-1} | election_t$ (non-competitive and legislative)



(c) $election_t | growth_{t-1}$ (main results)





Figure A13: Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of the marginal effects of $growth_{t-1}$ or $election_t$ on the probability of $breakdown_t$, based on the results reported in Table A20. Panel (a) is based on models 4 and 5 (for actual elections) or 7 and 8 (for scheduled elections); panel (b), on models 4, 9 and 11 (actual) or 7, 10 and 12 (scheduled); while results in panel (c) correspond to models 4 and 7, respectively.

Table A21: Adding controls (3): *oil and gas per capita*_{t-1} (log)


	actual elections				scheduled elections				non-competitive				legislative		
	growth only	election only	growth × el.	growth × EAR	growth × el.	growth × EAR	growth × election	growth × election	actual	sched.	actual	sched.	actual	sched.	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)			
<i>growth</i> _{t-1}	-0.14 (0.06)	-0.12 (0.06)	-0.13 (0.06)	-0.13 (0.06)	-0.12 (0.06)	-0.12 (0.06)	-0.12 (0.06)	-0.12 (0.06)	-0.15 (0.07)	-0.16 (0.07)	-0.14 (0.07)	-0.12 (0.06)			
<i>election</i> _t	0.07 (0.02)	0.08 (0.02)	0.10 (0.05)	0.10 (0.05)	0.11 (0.03)	0.13 (0.03)	0.12 (0.03)	0.12 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.05)	0.01 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.05)	-0.00 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)		
<i>growth</i> _{t-1} × <i>election</i> _t	-0.59 (0.37)	0.04 (0.83)	0.04 (0.83)	0.03 (0.83)	-0.94 (0.45)	-0.93 (0.45)	0.41 (0.45)	-0.19 (0.59)	0.41 (0.59)	-0.19 (0.37)	0.04 (0.16)	-0.32 (0.29)			
<i>growth</i> _{t-1} × <i>EAR</i> _t			0.04 (0.17)	0.05 (0.17)	0.04 (0.17)	0.05 (0.17)	-0.02 (0.17)	-0.02 (0.17)	-0.02 (0.17)	-0.02 (0.17)	-0.05 (0.18)				
<i>growth</i> _{t-1} × <i>election</i> _t × <i>EAR</i> _t			-0.92 (0.98)	-0.90 (0.97)	-0.92 (0.97)	-0.90 (0.97)	-0.20 (0.61)	-0.20 (0.61)	-0.20 (0.61)	-0.20 (0.61)	-0.05 (0.41)				
<i>EAR</i> _t			0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.02 (0.02)				
<i>election</i> _t × <i>EAR</i> _t			-0.02 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.03)				
<i>election</i> (<i>other year</i>) _t				0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)			
<i>growth</i> _{t-1} × <i>election</i> (<i>other year</i>) _t					0.12 (0.14)	0.12 (0.14)	0.12 (0.14)	0.12 (0.14)	0.12 (0.14)	0.12 (0.14)	0.13 (0.16)	0.12 (0.15)			
<i>election</i> (executive + legislative) _t												0.14 (0.14)			
<i>growth</i> _{t-1} × <i>election</i> (executive + legislative) _t												-0.93 (0.04)			
<i>GDP per capita</i> _{t-1} (log)															
<i>oil and gas</i> <i>per capita</i> _{t-1} (log)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)		
proportion of democratic neighbors _t															
observations	3823	3823	3823	3823	3823	3823	3823	3823	3823	3823	3823	3823	3823		
regimes	244	244	244	244	244	244	244	244	244	244	244	244	244		
countries	114	114	114	114	114	114	114	114	114	114	114	114	114		

OIS regression estimates. The dependent variable is *breakdown*_t. Specifications replicate those reported in Table 1, but controlling for oil and gas *per capita*_{t-1} (log). All specifications include regime and year fixed effects, as well as a duration polynomial of order 3. Robust standard errors clustered by regime in parentheses.

(a) $growth_{t-1} | election_t$ (main results)



(b) $growth_{t-1} | election_t$ (non-competitive and legislative)



(c) $election_t | growth_{t-1}$ (main results)





Figure A14: Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of the marginal effects of $growth_{t-1}$ or $election_t$ on the probability of $breakdown_t$, based on the results reported in Table A21. Panel (a) is based on models 4 and 5 (for actual elections) or 7 and 8 (for scheduled elections); panel (b), on models 4, 9 and 11 (actual) or 7, 10 and 12 (scheduled); while results in panel (c) correspond to models 4 and 7, respectively.

Table A22: Adding controls (4): proportion of democratic neighbors_t


	actual elections						scheduled elections			non-competitive			legislative	
	growth only	election only	growth ×	growth ×	growth × el. × EAR	el. × EAR	election only	growth ×	growth ×	actual	sched.	actual	sched.	
			election	el.				election	el.					
$growth_{t-1}$	-0.15 (0.06)		-0.12 (0.06)	-0.12 (0.06)	-0.13 (0.06)		-0.11 (0.06)	-0.12 (0.06)	-0.15 (0.07)	-0.16 (0.07)	-0.13 (0.06)	-0.11 (0.06)		
$election_t$	0.07 (0.02)		0.09 (0.02)	0.10 (0.05)	0.10 (0.05)		0.10 (0.03)	0.12 (0.03)	0.12 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.05)	0.02 (0.05)	0.01 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	
$growth_{t-1} \times election_t$			-0.74 (0.36)	-0.31 (0.75)	0.03 (0.83)		-1.15 (0.43)	-0.93 (0.45)	0.41 (0.58)	-0.29 (0.37)	-0.06 (0.19)	-0.42 (0.27)		
$growth_{t-1} \times EAR_t$			0.00 (0.17)	0.05 (0.17)	0.00 (0.17)		0.05 (0.17)		-0.03 (0.17)	-0.03 (0.17)	-0.10 (0.18)			
$growth_{t-1} \times election_t$ × EAR_t			-0.65 (0.90)	-0.90 (0.97)	-0.65 (0.97)		-0.90 (0.97)		-0.22 (0.60)	-0.22 (0.60)	0.38 (0.36)			
EAR_t			0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)		0.02 (0.02)		0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)		
$election_t \times EAR_t$			-0.00 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.06)	-0.00 (0.06)		-0.02 (0.06)		-0.03 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.03)			
$election (other year)_t$							-0.00 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.02)		
$growth_{t-1}$ × $election (other year)_t$							0.08 (0.14)	0.12 (0.15)	0.12 (0.15)	0.15 (0.15)	0.15 (0.15)	0.09 (0.14)		
$election$ $(executive + legislative)_t$												0.14 (0.14)		
$growth_{t-1} \times election$ $(executive + legislative)_t$												-1.21 (0.04)		
$GDP per capita_{t-1} (\log)$							-0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)		
$oil and gas$ $per capita_{t-1} (\log)$							-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.09 (0.09)		
$proportion of$ $democratic neighbors_t$	0.12 (0.06)	0.12 (0.06)	0.12 (0.06)	0.11 (0.06)	0.14 (0.06)		0.12 (0.06)	0.12 (0.06)	0.15 (0.06)	0.13 (0.06)	0.12 (0.06)	0.12 (0.06)		
observations	4061	4061	4061	4061	3823		4061	4061	3823	4061	4061	4061		
regimes	258	258	258	258	244		258	258	244	258	258	258		
countries	115	115	115	115	114		115	115	114	115	115	115		

OIS regression estimates. The dependent variable is $breakdown_t$. Specifications replicate those reported in Table 1, but controlling for *proportion of democratic neighbors_t*. All specifications include regime and year fixed effects, as well as a duration polynomial of order 3. Robust standard errors clustered by regime in parentheses.

(a) $growth_{t-1} | election_t$ (main results)



(b) $growth_{t-1} | election_t$ (non-competitive and legislative)



(c) $election_t | growth_{t-1}$ (main results)





Figure A15: Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of the marginal effects of $growth_{t-1}$ or $election_t$ on the probability of $breakdown_t$, based on the results reported in Table A22. Panel (a) is based on models 4 and 5 (for actual elections) or 7 and 8 (for scheduled elections); panel (b), on models 4, 9 and 11 (actual) or 7, 10 and 12 (scheduled); while results in panel (c) correspond to models 4 and 7, respectively.

Table A23: Adding controls (5): $GDP \text{ per capita}_{t-1} (\log)$, oil and gas $\text{per capita}_{t-1} (\log)$ and proportion of democratic neighbors_t


	actual elections				scheduled elections		non-competitive		legislative	
	growth only	election only	growth × election	growth × el. × EAR	election only	growth × election	actual	sched.	actual	sched.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
$growth_{t-1}$	-0.14 (0.06)	-0.11 (0.06)	-0.13 (0.06)		-0.12 (0.06)	-0.14 (0.07)	-0.15 (0.07)	-0.14 (0.07)	-0.12 (0.06)	
$election_t$		0.07 (0.02)	0.08 (0.02)	0.10 (0.05)	0.10 (0.03)	0.12 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.05)	0.01 (0.05)	-0.00 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)
$growth_{t-1} \times election_t$			-0.59 (0.37)	0.03 (0.83)		-0.93 (0.45)	0.42 (0.60)	-0.22 (0.37)	0.03 (0.16)	-0.32 (0.29)
$growth_{t-1} \times EAR_t$				0.05 (0.17)			-0.06 (0.17)		-0.04 (0.18)	
$growth_{t-1} \times election_t \times EAR_t$				-0.90 (0.97)			-0.20 (0.62)		0.41 (0.42)	
EAR_t					0.02 (0.02)		0.02 (0.01)		0.02 (0.02)	
$election_t \times EAR_t$				-0.02 (0.06)			-0.02 (0.06)		-0.03 (0.03)	
$election (other year)_t$					0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)		-0.01 (0.01)		0.00 (0.02)
$growth_{t-1} \times election (other year)_t$						0.12 (0.15)	0.10 (0.16)			0.13 (0.15)
$election (executive + legislative)_t$										0.14 (0.04)
$growth_{t-1} \times election (executive + legislative)_t$										-0.92 (0.54)
$GDP \text{ per capita}_{t-1} (\log)$	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)
oil and gas $\text{per capita}_{t-1} (\log)$	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)
proportion of democratic neighbors _t	0.15 (0.06)	0.15 (0.06)	0.14 (0.06)	0.15 (0.06)	0.14 (0.06)	0.15 (0.06)	0.16 (0.06)	0.15 (0.06)	0.15 (0.06)	0.15 (0.06)
observations	3823	3823	3823	3823	3823	3823	3823	3823	3823	3823
regimes	244	244	244	244	244	244	244	244	244	244
countries	115	115	115	114	115	114	115	115	115	115

OLS regression estimates. The dependent variable is *breakdown*. Specifications replicate those reported in Table 1, but including all controls simultaneously. All specifications include regime and year fixed effects, as well as a duration polynomial of order 3. Robust standard errors clustered by regime in parentheses.

(a) $growth_{t-1} | election_t$ (main results)



(b) $growth_{t-1} | election_t$ (non-competitive and legislative)



(c) $election_t | growth_{t-1}$ (main results)





Figure A16: Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of the marginal effects of $growth_{t-1}$ or $election_t$ on the probability of $breakdown_t$, based on the results reported in Table A23. Panel (a) is based on model 4 (for actual elections) or 6 (for scheduled elections); panel (b), on models 4, 7 and 9 (actual) or 6, 8 and 10 (scheduled); while results in panel (c) correspond to models 4 and 6, respectively.

Table A24: Alternative breakdown dates


	actual elections						scheduled elections						non-competitive			legislative	
	growth only	election only	growth × election		growth × el. × EAR		election only	growth × election		growth × election		actual	sched.	actual	sched.	(11)	(12)
			(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)		(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)						
$growth_{t-1}$	-0.16 (0.06)		-0.13 (0.06)	-0.13 (0.06)	-0.13 (0.06)	-0.13 (0.06)		-0.12 (0.06)	-0.13 (0.06)	-0.16 (0.06)	-0.17 (0.06)	-0.14 (0.06)	-0.12 (0.06)				
$election_t$	0.05 (0.02)		0.06 (0.02)	0.04 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)		0.06 (0.02)	0.08 (0.03)	0.08 (0.03)	0.07 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)			
$growth_{t-1} \times election_t$	-0.54 (0.31)		-0.45 (0.53)	-0.13 (0.52)	-0.45 (0.42)	-0.13 (0.42)		-0.96 (0.44)	-0.72 (0.44)	1.12 (0.75)	-0.17 (0.36)	-0.07 (0.17)	-0.40 (0.27)				
$growth_{t-1} \times EAR_t$			-0.02 (0.17)	0.03 (0.18)	-0.02 (0.17)	0.03 (0.18)		-0.02 (0.17)	-0.03 (0.17)	-0.03 (0.17)	-0.03 (0.17)	-0.09 (0.17)	-0.09 (0.17)				
$growth_{t-1} \times election_t$ × EAR_t			-0.28 (0.70)	-0.49 (0.70)	-0.28 (0.70)	-0.49 (0.70)		-0.87 (0.75)	-0.87 (0.75)	-0.87 (0.75)	-0.87 (0.75)	-0.25 (0.34)					
EAR_t			0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)		0.00 (0.01)	0.03 (0.01)	0.03 (0.01)	0.03 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)				
$election_t \times EAR_t$			0.04 (0.05)	0.03 (0.05)	0.04 (0.05)	0.03 (0.05)		0.04 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)		
$election_t \times (other year)_t$																	
$growth_{t-1} \times election_t \times (other year)_t$																	
$election_t \times (executive + legislative)_t$																	
$growth_{t-1} \times election_t \times (executive + legislative)_t$																	
$GDP \text{ per capita}_{t-1} (\log)$												0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)				
$oil \text{ and gas}$ $\text{per capita}_{t-1} (\log)$												-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.08 (0.14)	0.08 (0.14)		
proportion of $\text{democratic neighbors}_t$												0.11 (0.06)	0.11 (0.06)	0.10 (0.03)	0.10 (0.03)		
observations	4021	4021	4021	4021	3783	4021	4021	3783	4021	4021	4021	4021	4021	4021	4021	4021	
regimes	256	256	256	256	242	256	256	242	256	256	256	256	256	256	256	256	
countries	115	115	115	115	114	115	115	114	115	115	115	115	115	115	115	115	

OIS regression estimates. The dependent variable is $breakdown_t$. Specifications replicate those reported in Table 1, but coding $breakdown_t$ in a more restrictive way as explained in the text. All specifications include regime and year fixed effects, as well as a duration polynomial of order 3. Robust standard errors clustered by regime in parentheses.

(a) $growth_{t-1} | election_t$ (main results)



(b) $growth_{t-1} | election_t$ (non-competitive and legislative)



(c) $election_t | growth_{t-1}$ (main results)





Figure A17: Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of the marginal effects of $growth_{t-1}$ or $election_t$ on the probability of $breakdown_t$, based on the results reported in Table A24. Panel (a) is based on models 4 and 5 (for actual elections) or 7 and 8 (for scheduled elections); panel (b), on models 4, 9 and 11 (actual) or 7, 10 and 12 (scheduled); while results in panel (c) correspond to models 4 and 7, respectively.

Table A25: Survival models (1): Cloglog link


	legislative											
	non-competitive						scheduled elections					
	actual elections			growth × election			growth × el. × EAR			growth × el. × EAR		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
$growth_{t-1}$	-3.83 (1.31)	-3.67 (1.42)	-3.31 (1.53)	-3.68 (1.67)	-3.29 (1.49)	-3.57 (1.64)	-4.13 (1.42)	-4.28 (1.37)	-3.33 (1.49)	-3.25 (1.51)		
$election_t$	1.13 (0.20)	1.20 (0.21)	1.35 (0.29)	1.37 (0.30)	1.40 (0.24)	1.50 (0.24)	1.43 (0.26)	0.06 (0.72)	0.57 (0.36)	0.01 (0.62)	0.32 (0.41)	
$growth_{t-1} \times election_t$	-4.48 (3.58)	2.18 (4.95)	1.90 (6.11)	-6.15 (3.03)	-6.15 (3.15)	-6.15 (10.80)	4.36 (3.71)	-3.89 (2.18)	2.24 (4.66)	-5.83 (4.69)		
$growth_{t-1} \times EAR_t$												
$growth_{t-1} \times election_t \times EAR_t$												
EAR_t	0.17 (0.24)	0.16 (0.25)	0.16 (0.25)	-1.25 (3.24)	-1.25 (3.18)	-1.25 (3.18)	2.18 (3.05)	2.18 (3.05)	-2.80 (2.62)			
$election_t \times EAR_t$												
$election_t \times (other year)_t$	-15.77 (7.79)	-15.92 (8.66)	-15.92 (8.66)	-12.60 (12.16)	-12.60 (12.16)	-12.60 (12.16)	14.23 (6.79)	14.23 (6.79)				
$growth_{t-1} \times election_t \times (other year)_t$												
$oil and gas per capita_{t-1} (\log)$	-0.15 (0.41)	-0.26 (0.43)	-0.26 (0.43)	-0.15 (0.41)	-0.15 (0.43)	-0.09 (0.26)	-0.08 (0.26)	-0.10 (0.29)	0.09 (0.22)	-0.07 (0.26)		
$proportion of democratic neighbors_t$												
AIC	1564	1548	1538	1539	1424	1536	1525	1412	1565	1564	1569	1536
BIC	2062	2046	2049	2075	1967	2040	2049	1943	2101	2088	2105	2072
observations	4061	4061	4061	3823	4061	4061	3823	4061	4061	4061	4061	4061

GJS regression estimates with a cloglog link. The dependent variable is $breakdown_t$. All specifications include dummies for regime type as well as region and year fixed effects and a duration polynomial of order 3; estimates not reported to save space. Robust standard errors clustered by regime in parentheses.

(a) $growth_{t-1} | election_t$ (main results)



(b) $growth_{t-1} | election_t$ (non-competitive and legislative)



(c) $election_t | growth_{t-1}$ (main results)





Figure A18: Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of the marginal effects of $growth_{t-1}$ or $election_t$ on the linear predictor of $breakdown_t$, based on the results reported in Table A25. Panel (a) is based on models 4 and 5 (for actual elections) or 7 and 8 (for scheduled elections); panel (b), on models 4, 9 and 11 (actual) or 7, 10 and 12 (scheduled); while results in panel (c) correspond to models 4 and 7, respectively.

Table A26: Survival models (2): Probit link


	actual elections						scheduled elections						non-competitive			legislative	
	growth only	election only	growth × election		growth × el. × EAR		election only	growth × election		growth × election		actual	sched.	actual	sched.	(11)	(12)
			(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)		(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)						
$growth_{t-1}$	-1.90 (0.74)		-1.66 (0.78)	-1.55 (0.86)	-1.63 (0.94)	-1.55 (0.84)		-1.61 (0.92)	-2.06 (0.82)	-2.17 (0.81)	-2.17 (0.82)			-1.61 (0.85)	-1.55 (0.85)		
$election_t$	0.64 (0.12)	0.70 (0.12)	0.78 (0.18)	0.77 (0.19)	0.80 (0.14)	0.87 (0.14)	0.82 (0.15)	0.82 (0.15)	0.02 (0.39)	0.31 (0.20)	0.31 (0.20)	0.02 (0.31)	0.00 (0.21)	0.00 (0.31)	0.20 (0.21)		
$growth_{t-1} \times election_t$	-3.65 (2.16)	0.46 (3.12)	0.23 (4.25)	-4.14 (1.92)	-4.14 (2.00)	-4.10 (6.18)	-4.10 (2.52)	-4.10 (2.52)	-3.01 (2.52)	4.21 (2.19)	4.21 (2.19)	-3.01 (2.52)	0.92 (2.75)	-3.92 (2.75)			
$growth_{t-1} \times EAR_t$			-0.63 (1.72)	-0.76 (1.80)			-0.76 (1.74)		0.79 (1.74)			0.79 (1.53)		-1.68 (1.53)			
$growth_{t-1} \times election_t \times EAR_t$			-7.61 (4.75)	-7.23 (5.58)			-7.23 (5.58)		-7.27 (6.78)			-7.27 (3.42)		7.80 (3.42)			
EAR_t			0.10 (0.12)	0.08 (0.12)			0.08 (0.12)		0.30 (0.10)			0.30 (0.10)		0.18 (0.11)	0.18 (0.11)		
$election_t \times EAR_t$			-0.09 (0.25)	-0.13 (0.25)			-0.13 (0.25)		-0.56 (0.54)			-0.56 (0.54)		-0.59 (0.43)	-0.59 (0.43)		
$election (other year)_t$					-0.04 (0.12)	-0.03 (0.12)		-0.05 (0.14)		0.05 (0.11)		0.05 (0.11)		-0.01 (0.13)	-0.01 (0.13)		
$growth_{t-1} \times election (other year)_t$						-0.42 (1.80)		-0.53 (1.89)		2.79 (1.97)		2.79 (1.97)		-0.48 (1.78)	-0.48 (1.78)		
$election (executive + legislative)_t$														0.90 (0.16)	0.90 (0.16)		
$growth_{t-1} \times election (executive + legislative)_t$														-3.89 (2.02)	-3.89 (2.02)		
$GDP per capita_{t-1} (\log)$	-0.10 (0.07)	-0.14 (0.07)	-0.12 (0.07)	-0.11 (0.07)	-0.07 (0.08)	-0.07 (0.07)	-0.14 (0.07)	-0.11 (0.07)	-0.06 (0.08)	-0.10 (0.07)	-0.10 (0.07)	-0.11 (0.07)	-0.11 (0.07)	-0.10 (0.07)	-0.10 (0.07)		
$oil and gas per capita_{t-1} (\log)$							-0.03 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)								
$proportion of democratic neighbors_t$							1.25 (0.37)	1.25 (0.37)	1.34 (0.38)								
AIC	1563	1545	1536	1539	1425	1533	1524	1412	1564	1563	1568	1534					
BIC	2061	2043	2047	2075	1969	2037	2048	1943	2100	2087	2104	2071					
observations	4061	4061	4061	3823	4061	4061	3823	4061	4061	4061	4061	4061	4061	4061	4061		

GJS regression estimates with a probit link. The dependent variable is $breakdown_t$. All specifications include dummies for regime type as well as region and year fixed effects and a duration polynomial of order 3; estimates not reported to save space. Robust standard errors clustered by regime in parentheses.

(a) $growth_{t-1} | election_t$ (main results)



(b) $growth_{t-1} | election_t$ (non-competitive and legislative)



(c) $election_t | growth_{t-1}$ (main results)





Figure A19: Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of the marginal effects of $growth_{t-1}$ or $election_t$ on the linear predictor of $breakdown_t$, based on the results reported in Table A26. Panel (a) is based on models 4 and 5 (for actual elections) or 7 and 8 (for scheduled elections); panel (b), on models 4, 9 and 11 (actual) or 7, 10 and 12 (scheduled); while results in panel (c) correspond to models 4 and 7, respectively.

Table A27: Survival models (3): Probit link (+ unit means)


	actual elections				scheduled elections				non-competitive				legislative		
	growth only	election only	growth × election		growth × el. × EAR		growth × only		election	growth × election	growth × only	actual	sched.	actual	sched.
			(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)							
$growth_{t-1}$	-2.81 (0.79)		-2.64 (0.83)	-3.01 (0.89)	-3.30 (0.97)		-2.79 (0.85)	-3.03 (0.92)		-2.90 (0.83)	-2.98 (0.83)		-2.92 (0.90)	-2.86 (0.87)	
$election_t$	0.69 (0.13)	0.72 (0.13)	0.76 (0.21)	0.78 (0.22)	1.09 (0.18)	1.14 (0.18)	1.08 (0.20)	1.08 (0.20)	-0.06 (0.49)	0.21 (0.24)	0.23 (0.24)	0.23 (0.25)	0.62 (0.35)	0.62 (0.25)	
$growth_{t-1} \times election_t$	-2.55 (2.54)	1.27 (3.47)	3.05 (4.26)	-4.14 (2.23)	-2.13 (2.41)	4.25 (6.00)	-2.40 (2.83)	-2.40 (2.83)	-0.03 (6.00)	-4.30 (2.05)	-0.03 (2.05)	-4.30 (3.23)	-4.30 (2.05)	-4.30 (3.23)	
$growth_{t-1} \times EAR_t$			0.92 (1.89)	1.66 (2.09)			-0.22 (2.05)		-0.22 (2.05)	-0.18 (1.77)	-0.18 (1.77)				
$growth_{t-1} \times election_t$ × EAR_t			-8.84 (5.35)	-10.45 (5.93)			-3.30 (6.23)		-3.30 (6.23)	6.03 (3.63)					
EAR_t			0.44 (0.18)	0.49 (0.20)			0.32 (0.20)		0.32 (0.20)	0.52 (0.18)					
$election_t \times EAR_t$			0.08 (0.27)	-0.04 (0.28)			-0.59 (0.65)		-0.59 (0.65)	-0.58 (0.44)					
$election (other year)_t$					0.31 (0.17)	0.26 (0.18)	0.28 (0.20)		0.28 (0.17)	-0.06 (0.17)					
$growth_{t-1}$ × $election (other year)_t$						1.25 (2.06)	1.57 (2.43)		1.57 (2.43)	1.77 (2.30)					
$election (executive + legislative)_t$															
$growth_{t-1} \times election$															
$(executive + legislative)_t$															
$GDP per capita_{t-1} (\log)$	1.36 (0.25)	1.20 (0.23)	1.35 (0.25)	1.37 (0.26)	1.13 (0.31)	1.19 (0.23)	1.37 (0.26)	1.10 (0.30)	1.36 (0.25)	1.35 (0.25)	1.35 (0.25)	1.35 (0.25)	1.35 (0.26)	1.35 (0.26)	
$oil and gas$ $per capita_{t-1} (\log)$					0.17 (0.06)	0.18 (0.06)		0.18 (0.06)							
$proportion of$ $democratic neighbors_t$					1.75 (0.54)	1.75 (0.53)		1.75 (0.53)							
AIC	1491	1482	1469	1456	1343	1462	1444	1336	1500	1497	1484	1452			
BIC	2002	1993	2006	2043	1949	1986	2006	1917	2087	2059	2071	2039			
observations	4061	4061	4061	3823	4061	4061	3823	4061	4061	4061	4061	4061	4061		

GIS regression estimates with a probit link. The dependent variable is $breakdown_t$. Specifications include unit-specific means for all time-varying predictors (including every interaction term) as well as dummies for regime type, region and year fixed effects and a duration polynomial of order 3; estimates not reported to save space. Robust standard errors clustered by regime in parentheses.

(a) $growth_{t-1} | election_t$ (main results)



(b) $growth_{t-1} | election_t$ (non-competitive and legislative)



(c) $election_t | growth_{t-1}$ (main results)





Figure A20: Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of the marginal effects of $growth_{t-1}$ or $election_t$ on the linear predictor of $breakdown_t$, based on the results reported in Table A27. Panel (a) is based on models 4 and 5 (for actual elections) or 7 and 8 (for scheduled elections); panel (b), on models 4, 9 and 11 (actual) or 7, 10 and 12 (scheduled); while results in panel (c) correspond to models 4 and 7, respectively.

Table A28: Country fixed effects


	actual elections						scheduled elections						non-competitive			legislative	
	growth only	election only	growth × election		growth × el. × EAR		election only	growth × election		growth × election		actual	sched.	(11)	(12)		
			(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)		(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)						
$growth_{t-1}$	-0.16 (0.07)	-0.13 (0.07)	-0.11 (0.08)	-0.12 (0.07)	-0.11 (0.08)	-0.12 (0.07)	-0.11 (0.08)	-0.12 (0.07)	-0.12 (0.08)	-0.18 (0.08)	-0.19 (0.08)	-0.12 (0.08)	-0.11 (0.08)	-0.12 (0.08)	-0.11 (0.08)		
$election_t$	0.08 (0.02)	0.09 (0.03)	0.13 (0.05)	0.11 (0.05)	0.09 (0.03)	0.11 (0.03)	0.09 (0.03)	0.11 (0.03)	0.11 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.05)	0.03 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)		
$growth_{t-1} \times election_t$	-0.69 (0.37)	0.02 (0.67)	-0.06 (0.85)	-0.06 (0.42)	-0.99 (0.42)	-0.98 (0.45)	-0.99 (0.45)	-0.98 (0.45)	-0.98 (0.45)	0.21 (0.46)	-0.50 (0.46)	0.21 (0.46)	0.06 (0.40)	-0.41 (0.17)	-0.41 (0.30)		
$growth_{t-1} \times EAR_t$			-0.11 (0.19)	-0.06 (0.20)	-0.11 (0.19)	-0.06 (0.20)	-0.11 (0.19)	-0.06 (0.20)	-0.11 (0.20)	0.09 (0.20)	0.09 (0.20)	0.09 (0.20)	-0.22 (0.20)	-0.22 (0.20)	-0.22 (0.20)		
$growth_{t-1} \times election_t \times EAR_t$			-0.91 (0.81)	-0.82 (0.98)	-0.91 (0.81)	-0.82 (0.98)	-0.91 (0.81)	-0.82 (0.98)	-0.91 (0.81)	-0.40 (0.58)	-0.40 (0.58)	-0.40 (0.58)	0.47 (0.34)	0.47 (0.34)	0.47 (0.34)		
EAR_t			-0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)		
$election_t \times EAR_t$			-0.04 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)		
$election (other year)_t$							-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)		
$growth_{t-1} \times election (other year)_t$								-0.05 (0.15)	-0.05 (0.15)	-0.05 (0.15)	-0.05 (0.15)	-0.05 (0.15)	0.29 (0.20)	-0.02 (0.15)	-0.02 (0.15)	-0.02 (0.15)	
$election (executive + legislative)_t$																0.12 (0.12)	
$growth_{t-1} \times election (executive + legislative)_t$																0.12 (0.12)	
$GDP per capita_{t-1} (\log)$													0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	
$oil and gas per capita_{t-1} (\log)$													-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	
$proportion of democratic neighbors_t$													0.19 (0.06)	0.19 (0.06)	0.19 (0.06)	0.19 (0.06)	
observations	4061 115	4061 115	4061 115	4061 115	3823 114	4061 115	4061 115	3823 114	4061 115	4061 115	4061 115	4061 115	4061 115	4061 115	4061 115		

OLS regression estimates. The dependent variable is *breakdown_t*. Specifications replicate those reported in Table 1, but employing country instead of regime fixed effects. All specifications include country and year fixed effects, as well as a duration polynomial of order 3. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.

(a) $growth_{t-1} | election_t$ (main results)



(b) $growth_{t-1} | election_t$ (non-competitive and legislative)



(c) $election_t | growth_{t-1}$ (main results)





Figure A21: Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of the marginal effects of $growth_{t-1}$ or $election_t$ on the probability of $breakdown_t$, based on the results reported in Table A28. Panel (a) is based on models 4 and 5 (for actual elections) or 7 and 8 (for scheduled elections); panel (b), on models 4, 9 and 11 (actual) or 7, 10 and 12 (scheduled); while results in panel (c) correspond to models 4 and 7, respectively.

Table A29: Alternative measures of regime type (1): Adding indirect regimes and oligarchies


	actual elections						scheduled elections						non-competitive			legislative		
	growth only	election only	growth × election		growth × el. × EAR		growth × el. × EAR	election only	growth × election		growth × election		actual	sched.	actual	sched.	(11)	(12)
			(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)			(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)				
$growth_{t-1}$	-0.16 (0.06)		-0.12 (0.06)	-0.12 (0.06)	-0.13 (0.06)	-0.12 (0.06)			-0.13 (0.06)	-0.13 (0.06)	-0.17 (0.07)	-0.18 (0.07)	-0.14 (0.06)	-0.12 (0.06)				
$election_t$	0.07 (0.02)	0.09 (0.02)	0.10 (0.04)	0.10 (0.04)	0.09 (0.03)	0.11 (0.03)			0.11 (0.03)	0.11 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.05)	0.02 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)				
$growth_{t-1} \times election_t$	-0.77 (0.37)	-0.46 (0.77)	-0.18 (0.86)	-0.18 (0.41)	-1.10 (0.43)	-0.92 (0.43)			-1.10 (0.43)	-0.92 (0.43)	0.41 (0.57)	-0.27 (0.57)	0.01 (0.37)	-0.25 (0.17)	0.01 (0.17)	-0.25 (0.28)		
$growth_{t-1} \times EAR_t$			0.01 (0.17)	0.06 (0.17)	0.01 (0.17)	0.06 (0.17)			0.01 (0.17)	0.06 (0.17)	-0.00 (0.17)	-0.00 (0.17)	-0.09 (0.18)	-0.09 (0.18)				
$growth_{t-1} \times election_t \times EAR_t$			-0.52 (0.91)	-0.68 (1.00)	-0.52 (0.91)	-0.68 (1.00)			-0.52 (0.91)	-0.68 (1.00)	-0.23 (0.59)	-0.23 (0.59)	0.32 (0.35)					
EAR_t			0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)			0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)				
$election_t \times EAR_t$			-0.00 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.05)	-0.00 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.05)			-0.00 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)				
$election (other year)_t$									-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)				
$growth_{t-1} \times election (other year)_t$									0.10 (0.13)	0.15 (0.14)	0.10 (0.13)	0.15 (0.14)	0.20 (0.15)	0.20 (0.15)				
$election (executive + legislative)_t$															0.09 (0.14)	0.09 (0.14)		
$growth_{t-1} \times election (executive + legislative)_t$															0.13 (0.13)	0.13 (0.13)		
$(executive + legislative)_t (executive + legislative)_t$															-1.19 (0.04)	-1.19 (0.04)		
$GDP per capita_{t-1} (\log)$															0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)		
$oil and gas per capita_{t-1} (\log)$															-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)		
$proportion of democratic neighbors_t$															0.15 (0.06)	0.16 (0.06)		
observations	4225	4225	4225	4225	3957	4225	4225	3957	4225	4225	269	254	269	269	4225	4225	4225	4225
regimes	269	269	269	269	254	269	269	254	269	269	116	116	115	116	269	269	269	269
countries	116	116	116	116	115	116	116	115	116	116	116	116	116	116	116	116	116	116

OLS regression estimates. The dependent variable is $breakdown_t$. Specifications replicate those reported in Table 1, but adding indirect regimes (coded as EARs) and oligarchies (coded as closed regimes) to the sample (see fn. 21 and Appendix D). All specifications include regime and year fixed effects, as well as a duration polynomial of order 3. Robust standard errors clustered by regime in parentheses.

(a) $growth_{t-1} | election_t$ (main results)



(b) $growth_{t-1} | election_t$ (non-competitive and legislative)



(c) $election_t | growth_{t-1}$ (main results)





Figure A22: Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of the marginal effects of $growth_{t-1}$ or $election_t$ on the probability of $breakdown_t$, based on the results reported in Table A29. Panel (a) is based on models 4 and 5 (for actual elections) or 7 and 8 (for scheduled elections); panel (b), on models 4, 9 and 11 (actual) or 7, 10 and 12 (scheduled); while results in panel (c) correspond to models 4 and 7, respectively.

Table A30: Alternative measures of regime type (2): LIED data


	actual elections				scheduled elections				non-competitive				legislative	
	growth only	election only	growth × election	growth × el. × EAR	growth × el. × EAR	election only	growth × election	growth × el. × EAR	actual	sched.	(11)	(12)		
		(1)	(2)	(3)			(4)					(11)	(12)	
$growth_{t-1}$	-0.16 (0.06)		-0.12 (0.06)	-0.12 (0.06)	-0.14 (0.06)		-0.11 (0.06)	-0.13 (0.06)	-0.16 (0.07)	-0.16 (0.07)	-0.12 (0.07)	-0.11 (0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
$election_t$	0.07 (0.02)	0.09 (0.02)	0.08 (0.02)	0.07 (0.04)	0.10 (0.04)	0.12 (0.03)	0.12 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
$growth_{t-1} \times election_t$	-0.77 (0.37)	0.09 (0.70)	0.64 (0.73)	-1.42 (0.46)	-1.34 (0.48)	0.12 (0.52)	-0.13 (0.39)	-0.13 (0.52)	0.09 (0.39)	-0.13 (0.39)	0.09 (0.26)	-0.28 (0.24)	-0.28 (0.26)	-0.28 (0.24)
$growth_{t-1} \times EAR_t$														
$growth_{t-1} \times election_t$ × EAR_t					-0.00 (0.16)	0.09 (0.16)	-0.00 (0.16)	0.09 (0.16)	-0.04 (0.14)	-0.04 (0.14)	-0.04 (0.19)	-0.21 (0.19)	-0.21 (0.19)	-0.21 (0.19)
EAR_t					-1.23 (0.85)	-1.77 (0.89)	-1.23 (0.85)	-1.77 (0.89)	0.14 (0.55)	0.14 (0.55)	0.16 (0.35)			
$election_t \times EAR_t$					-0.00 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
$election_t \times election_t$ $(other year)_t$					0.03 (0.05)	0.03 (0.05)	0.03 (0.05)	0.03 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
$election_t \times election_t$ $(other year)_t$														
$growth_{t-1} \times election_t$ $(other year)_t$														
$oil and gas$ $per capita_{t-1} (\log)$														
$proportion of$ $democratic neighbors_t$														
observations	4220	4220	4220	4220	3952	4074	4074	3826	4220	3647	4220	3907		
regimes	269	269	269	269	254	265	265	251	269	264	269	262		
countries	116	116	116	116	115	116	116	115	116	116	116	116		

OLS regression estimates. The dependent variable is $breakdown_t$. Specifications replicate those reported in Table 1, but using the LIED data (Skaaning, Gerring and Bartusevičius 2015) to code EARs and closed regimes (see Appendix D for details). All specifications include regime and year fixed effects, as well as a duration polynomial of order 3. Robust standard errors clustered by regime in parentheses.

(a) $growth_{t-1} | election_t$ (main results)



(b) $growth_{t-1} | election_t$ (non-competitive and legislative)



(c) $election_t | growth_{t-1}$ (main results)





Figure A23: Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of the marginal effects of $growth_{t-1}$ or $election_t$ on the probability of $breakdown_t$, based on the results reported in Table A30. Panel (a) is based on models 4 and 5 (for actual elections) or 7 and 8 (for scheduled elections); panel (b), on models 4, 9 and 11 (actual) or 7, 10 and 12 (scheduled); while results in panel (c) correspond to models 4 and 7, respectively.

Table A31: Alternative measures of regime type (3): V-Dem data


	actual elections				scheduled elections				non-competitive				legislative	
	growth only	election only	growth × election		growth × el. × EAR		growth × el. × EAR		growth × election		growth × election		actual	sched.
			(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
$growth_{t-1}$	-0.16 (0.06)	-0.12 (0.06)	-0.16 (0.06)	-0.16 (0.07)	-0.16 (0.06)	-0.18 (0.06)	-0.18 (0.07)	-0.18 (0.07)	-0.15 (0.07)	-0.15 (0.07)	-0.15 (0.07)	-0.18 (0.07)	-0.16 (0.07)	
$election_t$	0.07 (0.02)	0.09 (0.02)	0.08 (0.02)	0.07 (0.03)	0.10 (0.03)	0.11 (0.04)	0.13 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.11 (0.06)	
$growth_{t-1} \times election_t$	-0.77 (0.37)	-0.41 (0.52)	-0.41 (0.52)	-0.09 (0.55)	-1.34 (0.50)	-1.34 (0.51)	-1.29 (0.29)	0.25 (0.45)	-0.32 (0.29)	0.25 (0.45)	-0.32 (0.29)	-0.32 (0.22)	-0.32 (0.92)	
$growth_{t-1} \times EAR_t$														
$growth_{t-1} \times election_t$ × EAR_t			0.16 (0.15)	0.19 (0.16)	0.16 (0.15)	0.19 (0.16)	0.16 (0.15)	-0.09 (0.15)	-0.09 (0.15)	-0.09 (0.15)	-0.09 (0.15)	0.08 (0.18)		
EAR_t														
$election_t \times EAR_t$			0.04 (0.05)	0.04 (0.05)	0.04 (0.05)	0.04 (0.05)	0.04 (0.05)	0.00 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	-0.25 (0.18)		
$election (other year)_t$														
$growth_{t-1}$ × $election (other year)_t$														
$election$														
$(executive + legislative)_t$														
$growth_{t-1} \times election$														
$(executive + legislative)_t$														
$GDP per capita_{t-1} (\log)$														
$oil and gas$														
$per capita_{t-1} (\log)$														
$proportion of$														
$democratic neighbors_t$														
observations	4187	4187	4187	3919	3932	3932	3675	4187	3860	4187	3581			
regimes	268	268	268	253	255	255	242	268	266	268	245			
countries	115	115	115	114	115	115	114	115	115	115	115			

OIS regression estimates. The dependent variable is $breakdown_t$. Specifications replicate those reported in Table 1, but using the V-Dem data (Coppedge et al. 2017) to code EARs and closed regimes (see Appendix D for details). All specifications include regime and year fixed effects, as well as a duration polynomial of order 3. Robust standard errors clustered by regime in parentheses.

(a) $growth_{t-1} | election_t$ (main results)



(b) $growth_{t-1} | election_t$ (non-competitive and legislative)



(c) $election_t | growth_{t-1}$ (main results)





Figure A24: Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of the marginal effects of $growth_{t-1}$ or $election_t$ on the probability of $breakdown_t$, based on the results reported in Table A31. Panel (a) is based on models 4 and 5 (for actual elections) or 7 and 8 (for scheduled elections); panel (b), on models 4, 9 and 11 (actual) or 7, 10 and 12 (scheduled); while results in panel (c) correspond to models 4 and 7, respectively.

Table A32: Alternative measures of economic performance (1): Recession dummy


	actual elections						scheduled elections			non-competitive			legislative	
	growth only	election only	growth × election		growth × el. × EAR		election only	growth × election		growth × election		actual	sched.	
			(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)		(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
$recession_{t-1}$	0.04 (0.02)		0.03 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)		0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)
$election_t$		0.07 (0.02)	0.06 (0.02)	0.10 (0.02)	0.09 (0.05)	0.10 (0.03)	0.08 (0.03)	0.09 (0.03)	0.08 (0.03)	0.09 (0.06)	0.01 (0.06)	0.01 (0.06)	0.01 (0.06)	0.03 (0.03)
$recession_{t-1} \times election_t$		0.15 (0.09)	0.02 (0.11)	0.04 (0.12)	0.04 (0.11)	0.20 (0.11)	0.19 (0.11)	-0.09 (0.11)	0.19 (0.11)	-0.09 (0.07)	0.04 (0.09)	-0.05 (0.07)	0.04 (0.09)	0.00 (0.07)
$recession_{t-1} \times EAR_t$				-0.02 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)					0.03 (0.04)		0.03 (0.04)		0.00 (0.04)
$recession_{t-1} \times election_t \times EAR_t$			0.27 (0.19)	0.24 (0.20)	0.24 (0.20)					0.02 (0.08)		0.02 (0.08)		-0.02 (0.07)
EAR_t				0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)					0.02 (0.01)		0.02 (0.01)		0.01 (0.01)
$election_t \times EAR_t$				-0.05 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.05)					-0.04 (0.06)		-0.04 (0.06)		-0.03 (0.04)
$election (other year)_t$						-0.00 (0.02)		-0.00 (0.02)		0.00 (0.02)		-0.01 (0.01)		0.01 (0.02)
$recession_{t-1} \times election (other year)_t$							-0.02 (0.03)		-0.02 (0.03)		0.00 (0.03)		-0.01 (0.03)	
$election (executive + legislative)_t$								-0.00 (0.03)						0.10 (0.03)
$recession_{t-1} \times election (executive + legislative)_t$									-0.04 (0.06)					0.22 (0.13)
$GDP per capita_{t-1} (\log)$										-0.00 (0.02)				
$oil and gas per capita_{t-1} (\log)$										-0.01 (0.01)		-0.00 (0.01)		-0.01 (0.03)
$proportion of democratic neighbors_t$										0.15 (0.06)		0.15 (0.06)		0.10 (0.03)
observations	4061	4061	4061	4061	3823	4061	4061	3823	4061	4061	4061	4061	4061	4061
regimes	258	258	258	258	244	258	258	244	258	258	258	258	258	258
countries	115	115	115	115	114	115	115	114	115	115	115	115	115	115

OIS regression estimates. The dependent variable is $breakdown_t$. Specifications replicate those reported in Table 1, but replacing $growth_{t-1}$ with a recession $recession_{t-1}$ dummy that takes the value of 1 if $growth_{t-1} < 0.05$, and 0 otherwise. All specifications include regime and year fixed effects, as well as a duration polynomial of order 3. Robust standard errors clustered by regime in parentheses.

(a) $recession_{t-1} | election_t$ (main results)



(b) $recession_{t-1} | election_t$ (non-competitive and legislative)



(c) $election_t | recession_{t-1}$ (main results)





Figure A25: Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of the marginal effects of $growth_{t-1}$ or $election_t$ on the probability of $breakdown_t$, based on the results reported in Table A32. Panel (a) is based on models 4 and 5 (for actual elections) or 7 and 8 (for scheduled elections); panel (b), on models 4, 9 and 11 (actual) or 7, 10 and 12 (scheduled); while results in panel (c) correspond to models 4 and 7, respectively.

Table A33: Alternative measures of economic performance (2): PWT data (1952-2015)


	actual elections				scheduled elections				non-competitive				legislative	
	growth only	election only	growth × election	growth × el. × EAR	growth × el. × EAR	election only	growth × election	growth × el. × EAR	actual	sched.	actual	sched.	actual	sched.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)		
$growth_{t-1}$	-0.13 (0.04)		-0.11 (0.04)	-0.11 (0.04)	-0.11 (0.04)	-0.12 (0.04)	-0.12 (0.04)	-0.12 (0.04)	-0.13 (0.05)	-0.13 (0.05)	-0.13 (0.05)	-0.12 (0.04)		
$election_t$		0.06 (0.02)	0.08 (0.02)	0.10 (0.04)	0.09 (0.04)	0.09 (0.03)	0.10 (0.03)	0.11 (0.03)	0.01 (0.07)	0.01 (0.07)	0.01 (0.07)	0.01 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	
$growth_{t-1} \times election_t$			-0.77 (0.37)	-0.56 (0.77)	-0.52 (0.75)	-0.48 (0.47)	-0.49 (0.55)	-0.49 (0.55)	0.31 (0.79)	-0.13 (0.39)	0.19 (0.12)	-0.24 (0.28)		
$growth_{t-1} \times EAR_t$				0.01 (0.11)	0.02 (0.12)				-0.14 (0.14)	-0.14 (0.14)	-0.05 (0.12)	-0.05 (0.12)		
$growth_{t-1} \times election_t$ × EAR_t				-0.24 (0.91)	-0.19 (0.90)				0.14 (0.80)	0.14 (0.80)	0.24 (0.37)			
EAR_t				0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)				0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)		
$election_t \times EAR_t$				-0.03 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.05)				-0.06 (0.08)	-0.06 (0.08)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)		
$election (other year)_t$					0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)			-0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	
$growth_{t-1}$ × $election (other year)_t$						0.01 (0.11)	0.01 (0.12)		0.01 (0.13)	0.01 (0.13)	0.00 (0.11)	0.00 (0.11)	0.01 (0.11)	
$election$													0.12 (0.12)	
$(executive + legislative)_t$														
$growth_{t-1} \times election$														
$(executive + legislative)_t$														
$GDP per capita_{t-1} (\log)$														
$oil and gas$														
$per capita_{t-1} (\log)$														
$proportion of$														
$democratic neighbors_t$														
observations	3586	3586	3586	3586	3494	3586	3586	3248	3586	3586	3586	3586	3586	3586
regimes	229	229	229	229	223	229	229	219	229	229	229	229	229	229
countries	106	106	106	106	106	106	106	106	106	106	106	106	106	106

OLS regression estimates. The dependent variable is *breakdown*. Specifications replicate those reported in Table 1, but measuring $growth_{t-1}$ with PWT v9.0 data. All specifications include regime and year fixed effects, as well as a duration polynomial of order 3. Robust standard errors clustered by regime in parentheses.

(a) $growth_{t-1} | election_t$ (main results)



(b) $growth_{t-1} | election_t$ (non-competitive and legislative)



(c) $election_t | growth_{t-1}$ (main results)





Figure A26: Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of the marginal effects of $growth_{t-1}$ or $election_t$ on the probability of $breakdown_t$, based on the results reported in Table A33. Panel (a) is based on models 4 and 5 (for actual elections) or 7 and 8 (for scheduled elections); panel (b), on models 4, 9 and 11 (actual) or 7, 10 and 12 (scheduled); while results in panel (c) correspond to models 4 and 7, respectively.

Table A34: Alternative measures of economic performance (3): WDI data (1962-2015)


	actual elections				scheduled elections				non-competitive				legislative		
	growth only	election only	growth × election	growth × el. × EAR	growth × el. × EAR	only	election	growth × election	growth × election	actual	sched.	actual	sched.		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)			
$growth_{t-1}$	-0.26 (0.07)		-0.23 (0.07)	-0.21 (0.07)	-0.20 (0.07)		-0.23 (0.07)	-0.23 (0.07)	-0.24 (0.08)	-0.27 (0.08)	-0.25 (0.08)	-0.21 (0.07)			
$election_t$		0.05 (0.02)	0.07 (0.02)	0.08 (0.04)	0.07 (0.04)	0.08 (0.03)	0.10 (0.03)	0.11 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.06)	0.01 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)			
$growth_{t-1} \times election_t$			-0.70 (0.39)	-0.89 (0.93)	-0.89 (0.91)		-0.83 (0.42)	-0.84 (0.45)	0.18 (0.45)	-0.05 (0.58)	0.13 (0.37)	-0.59 (0.19)	0.36) (0.36)		
$growth_{t-1} \times EAR_t$				-0.04 (0.16)	-0.04 (0.16)		-0.04 (0.16)	-0.04 (0.20)	-0.17 (0.20)	-0.17 (0.20)	-0.07 (0.17)				
$growth_{t-1} \times election_t$ × EAR_t				0.34 (1.04)	0.32 (1.03)		0.34 (1.04)	0.32 (1.03)	0.31 (0.60)	0.31 (0.60)	0.23 (0.36)				
EAR_t				0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)		0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)				
$election_t \times EAR_t$				-0.01 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.05)		-0.01 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.03)				
$election (other year)_t$						0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)		
$growth_{t-1}$ × $election (other year)_t$								0.08 (0.14)	0.09 (0.15)	0.06 (0.19)	0.06 (0.19)	0.07 (0.14)	0.07 (0.14)		
$election$													0.12 (0.12)		
$(executive + legislative)_t$														0.04 (0.04)	
$growth_{t-1} \times election$														-0.86 (0.52)	
$(executive + legislative)_t$															
$GDP per capita_{t-1} (\log)$															
$oil and gas$															
$per capita_{t-1} (\log)$															
$proportion of$															
$democratic neighbors_t$															
observations	3048	3048	3048	3048	3048	3048	3048	3048	2777	3048	3048	3048	3048	3048	3048
regimes	202	202	202	202	202	202	202	202	196	202	202	202	202	202	202
countries	104	104	104	104	104	104	104	104	104	104	104	104	104	104	104

OLS regression estimates. The dependent variable is *breakdown*. Specifications replicate those reported in Table 1, but measuring $growth_{t-1}$ with WDI data. All specifications include regime and year fixed effects, as well as a duration polynomial of order 3. Robust standard errors clustered by regime in parentheses.

(a) $growth_{t-1} | election_t$ (main results)



(b) $growth_{t-1} | election_t$ (non-competitive and legislative)



(c) $election_t | growth_{t-1}$ (main results)





Figure A27: Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of the marginal effects of $growth_{t-1}$ or $election_t$ on the probability of $breakdown_t$, based on the results reported in Table A34. Panel (a) is based on models 4 and 5 (for actual elections) or 7 and 8 (for scheduled elections); panel (b), on models 4, 9 and 11 (actual) or 7, 10 and 12 (scheduled); while results in panel (c) correspond to models 4 and 7, respectively.

Table A35: Party-based regimes


	actual elections						scheduled elections						non-competitive			legislative	
	growth only	election only	growth × election		growth × el. × EAR		growth × el. × EAR	election only	growth × election		growth × el. × EAR		actual	sched.	actual	sched.	
			(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)			(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	
$growth_{t-1}$	-0.09 (0.08)		-0.03 (0.06)	-0.08 (0.08)	-0.06 (0.08)		-0.09 (0.08)		-0.06 (0.08)	-0.10 (0.08)	-0.10 (0.08)	-0.08 (0.08)	-0.13 (0.09)	-0.13 (0.09)	-0.09 (0.08)		
$election_t$	0.10 (0.03)	0.13 (0.04)	0.17 (0.08)	0.16 (0.08)	0.11 (0.04)	0.13 (0.05)	0.12 (0.05)	0.13 (0.05)	0.12 (0.05)	0.12 (0.05)	0.12 (0.05)	0.06 (0.08)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.04)		
$growth_{t-1} \times election_t$	-1.36 (0.65)	-1.67 (1.69)	-2.13 (1.88)	-2.13 (1.88)	-0.92 (0.67)	-0.92 (0.67)	-0.67 (0.67)	-0.67 (0.67)	-0.67 (0.67)	-0.67 (0.67)	-0.67 (0.67)	-0.67 (0.98)	-0.26 (0.36)	0.23 (0.22)	0.09 (0.23)		
$growth_{t-1} \times EAR_t$		0.27 (0.14)		0.27 (0.14)	0.33 (0.15)		0.33 (0.15)		0.33 (0.15)		0.33 (0.15)		-0.08 (0.19)	0.13 (0.20)	0.13 (0.20)		
$growth_{t-1} \times election_t$ $\times EAR_t$		0.36 (1.83)	1.01 (2.01)		0.36 (1.83)	1.01 (2.01)		0.36 (1.83)	1.01 (2.01)		0.36 (1.83)	1.01 (2.01)	-1.47 (1.00)	0.73 (0.51)			
EAR_t		0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)		0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)		0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)		0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	
$election_t \times EAR_t$		-0.06 (0.09)	-0.05 (0.09)		-0.06 (0.09)	-0.05 (0.09)		-0.06 (0.09)	-0.05 (0.09)		-0.06 (0.09)	-0.05 (0.09)	-0.08 (0.08)	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.05)	
$election (other year)_t$													-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	
$growth_{t-1} \times election (other year)_t$													0.18 (0.17)	0.24 (0.17)	0.06 (0.18)	0.14 (0.19)	
$election (executive + legislative)_t$															0.13 (0.13)	0.13 (0.13)	
$growth_{t-1} \times election (executive + legislative)_t$															0.05 (0.05)	0.05 (0.05)	
$GDP per capita_{t-1} (\log)$													-0.03 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	
$oil and gas per capita_{t-1} (\log)$													-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.14 (0.19)	0.14 (0.19)	
$proportion of democratic neighbors_t$													0.09 (0.09)	0.09 (0.09)	0.09 (0.09)	0.09 (0.09)	
observations	1966	1966	1966	1966	1866	1866	1966	1966	1866	1866	1866	1866	1966	1966	1966	1966	
regimes	75	75	75	75	73	73	75	75	73	73	75	75	75	75	75	75	
countries	65	65	65	65	65	65	65	65	65	65	65	65	65	65	65	65	

OLS regression estimates. The dependent variable is *breakdown*. Specifications replicate those reported in Table 1, but restricting the sample to regimes that GWF classify as party-based (including party-personal, party-military and party-personal). All specifications include regime and year fixed effects, as well as a duration polynomial of order 3. Robust standard errors clustered by regime in parentheses.

(a) $growth_{t-1} | election_t$ (main results)



(b) $growth_{t-1} | election_t$ (non-competitive and legislative)



(c) $election_t | growth_{t-1}$ (main results)





Figure A28: Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of the marginal effects of $growth_{t-1}$ or $election_t$ on the probability of $breakdown_t$, based on the results reported in Table A35. Panel (a) is based on models 4 and 5 (for actual elections) or 7 and 8 (for scheduled elections); panel (b), on models 4, 9 and 11 (actual) or 7, 10 and 12 (scheduled); while results in panel (c) correspond to models 4 and 7, respectively.

Table A36: Regimes that are not party-based


	actual elections						scheduled elections						non-competitive			legislative	
	growth only	election only	growth × election		growth × el. × EAR		election only	growth × election		growth × election		actual	sched.	actual	sched.	(11)	(12)
			(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)		(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)						
$growth_{t-1}$	-0.22 (0.09)		-0.20 (0.09)	-0.15 (0.09)	-0.14 (0.09)			-0.14 (0.09)	-0.13 (0.09)	-0.22 (0.10)	-0.25 (0.10)	-0.15 (0.09)	-0.14 (0.09)				
$election_t$		0.05 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)	0.06 (0.06)	0.06 (0.06)	0.07 (0.04)	0.10 (0.04)	0.08 (0.05)	0.08 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.09)	0.03 (0.06)	0.02 (0.06)	0.04 (0.04)				
$growth_{t-1} \times election_t$		-0.48 (0.39)	-0.00 (0.80)	0.47 (0.80)		-1.40 (0.54)	-1.40 (0.59)	-1.40 (0.59)	-1.37 (0.59)	-1.27 (1.12)	-0.53 (0.76)	-0.12 (0.76)	-0.56 (0.24)	-0.33 (0.33)			
$growth_{t-1} \times EAR_t$				-0.19 (0.25)	-0.20 (0.27)					0.02 (0.30)	0.02 (0.30)	-0.29 (0.26)					
$growth_{t-1} \times election_t \times EAR_t$				-0.86 (1.06)	-1.42 (1.12)					1.36 (1.20)		0.44 (0.41)					
EAR_t				0.00 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)					0.05 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)	0.00 (0.02)					
$election_t \times EAR_t$				0.01 (0.07)	0.00 (0.08)					-0.02 (0.09)	-0.02 (0.09)	-0.06 (0.05)					
$election (other year)_t$						-0.00 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)		0.02 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)					
$growth_{t-1} \times election (other year)_t$							-0.02 (0.20)	-0.04 (0.22)			0.30 (0.28)		0.02 (0.21)				
$election (executive + legislative)_t$													0.15 (0.06)				
$growth_{t-1} \times election (executive + legislative)_t$													-1.56 (0.68)				
$GDP per capita_{t-1} (\log)$													0.03 (0.03)				
$oil and gas per capita_{t-1} (\log)$													0.00 (0.01)				
$proportion of democratic neighbors_t$													0.40 (0.12)				
observations	2095	2095	2095	2095	1957	2095	2095	1957	2095	2095	2095	2095	2095	2095	2095	2095	
regimes	183	183	183	183	171	183	183	171	183	183	183	183	183	183	183	183	
countries	84	84	84	84	80	84	84	80	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	

OLS regression estimates. The dependent variable is $breakdown_t$. Specifications replicate those reported in Table 1, but restricting the sample to regimes that GWF classify as not party-based. All specifications include regime and year fixed effects, as well as a duration polynomial of order 3. Robust standard errors clustered by regime in parentheses.

(a) $growth_{t-1} | election_t$ (main results)



(b) $growth_{t-1} | election_t$ (non-competitive and legislative)



(c) $election_t | growth_{t-1}$ (main results)





Figure A29: Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of the marginal effects of $growth_{t-1}$ or $election_t$ on the probability of $breakdown_t$, based on the results reported in Table A36. Panel (a) is based on models 4 and 5 (for actual elections) or 7 and 8 (for scheduled elections); panel (b), on models 4, 9 and 11 (actual) or 7, 10 and 12 (scheduled); while results in panel (c) correspond to models 4 and 7, respectively.

Table A37: Poor countries


	actual elections						scheduled elections						non-competitive			legislative		
	growth only	election only	growth × election		growth × el. × EAR		election only	growth × election		growth × election		actual	sched.	actual	sched.	actual	sched.	
			(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)		(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)							
$growth_{t-1}$	-0.20 (0.08)		-0.17 (0.08)	-0.17 (0.08)	-0.15 (0.08)	-0.15 (0.08)		-0.16 (0.08)	-0.14 (0.08)	-0.17 (0.09)	-0.20 (0.09)	-0.19 (0.09)	-0.16 (0.08)					
$election_t$	0.07 (0.02)	0.08 (0.03)	0.05 (0.05)	0.05 (0.05)	0.04 (0.05)	0.08 (0.03)	0.10 (0.03)	0.10 (0.03)	0.10 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.05)	0.03 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.05)	0.03 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.04 (0.04)			
$growth_{t-1} \times election_t$	-0.54 (0.55)	-0.74 (0.55)	-0.92 (1.23)	-0.92 (1.32)	-1.31 (0.54)	-1.31 (0.54)	-1.31 (0.55)	-1.15 (0.55)	-1.15 (0.55)	-0.03 (0.55)	-0.46 (0.50)	0.11 (0.50)	-0.50 (0.26)	0.11 (0.26)	-0.50 (0.51)			
$growth_{t-1} \times EAR_t$			-0.01 (0.24)	0.03 (0.26)	-0.01 (0.24)	0.03 (0.26)		-0.01 (0.26)	0.03 (0.26)	-0.24 (0.26)	-0.24 (0.26)	-0.24 (0.26)	-0.05 (0.25)	-0.05 (0.25)				
$growth_{t-1} \times election_t \times EAR_t$			0.13 (1.38)	0.44 (1.47)	0.13 (1.38)	0.44 (1.47)		0.13 (1.38)	0.44 (1.47)	0.45 (0.61)	0.45 (0.61)	0.45 (0.61)	0.22 (0.41)	0.22 (0.41)				
EAR_t			-0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)		-0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)			
$election_t \times EAR_t$			0.05 (0.06)	0.05 (0.06)	0.05 (0.06)	0.05 (0.06)		0.05 (0.06)	0.05 (0.06)	0.01 (0.05)	0.01 (0.05)	0.01 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)				
$election (other year)_t$								-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)		
$growth_{t-1} \times election (other year)_t$									0.18 (0.20)	0.18 (0.20)	0.21 (0.21)	0.21 (0.21)	0.21 (0.23)	0.11 (0.23)	0.11 (0.23)	0.21 (0.23)	0.21 (0.23)	
$election (executive + legislative)_t$																0.20 (0.20)		
$growth_{t-1} \times election (executive + legislative)_t$																	0.11 (0.11)	
$GDP per capita_{t-1} (\log)$																	0.11 (0.11)	
$oil and gas per capita_{t-1} (\log)$																	0.11 (0.11)	
$proportion of democratic neighbors_t$																	0.11 (0.11)	
observations	2786	2786	2786	2786	2627	2786	2786	2627	2786	2786	2786	2786	2786	2786	2786	2786	2786	
regimes	187	187	187	187	181	187	187	181	187	181	187	187	187	187	187	187	187	
countries	72	72	72	72	72	72	72	72	72	72	72	72	72	72	72	72	72	

OLS regression estimates. The dependent variable is $breakdown_t$. Specifications replicate those reported in Table 1, but restricting the sample to countries located below the median value of $GDP per capita$ in the year they first enter the sample (or the first year data is available). All specifications include regime and year fixed effects, as well as a duration polynomial of order 3. Robust standard errors clustered by regime in parentheses.

(a) $growth_{t-1} | election_t$ (main results)



(b) $growth_{t-1} | election_t$ (non-competitive and legislative)



(c) $election_t | growth_{t-1}$ (main results)





Figure A30: Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of the marginal effects of $growth_{t-1}$ or $election_t$ on the probability of $breakdown_t$, based on the results reported in Table A37. Panel (a) is based on models 4 and 5 (for actual elections) or 7 and 8 (for scheduled elections); panel (b), on models 4, 9 and 11 (actual) or 7, 10 and 12 (scheduled); while results in panel (c) correspond to models 4 and 7, respectively.

Table A38: Rich countries


	actual elections						scheduled elections						non-competitive			legislative	
	growth only	election only	growth × election		growth × el. × EAR		election only	growth × election		growth × election		actual	sched.	actual	sched.	actual	sched.
			(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)		(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)						
$growth_{t-1}$	-0.08 (0.08)		-0.04 (0.07)	-0.05 (0.08)	-0.10 (0.08)	-0.06 (0.08)		-0.12 (0.09)	-0.14 (0.10)	-0.13 (0.09)	-0.13 (0.09)			-0.05 (0.08)	-0.05 (0.08)	-0.05 (0.08)	
$election_t$	0.06 (0.04)	0.09 (0.04)	0.23 (0.12)	0.31 (0.12)	0.15 (0.08)	0.18 (0.09)	0.15 (0.09)	0.19 (0.09)	0.12 (0.13)	-0.02 (0.13)	0.12 (0.13)	0.12 (0.13)	0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.05)	0.05 (0.06)	
$growth_{t-1} \times election_t$		-0.84 (0.44)	0.32 (1.23)	1.82 (0.86)		-0.85 (0.64)	-0.46 (0.55)	1.11 (1.04)	0.04 (1.04)	-0.14 (0.20)	1.11 (1.04)	0.04 (1.04)	-0.14 (0.20)	-0.14 (0.25)	-0.26 (0.21)		
$growth_{t-1} \times EAR_t$				0.02 (0.14)	0.13 (0.14)					0.25 (0.17)		0.25 (0.17)		-0.18 (0.19)			
$growth_{t-1} \times election_t$ $\times EAR_t$			-1.44 (1.41)	-2.97 (1.14)						-1.22 (1.02)				-0.18 (0.49)			
EAR_t				0.03 (0.03)	0.04 (0.04)					0.04 (0.02)				0.04 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	
$election_t \times EAR_t$				-0.16 (0.13)	-0.25 (0.13)					-0.17 (0.14)				-0.03 (0.06)			
$election (other year)_t$						0.05 (0.07)	0.04 (0.06)	0.07 (0.07)			-0.00 (0.02)				0.04 (0.06)		
$growth_{t-1}$ $\times election (other year)_t$								-0.06 (0.18)	0.07 (0.18)		0.24 (0.17)			-0.12 (0.18)			
$election$															0.24 (0.18)		
$(executive + legislative)_t$																	
$growth_{t-1} \times election$																	
$(executive + legislative)_t$																	
$GDP per capita_{t-1} (\log)$																	
$oil and gas$																	
$per capita_{t-1} (\log)$																	
$proportion of$																	
$democratic neighbors_t$																	
observations	1275	1275	1275	1275	1275	1275	1275	1275	1275	1275	1275	1275	1275	1275	1275	1275	1275
regimes	71	71	71	71	63	71	63	71	63	71	71	71	71	71	71	71	71
countries	43	43	43	43	42	43	42	43	42	43	43	43	43	43	43	43	43

OLS regression estimates. The dependent variable is $breakdown_t$. Specifications replicate those reported in Table 1, but restricting the sample to countries located above the median value of $GDP per capita$ in the year they first enter the sample (or the first year data is available). All specifications include regime and year fixed effects, as well as a duration polynomial of order 3. Robust standard errors clustered by regime in parentheses.

(a) $growth_{t-1} | election_t$ (main results)



(b) $growth_{t-1} | election_t$ (non-competitive and legislative)



(c) $election_t | growth_{t-1}$ (main results)




Figure A31: Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of the marginal effects of $growth_{t-1}$ or $election_t$ on the probability of $breakdown_t$, based on the results reported in Table A38. Panel (a) is based on models 4 and 5 (for actual elections) or 7 and 8 (for scheduled elections); panel (b), on models 4, 9 and 11 (actual) or 7, 10 and 12 (scheduled); while results in panel (c) correspond to models 4 and 7, respectively.

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