A President of One's Own?
Presidents and "Their" Districts in Latin America's Federations*

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To what extent do presidents develop a "special relationship" with "their" state, both before and after assuming office? Despite abundant anecdotal evidence, this phenomenon has received little systematic attention so far. In this paper we claim that the combination of (a) presidents' reliance on their network for mobilization and appointment decisions and (b) governors' high approval ratings may give rise to a dynamic in which candidates over-perform electorally in their state and later disproportionately favor it in cabinet appointment. Data from Argentina (1983-2024) and Mexico (1988-2024) support this logic, but we find mostly null effects for Brazil (1989-2024). Consistent with electoral incentives, there is no evidence that the president's state is favored in the allocation of federal transfers or federal spending.

Keywords: presidents – friends-and-neighbors – cabinet appointments – political networks – Latin America

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> If successful [...], the director could expect to become a close collaborator of the new president. His subordinates were aware of the advantages [...] for their own careers. 'If he becomes a minister,' commented one respondent, 'then his entire *equipito* [inner circle; literally, "little team"] will follow him and we'll all have positions in the Ministry.'
> –Grindle (1977:52), quoted in Persico, Rodríguez-Pueblita and Silverman (2011:252)

In presidential regimes with a federal structure, the chief executive is often associated with a specific state. Fernando Collor became president of Brazil after serving as mayor, federal deputy and governor in Alagoas, where his family owned a media conglomerate. During Carlos Menem's presidential stint in Argentina, the province of La Rioja, which he had governed for nine years, was present all over the administration. His hometown of Anillaco (population in 1991: 857) acquired a replica of the presidential palace as well as landing strip (allegedly to export olives; see Clarín 2006). Julio Nazareno, an unremarkable lawyer who had been Menem's partner in his legal firm in La Rioja, became a Supreme Court Justice (Obarrio 2003). A decade later, Néstor Kirchner's numerous appointees from the province of Santa Cruz were dubbed "the penguins" by the media, in a reference to their Patagonian origins (Moreno 2005; Panizza, Ramos Larraburu and Scherlis 2018). Mexican politics has long been structured along *camarillas*, loose networks of allies and followers orbiting around an important politician (Grindle 1977; Smith 1979; Persico, Rodríguez-Pueblita and Silverman 2011). More recently, over 80% of Javier Milei's cabinet members came from the City of Buenos Aires, and Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) and his successor Claudia Sheinbaum drew a similar fraction of cabinet members from Mexico City, which they had governed during 2000-05 and 2018-24 respectively. AMLO also promoted massive infrastructure projects in his birth state of Tabasco, whose governor he unsuccessfully tried to groom for the presidency (Aguilera 2019; Zissis 2023). And although he did not rely on the state of Rio de Janeiro to the same extent, Brazil's Jair

Bolsonaro drew on a corporatist network instead, recruiting an unusual number of collaborators from the military (Hunter and Vega 2022).

Yet despite these anecdotes being well known by country specialists, there is little systematic research on the connection between presidents and their districts. In this paper we attempt to fill this gap by looking at the phenomenon from three dimensions: Are voters especially likely to support presidential candidates hailing from their own state? Do presidents favor "their" home state in cabinet appointments? Does this have financial repercussions for the president's state?

Students of autocracies have long documented the tendency of presidents to spend lavishly in their hometowns, culminating in egregious examples like an airstrip for the Concorde in the middle of the jungle or a replica of St. Peter's in the president's hometown (Hodler and Raschky 2014; Dreher et al. 2019). This makes political sense for rulers whose survival depends on the unwavering support of a small clique, but for democratically elected politicians checks and balances are more likely to bind; lavish spending in the president's hometown may attract negative publicity; and in any case, a vote in any district is as good as in any other. Assembling a cabinet requires sopping different national and regional constituencies, as well as recruiting technocrats (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2005; Amorim Neto 2006; Camerlo and Pérez-Liñán 2015; Martínez-Gallardo and Schleiter 2015) that tend to reside in the capital city or other large urban centers.

Still, presidents may end up disproportionately relying in "their" state for more roundabout reasons. Rulers often need close confidants and collaborators they can trust (Panizza, Ramos Larraburu and Scherlis 2018), and in federal countries a disproportionate share of these will come from the president's state. These collaborators have networks of their own, whose members expect to benefit handsomely if a candidate from their state captures the national executive. Intuitively, as a state politician moves to the national executive, every member of his or her circle can expect to move "one step up the ladder:" the top echelons of the local elite can aspire to an appointment in the federal bureaucracy, while those one level below move one step up in the subnational hierarchy. Even though the candidate's state is unlikely to be pivotal in the presidential race (Shachar and Nalebuff

1999), the members of his or her network have an incentive to mobilize mobilize voters in order to show their commitment and land a job after the election (Persico, Rodríguez-Pueblita and Silverman 2011; Rau, Sarkar and Stokes 2025). Voters' approval of a former governor seeking the national presidency may produce a similar effect.

Three implications follow. First, presidential candidates will do especially well electorally in the state where they have their political base, especially if they have previous experience as governors. Second, presidents will show a bias toward "their" state in cabinet appointments. Again, this effect should be stronger for former governors, who have a larger pool of collaborators to draw on. Third, when a politician was born in one state but developed his or her career elsewhere, the effect should be limited to the second district –i.e., we expect a *political* connection rather than a personal or an affective one (Carozzi and Repetto 2016; Fabre and Sangnier 2025). We do not expect an effect on states finances, however. On the one hand, the bulk of financial transfers from the center to the subnational governments are based on formulas that the president cannot change (Rodden 2006; Bonvecchi and Lodola 2011); on the other, even when presidents have discretion, electoral considerations suggest benefiting states according to their electoral or legislative weight (Gibson and Calvo 2000), not to favor their state at the expense of the rest.

Our results show that in both Argentina (1983-2024) and Mexico (1988-2024), presidential candidates from major parties over-perform electorally in the state where they have their political base, and the effect is even larger for former governors. The direction of the effect is similar, but smaller in magnitude, for vice-presidential candidates, probably because they also enjoy a high level of voter approval. The president's state subsequently becomes over-represented in the cabinet, as does the vice-president's, though former governors no longer make a difference. These results are driven by the president(ial candidate)'s political base rather than his or her state of birth, and are robust to a wide variety of sample, control and specification changes. But in line with the existing literature on fiscal federalism and Hodler and Raschky's (2014) findings for democracies, the president's state is not favored in the distribution of financial transfers; there is no effect for either aggregate or more

fine-grained measures. We also find null results for Brazil (1985-2024), which we attribute to two factors. One is that 14 out of 17 presidential candidates from the two major parties came from São Paulo, which was thus almost guaranteed to capture the presidency. The other is that the extreme fragmentation of the Brazilian Congress forces presidents to exchange cabinet appointments for legislative support, reducing the president's discretion (Bersch, Lopez and Taylor 2023).

Theory: Presidents and "their" districts

We examine the relationship between presidents and "their" districts across three dimensions: (a) the *electoral* one, i.e. whether presidential candidates are disproportionately favored by voters living in their district; (b) the *appointment* one: whether presidents disproportionately nominate cabinet ministers hailing from their state; and (c) the *financial* one: whether voters living in the president's district are favored in the distribution of public spending.

The most straightforward way to connect these three is by postulating a *quid-pro-quo* between voters and politicians: citizens elect a president from "their" district because they expect to be rewarded with material benefits afterwards. In this narrative, cabinet over-representation is simply a means to an end to ensure that the president complies with his or her part of the bargain. This "regional favoritism" story has been widely documented in African autocracies (Hodler and Raschky 2014; Dreher et al. 2019), but travels poorly to a democratic polity in which a vote in any place is as good as one in any other (Shachar and Nalebuff 1999). This logic is especially strong when the president comes from a small state,[1] but even large districts like Buenos Aires, Mexico or São Paulo are unlikely to be pivotal in the presidential race (see Appendix Figure A1). In addition, blatant favoritism towards the president's state may attract negative media coverage, and democratic check and balances may tie the president's hands anyway.

[1]When Menem, Kirchner and Collor were elected, La Rioja, Santa Cruz and Alagoas comprised just 0.68%, 0.54% and 1.71% of their country's population, respectively.

In contrast, in this paper we connect these three dimensions through the network mobilization logic proposed by Persico, Rodríguez-Pueblita and Silverman (2011). These authors model presidents' "special relationship" with "their" state neither as a deliberate choice nor as a conscious exchange with voters, but rather as an unintended by-product of their reliance on personal and policy networks that are overwhelmingly based on the president's state. Both in Latin America and beyond, politics is organized into factions: networks of politicians who know, trust and support each other. Whether formal (as in Uruguay: Panizza, Ramos Larraburu and Scherlis 2018) or informal (Mexican *camarillas*: cf. Grindle 1977 and Smith 1979), factions are crucial for solving the collective action problems involved in mobilizing voters (Rosas and Lucardi 2020; Rau, Sarkar and Stokes 2025), sharing information, and staffing the public bureaucracy when the faction's leader(s) get(s) elected to office (Scherlis 2010).

Of course, factional affiliation is not the only determinant behind public sector appointments: some bureaucratic and technical positions are off limits to faction members (Scherlis 2010), sound politics often dictates appointing ministers from rival factions (or parties) to keep their party (or coalition) happy, and candidates may over-perform electorally in their home district simply because voters know of and approve of them. But it is still the case that presidents often surround themselves with close associates and collaborators who both provide advice and act as gatekeepers for the people, proposals and ideas that reach the chief executive. In turn, these collaborators have friends, colleagues and allies of their own (Scherlis 2010), forming a network in which all members of a politician's faction move "one step upon the ladder" when (s)he reaches the presidency (Persico, Rodríguez-Pueblita and Silverman 2011). For example, subnational ministers who move with the president to the national capital will bring their own teams with them, opening a spot for ambitious politicians at the state level who occupy the (now empty) positions in the subnational cabinet. Not all factions are geographically based –some are structured around professional circles, universities or think tanks–, but many are, affecting both the incentives to mobilize voters on election day and

reinforcing the influence of the president's state in national politics, *even when it is not optimal* from an electoral or a policymaking perspective (Persico, Rodríguez-Pueblita and Silverman 2011).

In what follows, we discuss what this factional mobilization logic can say about the geographic distribution of electoral support, cabinet nominations and government finances, and introduce the hypotheses we will examine in the remaining of the paper. When appropriate, we will discuss potential caveats and scope conditions, as well as alternative explanations for some specific dimension –notably the possibility that politicians with a successful track record may be especially likely to both gain their party's nomination *and* over-perform electorally in their state.

The regional distribution of electoral support. It has long been noted that candidates tend to receive a disproportionate share of the vote in the place where they were born, grew up, or have their political base. Yet with effect sizes ranging between 2.5 and 7 percentage points (Meredith 2013; Heersink and Peterson 2016; Fiva and Smith 2017; Schulte-Cloos and Bauer 2023), such a bonus in a single district can only sway the election if a candidate hails from a large state and the race is particularly close –a rare occurrence in our sample (see Figure A1).[2]

Nonetheless, there are two different reasons why presidential candidates may over-perform in their home district. The network mobilization logic discussed above implies that if the winning candidate uses the electoral results in his or her state as a basis for making appointment decisions, (s)he may set a chain reaction where the network's members try to show their worth by mobilizing voters on election day (Persico, Rodríguez-Pueblita and Silverman 2011; Rau, Sarkar and Stokes 2025). The point is not that the president will look at every precinct in the state, but rather that low-level members of the network will feel watched by operatives one step above them, who in turn will have their own monitors, and so on. Intuitively, showing the upcoming president (or their state-

[2]For the same reason, it cannot meaningfully affect the degree of party system nationalization, which has been the chief focus of studies on the geographical distribution of electoral support in Latin America (Jones and Mainwaring 2003; Morgenstern, Swindle and Castagnola 2009).

level principals) that they mobilized votes for him or her may increase the chance of landing a top cabinet position, inducing collaborators and supporters to try to show how much effort they exerted on election day. Alternatively, voters may support presidential candidates from their state simply because they are better informed about their record. That is, highly successful politicians, and in particular highly successful governors, are disproportionately likely to grab their party's nomination, and voters may reward their (past) gubernatorial performance massively at the polls.[3] Either way, the implication is that:

H_1: *Presidential candidates*

(a) *Will over-perform electorally in the state where they have their political base; and*

(b) *The effect will be stronger for former governors.*

In practice, adjudicating between these mechanisms is complicated. To begin with, they are not mutually exclusive. In addition, both predict a stronger effect for former governors, who have both a larger network and a longer track record. And since both emphasize the political rather than the personal link between the candidate and his or her state, they agree in expecting a larger effect for the candidate's political base than for his or her state of birth. We can think of two differences, however. Within the candidate's state, the first mechanism expects over-performance to be concentrated where the candidate's network is larger, whereas the latter expects it to be driven by voters' approval. And insofar as voter approval affects the choice of the *vice*-presidential candidate, the voter approval mechanism expects a positive effect in the state where the vice-presidential candidate has his or her political base, whereas the network mobilization logic expects no such boost, as vice-presidents have little appointment power.

Cabinet appointments. Amorim Neto (2006) sparked a large literature on how Latin American presidents choose their ministers. The basic idea is that presidents face a trade-off between nominating partisan ministers, on the one hand, and technocrats and cronies, on the other. The former

[3]We thank an anonymous reviewer for highlighting this possibility.

are crucial for securing support in the legislature, but having an independent power base makes them less dependent on the president's whims. Technocrats and cronies differ in their level of technical expertise, but their reliance on the executive means that they serve at the president's discretion.

After an initial focus on how cabinet composition depends on country-level characteristics and the distribution of seats in the legislature (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2005; Amorim Neto 2006; Martínez-Gallardo 2012; Martínez-Gallardo and Schleiter 2015; Panizza, Ramos Larraburu and Scherlis 2018), the literature shifted to the role of time-varying factors –such midterm elections, scandals, and voters' approval– on ministerial resignations and cabinet reshuffles (Martínez-Gallardo 2014; Camerlo and Pérez-Liñán 2015). Only Paniagua and Ricart-Huguet (2025) have something to say about the geographic origins of ministers, however: their chief claim is that the City and the Province of Buenos Aires acquiesce to be heavily under-represented in the national legislature because they can compensate with substantial over-representation in the cabinet.[4] While valuable, this contribution is limited to Argentina, and emphasizes long-run structural differences between provinces; the authors do not consider how being the *president's* state may affect its representation in the cabinet.

The voter approval story focuses on electoral dynamics and thus has little to say about cabinet appointments either. But the account of Persico, Rodríguez-Pueblita and Silverman (2011) clearly treats factional membership as a major consideration that presidents take into account when assembling their cabinets. To the extent that the president's faction is geographically concentrated, the president's state will end up over-represented in the cabinet *even if such over-representation is not the president's deliberate goal*. And since former governors are more likely to have both a larger network and an already functioning cabinet, we expect a stronger effect for them:

[4]Though this only applies to the *province* of Buenos Aires; since 1983, the *City* of Buenos Aires has been over-represented both in the national cabinet (see Figure 2) and the Chamber of Deputies.

H$_2$: *The president's state*

(a) *Will be over-represented in the cabinet; and*

(b) *This effect will be stronger when the president is a former governor.*

That said, the degree of presidential autonomy places an important scope condition on this argument (Amorim Neto 2006). When presidents have to exchange cabinet nominations for legislative support –as in Brazil, where the extreme level of congressional fragmentation means the cabinet is used as a patronage tool to build and sustain legislative coalitions (Bersch, Lopez and Taylor 2023)–,[5] the president's state should be far less over-represented in the cabinet, if at all.

Subnational finances. The extent to which the government of the president's state will receive substantially more funds, is far less clear. On the one hand, Persico, Rodríguez-Pueblita and Silverman (2011) suggest that the president's network should generate such an effect, even if it is not electorally optimal. Intuitively, those with direct access to the president's inner circle will be in a better position to lobby for discretionary funds, and elected authorities in the president's state will enjoy such kind of privileged access –after all, they are part of the president's network. This predicts favorable treatment for the president's state.

Two alternative forces pointing in the opposite way, however. In Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, the bulk of transfers from the national government to the states are determined by automatic formulas that fall outside the president's discretion (Wibbels 2005; Díaz-Cayeros 2006; Rodden 2006; Bonvecchi and Lodola 2011). Discretionary transfers do exist, but when all votes are worth the same, over-spending in a state that is unlikely to be pivotal makes little electoral sense (Shachar and Nalebuff 1999; Lindbeck and Weibull 1987), as even the bulk of core voters (Cox and McCubbins 1986; Dixit and Londregan 1996) reside outside the president's state. The empirical evidence on the distribution of discretionary transfers in Latin America shows that political considerations play a

[5]Lacking legislative powers, Uruguayan presidents have to nominate mostly partisan ministers to facilitate the approval of their legislative initiatives (Panizza, Ramos Larraburu and Scherlis 2018).

key role, but the goal is to maximize the electoral or legislative support of the president's party across the country, not in a single state (Gibson and Calvo 2000; Bonvecchi and Lodola 2011; Brollo and Nannicini 2012; González and Mamone 2015).

There are two ways to reconcile these contradictory perspectives. One is simply that one is right and the other is wrong. The other is that Persico, Rodríguez-Pueblita and Silverman's (2011) model can explain the geographical allocation of minor, discretionary projects financed directly by the national government. Indeed, bureaucrats and legislators in Vietnam (Do, Nguyen and Tran 2017), China (Ji and Ma 2025) or Italy (Carozzi and Repetto 2016) do favor their birthplaces or bailiwicks, but these are low-level officials who face little public scrutiny and can only affect relatively minor amounts. When it comes to major spending categories, in contrast, the president should have both weaker opportunities and fewer incentives to benefit his or her own state. Given that the bulk of our data consists of relatively coarse measures of government transfers and spending, we follow the predictions from the fiscal federalism literature:

> H_3: *The president's state will* not *receive special treatment in the allocation of federal funds, though it may become favored in the distribution of minor projects or highly discretionary transfers.*

Conceptualizing politicians' bases. Politicians are often born and develop their career in the same state. In those cases where the two do not match, the previous discussion suggests that it is the state where the candidate (or elected president) has his or her political base that should prevail: it is there that (s)he has a network of collaborators and a track record to show (Fabre and Sangnier 2025). That said, we can exploit the fact that some politicians are born in one state but build their political base elsewhere to carry a placebo test: when both the political base and the state of birth are included in the equation, the former should have a much stronger effect than the latter. To put it differently, finding the opposite would count as evidence that politicians' connections to their state is based on personal reasons rather than the *political* connections advanced here:

H4: *The effects mentioned in H1-3 should be driven by the state where presidential candidates, presidents and ministers have their political bases rather than by the state where they were born.*

Data

Case selection. We look at the three largest federations in Latin America: Argentina (1983-2024), Brazil (1985-2024) and Mexico (1988-2024). While presidents in unitary countries may of course cultivate a close attachment to "their" hometown or district, a (democratic) federal structure provides governors with unparalleled opportunities and incentives to assemble a governing team and then run for the presidency –the very dynamic that is at the center of our argument. This also explains why we excluded Venezuela from the analysis. Although formally a federal country, direct elections for governors were first held in 1989, giving ambitious politicians comparatively little time to cultivate and build regional power bases before the arrival of *chavismo* in 1998. The extreme nationalization of politics that followed, coupled with the regime's gradual but relentless transition toward autocracy, meant that ambitious governors would no longer expect to run for the presidency in a free and fair election.[6]

Sources. Electoral returns, population figures and subnational state finances come from the official agencies listed in Appendix A. Biographical data for 26 presidents, 78 presidential candidates and 1,084 ministers and secretaries with ministerial status comes mostly from Wikipedia.[7] We focus on ministers and secretaries with ministerial status because the universe of "the president's closest advisors" is hard to define systematically, either between countries or over time. Biographical data

[6]The regime's extreme degree of de-institutionalized further means that data on financial transfers and ministers' biographies is simply unavailable.

[7]For every individual, one of us or a research assistant hand-coded portfolio, gender, birthday, birthplace, political base and start and end dates. When needed, we complemented with a Google search.

is also much more readily available for cabinet members than for other appointees (e.g., directors of independent agencies and public enterprises).

We conceptualize an individual's *political base* as the state where (s)he has his or her political (or professional) connections, i.e. the people they are more likely to recruit for their team. We operationalize it as the last state where a given individual sought elected office, won it, or held a non-elected public position. For the (few) people with no previous public sector experience, we tried to determine the state where they held their professional life before running as a candidate or assuming office. For individuals serving as ministers, national legislators and ambassadors –who reside in the capital city or abroad–, we coded their political base as the state where they were elected or had developed a career immediately before assuming the national office in question: such individuals typically retain deep connections to the state where they were initially elected or had developed their career. Note that this coding rule allows a politician to switch his or her political base: for example, in 1988 and 1994 the political base of Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas was Michoacán, where he had been senator (1976-80) and governor (1980-86); but in 1997 he was elected governor of Mexico City, and thus in 2000 we code his political base there. Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (Santa Cruz to Buenos Aires) and Felipe Calderón (Mexico City to Michoacán) are other prominent examples.

The analysis is divided in three parts. We first examine whether presidential candidates do better electorally in the state where they have their political base. Then, we look at the geographical connections of a president's cabinet appointments. Finally, we examine how a president affects financial transfers to, and public spending in, his or her state. Since each analysis employs different indicators, units of observations, and specifications, we discuss them separately.

Analysis (I): Electoral results

Empirical strategy. H_1 predicts that presidential candidates should over-perform in the state where they have their political base, and the effect should be stronger for former governors. Accordingly,

we estimate models of the form

$$\begin{aligned} \%votes_{s,t} \;=\; & \beta^{\text{P}} \cdot base^{\text{P}}_{s,t} + \gamma^{\text{P}} \cdot former\ governor^{\text{P}}_{s,t} \\ & + \beta^{\text{V}} \cdot base^{\text{V}}_{s,t} + \gamma^{\text{V}} \cdot former\ governor^{\text{V}}_{s,t} + \mu_s + \delta_t + \varepsilon_{s,t}, \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

where % $votes_{s,t}$ is the percentage of votes (excluding blank and null ballots) obtained by the party of interest in state s in the first or only round of the election that took place in year t. μ_s and δ_t are state and election year fixed effects, respectively. $base_{s,t}$ and $former\ governor_{s,t}$ are dummies indicating whether the party's candidate in election year t had his or her political base in state s or was a former governor of state s, respectively. Note that it is not possible being a former governor of state s without having a political base there, and thus the γ's estimate an (implicit) interaction term. The P and V superscripts identify (vice-)presidential candidates; we include the latter as placebos. Standard errors are clustered by state.

Since each election features multiple candidates, some of whom get very few votes, we only report results for a subset of 2-3 major reference parties in each country: the PJ[8] and UCR (plus allies in 1999 and 2015-2023) in Argentina; the PT and PSDB in Brazil; and the PRI,[9] PAN and PRD (replaced by MORENA since 2018)[10] in Mexico. We also report results for the incumbent president's party and the first- and second-placed parties in the first round of the election. Appendix Table A1 provides the full list of presidential candidates included in each sample.

Results. For every major reference party and election year, Figure 1 shows the full distribution of state-level vote shares as well as the party's performance at the national level and in the state where its presidential candidate had his or her birthplace and political base. In Argentina, the solid blue

[8] In 2003, the PJ fielded three candidates, two of which reached the runoff. We therefore included all three candidates in the sample with a weight of 1/3 each.

[9] In 2024 we only include the PAN in the sample because the PRI backed a *panista* candidate.

[10] The PRD fielded no candidate of its own in 2018 and 2024, but its former candidate in 2006 and 2012 became had become MORENA's founder and unquestioned leader.



Figure 1: Electoral results for each country's major reference parties. The broken **black** lines and the solid **blue** lines indicate the party's performance at the national level and in the state where its candidate had his or her political base, respectively. *All three candidates (Menem, Kirchner and R. Saá) included in 2003.

line lies (well) above the broken black one for the PJ in 1989, 1995 and 2003 (and to a lesser extent in 2023), as well as for the UCR in 1989, 1995 and 2015-2023. While there are some exceptions (e.g. the PJ in 2019), these are rare and never of comparable magnitude. In Brazil the picture is somewhat different. The PT fielded the same candidate (Lula) in 6 out of 9 elections, and does not do remarkably well in São Paulo (where Fernando Haddad underperformed in 2018), nor in Rio

Grande do Sul in 2010 and 2014. PSDB candidates modestly overperformed in their states in 1989 and 2006-2014. But Mexico's story is similar to Argentina's: the PRI underperformed each time it nominated a candidate from Mexico City, but its performance in Sinaloa (2000), Tabasco (2006) and the state of Mexico (2012) was well above average for the corresponding election years. The same can be said for the PAN when it nominated a candidate from Sinaloa (1988), Guanajuato (2000), Querétaro (2018) or Mexico City (2024). The PRD clearly overperformed in Michoacán in 1988-1994 and in Mexico City in 2000 to 2012. MORENA's slight 2018 advantage had reversed by 2024.

Table 1(a) shows the regression estimates for Argentina. Even when accounting for state and election year effects, PJ candidates increase their party's vote share by 17 percentage points in the district where they have their political base. Column (2) shows that the increase is just 6.3 pp. for candidates who lacked experience as governors, but former governors bring an additional 18.5 percentage point boost. These effects are large both in absolute terms and relative to the average outcome values reported at the bottom of the panel. For the UCR, the average effect is sizable (a 7.4 pp increase), but the estimates are no longer significant when accounting for former gubernatorial status. Consistent with the idea that voter approval explains part of the effect, vice-presidential candidates add 6-7 pp. to the presidential ticket in their own state, though the effect is limited to the PJ and former governors do not make a difference. Columns (7) and (8) show that the effect for the incumbent party is similar to the PJ's (even though the PJ was not the incumbent party in 1983, 1989 or 2019) and similar in magnitude for the candidates of the first and second-placed parties, though only the latter are statistically significant. The first-placed candidate in the first round always came from the PJ or the UCR, but 4 of the 10 second-place finishers came from third parties that lacked a national structure;[11] unsurprisingly, they seem to have done really well in "their" district.

Brazil is a different story: the first four columns of Table 1(b) show mostly positive but small and insignificant effects for the PT and PSDB. This probably reflects the fact that 14 of the 17 candidates from these parties –which were the only serious contenders for the presidency for six straight elec-

[11] José Bordón (1995), Elisa Carrió (2007), Hermes Binner (2011) and Javier Milei (2023).

Table 1: Electoral support by reference party

	PJ		UCR (+ allies)				incumbent		first		second	
(a) Argentina	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
presi: base	16.99	6.33	7.42	4.64			19.81	7.00	15.25	4.68	14.64	1.61
	(8.16)	(2.70)	(2.95)	(2.72)			(8.92)	(2.98)	(9.61)	(3.87)	(6.12)	(1.31)
presi: former gov.		18.46		5.37				16.35		19.07		17.68
		(8.63)		(3.73)				(6.07)		(10.25)		(5.61)
VP: base	6.76	5.89	0.27	−0.28			2.55	1.08	8.99	5.53	2.39	1.56
	(2.35)	(2.25)	(1.89)	(2.16)			(2.45)	(2.35)	(2.62)	(4.07)	(2.69)	(3.34)
VP: former gov.		1.82						7.82		8.51		4.55
		(4.79)						(5.91)		(4.73)		(4.77)
n obs.	288	288	240	240			216	216	240	240	240	240
$\bar{y}$ (president's state)	52.9 (SD: 16.9)		36.5 (SD: 19.6)				53.5 (SD: 14.8)		54.9 (SD: 15.8)		44.7 (SD: 15.4)	
$\bar{y}$ (other states)	44.4 (SD: 15.2)		26.9 (SD: 15.9)				42.2 (SD: 15.3)		46.5 (SD: 13.9)		29.0 (SD: 13.1)	

(b) Brazil	PT		PSDB				incumbent		first		second	
presi: base	6.34	4.01	0.97	−3.65			5.73	5.76	13.26	12.66	3.04	0.19
	(5.30)	(5.26)	(4.75)	(4.19)			(1.75)	(2.25)	(4.12)	(3.85)	(6.37)	(9.80)
presi: former gov.				4.57						11.53		9.30
				(2.49)						(4.31)		(6.20)
VP: base	1.90	−1.20	0.50	−2.22			−0.17	−2.77	0.24	3.36	−2.63	−4.35
	(5.04)	(4.91)	(1.40)	(1.70)			(2.90)	(3.91)	(4.18)	(5.83)	(6.69)	(6.53)
VP: former gov.		10.86		11.74				5.88		−9.29		24.45
		(10.06)		(2.60)				(5.46)		(5.64)		(5.48)
n obs.	243	243	216	216			243	243	243	243	243	243
$\bar{y}$ (president's state)	33.7 (SD: 11.8)		38.9 (SD: 17.7)				36.3 (SD: 21.5)		50.4 (SD: 9.8)		33.8 (SD: 13.5)	
$\bar{y}$ (other states)	38.2 (SD: 16.1)		30.6 (SD: 20.8)				36.5 (SD: 22.7)		48.0 (SD: 13.3)		30.4 (SD: 13.5)	

(c) Mexico	PRI		PAN		PRD		incumbent		first		second	
presi: base	10.49	0.28	5.33	5.37	10.89	10.89	9.58	4.60	7.09	−2.89	21.17	8.13
	(4.88)	(0.91)	(3.26)	(3.85)	(10.03)	(10.03)	(6.24)	(2.93)	(5.58)	(6.71)	(6.04)	(4.84)
presi: former gov.		16.33		−0.24				13.69		16.63		21.72
		(3.56)		(3.59)				(4.67)		(5.60)		(3.96)
n obs.	192	192	224	224	224	224	224	224	224	224	224	224
$\bar{y}$ (president's state)	38.5 (SD: 17.7)		35.0 (SD: 13.7)		50.7 (SD: 14.0)		36.9 (SD: 19.5)		46.9 (SD: 13.0)		48.5 (SD: 15.7)	
$\bar{y}$ (other states)	38.5 (SD: 16.2)		28.0 (SD: 12.8)		33.9 (SD: 20.4)		41.8 (SD: 18.1)		49.7 (SD: 13.9)		28.7 (SD: 11.2)	

OLS regression estimates (except for the PJ models, where observations for 2003 have a weight of 1/3 each). All specifications include fixed effects by state and election year. Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses.

tions between 1994 and 2014– had their political base in São Paulo. Indeed, columns (9) and (10) suggest that when a strong candidate from neither party ran for office –Collor in 1989 and Bolsonaro in 2018–, they overperformed in their own state. Again in line with the voter approval story,

vice-presidential candidates also over-perform, but the effect is restricted to the PSDB –and unlike Argentina, it is driven by former governors.

The bottom panel shows that the PRI overperforms in the state where its presidential candidate has his political base, but the 10.5 pp effect is basically driven by a large 16.3 pp. increase when the candidate was a former governor: Labastida (2000), Madrazo (2006) and Peña Nieto (2012). Despite Fox's road to the presidency from the governorship of Guanajuato, the PAN does not do better where its candidate has his political base, not even when a former governor is on the ballot. More surprisingly, the 11 pp, effect for the PRD (and MORENA) is rendered statistically insignificant by its large standard error. This is possibly because we only have three candidates (Cárdenas 1988-2000, López Obrador 2006-2018, and Sheinbaum in 2024), all of whom were former governors and hailed from just two states (Michoacán and Mexico City). Indeed, the results for the first and second-placed parties suggest that former governors who do well in the election overall *do* overperform in their home states by between 16.6 and 21.7 percentage points. These cannot be explained by a single party, as they include cases like Fox (PAN), Peña Nieto (PRI), and López Obrador (MORENA), while Labastida (PRI) and Cárdenas and López Obrador (PRD) are the corresponding second-placed candidates (see Appendix Table A1).

Robustness. Appendix B shows that excluding idiosyncratic observations or reference parties that obtained fewer than 5% of votes nationally weakens the findings for the PJ but produces stronger results for Argentina's UCR, Brazil's PSDB and Mexico's PRD. Coding candidates who switched states as having multiple political bases strengthens the estimates for Argentina's PJ, Brazil's PT and Mexico's PRD. A party's electoral strength at the state level is a potential confounder, as it may increase both its chance of nominating a presidential candidate and its vote share in the presidential election. But controlling for the reference party's incumbency status and vote share in the previous gubernatorial election or the degree of subnational democracy –which may affect both the governor's control of

local elections and his or her capacity to intervene in national politics (Gibson 2005)–[12] leaves the results unchanged (Table A2). The findings are driven by the candidate's political base rather than his or her state of birth (Tables A3 and A4). Estimating the models with random effects or using pooled specifications with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors make them even stronger (Table A5).

Analysis (II): Cabinet appointments

Specification. In this case the unit of observation is now the president-state: we treat presidents who served multiple consecutive terms as a single observation.[13] This is a conservative choice: the president's political base can only change when the individual occupying the presidency changes, so counting consecutive terms separately would multiply the number of observations without increasing variation in the explanatory variable. We exclude acting vice-presidents and interims from the sample, bringing the number of presidents to 21 (see Table A6). Specifications take the form

$$\begin{aligned} \textit{cabinet representation}_{s,t} \quad = \quad & \beta^{\mathrm{P}} \cdot \textit{base}^{\mathrm{P}}_{s,t} + \gamma^{\mathrm{P}} \cdot \textit{former governor}^{\mathrm{P}}_{s,t} \\ & + \beta^{\mathrm{V}} \cdot \textit{base}^{\mathrm{V}}_{s,t} + \gamma^{\mathrm{V}} \cdot \textit{former governor}^{\mathrm{V}}_{s,t} + \mu_s + \varepsilon_{s,t}, \end{aligned} \tag{2}$$

where the explanatory variables are defined similarly as before (though note the absence of a time effect), and the outcome is a measure of state s's representation in the cabinet during president t's term: either the difference between a state's % of seats in the cabinet and its % of the country's population; or the number of ministers per 10 million inhabitants. Outcomes are measured both for the *initial cabinet* at inauguration and for the president's *full term*, weighting ministers according to the number of days served.[14] Standard errors are clustered by state.

[12] We interact this measure with an incumbency dummy: a less democratic subnational polity should benefit the party controlling the governorship, but hinder other parties' electoral performance.

[13] But Lula appears twice in the sample: he sat out three periods between his second and third terms.

[14] For presidents currently in office, we consider the end of their term to be November 30, 2024.



Figure 2: Relationship between a state's percentage of the country population and its percentage of seats in each president's initial cabinet. The 45° line indicates the case of perfectly proportional representation.

Results. Figure 2 compares a state's % of the national population with its % of seats in each president's initial cabinet. Observations above (below) the 45° line indicate a state is over- (under-)represented. The city of Buenos Aires, São Paulo and Mexico City are generally over-represented regardless of the president's identity, which is unsurprising as federal bureaucrats (Grottola 2022) as well as elite universities, think tanks and major NGOs and advocacy groups (Paniagua and Ricart-Huguet 2025) are overwhelmingly concentrated there. Conversely, the gray area at the bottom left corner indicates that most states have little or no representation in the cabinet. Even for large units like Buenos Aires, São Paulo, Minas Gerais, Mexico City or the state of Mexico, the state where the president has his or her political base tends to be substantially over-represented in the cabinet. Importantly, this effect is driven by the states where presidents and ministers have their political bases rather than their birthplaces: the Sankey diagrams in Appendix Figure A2 show that ministers whose state of birth does not coincide with the president's are disproportionately likely to have moved to the latter rather than the other way around.

Table 2(a) shows that Argentine presidents heavily over-represent their state in the national cabinet –by 25 pp. in the initial cabinet and a still hefty 18 pp. during their full term. Former governors are not different, however. The vice-president's district is also over-represented, but the effect is less than half as large, and becomes zero for former governors. This is somewhat surprising, but note

Table 2: State representation in the cabinet, by president

	DV: % min. − % pop.				DV: min. per 10M			
	initial cabinet		full term		initial cabinet		full term	
(a) Argentina	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
presi: base	25.36	24.68	18.71	18.29	69.02	20.63	65.07	14.10
	(0.95)	(1.28)	(1.98)	(1.33)	(37.41)	(13.70)	(41.89)	(10.36)
presi: former gov.		0.89		0.44		95.25		100.57
		(2.39)		(2.82)		(45.26)		(48.38)
VP: base	9.80	12.06	7.58	9.58	0.23	−15.63	−7.30	−25.33
	(4.38)	(4.22)	(2.55)	(1.71)	(10.54)	(10.83)	(14.23)	(16.04)
VP: former gov.		−14.17		−12.27		13.91		22.32
		(4.22)		(1.71)		(10.83)		(16.04)
n obs.	192	192	192	192	192	192	192	192
(b) Brazil								
presi: base	5.03	6.70	2.54	3.24	0.87	0.31	1.07	0.95
	(2.81)	(4.69)	(2.19)	(3.56)	(0.70)	(0.68)	(1.09)	(1.64)
presi: former gov.		−3.01		−0.97		3.03		0.93
		(4.69)		(3.56)		(0.68)		(1.64)
VP: base	3.20	5.84	0.82	2.08	0.40	0.56	0.05	0.23
	(1.19)	(1.93)	(0.56)	(0.82)	(0.10)	(0.19)	(0.56)	(0.95)
VP: former gov.		−7.44		−3.56		−0.52		−0.52
		(3.96)		(2.95)		(0.48)		(2.29)
n obs.	162	162	162	162	162	162	162	162
(c) Mexico								
presi: base	17.15	11.51	17.37	13.11	4.03	3.24	4.31	4.15
	(5.71)	(4.89)	(4.18)	(3.19)	(1.27)	(0.99)	(0.70)	(0.29)
presi: former gov.		9.40		7.10		1.32		0.27
		(5.21)		(3.87)		(1.01)		(0.72)
n obs.	224	224	224	224	224	224	224	224

OLS regression estimates. All specifications include state fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. Only elected presidents are included.

that Argentinean vice-presidents who were not former governors came overwhelmingly from the City and the Province of Buenos Aires, which are always highly represented in the national cabinet (Figure 2; Paniagua and Ricart-Huguet 2025): the estimate may thus be capturing this phenomenon rather than the vice-president's direct influence on appointments. The effect on the number of ministers per 10 million inhabitants in columns (5) and (7) are also positive, but the large standard errors render them insignificant. Columns (6) and (8) suggest this happens because the effect is particularly large for former governors, many of whom came from very small districts and nominated a

relatively large number of ministers from their states. Vice-presidents make no difference to this outcome; this is consistent with them coming from large districts, where the number of ministers per capita is bound to be relatively low.

As before, the results for Brazil are mostly positive but substantively small and insignificant; the vice-president's state is over-represented by 2 to 6 percentage points, but the effect disappears for former governors. The parallel with Argentina is telling: most of the individuals in question came from the country's two largest states (São Paulo and Minas Gerais), which are usually over-represented in the cabinet anyway (Figure 2). Like their Argentinean peers, Mexican presidents disproportionately favor their own state when assembling their cabinet: depending on the specification, the president's state is over-represented by between 11.5 and 17.4 percentage points, both highly significant estimates, and former governors bring about a further (but nonsignificant) 7.1–9.4 pp. increase. The results are similar for the number of ministers per capita: a significant increase of between 3.2 and 4.3 per ten million. The effect of being a former governor is again positive but not significant. In Appendix Table A13, we show that the effect is mostly driven by medium- and low-prestige portfolios rather than high-prestige ones like Finance and Interior. This makes sense because the latter require more expertise or experience, which are less likely to come from the president's inner circle.

Robustness. These results are robust to including interims and acting vice-presidents and looking at *presidencies* instead of presidents. As expected, using (vice-)presidential runner-ups as placebos yields mostly null results (Table A8). Accounting for presidents with multiple political bases; controlling for the same variables mentioned above plus others taken from the cabinet literature –the president party's ideology and the % of seats it controls in the lower house, plus minority, coalition and reelection dummies, which can limit the president's nomination autonomy– (Table A9) or estimating alternative model specifications (Table A12) does not change the results either. Focusing on both presidents' and ministers' birthplaces instead of their political bases substantially weaken the results, and the findings are robust to controlling for the president's birthplaces as well (Table A10), even when we distinguish presidents who did and did not move (Table A11).

Analysis (III): Subnational finances

Empirical strategy. For the three countries in our sample, the literature has shown that state governments raise relatively little revenue but have ample spending responsibilities, creating perverse incentives to over-spend (or over-borrow) and then seek relief from the national government (Wibbels 2005; Díaz-Cayeros 2006; Rodden 2006). An implication is that if presidents are biased toward "their" state, the local government may face a an event stronger temptation to behave recklessly (Rodden 2006). We thus look at four indicators of fiscal profligacy: (i) consumption expenditures; (ii) current non-discretionary expenditures;[15] (iii) capital transfers from the central government; and (iv) the primary balance of the state government (i.e. income minus expenditures), all of which are available for a relatively long time period (1984-2022 for Argentina, 1985-2021 for Brazil and 1989-2022 for Mexico). We complement these with (v) a more direct measure of federal government behavior: the discretionary portion of Mexico's *Ramo 23*, which is only available for 2010-2018,[16] as well as direct federal spending on public works in Argentina (1995-2025) and Brazil (2010-2025).[17]

To prevent the bouts of hyperinflation in Argentina and Brazil from contaminating these measures, for outcomes (i)-(iii) and (v) above we computed the natural logarithm of each state's per capita ratio relative to all other states:

$$\ln\left(\textit{ratio per capita}_{j,t,s}\right) \quad = \quad \ln\left(\frac{\textit{amount}_{j,t,s}}{\textit{population}_{t,s}} \Big/ \frac{\sum \textit{amount}_{j,t,-s}}{\sum \textit{population}_{t,-s}}\right) \tag{3}$$

Thus a value of $\ln(1) = 0$ indicates that in year t, state s spent (or received as income) in category j as much as the country average when excluding state s; positive and negative values indicate over and

[15] Thus excluding automatic transfers like Argentina's *coparticipación* or Mexico's *participaciones*.

[16] *Ramo 23* is a hodgepodge of different programs and funds, some discretionary and others entirely formula-based. We thus only include the most discretionary ones. The series ends in 2019, when AMLO eliminated most discretionary items in the *ramo* (Carretto 2018).

[17] We thank an anonymous reviewer for insisting on this point.

under-spending, respectively. We do not transform the primary balance of the state government because is already expressed as a percentage.

Since effects may be heterogeneous across states, two-way fixed-effects specifications like the one displayed in Equation 1 are not advisable (Roth et al. 2023). We rather exploit the fact that only one state is treated at a given moment to build a dataset of *transition events*, defined as moments in which the political base of the president changed.[18] We keep the four periods immediately before and after each transition event and number them relatively to $t = 0$, the year in which the president initiating the transition was elected:[19] $t-3$, $t-2$, ..., t, $t+1$, ..., $t+4$. We then "stack" the observations one above the other to estimate an event-study specification of the form:

$$y_{i,s,t} = \sum_{t \in (-T:T)} \beta^t \cdot base_{i,s} \cdot I(t = T) + \mu_{i,s} + \delta_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,s,t}, \tag{4}$$

where $I(\cdot)$ is the indicator function, i indexes individual transition events, s indexes states, and t indexes periods around the transition window. We estimate one coefficient for each value of t; the goal is to see whether the president's state was already different before the transition, or began differing afterwards. State-transition and year-transition fixed effects mean that observations are compared to others from the same state and year *within the same transition event*. Standard errors are clustered by state-transition, as this is the unit at which the treatment is administered.

Results. Figure 3 displays the event study estimates. Year 0 is not reported, as it provided the baseline to which other estimates are compared. As in the previous section, we restrict the samples to elected presidents. Since the choice of control group may affect the results, we report three separate

[18] A transition event implies that the identity of the individual occupying the presidency changed, but the reverse need not be true. In 2015, Macri (CABA) replaced Fernández (Buenos Aires); since Macri's successors also came from CABA, we code no transition events in 2019 nor 2023.

[19] Argentinean and Mexican presidents typically assume office in December and Brazilian ones on January 1st. Thus, presidents are elected in $t = 0$, but they can only affect outcomes since $t+1$.



Figure 3: Event study estimates and 95% CIs of the effect of having an *elected* president whose political base is on state s on s's financial outcomes. $t = 0$ is the baseline to which other estimates are compared.

estimates for each outcome. In the *low strictness* estimates, all not currently treated states are included in the control group, maximizing sample size but including previously treated states. In the *medium strictness* estimates, we restrict the control group to never or not-yet-treated states, and the

high strictness estimates limit the control group to states that never had a vice-president or a runner-up with a political base there. In practice, most estimates are insignificant across the board and the choice of control group does not matter. In Argentina, current transfers increase substantially but only in the president's fourth year in office; we thus do not want to read too much into it. In Mexico, consumption expenditures in the president's state go down by a nontrivial amount, though the effect is insignificant. The effect for states' primary balances are very close to zero overall. When we look at more disaggregated measures, we find little evidence that Argentine presidents spend more on public works on their district;[20] the effect for Brazil is positive, but relatively small in size, and it only appears in the second part of the term. As for Mexico's *Ramo 23*, the estimates were already negative even before the president assumed office, and in any case the short time series (2010-2018) means we are only examining Penã Nieto's presidency.

Robustness. Results are very similar if we add transition events for acting vice-presidents and interims (see Appendix Figure A3); if we focus on the president's state of birth (Figure A4); if we include the same controls as in the election analysis (Figure A5); or if we look at the political base of the vice-president (Figure A6) or the runner-up in the presidential election (Figure A7). In Brazil the runner-up's state seems to receive fewer current and capital transfers –and to have a larger deficit–, but we do not want to read much into this because the parallel trends assumption does not hold.

Case study: The *Grupo Atlacomulco* in 2012

To illustrate some of the mechanisms that may be driving the results on elections and cabinet nominations, in this section we provide some evidence from the *Grupo Atlacomulco*, a prominent network of politicians that ruled the State of Mexico between 1942 and 2023. The group takes its name from the municipality of Atlacomulco, which produced no less than six state governors. The last of these,

[20] Disaggregated data for Argentina is only available since 1995, so we cannot capture the well-documented Menem case (Gibson and Calvo 2000).

Table 3: Electoral support for the PRI: The *Grupo Atlacomulco* in 2012

1994 × Atlacomulco	0.52	−0.69
	(0.94)	(0.94)
× other states	−2.85	−4.17
	(0.69)	(0.72)
2006 × Atlacomulco	1.20	0.73
	(0.88)	(0.86)
× other states	−0.19	0.12
	(0.61)	(0.58)
2012 × Atlacomulco	**3.14**	**1.87**
	(1.27)	**(1.30)**
× other states	−11.82	−11.40
	(0.98)	(0.92)
2018 × Atlacomulco	0.96	0.11
	(1.17)	(1.01)
× other states	−7.81	−4.63
	(0.86)	(0.77)
2024 × Atlacomulco	6.83	6.39
	(2.18)	(1.89)
× other states	−6.08	−4.03
	(1.20)	(1.14)
municipal PRI vote (%)		0.19
		(0.01)
PRI coalition (0/1)		−2.20
		(0.83)
municipal PRI vote (%) × PRI coalition (0/1)		0.09
		(0.02)
n obs.	12,088	12,088
incumbency dummies	no	yes

OLS regression estimates. The unit of observation is the municipality in the presidential election year. The (excluded) reference groups are the 2000 election and the municipalities in the state of Mexico not associated with the Atlacomulco group. All specifications include fixed effects by municipality and election year. Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses.

Enrique Peña Nieto, became president in 2012. Peña Nieto was expected to draw heavily on the Atlacomulco group to staff his administration, giving both state- and local-level politicians strong incentives to mobilize voters in order to gain access to the positions left vacant by officeholders moving to federal roles.

Figure 1 already showed that the PRI overperformed in the State of Mexico in 2012. To see whether there was mobilization *within* the state, we compare the PRI's municipal-level performance in three sets of municipalities: (a) the 43 municipalities associated with the Atlacomulco group,

which we hand-coded from the most detailed historical account of the group (Toribio 2006; see Appendix A for the full list); (b) all other municipalities in the State of Mexico; and (c) all municipalities located in other states. Since the PRI is generally stronger in some areas than others, and its overall performance in a given election may depend on an array of factors –such as candidate quality, economic performance, and voter sentiment toward the party (and its opponents)–, we include fixed effects by state and election year throughout. That is, our focus is on the PRI's *relative* performance in the Atlacomulco municipalities *vis-à-vis* the reference point, which are other municipalities in the State of Mexico and the 2000 presidential election. The first column of Table 3 shows that in 2012 (and in 2024) the PRI did indeed overperform in the Atlacomulco municipalities, while it severely underperformed outside the state. That said, the 3.1 pp. effect is not robust to the inclusion of controls measuring the PRI's performance in the previous municipal election as well as a set of incumbency dummies at the municipal, state and national levels (as well as their interactions), so the results should be taken with a grain of salt.

A qualitative assessment shows that no less than five of Peña Nieto's appointments had accompanied him in the governorship. Luis Videgaray became Secretary of Finance, one of the most powerful positions in the cabinet. Alfonso Navarrete, a former Attorney General, became Secretary of Labor and later Secretary of the Interior. Luis Miranda Nava served as Undersecretary of the Interior first and Secretary of Social Development later. And Gerardo Ruiz Esparza, who had served as Secretary of Communications in the state, became federal Secretary of Communications and Transportation. Peña Nieto also brought Emilio Chuayffet –a prominent member of the group who had been state governor during 1993-95– as Secretary of Public Education (Reséndiz 2013).

The list extends to less prominent positions. Former state Undersecretary of Revenue Aristóteles Núñez became head of the Tax Administration Service. Alejandro Murat moved from the state's registry and broadcasting institutes to the National Housing Fund. Roberto Padilla Domínguez, who had coordinated Peña Nieto's governorship agenda, was named Technical Secretary. And Humberto Castillejos Cervantes, a longtime legal advisor to Peña Nieto, became Legal Counsel to the

Presidency (see Reséndiz 2013 for more examples). Perhaps the most prominent case is Peña Nieto's cousin Alfredo del Mazo Maza, son and grandson of state governors and former mayor of Huixquilucan, one of the group's strongholds. After serving as director of the National Development Bank, in 2015 he moved to the Chamber of Deputies and was elected state governor in 2017.

Discussion and conclusion

Overview. Do presidents in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico develop a special relationship with "their" district? As summarized in Table 4, our results show that presidential candidates in Argentina and Mexico often receive an electoral boost in the state where they have their political base, which later becomes overrepresented in the cabinet. Former governors enjoy a larger electoral bonus, but this does not translate into cabinet appointments. But consistent with both the electoral incentives and the automatic nature of most transfers, there is no evidence that the president's state becomes more profligate after (s)he assumes the presidency, and the data on infrastructure projects shows only a small effect in Brazil.

While these results may not seem overly surprising, they are quite informative nonetheless. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to go beyond anecdotal evidence to carry out a systematic study of how president's connections to a given district shapes electoral returns,[21] cabinet appointments, and fiscal transfers and spending across Latin American federations. Furthermore, a closer look reveals that our results are stronger than they may appear at first sight. States where a party tends to do well may be more likely to have a presidential nominee, and locally powerful governors may be in a much better position to vie for their party's nomination (Gervasoni 2018). By including state and election year effects, our results are robust to this possibility; indeed, controlling for a party's party's incumbency status and its past electoral performance at the state level leaves the

[21] Ames (1995) and Poertner (2023) focus on how mayors (respectively, federal deputies) mobilize voters for *other* candidates rather than themselves.

Table 4: Summary of results

H_1: **Elections**		**Argentina**	**Brazil**	**Mexico**
(a) Candidates will overperform in political base		✓ (except UCR, 1st, 2nd)	× (only incumbent, 1st)	× (only PRI, 2nd)
(b) Stronger for former governors		✓ (except UCR)	× (only 1st)	✓ (except PAN)
H_2: **Appointments**				
(a) President's state overrepresented in the cabinet		✓ (except for min./10M)	×	✓
(b) Stronger for former governors		✓/× (only for min./10M)	× (only for min./10M)	×
H_3: **Transfers**				
President's state not favored in major transfers		✓	✓	✓
President's state somewhat favored in minor spending decisions		×	✓	×
H_4: **Birthplace**				
Effect driven by political base rather than state of birth	H_1	✓	✓ (when there is an effect)	✓
	H_2	✓	✓	✓/× (birthplace *also* matters)
	H_3	*no effect*	*no effect*	*no effect*

findings unchanged (see Appendix Tables A2 and A9). The fact that the financial results are pretty insensitive to the inclusion of control variables (see Figure A5) and the choice of control group, and that the parallel paths assumptions seems to hold in many (but not all) cases further indicates that our specifications are doing a good job at comparing like with like.

These specification choices give our estimates an average treatment effect *on the treated* (ATT) interpretation: presidential states may be unrepresentative, but we are still estimating the expected vote (or cabinet) share premium of having a president(ial candidate) with a political base in the state. Intuitively, we are not explaining why the PJ generally performs well in La Rioja or Santa Cruz, or the PRI in the State of Mexico; rather, our point is that the PJ did *especially* well in La Rioja in 1989, 1995 and 2003 and in Santa Cruz in 2003 –or the PRI in Sinaloa 2000, Tabasco 2006 or the State of Mexico 2012– because a candidate with strong ties to the state was in the ballot and had a shot at winning the presidency. The same applies to cabinet nominations: the city of Buenos Aires and

Mexico City may be generally over-represented, but they are *even more over-represented* when the president has his or her political base there. Indeed, with 20 out of 23 (87%) of her ministers coming from Mexico City, Claudia Sheinbaum sets the over-representation record for our sample.

The results for H_4 are also informative. On the one hand, a politician's state of birth is an obvious confounder: it may affect both the location of its political base and its electoral performance or its nomination decisions. Relatively few politicians move between states, but even then Tables A3 and A10 show that the political base matters much more than the birthplace, and the same holds for ministers (see Figure A2). On the other hand, distinguishing birthplace and political base can be informative about the underlying mechanisms: had the results been driven by the president's birthplace, we should have concluded that personal affection and ties matter more than political factors like voter evaluations or personal networks (Carozzi and Repetto 2016; Fabre and Sangnier 2025). That said, presidents who move away from their birthplace are not randomly chosen. We thus created a *mover* dummy that takes the value of 1 if the president moved from his or her birth state and 0 otherwise, and interacted it with all the explanatory variables in in Tables 1 and 2.[22] The results lack a clear direction and are pretty unstable: in Argentina the electoral results seem to be driven by candidates who did not move, in Brazil and Mexico we find the opposite (see Appendix Table A4). The cabinet results are reversed: in Argentina it is driven by movers, in Mexico by remainers (Table A11). We thus draw no firm conclusions from this exercise.

Finally, some of our null findings merit further comment. Former governors do not seem to affect cabinet composition because most presidents who were not former governors –Alfonsín, Milei, and Cristina and Alberto Fernández in Argentina; Salinas and Zedillo in Mexico– mostly came from the capital city (or the surrounding province of Buenos Aires), where there is no lack of potential nominees (see Figure 2). The other is what makes Brazil different. When 14 out of 17 major presidential candidates came from São Paulo, the president's state was decided in advance, and in any case a given campaign's mobilization effort would be counteracted by the other's. Indeed, maver-

[22] We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this exercise.

ick candidates like Collor in 1989 and Bolsonaro in 2018 and 2022 did disproportionately well in Alagoas and Rio de Janeiro. The cabinet results are probably explained by the extreme fragmentation of the legislature: when the largest party rarely gets even 20% of seats, the cabinet becomes a source of patronage for buying legislative support (Bersch, Lopez and Taylor 2023). Consistently, Brazilian cabinets are both larger and more geographically balanced than in Argentina or Mexico: they have 29 ministers on average instead of 17 or 21, and São Paulo is much less over-represented than the City of Buenos Aires (CABA) and Mexico City (see Figure 2). This highlights an important scope condition: presidents are more likely to appoint ministers from their state when they have more autonomy *vis-à-vis* legislators or their own parties, which is not the case everywhere (Amorim Neto 2006; Panizza, Ramos Larraburu and Scherlis 2018). Personalist presidents are extremely autonomous, and as noted in the introduction both Milei and López Obrador appointed an enormous proportion of ministers from the City of Buenos Aires and Mexico City.

Implications for further research. Our analysis also complements three existing literatures, and does so in ways that open avenues for future research. First, we show that where a candidate comes from matter for his or her distribution of support, and since the logic of our argument is "fractal," we would expect a similar relationship between gubernatorial candidates and their municipalities. Second, our argument suggests that different types of ministers should come from different places: technocrats from highly urbanized districts; partisan ministers from large districts with many votes and/or legislators; and friends, cronies and close confidants from the president's state. The fact that the president's state is mostly over-represented in low- and medium-prestige portfolios (Table A13) is suggestive in this regard. Ministers hailing from the president's state may also behave differently: if their political socialization was idiosyncratic or they (feel they) are closer to the president, they may be more likely to become involved in scandals. And the president's network is not only geographic; for example, both Chávez and Bolsonaro seem to have appointed a disproportionate share of collaborators with a military background. Whether officers who had met them before they became involved in politics later secured important appointments can make for a fascinating study.

From a normative perspective, presidents disproportionately recruiting collaborators from their own network poses a trade-off for democratic representation analogous to the classic majority vs. proportionality distinction highlighted by Lijphart (1999). On the one hand, leaders of large organizations (including firms and academic departments!) may be in a better position to act quickly and effectively when they have a team of trusted collaborators to whom they may delegate policy design and implementation. But collaborators who enjoy unrivaled access to the president may benefit disproportionately from such a connection –for example, those who feel shielded by their connection to the president may behave more corruptly. Collaborators originating from the president's state are likely less educated, which is not necessarily bad if they bring ideas and perspectives that the highly educated tend to overlook (Carnes and Lupu 2016). On the other hand, a cabinet that contains a greater variety of viewpoints but at the cost of introducing too many veto points (Tsebelis 1995).

In any case, the educational differential is irrelevant for presidents coming from the City of Buenos Aires, São Paulo or Mexico City, which has been the norm recently (Table A6). The fact that these districts regularly get over 50% of cabinet seats with just 10% of the national population also merits further attention. Is this over-representation simply a byproduct of the fact that federal bureaucrats have to be concentrated *somewhere* (Grottola 2022)? Or are there hard-to-defend barriers that prevent talented people born in other jurisdictions to access a national policymaking role?

The mismatch between *ministerial* and *legislative* representation that characterizes the countries we study is worth considering in more detail. While the president is elected in a single nationwide district, small states are heavily over-represented in the Senate –and in Argentina and Brazil, also in the Chamber of Deputies (Samuels and Snyder 2001). Whether or not this reflects an (implicit) pact whereby some states compensate under-representation in the legislature with over-representation in the cabinet (Paniagua and Ricart-Huguet 2025), the case is that small (though not necessarily poor) states are disproportionately influential in shaping legislation that will be implemented by ministers who developed their careers in rich and heavily urban districts. How this lack of congruence shapes representation and public policy is a fascinating area for further study.

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Online Appendix

"A President of One's Own?"
(for online publication only)

A Data Sources

Biographical data

We created an individual level dataset of all presidents, presidential candidates, vice-presidents, vice-presidential candidates, and ministers for Argentina since 1983, Brazil since 1985 and Mexico since 1988. We downloaded each individual's Wikipedia page and recorded the following variables: full name, time period (election year for candidates, presidencies for elected presidents and cabinet ministers), gender, birth date, city and state of birth, city and state in which his/her career was developed, year of election (for presidents and vice-presidents only), end year of constitutional mandate (for presidents and vice-presidents only), date when they started and ended the position, type of office (minister, secretary, etc), and portfolio (finance, defense, etc). When Wikipedia data was lacking we relied on alternative sources like university websites, legislature lineup pages, news articles, or media interviews.

Demographics

Population data comes from official census figures. For Argentina the census years are 1980, 1991, 2001, 2010 and 2022, publicly available at Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos (INDEC). For Mexico census years are 1980, 1990, 2000, 2010 and 2020, from the Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (INEGI). And for Brazil census years are 1980, 1991, 2000, 2010 and 2022, data is also publicly available at Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE).

Electoral results

Candidates' vote shares come from the Dirección Nacional Electoral (DINE) and the Cámara Nacional Electoral (CNE) for Argentina, the Centro de Estudios de la Democracia (CEDE) and Instituto Nacional Electoral (INE) for Mexico, and Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE) for Brazil. Presidential elections in Argentina were held in 1983, 1989, 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011, 2015, 2019 and 2023. In Mexico: 1988, 1994, 2000, 2006, 2012, 2018 and 2024. And in Brazil: 1989, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014, 2018 and 2022. Municipal-level electoral results from Mexico come from the Recent Mexican Election Vote Returns Repository Magar (N.d.).[1] Subnational Democracy Indexes come from the Subnational Politics Project (Giraudy, González and Urdinez 2025), which we extended as needed using the reported by the authors.

Fiscal transfers and public works

For Argentina we built our transfers data on the basis of figures from the Dirección Nacional de Asuntos Provinciales (DNAP) with Fundación Norte y Sur as support, and used official budget expenditures from Dirección de Datos Abiertos for public works –filtered by *Bienes de Uso* (Fixed Assets) and *Construcciones* (Construction). For Brazil we relied on the Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (IPEA) cross-checking with the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE) and Ministério da Economia for transfers, and used public works data reported by the Senate's SIGA website –filtered by *Investimentos* (Investments) and *Aplicacoes Diretas* (Direct Application). For Mexico we use data from the Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (INEGI) for transfers, and *Ramo 23* data from Mexico's Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público. We provide details about *Ramo 23* in page 22 of the main text.

[1] The list municipalities comprising the *Grupo Atlacomulco* comes from Toribio (2006): Atlacomulco, Tianguistenco, Acambay, Almoloya del Río, Chalco, Cuautitlán, Cuautitlán Izcalli, Ecatepec, El Oro, Ixtapan, Ixtlahuaca, Jocotitlán, Lerma, Metepec, Naucalpan, Nezahualcóyotl, San Felipe del Progreso, Sultepec, Temascalcingo, Temascaltepec, Tenancingo, Tenango del Valle, Texcoco, Timilpan, Tlalnepantla, Toluca, Valle de Bravo, Villa del Carbón, Zumpango, Aculco, Almoloya de Juárez, Amecameca, Atizapán de Zaragoza, Huixquilcan, Isidro Fabela, Ixtapaluca, Jilotepec, Ozumba, San Mateo Atenco, Tejupilco, Valle de Chalco, Xalatlaco and Zinacantepec.

B Election Results

Reference parties

Table A1 lists all candidates for each reference party, the district where they developed their career, and the % of positive votes they obtained at the national level in the first round of the election.

States' electoral weights

Figure A1 shows each state's electoral weight as the proportion of positive votes cast nationally for every election included in the sample. The black squares indicates the actual margin of victory (in the first round) between the first-placed candidate and the runner-up –whose political bases are displayed in blue and pink, respectively.

Robustness checks

- Table A2 replicates the estimations in Table 1 but (a) including controls; (b) excluding idiosyncratic observations: (i) the PJ in 2003 (three official candidates); (ii) the UCR in 1989 (the electoral college system allowed a candidate to have different vice-presidential candidates); and (iii) the PRD since 2018 (i.e., not counting MORENA as a continuation of the PRD); and (iv) reference parties that received less than 5% of the national vote: the UCR in 2003, the PSDB in 2022, and the Brazilian incumbent in 1989 and 2018; or (c) coding candidates who switched districts as having multiple political bases: Fernández de Kirchner, Carrió and Scioli in Argentina; Brizola in Brazil; and Cárdenas, Calderón and López Obrador in Mexico.
- Table A3 replicates the estimations in Table 1 but accounting for candidates' state of birth.
- Table A4 reports the results distinguishing between *movers* and *remainers*.
- Table A5 reports alternative model specifications: random effects and pooled specifications with Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors.

Table A1: List of reference parties and their presidential candidates

Argentina	incumbent	1st placed	2nd placed	PJ	UCR (+ allies)*
1983	**	Alfonsín (PBA) 51.7	Luder (PBA) 40.2	Luder (PBA) 40.2	Alfonsín (PBA) 51.7
1989	Angeloz (CBA) 37.1	Menem (LR) 47.5	Angeloz (CBA) 37.1	Menem (LR) 47.5	Angeloz (CBA) 37.1
1995	Menem (LR) 49.9	Menem (LR) 49.9	Bordón (MZA) 29.3	Menem (LR) 49.9	Massaccesi (RN) 17.0
1999	Duhalde (PBA) 38.3	De la Rúa (CABA) 48.4	Duhalde (PBA) 38.3	Duhalde (PBA) 38.3	De la Rúa (CABA) 48.4
2003	Kirchner (SC) 22.2	Menem (LR) 24.5	Kirchner (SC) 22.2	CM/NK/ARS (LR/SC/SL) 24/22/14†	Moreau (PBA) 2.3
2007	CFK (PBA) 45.3	CFK (PBA) 45.3	Carrió (CABA) 23.0	CFK (PBA) 45.3	Lavagna (CABA) 16.9
2011	CFK (PBA) 54.1	CFK (PBA) 54.1	Binner (SFE) 16.8	CFK (PBA) 54.1	Alfonsín (h) (PBA) 11.1
2015	Scioli (PBA) 37.1	Scioli (PBA) 37.1	Macri (CABA) 34.2	Scioli (PBA) 37.1	Macri (CABA) 34.2
2019	Macri (CABA) 40.3	Fernández (CABA) 48.2	Macri (CABA) 40.3	Fernández (CABA) 48.2	Macri (CABA) 40.3
2023	Massa (PBA) 36.8	Massa (PBA) 36.8	Milei (CABA) 30.1	Massa (PBA) 36.8	Bullrich (CABA) 23.7

Brazil	incumbent	1st placed	2nd placed	PT	PSDB
1989	Guimaraes (SP) 4.7	Collor (AL) 30.5	Lula (SP) 17.2	Lula (SP) 17.2	Covas (SP) 11.5
1994	Cardoso (SP) 54.3	Cardoso (SP) 54.3	Lula (SP) 27.0	Lula (SP) 27.0	Cardoso (SP) 54.3
1998	Cardoso (SP) 53.2	Cardoso (SP) 53.2	Lula (SP) 31.8	Lula (SP) 31.8	Cardoso (SP) 53.2
2002	Serra, Jose (SP) 23.2	Lula (SP) 46.4	Serra, Jose (SP) 23.2	Lula (SP) 46.4	Serra, Jose (SP) 23.2
2006	Lula (SP) 48.6	Lula (SP) 48.6	Alckmin (SP) 41.6	Lula (SP) 48.6	Alckmin (SP) 41.6
2010	Rousseff (RS) 46.9	Rousseff (RS) 46.9	Serra, Jose (SP) 32.6	Rousseff (RS) 46.9	Serra, Jose (SP) 32.6
2014	Rousseff (RS) 41.6	Rousseff (RS) 41.6	Neves (MG) 33.5	Rousseff (RS) 41.6	Neves (MG) 33.5
2018	Meirelles (GO) 1.2	Bolsonaro (RJ) 46.0	Haddad (SP) 29.3	Haddad (SP) 29.3	Alckmin (SP) 4.8
2022	Bolsonaro (RJ) 43.2	Lula (SP) 48.4	Bolsonaro (RJ) 43.2	Lula (SP) 48.4	

Mexico	incumbent	1st placed	2nd placed	PRI	PAN	PRD‡
1988	Salinas (DF) 50.5	Salinas (DF) 50.5	Cárdenas (MI) 30.9	Salinas (DF) 50.5	Clouthier (SIN) 17.1	Cárdenas (MI) 30.9
1994	Zedillo (DF) 50.2	Zedillo (DF) 50.2	Cevallos (DF) 26.7	Zedillo (DF) 50.2	Cevallos (DF) 26.7	Cárdenas (MI) 17.1
2000	Labastida (SIN) 36.9	Fox (GTO) 43.5	Labastida (SIN) 36.9	Labastida (SIN) 36.9	Fox (GTO) 43.5	Cárdenas (DF) 17.0
2006	Calderón (MI) 37.0	Calderón (MI) 37.0	AMLO (DF) 36.4	Madrazo (TAB) 22.9	Calderón (MI) 37.0	AMLO (DF) 36.4
2012	V. Mota (DF) 26.0	Peña Nieto (MEX) 39.2	AMLO (DF) 32.4	Peña Nieto (MEX) 39.2	V. Mota (DF) 26.0	AMLO (DF) 32.4
2018	Meade (DF) 16.9	AMLO (DF) 54.8	Anaya (QRO) 22.9	Meade (DF) 16.9	Anaya (QRO) 22.9	AMLO (DF) 54.8
2024	Sheinbaum (DF) 61.3	Sheinbaum (DF) 61.3	Gálvez (DF) 28.1		Gálvez (DF) 28.1	Sheinbaum (DF) 61.3

Presidential candidate, district where (s)he developed his or her career, and percentage of positive votes obtained at the national level, for all reference parties included in the sample. All percentages calculated over *positive* votes, i.e. excluding blank and null ballots. * *Alianza* in 1999; *Juntos por el Cambio* / *Cambiemos* since 2015. ** The outgoing military regime did not officially support any candidate. † The PJ officially fielded 3 candidates: Carlos Menem, Néstor Kirchner, and Adolfo Rodríguez Saá. ‡ FDN in 1988; MORENA since 2018.



Figure A1: States' electoral weight in national elections. The square **black** dots indicate the first-placed candidate's margin of victory at the *national* level (as a percentage of positive votes), while the small gray circles indicate each state's percentage of positive votes in the *national* election. When pink dots are not visible, it is because the first- and the second-placed candidate had the same political base.

Table A2: Electoral support by reference party: Adding controls; excluding idiosyncratic observations; accounting for multiple political bases

	PJ				UCR (+ allies)								incumbent				first				second			
(a) Argentina: base	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)
presi: base	16.99	17.20	7.47	14.55	7.42	7.92	9.58	7.42					19.81	19.65	20.27	15.86	15.25	16.36	15.25	14.21	14.64	10.86	16.04	13.87
	(8.16)	(8.27)	(5.42)	(6.48)	(2.95)	(3.39)	(3.29)	(2.95)					(8.92)	(8.88)	(10.73)	(5.78)	(9.61)	(9.17)	(9.61)	(7.95)	(6.12)	(7.09)	(7.11)	(5.51)
VP: base	6.76	6.88	3.97	6.69	0.27	−0.23	−1.04	0.27					2.55	3.11	2.13	2.79	8.99	9.50	8.99	9.76	2.39	3.62	3.46	2.56
	(2.35)	(2.34)	(2.76)	(2.31)	(1.89)	(1.81)	(2.51)	(1.89)					(2.45)	(2.85)	(2.83)	(2.62)	(2.62)	(2.75)	(2.62)	(2.49)	(2.69)	(2.95)	(2.70)	(2.82)
n obs.	288	285	216	288	240	237	192	240					216	215	192	216	240	237	240	240	240	237	216	240
(b) Argentina: base + governor																								
presi: base	6.33	6.58	2.81	7.07	4.64	6.41	5.91	4.64					7.00	7.21	8.17	5.71	4.68	6.41	4.68	7.15	1.61	−0.54	2.50	3.05
	(2.70)	(2.78)	(2.34)	(3.54)	(2.72)	(4.09)	(2.61)	(2.72)					(2.98)	(2.98)	(3.97)	(3.84)	(3.87)	(2.87)	(3.87)	(5.19)	(1.31)	(1.78)	(2.16)	(1.75)
presi: former gov.	18.46	18.40	8.06	18.03	5.37	2.91	7.81	5.37					16.35	15.96	15.99	17.90	19.07	18.29	19.07	16.84	17.68	15.44	19.18	16.33
	(8.63)	(8.78)	(4.85)	(8.29)	(3.73)	(3.81)	(3.27)	(3.73)					(6.07)	(6.20)	(6.66)	(7.13)	(10.25)	(9.47)	(10.25)	(9.62)	(5.61)	(6.50)	(5.98)	(5.71)
VP: base	5.89	5.98	2.30	6.24	−0.28	−0.50	−2.02	−0.28					1.08	1.60	1.14	1.46	5.53	6.37	5.53	6.54	1.56	2.71	2.96	1.54
	(2.25)	(2.18)	(2.40)	(1.97)	(2.16)	(1.89)	(2.76)	(2.16)					(2.35)	(2.66)	(2.73)	(2.50)	(4.07)	(3.95)	(4.07)	(3.82)	(3.34)	(3.74)	(3.57)	(3.37)
VP: former gov.	1.82	1.76	3.96	1.43									7.82	7.67	7.23	7.46	8.51	7.54	8.51	7.50	4.55	3.78	2.73	4.75
	(4.79)	(4.93)	(5.84)	(4.71)									(5.91)	(5.90)	(6.69)	(6.02)	(4.73)	(4.53)	(4.73)	(4.40)	(4.77)	(4.65)	(5.14)	(4.84)
n obs.	288	285	216	288	240	237	192	240					216	215	192	216	240	237	240	240	240	237	216	240
(c) Brazil: base	PT				PSDB								incumbent				first				second			
presi: base	6.34	5.55	6.34	8.84	0.97	0.50	1.23	0.97					5.73	5.09	9.11	5.73	13.26	12.60	13.26	13.26	3.04	3.25	3.04	2.97
	(5.30)	(4.97)	(5.30)	(4.13)	(4.75)	(4.92)	(4.46)	(4.75)					(1.75)	(1.93)	(2.60)	(1.75)	(4.12)	(3.88)	(4.12)	(4.12)	(6.37)	(6.79)	(6.37)	(5.86)
VP: base	1.90	1.00	1.90	6.05	0.50	0.23	0.84	0.50					−0.17	0.12	−2.83	−0.17	0.24	0.25	0.24	0.24	−2.63	−3.48	−2.63	−0.57
	(5.04)	(4.59)	(5.04)	(2.75)	(1.40)	(1.41)	(1.92)	(1.40)					(2.90)	(3.07)	(2.20)	(2.90)	(4.18)	(4.14)	(4.18)	(4.18)	(6.69)	(6.47)	(6.69)	(4.93)
n obs.	243	243	243	243	216	216	189	216					243	242	189	243	243	242	243	243	243	242	243	243
(d) Brazil: base + governor																								
presi: base	4.01	3.74	4.01	5.56	−3.65	−4.00	−5.31	−3.65					5.76	5.08	9.17	5.76	12.66	11.56	12.66	12.66	0.19	0.15	0.19	0.07
	(5.26)	(5.15)	(5.26)	(3.62)	(4.19)	(4.26)	(3.54)	(4.19)					(2.25)	(2.51)	(2.41)	(2.25)	(3.85)	(3.41)	(3.85)	(3.85)	(9.80)	(9.55)	(9.80)	(9.49)
presi: former gov.					4.57	4.83	7.01	4.57									11.53	13.15	11.53	11.53	9.30	9.67	9.30	9.38
					(2.49)	(3.05)	(3.11)	(2.49)									(4.31)	(3.86)	(4.31)	(4.31)	(6.20)	(6.10)	(6.20)	(6.05)
VP: base	−1.20	−1.43	−1.20	0.31	−2.22	−2.42	−2.90	−2.22					−2.77	−2.68	−2.05	−2.77	3.36	2.77	3.36	3.36	−4.35	−4.82	−4.35	−3.84
	(4.91)	(4.96)	(4.91)	(3.63)	(1.70)	(1.75)	(1.60)	(1.70)					(3.91)	(4.19)	(2.97)	(3.91)	(5.83)	(5.87)	(5.83)	(5.83)	(6.53)	(6.57)	(6.53)	(6.20)
VP: former gov.	10.86	8.67	10.86	15.74	11.74	11.90	13.65	11.74					5.88	6.31	−2.95	5.88	−9.29	−7.78	−9.29	−9.29	24.45	21.76	24.45	22.30
	(10.06)	(8.50)	(10.06)	(9.84)	(2.60)	(2.66)	(2.85)	(2.60)					(5.46)	(6.03)	(3.89)	(5.46)	(5.64)	(5.83)	(5.64)	(5.64)	(5.48)	(6.22)	(5.48)	(4.46)
n obs.	243	243	243	243	216	216	189	216					243	242	189	243	243	242	243	243	243	242	243	243
(e) Mexico: base	PRI				PAN				PRD				incumbent				first				second			
presi: base	10.49	12.51	10.49	10.49	5.33	5.66	5.33	3.49	10.89	19.92	12.07	13.80	9.58	12.50	9.58	12.75	7.09	5.11	7.09	11.31	21.17	20.28	21.17	25.42
	(4.88)	(2.88)	(4.88)	(4.88)	(3.26)	(2.82)	(3.26)	(4.33)	(10.03)	(4.84)	(4.77)	(6.83)	(6.24)	(5.65)	(6.24)	(5.76)	(5.58)	(1.66)	(5.58)	(6.32)	(6.04)	(6.17)	(6.04)	(6.15)
n obs.	192	191	192	192	224	222	224	224	224	223	160	224	224	222	224	224	224	222	224	224	224	223	224	224
(f) Mexico: base + governor																								
presi: base	0.28	8.08	0.28	0.28	5.37	6.03	5.37	3.14	10.89	19.92	12.07	15.01	4.60	10.71	4.60	7.98	−2.89	3.12	−2.89	7.02	8.13	12.25	8.13	20.05
	(0.91)	(1.64)	(0.91)	(0.91)	(3.85)	(3.33)	(3.85)	(5.10)	(10.03)	(4.84)	(4.77)	(0.80)	(2.93)	(2.61)	(2.93)	(2.53)	(6.71)	(2.82)	(6.71)	(9.30)	(4.84)	(1.86)	(4.84)	(9.98)
presi: former gov.	16.33	6.57	16.33	16.33	−0.24	−2.20	−0.24	2.05				−1.86	13.69	4.66	13.69	12.02	16.63	3.05	16.63	9.03	21.72	13.44	21.72	11.97
	(3.56)	(4.03)	(3.56)	(3.56)	(3.59)	(3.18)	(3.59)	(4.88)				(10.34)	(4.67)	(9.26)	(4.67)	(4.17)	(5.60)	(3.75)	(5.60)	(7.13)	(3.96)	(5.52)	(3.96)	(7.99)
n obs.	192	191	192	192	224	222	224	224	224	223	160	224	224	222	224	224	224	222	224	224	224	223	224	224
specification	orig.	contr.	excl.	bases	orig.	contr.	excl.	bases	orig.	contr.	excl.	bases	orig.	contr.	excl.	bases	orig.	contr.	excl.	bases	orig.	contr.	excl.	bases

OLS regression estimates (except for the PJ models in columns (1)-(2), (4)-(6), (8), (13)-(14), (16)-(18), (20)-(22) and (23), where observations for 2003 have a weight of 1/3 each). All specifications include fixed effects by state and election year. Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. Columns (1), (5), (9), (13), (17) and (21) replicate the original estimates from Table 1. Models in columns (2), (6), (10), (14), (18) and (22) include controls for the reference party's vote % in the previous gubernatorial election, an incumbency dummy, the level of subnational democracy from Giraudy, González and Urdinez (2025), and the interaction between the last two. Specifications in columns (3), (7), (11), (15), (19) and (23) exclude the following observations: Argentina 1989 (UCR, incumbent and second): two vice-presidential candidates (allowed by the electoral college system); Argentina 2003 (PJ): the party officially fielded three presidential candidates; Mexico 2018 and 2024 (PRD): the party officially supported the PAN's presidential candidate; and Argentina 2003 (UCR), Brazil 1989 (incumbent), and Brazil 2018 (PSDB and incumbent), which obtained less than 5% of the national vote. For the models in columns (4), (8), (12), (16), (20) and (24), candidates who switched districts are coded as having multiple political bases: Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (ARG, presi, 2007 and 2011 and VP 2019): Santa Cruz & the province of Buenos Aires; Elisa Carrió (ARG, presi, 2007): Chaco & the City of Buenos Aires; Daniel Scioli (ARG, presi, 2015): the city and province of Buenos Aires; Leonel Brizola (BRA, VP, 1998): Rio Grande do Sul (former governor) & Rio de Janeiro; Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas (MEX, presi, 2000): Michoacán (former governor) & Mexico City; Felipe Calderón (MEX, presi, 2006): Mexico City & Michoacán; and Andrés Manuel López Obrador (MEX, presi, 2006, 2012 and 2018): Tabasco & Mexico City.

Table A3: Electoral support by reference party: Accounting for candidates' birthplaces

	PJ			UCR (+ allies)						incumbent			first			second		
(a) Argentina: base, birthplace or both	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)
presi: base	16.99		11.81	7.42		7.98				19.81		19.22	15.25		10.90	14.64		13.55
	(8.16)		(6.18)	(2.95)		(3.82)				(8.92)		(8.05)	(9.61)		(5.98)	(6.12)		(4.56)
presi: birthplace		13.85	6.20		2.58	−1.13					14.29	2.39		14.01	5.97		9.02	2.71
		(7.01)	(3.46)		(3.09)	(3.71)					(8.75)	(4.45)		(9.66)	(6.29)		(6.74)	(5.51)
VP: base	6.76		5.32	0.27		0.32				2.55		0.51	8.99		8.53	2.39		1.51
	(2.35)		(4.79)	(1.89)		(4.35)				(2.45)		(4.19)	(2.62)		(6.69)	(2.69)		(3.91)
VP: birthplace		3.86	1.37		−1.24	−0.36					0.31	3.72		8.42	1.33		−0.40	1.21
		(3.14)	(5.91)		(1.49)	(4.19)					(3.39)	(5.94)		(3.11)	(7.46)		(3.91)	(3.91)
n obs.		288	288		240	240					216	216		240	240		240	240
(b) Argentina: base, birthplace or both + governor																		
presi: base	6.33		−0.19	4.64		4.73				7.00		1.50	4.68		−9.83	1.61		1.46
	(2.70)		(2.08)	(2.72)		(4.49)				(2.98)		(5.47)	(3.87)		(4.12)	(1.31)		(1.40)
presi: former gov.	18.46		19.13	5.37		5.35				16.35		18.45	19.07		26.93	17.68		18.14
	(8.63)		(8.86)	(3.73)		(4.69)				(6.07)		(5.94)	(10.25)		(7.60)	(5.61)		(5.15)
presi: birthplace			6.67			−0.40						5.55			13.00			0.69
			(3.23)			(4.47)						(5.90)			(7.28)			(4.96)
VP: base	5.89		6.01	−0.28		0.25				1.08		1.99	5.53		8.50	1.56		−1.18
	(2.25)		(3.77)	(2.16)		(4.26)				(2.35)		(3.45)	(4.07)		(4.76)	(3.34)		(3.66)
VP: former gov.	1.82		3.39							7.82		8.07	8.51		8.55	4.55		3.41
	(4.79)		(5.16)							(5.91)		(6.33)	(4.73)		(5.62)	(4.77)		(4.84)
VP: birthplace			−1.66			−0.89						−1.17			−3.01			3.87
			(5.39)			(4.09)						(4.24)			(6.28)			(3.17)
n obs.	288		288	240		240				216		216	240		240	240		240
(c) Brazil: base, birthplace or both	PT			PSDB						incumbent			first			second		
presi: base	6.34		7.31	0.97		−0.75				5.73		4.38	13.26		14.13	3.04		−0.97
	(5.30)		(3.35)	(4.75)		(6.88)				(1.75)		(1.72)	(4.12)		(3.25)	(6.37)		(3.60)
presi: birthplace		−1.75	−1.72		1.78	2.03					2.54	2.15		1.30	3.64		7.55	7.94
		(2.62)	(2.69)		(2.94)	(4.53)					(3.73)	(3.73)		(6.50)	(6.67)		(5.32)	(5.20)
VP: base	1.90		−2.47	0.50						−0.17		5.16	0.24		−5.17	−2.63		3.79
	(5.04)		(17.19)	(1.40)						(2.90)		(3.51)	(4.18)		(2.87)	(6.69)		(12.07)
VP: birthplace		0.88	5.31		0.61	0.54					−1.91	−5.80		−0.46	7.21		−3.19	−6.05
		(2.38)	(15.06)		(1.72)	(1.41)					(2.92)	(3.99)		(4.53)	(3.86)		(3.23)	(8.05)
n obs.		243	243		216	216					243	243		243	243		243	243
(d) Brazil: base, birthplace or both + governor																		
presi: base	4.01		5.00	−3.65		−3.92				5.76		4.11	12.66		13.98	0.19		−0.33
	(5.26)		(3.63)	(4.19)		(5.23)				(2.25)		(2.14)	(3.85)		(2.77)	(9.80)		(9.02)
presi: former gov.				4.57		4.27							11.53		9.80	9.30		5.45
				(2.49)		(4.10)							(4.31)		(3.62)	(6.20)		(10.59)
presi: birthplace			−1.87			0.58						1.72			3.22			5.69
			(2.66)			(4.54)						(3.72)			(6.54)			(8.32)
VP: base	−1.20		−11.12	−2.22						−2.77		3.69	3.36		−3.89	−4.35		−2.45
	(4.91)		(15.30)	(1.70)						(3.91)		(4.34)	(5.83)		(3.13)	(6.53)		(11.89)
VP: former gov.	10.86		15.47	11.74		11.73				5.88		7.49	−9.29		−10.82	24.45		22.83
	(10.06)		(15.58)	(2.60)		(2.63)				(5.46)		(5.39)	(5.64)		(5.69)	(5.48)		(10.37)
VP: birthplace			10.75			−2.20						−8.02			9.80			−1.01
			(13.08)			(1.80)						(5.65)			(4.92)			(6.65)
n obs.	243		243	216		216				243		243	243		243	243		243
(e) Mexico: base, birthplace or both	PRI			PAN			PRD			incumbent			first			second		
presi: base	10.49			5.33		5.11	10.89		12.68	9.58			7.09		3.91	21.17		19.43
	(4.88)			(3.26)		(2.13)	(10.03)		(10.63)	(6.24)			(5.58)		(7.62)	(6.04)		(5.39)
presi: birthplace		10.49	10.49		2.88	0.47		2.79	5.96		9.58	9.58		7.83	5.61		12.98	10.43
		(4.88)	(4.88)		(3.80)	(2.40)		(8.65)	(8.31)		(6.24)	(6.24)		(6.42)	(8.54)		(9.00)	(8.70)
n obs.		192	192		224	224		224	224		224	224		224	224		224	224
(f) Mexico: base, birthplace or both + governor																		
presi: base	0.28			5.37		5.10	10.89		12.68	4.60			−2.89		−12.50	8.13		5.68
	(0.91)			(3.85)		(2.60)	(10.03)		(10.63)	(2.93)			(6.71)		(7.18)	(4.84)		(6.22)
presi: former gov.	16.33		16.33	−0.24		0.04				13.69		13.69	16.63		22.03	21.72		22.74
	(3.56)		(3.56)	(3.59)		(2.42)				(4.67)		(4.67)	(5.60)		(6.71)	(3.96)		(5.85)
presi: birthplace			0.28			0.47			5.96			4.60			11.24			11.04
			(0.91)			(2.20)			(8.31)			(2.93)			(7.24)			(8.88)
n obs.	192			224		224	224		224	224			224		224	224		224

OLS regression estimates (except for the PJ models, where observations for 2003 have a weight of 1/3 each). All specifications include fixed effects by state and election year. Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses.

Table A4: Electoral support by reference party: Distinguishing between *movers* and *remainers*

	PJ		UCR (+ allies)				incumbent		first		second	
(a) Argentina	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
presi: base	15.20	1.94	11.66	10.77			16.11	5.35	16.86	3.01	8.47	-31.88
	(7.25)	(5.27)	(4.11)	(4.88)			(12.08)	(7.89)	(8.95)	(5.21)	(10.40)	(4.59)
presi: base × mover	-5.06	6.91	-4.55	-11.39			2.05	-7.93	-10.46	-35.06	7.43	44.40
	(5.04)	(4.83)	(3.87)	(4.83)			(5.67)	(5.53)	(7.55)	(8.52)	(11.77)	(10.74)
presi: former gov.		24.57		2.98				17.75		35.49		48.27
		(9.02)		(6.90)				(7.01)		(5.76)		(12.67)
presi: former gov. × mover		-30.43		7.87								-44.58
		(9.25)		(6.45)								(17.00)
presi: birthplace	4.25	3.19	-4.62	-4.94			6.48	4.07	2.37	0.63	6.20	7.48
	(4.94)	(5.47)	(4.22)	(3.99)			(8.40)	(7.50)	(7.23)	(8.06)	(1.35)	(1.30)
VP: base	18.80	17.74	-7.69	-7.59			14.95	13.01	24.99	22.65	5.71	10.66
	(3.66)	(4.39)	(5.16)	(5.09)			(3.91)	(3.05)	(3.04)	(3.77)	(4.90)	(4.92)
VP: base × mover	-24.45	-19.41	12.13	11.20			-23.89	-18.90	-29.95	-23.43	-5.34	-12.14
	(3.82)	(4.66)	(8.30)	(8.29)			(4.79)	(4.75)	(6.04)	(4.94)	(8.91)	(8.07)
VP: former gov.		0.41						3.84		5.49		-1.41
		(5.40)						(6.00)		(5.39)		(5.80)
VP: birthplace	-9.25	-10.16	6.01	5.41			-6.56	-7.73	-11.83	-13.67	-2.37	-2.49
	(1.74)	(1.74)	(4.68)	(4.54)			(3.80)	(3.39)	(2.55)	(3.33)	(2.84)	(2.92)
n obs.	288	288	240	240			216	216	240	240	240	240
(b) Brazil	PT		PSDB				incumbent		first		second	
presi: base	-5.53	-5.34	6.86	5.20			1.99	1.31	14.13	13.98	-10.57	-22.31
	(5.13)	(5.43)	(4.91)	(4.82)			(4.84)	(4.95)	(3.25)	(2.77)	(4.80)	(6.12)
presi: base × mover	13.52	13.94	-13.80	-13.26			1.61	1.33			9.03	19.95
	(3.59)	(3.62)	(4.54)	(4.20)			(5.82)	(6.02)			(5.91)	(8.47)
presi: former gov.				0.46						9.80		18.39
				(2.47)						(3.63)		(4.32)
presi: birthplace	0.21	0.28	-4.81	-4.79			3.03	2.59	3.64	3.22	12.00	11.32
	(1.56)	(1.53)	(2.21)	(2.27)			(5.06)	(5.06)	(6.67)	(6.56)	(5.89)	(6.65)
VP: base	-29.83	-29.57	0.10	-2.38			-0.73	-4.95	2.04	5.91	-13.92	-14.78
	(2.59)	(2.63)	(1.39)	(1.77)			(5.24)	(6.71)	(4.24)	(5.97)	(9.54)	(9.22)
VP: base × mover	51.80	55.46					11.96	17.04	-7.21	-9.80	34.29	33.25
	(4.13)	(5.55)					(10.76)	(12.85)	(3.86)	(4.93)	(9.62)	(11.17)
VP: former gov.		-3.92		11.47				9.35		-10.82		4.57
		(3.86)		(2.70)				(5.81)		(5.70)		(7.57)
VP: birthplace	28.99	29.30					-0.61	-1.33			7.86	8.20
	(2.20)	(2.55)					(4.19)	(4.04)			(5.27)	(5.20)
n obs.	243	243	216	216			243	243	243	243	243	243
(c) Mexico	PRI		PAN		PRD		incumbent		first		second	
presi: base	10.49	0.28	2.01	2.04	-11.31	-11.31	9.58	4.60	-20.23	-24.14	-0.25	-12.50
	(4.90)	(0.91)	(5.85)	(5.83)	(1.37)	(1.37)	(6.25)	(2.95)	(3.22)	(3.93)	(14.87)	(9.53)
presi: base × mover			4.98	5.87	34.14	34.14			43.64	37.45	26.50	26.31
			(6.39)	(6.55)	(1.83)	(1.83)			(5.05)	(6.60)	(15.42)	(10.47)
presi: former gov.		16.33		-2.73				13.69		9.85		25.43
		(3.58)		(2.45)				(4.70)		(4.48)		(4.55)
presi: former gov. × mover												-6.98
												(6.87)
presi: birthplace			2.35	2.41	17.04	17.04			25.11	24.86	17.20	16.71
			(1.39)	(1.42)	(1.68)	(1.68)			(4.35)	(4.58)	(11.48)	(11.75)
n obs.	192	192	224	224	224	224	224	224	224	224	224	224

OLS regression estimates (except for the PJ models, where observations for 2003 have a weight of 1/3 each). All specifications include fixed effects by state and election year. Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. *movers* are those candidates who were born in one state but have their political base in another.

Table A5: Electoral support by reference party: Alternative model specifications

	PJ*				UCR (+ allies)								incumbent				first				second			
(a) Argentina: base	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)
presi: base	16.99	15.29	8.41	8.41	7.42	8.18	9.04	9.04					19.81	16.85	11.50	11.50	15.25	13.18	7.99	7.99	14.64	15.28	15.28	15.28
	(8.16)	(3.43)	(7.15)	(6.86)	(2.95)	(2.29)	(2.95)	(3.49)					(8.92)	(4.05)	(6.53)	(5.35)	(9.61)	(3.59)	(6.56)	(6.38)	(6.12)	(3.02)	(6.02)	(5.90)
VP: base	6.76	5.67	1.19	1.19	0.27	1.37	3.53	3.53					2.55	0.78	−2.58	−2.58	8.99	7.37	2.32	2.32	2.39	2.42	2.42	2.42
	(2.35)	(3.04)	(2.09)	(1.44)	(1.89)	(2.11)	(2.51)	(1.68)					(2.45)	(3.72)	(2.83)	(1.31)	(2.62)	(3.29)	(2.50)	(2.15)	(2.69)	(3.02)	(4.78)	(4.83)
test p-val.		0.256	0.273	0.273		0.010	0.479	0.479						0.113	0.714	0.714		0.045	0.286	0.286		0.882	0.658	0.658
(b) Argentina: base + governor																								
presi: base	6.33	4.26	0.17	0.17	4.64	4.94	−2.50	−2.50					7.00	4.26	7.93	7.93	4.68	2.32	−0.25	−0.25	1.61	2.01	4.56	4.56
	(2.70)	(4.59)	(4.26)	(3.94)	(2.72)	(3.13)	(7.09)	(6.73)					(2.98)	(6.99)	(4.94)	(3.02)	(3.87)	(4.96)	(3.81)	(3.20)	(1.31)	(5.47)	(6.22)	(6.77)
presi: former gov.	18.46	19.32	16.72	16.72	5.37	6.47	23.93	23.93					16.35	16.95	5.87	5.87	19.07	20.25	16.93	16.93	17.68	18.96	16.16	16.16
	(8.63)	(5.58)	(9.05)	(7.66)	(3.73)	(4.27)	(10.26)	(10.57)					(6.07)	(7.85)	(8.58)	(7.89)	(10.25)	(6.54)	(8.34)	(7.50)	(5.61)	(6.44)	(7.50)	(7.21)
VP: base	5.89	4.37	0.38	0.38	−0.28	0.73	0.96	0.96					1.08	−0.61	−5.38	−5.38	5.53	3.90	1.25	1.25	1.56	2.60	−0.28	−0.28
	(2.25)	(3.90)	(2.53)	(2.53)	(2.16)	(2.15)	(3.17)	(2.42)					(2.35)	(4.27)	(2.76)	(2.59)	(4.07)	(3.72)	(2.97)	(2.57)	(3.34)	(3.37)	(4.75)	(4.71)
VP: former gov.	1.82	3.36	5.02	5.02									7.82	9.01	14.54	14.54	8.51	9.71	5.19	5.19	4.55	3.07	16.40	16.40
	(4.79)	(6.19)	(6.40)	(6.32)									(5.91)	(8.82)	(8.41)	(8.67)	(4.73)	(7.92)	(6.36)	(4.05)	(4.77)	(7.39)	(4.42)	(4.46)
test p-val.		0.680	0.460	0.460		0.026	0.169	0.169						0.305	0.786	0.786		0.230	0.552	0.552		0.792	0.455	0.455
n obs.	288	288	288	288	240	240	240	240					216	216	216	216	240	240	240	240	240	240	240	240
(c) Brazil: base	PT				PSDB								incumbent				first				second			
presi: base	6.34	2.66	−3.80	−3.80	0.97	5.35	8.24	8.24					5.73	0.55	−0.01	−0.01	13.26	6.28	2.63	2.63	3.04	3.84	3.87	3.87
	(5.30)	(4.58)	(2.44)	(2.20)	(4.75)	(4.74)	(1.94)	(1.55)					(1.75)	(3.72)	(2.37)	(2.21)	(4.12)	(4.46)	(3.87)	(3.62)	(6.37)	(4.00)	(3.24)	(3.20)
VP: base	1.90	0.08	−3.36	−3.36	0.50	0.32	−1.43	−1.43					−0.17	−1.45	−1.55	−1.55	0.24	−2.35	−3.13	−3.13	−2.63	−2.37	−2.35	−2.35
	(5.04)	(3.49)	(3.72)	(4.55)	(1.40)	(3.33)	(3.36)	(3.43)					(2.90)	(3.65)	(3.09)	(3.28)	(4.18)	(4.34)	(3.10)	(3.06)	(6.69)	(3.91)	(3.92)	(3.79)
test p-val.		0.349	0.411	0.411		0.316	0.468	0.468						0.121	0.494	0.494		0.014	0.273	0.273		0.980	0.959	0.959
(d) Brazil: base + governor																								
presi: base	4.01	0.74	−4.56	−4.56	−3.65	3.00	11.09	11.09					5.76	0.86	−0.27	−0.27	12.66	3.59	0.22	0.22	0.19	0.68	−1.21	−1.21
	(5.26)	(4.72)	(2.76)	(2.88)	(4.19)	(6.04)	(5.28)	(5.21)					(2.25)	(3.73)	(2.63)	(2.42)	(3.85)	(4.86)	(3.27)	(2.80)	(9.80)	(4.98)	(3.80)	(3.10)
presi: former gov.					4.57	3.16	−5.71	−5.71									11.53	19.45	16.01	16.01	9.30	10.32	15.70	15.70
					(2.49)	(6.21)	(12.46)	(12.43)									(4.31)	(13.42)	(3.05)	(2.92)	(6.20)	(8.16)	(5.99)	(4.70)
VP: base	−1.20	−3.01	−5.74	−5.74	−2.22	−1.61	−10.23	−10.23					−2.77	−4.87	0.68	0.68	3.36	−2.12	−5.54	−5.54	−4.35	−3.66	−2.82	−2.82
	(4.91)	(3.99)	(4.29)	(5.10)	(1.70)	(3.72)	(6.75)	(7.34)					(3.91)	(4.92)	(8.27)	(7.87)	(5.83)	(5.31)	(4.62)	(4.29)	(6.53)	(4.20)	(3.60)	(3.22)
VP: former gov.	10.86	11.88	11.37	11.37	11.74	8.63	35.17	35.17					5.88	7.65	−4.99	−4.99	−9.29	−0.75	8.00	8.00	24.45	18.50	14.89	14.89
	(10.06)	(7.55)	(6.24)	(7.39)	(2.60)	(7.55)	(5.82)	(4.56)					(5.46)	(7.39)	(14.40)	(15.44)	(5.64)	(9.14)	(6.19)	(6.47)	(5.48)	(12.14)	(4.76)	(4.68)
test p-val.		0.605	0.420	0.420		0.475	0.177	0.177						0.291	0.364	0.364		0.037	0.451	0.451		0.401	0.798	0.798
n obs.	243	243	243	243	216	216	216	216					243	243	243	243	243	243	243	243	243	243	243	243
(e) Mexico: base	PRI				PAN				PRD				incumbent				first				second			
presi: base	10.49	7.21	0.00	0.00	5.33	5.46	7.02	7.02	10.89	12.11	16.85	16.85	9.58	−3.64	−4.93	−4.93	7.09	−2.75	−2.75	−2.75	21.17	19.83	19.83	19.83
	(4.88)	(3.20)	(8.06)	(8.91)	(3.26)	(2.37)	(4.12)	(3.40)	(10.03)	(4.06)	(5.81)	(6.38)	(6.24)	(3.90)	(6.35)	(6.46)	(5.58)	(4.11)	(5.89)	(6.04)	(6.04)	(3.88)	(4.95)	(3.89)
test p-val.		0.001	0.994	0.994		0.695	0.980	0.980		0.413	0.139	0.139		0.000	0.993	0.993		0.003	0.654	0.654		0.688	0.161	0.161
(f) Mexico: base + governor																								
presi: base	0.28	−6.37	−10.73	−10.73	5.37	5.28	2.43	2.43	10.89	12.11	16.85	16.85	4.60	−10.54	−14.50	−14.50	−2.89	−13.77	−14.20	−14.20	8.13	7.16	3.70	3.70
	(0.91)	(4.87)	(5.72)	(4.58)	(3.85)	(2.61)	(4.34)	(4.35)	(10.03)	(4.06)	(5.81)	(6.38)	(2.93)	(4.45)	(5.12)	(4.78)	(6.71)	(6.21)	(5.94)	(5.83)	(4.84)	(5.83)	(3.38)	(4.02)
presi: former gov.	16.33	22.45	21.47	21.47	−0.24	1.12	32.12	32.12					13.69	21.20	33.51	33.51	16.63	19.30	20.05	20.05	21.72	22.18	28.22	28.22
	(3.56)	(6.44)	(10.89)	(7.63)	(3.59)	(6.51)	(2.80)	(2.09)					(4.67)	(8.20)	(6.43)	(4.95)	(5.60)	(8.22)	(5.54)	(3.77)	(3.96)	(7.70)	(3.31)	(4.21)
test p-val.		0.022	0.685	0.685		0.105	0.198	0.198		0.413	0.139	0.139		0.001	0.230	0.230		0.019	0.389	0.389		0.972	0.209	0.209
n obs.	192	192	192	192	224	224	224	224	224	224	224	224	224	224	224	224	224	224	224	224	224	224	224	224
specification	TWFE	RE	DK	DK(AR(1))	TWFE	RE	DK	DK(AR(1))	TWFE	RE	DK	DK(AR(1))	TWFE	RE	DK	DK(AR(1))	TWFE	RE	DK	DK(AR(1))	TWFE	RE	DK	DK(AR(1))

TWFE (respectively, RE) specifications include fixed (respectively, random) effects by state and year. DK and DK(AR(1)) models are estimated by pooled OLS. In TWFE and RE specifications, standard errors are clustered by state. DK specifications use Driscoll-Kraay standard errors (Driscoll and Kraay 1998). In RE specifications, p-values correspond to a Hausman test of the null hypothesis that state- and year-level effects are uncorrelated with the regressors. In DK and DK(AR(1)) specifications, the p-values correspond to a Breusch-Pagan test of the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity across states. * WLS for the PJ models; the party had 3 official candidates in 2003, which are included with a weight of 1/3 each.

C Cabinet nominations

List of presidents

Table A6 presents the list of presidents included in the cabinet sample.

Birthplace vs. political base of ministers and presidents

The Sankey plots in Figure A2 shows the proportion of ministers whose birth and career states coincided with the president's political base. We see that it is more common for ministers who were born outside of the president's political base to move there than the other way round.

Portfolio classification

Table A7 shows the classification by country and topic given formal names change. We first prompted Claude *and* chatGPT to classify the portfolios. We then manually checked this classification taking into account (a) the portfolio's official rank (e.g., "Cabinet chief" is high-rank); (b) its traditional prestige (Foreign Affairs, Interior and the Treasury are high-ranking ministries); (c) the amount of money it is responsible for spending; and (d) the manner of people that is directly affected by the ministry's actions. For that reason, a given portfolio's rank may vary between countries; due to the War on Drugs, Defense is high-ranking in Mexico but medium-ranking in Argentina and Brazil. Tourism is much more economically relevant in Mexico as well.

Robustness checks

- Table A8 replicates the results in Table 2 but including acting vice-presidents and interims, measuring the variables by *presidency* instead of president, and using runner-ups as placebos.

- Table A9 replicates the results in Table 2 but (a) allowing Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, Felipe Calderón and Andrés Manuel López Obrador to have multiple political bases; or (b) including controls.
- Table A10 accounts for presidents' and ministers' birthplaces.
- Table A11 distinguishes between *movers* and *remainers*.
- Table A12 reports alternative model specifications: random effects and pooled specifications with Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors.
- Table A13 report separate results for high-, medium- and low-prestige portfolios.

Table A6: Presidents included in the sample

Argentina ($N = 10$)	type	N_{terms}	election year	start date	end date	state of birth	political base	former gov.
Alfonsín, Raúl Ricardo	president	1	1983	1983-12-10	1989-07-07	BUENOS AIRES	BUENOS AIRES	NO
Menem, Carlos Saúl	president	2	1989	1989-07-08	1999-12-09	LA RIOJA	LA RIOJA	YES
De la Rúa, Fernando	president	1	1999	1999-12-10	2001-12-20	CORDOBA	CITY OF BUENOS AIRES	YES
Rodríguez Saá, Adolfo	interim	1		2001-12-23	2001-12-30	SAN LUIS	SAN LUIS	YES
Duhalde, Eduardo Alberto	interim	1		2002-01-02	2003-05-24	BUENOS AIRES	BUENOS AIRES	YES
Kirchner, Néstor Carlos	president	1	2003	2003-05-25	2007-12-09	SANTA CRUZ	SANTA CRUZ	YES
Fernández de Kirchner, Cristina	president	2	2007	2007-12-10	2015-12-09	BUENOS AIRES	BUENOS AIRES	NO
Macri, Mauricio	president	1	2015	2015-12-10	2019-12-09	BUENOS AIRES	CITY OF BUENOS AIRES	YES
Fernández, Alberto Ángel	president	1	2019	2019-12-10	2023-12-09	CITY OF BUENOS AIRES	CITY OF BUENOS AIRES	NO
Milei, Javier Gerardo	president	1	2023	2023-12-10		CITY OF BUENOS AIRES	CITY OF BUENOS AIRES	NO
Brazil ($N = 9$)								
Sarney de Araújo Costa, José	vice-president	1	1985	1985-03-15	1990-03-14	MARANHAO	MARANHAO	YES
Collor de Mello, Fernando Affonso	president	1	1989	1990-03-15	1992-10-01	RIO DE JANEIRO	ALAGOAS	YES
Cautiero Franco, Itamar Augusto	vice-president	1	1989	1992-10-02	1994-12-31	NONE (BRAZILIAN SEA)	MINAS GERAIS	NO
Cardoso, Fernando Henrique	president	2	1994	1995-01-01	2002-12-31	RIO DE JANEIRO	SAO PAULO	NO
Lula da Silva, Luiz Inácio (1)	president	2	2002	2003-01-01	2010-12-31	PERNAMBUCO	SAO PAULO	NO
Rousseff, Dilma Vana	president	2	2010	2011-01-01	2016-05-11	MINAS GERAIS	RIO GRANDE DO SUL	NO
Temer Lulia, Michel Miguel Elias	vice-president	1	2014	2016-05-12	2018-12-31	SAO PAULO	SAO PAULO	NO
Bolsonaro, Jair Messias	president	1	2018	2019-01-01	2022-12-31	SAO PAULO	RIO DE JANEIRO	NO
Lula da Silva, Luiz Inácio (2)	president	1	2022	2023-01-01		PERNAMBUCO	SAO PAULO	NO
Mexico ($N = 7$)								
Salinas de Gortari, Carlos	president	1	1988	1988-12-01	1994-11-30	MEXICO CITY	MEXICO CITY	NO
Zedillo Ponce de León, Ernesto	president	1	1994	1994-12-01	2000-11-30	MEXICO CITY	MEXICO CITY	NO
Fox Quesada, Vicente	president	1	2000	2000-12-01	2006-11-30	MEXICO CITY	GUANAJUATO	YES
Calderón Hinojosa, Felipe de Jesús	president	1	2006	2006-12-01	2012-11-30	MICHOACAN	MICHOACAN	NO
Peña Nieto, Enrique	president	1	2012	2012-12-01	2018-11-30	MEXICO	MEXICO	YES
López Obrador, Andrés Manuel	president	1	2018	2018-12-01	2024-09-30	TABASCO	MEXICO CITY	YES
Sheinbaum Pardo, Claudia	president	1	2024	2024-10-01		MEXICO CITY	MEXICO CITY	YES

For presidents currently in office (Milei, Lula and Sheinbaum) we consider their last day to be November 30, 2024. *Although he formally resigned on December 29, 1992, he had been suspended on October 1st, 1992, with vice-president Franco taking office and revamping the cabinet. We thus code Francos's term as beginning on October 2nd. †Although she was formally deposed on August 31, 2016, she had been suspended on May 12, 2016, with vice-president Temer taking office and revamping the cabinet. We thus code Temer's term as beginning on May 12.



Figure A2: Sankey diagrams showing the percentage of ministers (weighted by the length of their tenure) whose state of birth and the state where they developed their career coincided with the president's political base. It is more common for ministers who were born outside of the president's political base to move there than the other way round.

Table A7: Portfolio rank

portfolio	Argentina	Brazil	Mexico
Agriculture	Medium	Medium	Medium
Cabinet chief	High	High	
Children welfare		Low	
Communications	Low	Low	
Communications & transportation		Medium	Medium
Culture	Low	Low	Low
Defense	Medium	Medium	High
Digital services & modernization	Low	Low	Low
Drugs	Low		
Economic coordination	Medium	Medium	High*
Economic coordination (secretariat)		Low	
Economic development	Medium	Medium	Medium
Education	Medium	Medium	Medium
Energy	Medium	Medium	Medium
Environment	Low	Low	Low
Fishing		Low	Low
Foreign affairs	High	High	High
Health	Medium	Medium	Medium
Human rights		Low	
Infrastructure	Medium	Medium	
Intelligence	Medium	Medium	
Interior	High	High	High
Interior (secretariat)		Low	
Irrigation		Low	
Justice	Medium	Medium	Medium
Labor	Medium	Medium	Medium
Legal affairs	Low	Low	Low
Navy & air force		Low	High
Ports & aviation		Low	
Private secretary	Low	Low	Low
Public finances	High	High	High
Public relations	Low	Low	
Public security	Medium	Medium	High
Regional integration		Medium	
Science & technology	Low	Low	Low
Small business development		Low	
Social welfare	Medium	Medium	Medium
Special projects	Low	Low	
Sports	Low	Low	
Tourism	Low	Low	Medium
Transportation	Medium	Medium	
Urban services	Low	Low	
Women & minorities	Low	Low	Low

* Until its dissolution in 1992, the *Secretaría de Programación y Presupuesto* (SPP) was a kind of superministry coordinating all economic affairs. Three presidents (de la Madrid, Salinas and Zedillo) were former SPP chairmen.

Table A8: State representation in the cabinet: acting VPs and interims; *presidencies* instead of presidents; and runner-ups as placebos

	DV: % ministers − % population								DV: ministers per 10M population							
	initial cabinet				full term				initial cabinet				full term			
(a) Argentina: base	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
presi: base	25.36	30.43	21.30	−3.91	18.71	26.53	17.72	−5.62	69.02	72.43	54.69	−4.08	65.07	71.17	53.90	−4.02
	(0.95)	(1.41)	(1.69)	(2.82)	(1.98)	(2.27)	(2.06)	(3.07)	(37.41)	(34.03)	(27.88)	(3.51)	(41.89)	(37.15)	(30.76)	(2.57)
VP: base	9.80	10.52	5.40	−2.31	7.58	8.24	4.45	−2.50	0.23	−0.84	−3.76	−8.36	−7.30	−6.95	−5.77	−7.02
	(4.38)	(4.78)	(4.53)	(1.03)	(2.55)	(3.10)	(2.82)	(1.84)	(10.54)	(12.99)	(7.56)	(6.71)	(14.23)	(16.01)	(8.96)	(7.24)
(b) Argentina: base + governor																
presi: base	24.68	26.31	20.20	−2.58	18.29	20.34	16.99	−9.33	20.63	24.75	14.43	−6.50	14.10	20.60	13.42	−7.20
	(1.28)	(2.02)	(0.87)	(10.45)	(1.33)	(5.32)	(1.80)	(9.41)	(13.70)	(10.72)	(10.33)	(4.49)	(10.36)	(9.17)	(10.15)	(4.52)
presi: former gov.	0.89	6.12	1.72	−1.96	0.44	9.48	1.05	4.88	95.25	75.91	78.89	2.70	100.57	80.70	79.42	3.84
	(2.39)	(4.66)	(2.44)	(12.38)	(2.82)	(9.82)	(3.16)	(11.03)	(45.26)	(28.80)	(30.38)	(6.28)	(48.38)	(31.96)	(37.62)	(5.72)
VP: base	12.06	12.47	6.50	−3.24	9.58	9.39	5.49	−3.50	−15.63	−8.20	−12.15	−12.04	−25.33	−15.84	−14.51	−10.00
	(4.22)	(4.44)	(5.03)	(1.32)	(1.71)	(3.14)	(3.24)	(2.54)	(10.83)	(15.65)	(8.42)	(9.54)	(16.04)	(19.68)	(11.13)	(10.41)
VP: former gov.	−14.17	−15.70	−8.94	3.03	−12.27	−12.45	−8.09	3.13	13.91	5.46	10.02	11.79	22.32	12.64	12.17	9.49
	(4.22)	(4.44)	(5.03)	(1.33)	(1.71)	(3.14)	(3.24)	(2.55)	(10.83)	(15.65)	(8.42)	(9.54)	(16.04)	(19.68)	(11.13)	(10.42)
n obs.	192	240	240	240	192	240	240	240	192	240	240	240	192	240	240	240
(c) Brazil: base																
presi: base	5.03	6.85	5.22	2.09	2.54	4.74	2.83	0.86	0.87	1.05	0.94	0.48	1.07	1.54	0.68	0.25
	(2.81)	(2.63)	(2.40)	(0.50)	(2.19)	(1.74)	(1.72)	(0.23)	(0.70)	(0.41)	(0.49)	(0.23)	(1.09)	(0.58)	(0.48)	(0.13)
VP: base	3.20	2.71	2.98	4.21	0.82	1.55	0.85	2.89	0.40	0.19	0.42	0.44	0.05	0.51	0.15	0.21
	(1.19)	(2.11)	(0.89)	(1.50)	(0.56)	(0.84)	(0.27)	(1.84)	(0.10)	(0.20)	(0.13)	(0.37)	(0.56)	(0.42)	(0.17)	(0.33)
(d) Brazil: base + governor																
presi: base	6.70	9.46	6.77	0.72	3.24	5.80	3.48	1.82	0.31	0.73	0.64	0.40	0.95	1.39	0.39	0.29
	(4.69)	(3.25)	(3.94)	(1.07)	(3.56)	(2.39)	(2.78)	(0.58)	(0.68)	(0.37)	(0.51)	(0.39)	(1.64)	(0.84)	(0.56)	(0.14)
presi: former gov.	−3.01	−7.17	−3.26	3.26	−0.97	−2.77	−1.03	−2.73	3.03	1.48	2.45	0.25	0.93	0.78	1.86	−0.14
	(4.69)	(3.35)	(3.94)	(1.94)	(3.56)	(2.52)	(2.78)	(0.76)	(0.68)	(0.79)	(0.51)	(0.35)	(1.64)	(0.90)	(0.56)	(0.13)
VP: base	5.84	5.33	5.72	4.61	2.08	2.75	2.14	3.05	0.56	0.45	0.61	0.39	0.23	0.72	0.15	0.25
	(1.93)	(3.25)	(1.74)	(1.82)	(0.82)	(1.68)	(1.19)	(1.88)	(0.19)	(0.28)	(0.20)	(0.37)	(0.95)	(0.84)	(0.30)	(0.38)
VP: former gov.	−7.44	−7.34	−7.34	−1.73	−3.56	−3.36	−3.49	−3.63	−0.52	−0.80	−0.67	0.69	−0.52	−0.62	−0.10	−0.43
	(3.96)	(2.64)	(3.58)	(1.43)	(2.95)	(2.01)	(3.20)	(1.45)	(0.48)	(0.24)	(0.49)	(0.28)	(2.29)	(1.89)	(0.55)	(0.29)
n obs.	162	243	243	243	162	243	243	243	162	243	243	243	162	243	243	243
(e) Mexico: base																
presi: base	17.15	17.15	17.15	−5.42	17.37	17.37	17.37	−1.87	4.03	4.03	4.03	−1.53	4.31	4.31	4.31	−0.72
	(5.71)	(5.71)	(5.71)	(2.90)	(4.18)	(4.18)	(4.18)	(0.21)	(1.27)	(1.27)	(1.27)	(0.43)	(0.70)	(0.70)	(0.70)	(0.50)
(f) Mexico: base + governor																
presi: base	11.51	11.51	11.51	7.24	13.11	13.11	13.11	8.82	3.24	3.24	3.24	1.43	4.15	4.15	4.15	2.02
	(4.89)	(4.89)	(4.89)	(3.96)	(3.19)	(3.19)	(3.19)	(5.19)	(0.99)	(0.99)	(0.99)	(1.48)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(1.95)
presi: former gov.	9.40	9.40	9.40	−21.11	7.10	7.10	7.10	−17.82	1.32	1.32	1.32	−4.93	0.27	0.27	0.27	−4.57
	(5.21)	(5.21)	(5.21)	(9.53)	(3.87)	(3.87)	(3.87)	(7.39)	(1.01)	(1.01)	(1.01)	(2.60)	(0.72)	(0.72)	(0.72)	(2.14)
n obs.	224	224	224	224	224	224	224	224	224	224	224	224	224	224	224	224
sample	orig.	all	presidency	runner-up	orig.	all	presidency	runner-up	orig.	all	presidency	runner-up	orig.	all	presidency	runner-up

OLS regression estimates. All specifications include state fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. Columns (1), (5), (9) and (13) replicate the original estimates from Table 2 and only include elected presidents. Models in columns (2), (6), (10) and (14) add acting vice-presidents and interims to the sample. Specifications in columns (3), (7), (11) and (15) include only elected presidents, but multiple terms, consecutive or not, are treated as separate observations. Note that this does not change the results for Mexico. For the models in columns (4), (8), (12) and (16), the explanatory variables are measured for the runner-up (as well as his or her vice-presidential candidate) who *failed* to win the election, rather than for the actual (vice-)president.

Table A9: State representation in the cabinet: Multiple political bases and controls

	DV: % ministers − % population								DV: ministers per 10M population							
	initial cabinet				full term				initial cabinet				full term			
(a) Argentina: base	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
presi: base	25.36	26.98	25.08	23.01	18.71	20.54	18.32	15.92	69.02	84.79	65.96	66.59	65.07	110.01	59.77	61.13
	(0.95)	(0.79)	(1.16)	(1.50)	(1.98)	(3.03)	(1.88)	(1.62)	(37.41)	(43.59)	(35.33)	(36.13)	(41.89)	(70.99)	(37.92)	(38.47)
VP: base	9.80	8.24	9.64	7.93	7.58	6.01	7.36	5.37	0.23	−5.50	−1.49	2.64	−7.30	−18.38	−10.27	−5.48
	(4.38)	(4.12)	(4.47)	(4.20)	(2.55)	(2.74)	(2.71)	(2.16)	(10.54)	(12.21)	(9.78)	(9.97)	(14.23)	(21.30)	(12.33)	(13.19)
(b) Argentina: base + governor																
presi: base	24.68	26.13	24.62	19.09	18.29	20.25	18.20	11.95	20.63	54.92	20.30	3.41	14.10	94.52	13.35	−6.35
	(1.28)	(1.15)	(1.15)	(4.99)	(1.33)	(2.48)	(1.54)	(2.02)	(13.70)	(38.84)	(14.51)	(10.95)	(10.36)	(83.93)	(11.89)	(12.52)
presi: former gov.	0.89	1.76	0.35	7.07	0.44	0.51	−0.29	7.13	95.25	67.86	92.46	113.06	100.57	35.40	94.23	120.76
	(2.39)	(1.36)	(2.57)	(6.88)	(2.82)	(2.93)	(2.76)	(4.48)	(45.26)	(31.57)	(44.99)	(42.62)	(48.38)	(44.94)	(47.14)	(46.84)
VP: base	12.06	9.71	12.02	8.46	9.58	7.39	9.53	5.34	−15.63	−16.02	−15.81	−22.77	−25.33	−26.10	−25.75	−32.57
	(4.22)	(4.02)	(4.38)	(4.86)	(1.71)	(2.66)	(1.97)	(2.27)	(10.83)	(11.88)	(9.97)	(13.15)	(16.04)	(21.03)	(13.60)	(17.90)
VP: former gov.	−14.17	−11.82	−14.60	−11.03	−12.27	−10.08	−12.86	−7.89	13.91	14.30	11.65	18.03	22.32	23.10	17.18	18.91
	(4.22)	(4.02)	(4.50)	(5.49)	(1.71)	(2.66)	(1.88)	(2.83)	(10.83)	(11.88)	(9.34)	(13.86)	(16.04)	(21.03)	(12.76)	(20.80)
n obs.	192	192	192	168	192	192	192	168	192	192	192	168	192	192	192	168
(c) Brazil: base																
presi: base	5.03	5.03	4.28	4.99	2.54	2.54	2.04	2.62	0.87	0.87	0.64	−0.52	1.07	1.07	0.59	−0.94
	(2.81)	(2.81)	(2.98)	(3.36)	(2.19)	(2.19)	(2.30)	(2.51)	(0.70)	(0.70)	(0.73)	(0.53)	(1.09)	(1.09)	(1.19)	(0.95)
VP: base	3.20	3.20	3.15	3.69	0.82	0.82	0.78	1.14	0.40	0.40	0.38	0.22	0.05	0.05	0.02	−0.64
	(1.19)	(1.19)	(0.99)	(1.15)	(0.56)	(0.56)	(0.54)	(0.64)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.43)	(0.56)	(0.56)	(0.69)	(0.81)
(d) Brazil: base + governor																
presi: base	6.70	6.70	5.94	6.82	3.24	3.24	2.73	3.59	0.31	0.31	0.07	−0.40	0.95	0.95	0.45	−0.92
	(4.69)	(4.69)	(4.89)	(5.16)	(3.56)	(3.56)	(3.68)	(3.71)	(0.68)	(0.68)	(0.74)	(0.69)	(1.64)	(1.64)	(1.76)	(1.19)
presi: former gov.	−3.01	−3.01	−3.06		−0.97	−0.97	−1.00		3.03	3.03	3.02		0.93	0.93	0.90	
	(4.69)	(4.69)	(4.78)		(3.56)	(3.56)	(3.65)		(0.68)	(0.68)	(0.71)		(1.64)	(1.64)	(1.73)	
VP: base	5.84	5.84	5.69	7.16	2.08	2.08	1.98	2.98	0.56	0.56	0.51	0.43	0.23	0.23	0.13	−0.60
	(1.93)	(1.93)	(1.77)	(2.94)	(0.82)	(0.82)	(0.89)	(1.90)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.29)	(0.44)	(0.95)	(0.95)	(1.14)	(0.86)
VP: former gov.	−7.44	−7.44	−7.15	−8.49	−3.56	−3.56	−3.37	−4.49	−0.52	−0.52	−0.43	−0.53	−0.52	−0.52	−0.34	−0.11
	(3.96)	(3.96)	(3.78)	(5.16)	(2.95)	(2.95)	(2.86)	(3.79)	(0.48)	(0.48)	(0.49)	(1.16)	(2.29)	(2.29)	(2.22)	(2.00)
n obs.	162	162	162	135	162	162	162	135	162	162	162	135	162	162	162	135
(e) Mexico: base																
presi: base	17.15	11.64	16.94	15.86	17.37	14.49	17.24	16.73	4.03	2.68	3.98	3.60	4.31	3.90	4.24	4.11
	(5.71)	(4.86)	(5.68)	(5.81)	(4.18)	(4.41)	(4.17)	(4.24)	(1.27)	(0.93)	(1.25)	(1.43)	(0.70)	(0.70)	(0.68)	(0.84)
(f) Mexico: base + governor																
presi: base	11.51	4.24	11.59	11.13	13.11	9.28	13.16	13.44	3.24	1.24	3.26	3.34	4.15	3.31	4.18	4.95
	(4.89)	(2.58)	(4.87)	(4.26)	(3.19)	(3.36)	(3.18)	(2.93)	(0.99)	(0.62)	(0.98)	(0.96)	(0.29)	(0.50)	(0.28)	(0.52)
presi: former gov.	9.40	15.74	8.98	7.88	7.10	11.08	6.86	5.50	1.32	3.06	1.22	0.43	0.27	1.25	0.11	−1.40
	(5.21)	(4.78)	(5.36)	(6.56)	(3.87)	(3.90)	(3.93)	(4.71)	(1.01)	(1.05)	(1.03)	(1.50)	(0.72)	(0.84)	(0.71)	(0.95)
n obs.	224	224	224	224	224	224	224	224	224	224	224	224	224	224	224	224
sample	original	mult. bases	% votes	all controls	original	mult. bases	% votes	all controls	original	mult. bases	% votes	all controls	original	mult. bases	% votes	all controls

OLS regression estimates. All specifications include state fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. Columns (1), (5), (9) and (13) replicate the original estimates from Table 2. In the models in columns (2), (6), (10) and (14), Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, Felipe Calderón and Andrés Manuel López Obrador are coded as having multiple political bases. Models in columns (3), (7), (11) and (15) control for the % of votes received by the president in the first round of the election. Those in columns (4), (8), (12) and (16) add further controls: the % of seats in the lower chamber, minority, coalition and reelection dummies, the president party's ideology, provincial population density (logged), the president party's vote % in the last gubernatorial election held in the province, a provincial incumbency dummy, the level of subnational democracy and the interaction between the last two.

Table A10: State representation in the cabinet: Accounting for presidents' and ministers' birthplaces

	DV: % ministers − % population						DV: ministers per 10M population					
	initial cabinet			full term			initial cabinet			full term		
(a) Argentina: base, birthplace or both	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
presi: base	25.36		26.57	18.71		14.05	69.02		57.43	65.07		48.64
	(0.95)		(3.66)	(1.98)		(4.76)	(37.41)		(31.51)	(41.89)		(35.25)
presi: birthplace		6.51	−1.92		5.34	4.60		12.88	15.39		16.53	21.35
		(1.12)	(3.82)		(1.49)	(4.26)		(7.93)	(12.38)		(14.04)	(13.98)
VP: base	9.80		11.30	7.58		15.66	0.23		0.68	−7.30		−4.37
	(4.38)		(5.33)	(2.55)		(5.11)	(10.54)		(13.66)	(14.23)		(17.03)
VP: birthplace		1.11	−2.26		−0.21	−8.01		−0.68	3.75		−5.92	2.56
		(4.31)	(7.13)		(1.77)	(5.73)		(1.09)	(11.87)		(4.74)	(13.29)
n obs.	192	192	192	192	192	192	192	192	192	192	192	192
(b) Argentina: base, birthplace or both + governor												
presi: base	24.68		25.38	18.29		12.00	20.63		−25.63	14.10		−39.83
	(1.28)		(3.97)	(1.33)		(4.83)	(13.70)		(33.22)	(10.36)		(38.08)
presi: former gov.	0.89		0.27	0.44		1.54	95.25		112.33	100.57		120.28
	(2.39)		(2.95)	(2.82)		(3.41)	(45.26)		(28.61)	(48.38)		(31.82)
presi: birthplace			−0.83			5.96			47.01			54.73
			(3.52)			(4.00)			(34.19)			(37.31)
VP: base	12.06		13.69	9.58		17.83	−15.63		−1.72	−25.33		−8.10
	(4.22)		(4.58)	(1.71)		(4.35)	(10.83)		(34.05)	(16.04)		(39.37)
VP: former gov.	−14.17		−13.70	−12.27		−12.57	13.91		3.77	22.32		10.67
	(4.22)		(4.11)	(1.71)		(1.42)	(10.83)		(4.80)	(16.04)		(8.29)
VP: birthplace			−2.10			−7.96			−3.77			−5.58
			(7.05)			(5.69)			(30.32)			(35.42)
n obs.	192		192	192		192	192		192	192		192
(c) Brazil: base, birthplace or both												
presi: base	5.03		4.21	2.54		2.51	0.87		0.85	1.07		1.16
	(2.81)		(2.33)	(2.19)		(1.99)	(0.70)		(0.78)	(1.09)		(1.13)
presi: birthplace		−1.14	−3.75		−0.04	−0.13		0.23	−0.07		0.21	0.37
		(2.78)	(3.65)		(2.48)	(2.71)		(0.53)	(0.79)		(0.82)	(1.04)
VP: base	3.20		1.81	0.82		0.09	0.40		0.32	0.05		−0.86
	(1.19)		(0.91)	(0.56)		(0.76)	(0.10)		(0.19)	(0.56)		(0.36)
VP: birthplace		7.70	0.58		2.79	0.83		1.24	0.07		1.07	1.18
		(0.91)	(1.26)		(1.32)	(0.57)		(0.40)	(0.10)		(1.47)	(0.58)
n obs.	162	162	162	162	162	162	162	162	162	162	162	162
(d) Brazil: base, birthplace or both + governor												
presi: base	6.70		5.82	3.24		3.31	0.31		0.25	0.95		1.11
	(4.69)		(4.19)	(3.56)		(3.36)	(0.68)		(0.71)	(1.64)		(1.69)
presi: former gov.	−3.01		−2.14	−0.97		−1.04	3.03		3.08	0.93		0.77
	(4.69)		(4.19)	(3.56)		(3.36)	(0.68)		(0.71)	(1.64)		(1.69)
presi: birthplace			−3.73			−0.11			−0.22			0.32
			(3.33)			(2.52)			(0.80)			(1.05)
VP: base	5.84		2.48	2.08		0.41	0.56		0.33	0.23		−0.81
	(1.93)		(0.78)	(0.82)		(0.59)	(0.19)		(0.20)	(0.95)		(0.35)
VP: former gov.	−7.44		−8.16	−3.56		−4.04	−0.52		−0.57	−0.52		−0.85
	(3.96)		(3.34)	(2.95)		(3.00)	(0.48)		(0.48)	(2.29)		(2.50)
VP: birthplace			3.21			2.13			0.23			1.45
			(1.40)			(0.75)			(0.18)			(1.03)
n obs.	162		162	162		162	162		162	162		162
(e) Mexico: base, birthplace or both												
presi: base	17.15		13.18	17.37		15.25	4.03		3.34	4.31		3.51
	(5.71)		(5.19)	(4.18)		(4.44)	(1.27)		(1.25)	(0.70)		(0.87)
presi: birthplace		0.40	7.01		−0.15	3.74		0.36	1.21		0.81	1.42
		(2.50)	(3.88)		(2.81)	(2.66)		(0.99)	(0.72)		(0.89)	(0.42)
n obs.	224	224	224	224	224	224	224	224	224	224	224	224
(f) Mexico: base, birthplace or both + governor												
presi: base	11.51		2.48	13.11		7.79	3.24		1.76	4.15		2.72
	(4.89)		(6.07)	(3.19)		(4.74)	(0.99)		(1.07)	(0.29)		(0.55)
presi: former gov.	9.40		14.36	7.10		10.02	1.32		2.13	0.27		1.05
	(5.21)		(4.09)	(3.87)		(2.88)	(1.01)		(1.06)	(0.72)		(0.79)
presi: birthplace			10.68			6.30			1.75			1.69
			(4.48)			(2.31)			(0.93)			(0.44)
n obs.	224		224	224		224	224		224	224		224

OLS regression estimates. All specifications include state fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. In columns (2), (5), (8) and (11), both the president's and the ministers' states are defined as those in which they were born, even if they developed their political career elsewhere. In all other columns, ministers' states are defined as those where they developed their political career. Only elected presidents are included.

Table A11: State representation in the cabinet, by president: Distinguishing between *movers* and *remainers*

	DV: % min. − % pop.				DV: min. per 10M			
(a) Argentina	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	president's initial cabinet		president's full term		president's initial cabinet		president's full term	
presi: base	19.23	18.86	7.07	6.50	71.77	6.97	67.49	-4.30
	(1.13)	(0.61)	(2.34)	(1.64)	(41.43)	(4.69)	(45.66)	(0.54)
presi: base × mover	13.68	11.96	13.21	11.21	-27.67	-150.59	-37.21	-172.93
	(2.62)	(3.49)	(2.28)	(4.97)	(28.10)	(1.62)	(32.65)	(7.57)
presi: former gov.		0.35		0.92		167.66		186.00
		(2.72)		(5.23)		(4.72)		(7.46)
presi: birthplace	4.88	5.25	10.93	11.27	2.70	2.35	5.23	4.67
	(0.65)	(0.64)	(0.38)	(0.21)	(1.41)	(0.22)	(1.93)	(0.53)
VP: base	22.85	25.09	24.57	26.67	-12.54	3.95	-13.14	4.18
	(3.86)	(3.76)	(2.28)	(1.05)	(14.51)	(1.68)	(15.90)	(2.93)
VP: base × mover	-22.16	-21.79	-17.40	-17.13	26.68	7.71	19.79	-1.44
	(0.77)	(0.72)	(0.83)	(0.65)	(11.92)	(1.41)	(13.61)	(0.82)
VP: former gov.		-13.39		-12.22		-5.00		0.42
		(4.46)		(1.49)		(1.51)		(3.74)
VP: birthplace	-14.18	-13.80	-17.41	-17.14	18.29	-0.68	13.63	-7.60
	(0.77)	(0.72)	(0.83)	(0.65)	(11.92)	(1.41)	(13.61)	(0.82)
n obs.	192	192	192	192	192	192	192	192
(b) Brazil								
presi: base	4.21	5.82	2.51	3.31	0.85	0.25	1.16	1.11
	(2.33)	(4.21)	(1.99)	(3.37)	(0.78)	(0.71)	(1.13)	(1.70)
presi: former gov.		-2.14		-1.04		3.08		0.77
		(4.21)		(3.37)		(0.71)		(1.70)
presi: birthplace	-3.75	-3.73	-0.13	-0.11	-0.07	-0.22	0.37	0.32
	(3.65)	(3.34)	(2.71)	(2.53)	(0.79)	(0.80)	(1.04)	(1.05)
VP: base	2.39	5.69	0.92	2.55	0.39	0.56	0.32	0.64
	(1.67)	(1.66)	(1.21)	(0.92)	(0.22)	(0.30)	(0.90)	(1.29)
VP: base × mover	-0.58	-3.21	-0.83	-2.13	-0.07	-0.23	-1.18	-1.45
	(1.26)	(1.40)	(0.57)	(0.75)	(0.10)	(0.18)	(0.58)	(1.03)
VP: former gov.		-8.16		-4.04		-0.57		-0.85
		(3.35)		(3.01)		(0.48)		(2.51)
n obs.	162	162	162	162	162	162	162	162
(c) Mexico								
presi: base	11.75	4.96	17.38	11.70	3.36	2.28	4.04	3.35
	(5.92)	(4.54)	(2.89)	(2.76)	(0.76)	(0.71)	(1.22)	(0.95)
presi: base × mover	2.58	-8.10	-3.84	-12.77	-0.03	-1.72	-0.97	-2.05
	(12.85)	(13.77)	(5.61)	(5.63)	(2.19)	(2.11)	(0.96)	(1.70)
presi: former gov.		17.05		14.26		2.70		1.73
		(4.53)		(2.41)		(0.92)		(1.36)
presi: birthplace	8.16	7.75	2.02	1.67	1.19	1.13	0.99	0.94
	(7.22)	(7.02)	(1.24)	(0.89)	(1.21)	(1.18)	(0.83)	(0.87)
n obs.	224	224	224	224	224	224	224	224

OLS regression estimates. All specifications include fixed effects by state. Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. Only elected presidents are included in the sample. *movers* are those presidents who were born in one state but have their political base in another.

Table A12: State representation in the cabinet: Alternative model specifications

	DV: % ministers − % population								DV: ministers per 10M population							
	initial cabinet				full term				initial cabinet				full term			
(a) Argentina: base	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
presi: base	25.36	25.72	35.16	35.16	18.71	19.07	29.42	29.42	69.02	70.67	72.48	72.48	65.07	71.68	75.72	75.72
	(0.95)	(1.68)	(8.85)	(9.51)	(1.98)	(1.70)	(9.22)	(9.78)	(37.41)	(7.81)	(30.01)	(22.02)	(41.89)	(12.89)	(34.90)	(26.08)
VP: base	9.80	10.09	16.82	16.82	7.58	7.89	16.11	16.11	0.23	−4.08	−7.17	−7.17	−7.30	−10.10	−12.58	−12.58
	(4.38)	(1.68)	(9.69)	(9.19)	(2.55)	(1.70)	(9.34)	(7.81)	(10.54)	(7.81)	(10.15)	(7.70)	(14.23)	(12.89)	(11.85)	(9.02)
test p-val.		0.057	0.000	0.000		0.043	0.000	0.000		0.016	0.000	0.000		0.032	0.227	0.227
(b) Argentina: base + governor																
presi: base	24.68	24.91	27.49	27.49	18.29	18.55	22.28	22.28	20.63	22.50	22.78	22.78	14.10	20.44	21.73	21.73
	(1.28)	(2.19)	(15.27)	(17.16)	(1.33)	(2.24)	(16.89)	(18.70)	(13.70)	(8.90)	(12.41)	(13.24)	(10.36)	(16.22)	(13.68)	(14.16)
presi: former gov.	0.89	1.08	13.71	13.71	0.44	0.59	12.63	12.63	95.25	103.70	106.50	106.50	100.57	111.18	116.08	116.08
	(2.39)	(2.88)	(17.25)	(16.31)	(2.82)	(2.94)	(18.42)	(18.42)	(45.26)	(12.28)	(33.74)	(28.77)	(48.38)	(22.33)	(42.04)	(35.76)
VP: base	12.06	12.35	18.83	18.83	9.58	9.92	18.14	18.14	−15.63	−16.55	−17.16	−17.16	−25.33	−23.47	−23.94	−23.94
	(4.22)	(1.86)	(12.30)	(12.70)	(1.71)	(1.89)	(11.39)	(10.89)	(10.83)	(7.32)	(10.44)	(9.92)	(16.04)	(13.36)	(12.69)	(12.98)
VP: former gov.	−14.17	−14.48	−20.99	−20.99	−12.27	−12.62	−20.53	−20.53	13.91	14.05	14.47	14.47	22.32	18.97	19.00	19.00
	(4.22)	(4.41)	(12.00)	(12.49)	(1.71)	(4.50)	(11.05)	(10.61)	(10.83)	(18.66)	(10.30)	(9.58)	(16.04)	(33.95)	(12.58)	(12.12)
test p-val.		0.000	0.000	0.000		0.000	0.000	0.000		0.007	0.076	0.076		0.023	0.922	0.922
n obs.	192	192	192	192	192	192	192	192	192	192	192	192	192	192	192	192
(c) Brazil: base																
presi: base	5.03	5.45	6.48	6.48	2.54	3.03	4.70	4.70	0.87	0.88	0.99	0.99	1.07	1.15	1.45	1.45
	(2.81)	(1.45)	(2.81)	(2.67)	(2.19)	(1.29)	(2.20)	(2.28)	(0.70)	(1.16)	(0.54)	(0.63)	(1.09)	(1.89)	(0.73)	(0.73)
VP: base	3.20	2.89	1.99	1.99	0.82	0.75	0.22	0.22	0.40	0.36	0.18	0.18	0.05	0.07	0.12	0.12
	(1.19)	(1.41)	(2.47)	(2.57)	(0.56)	(1.25)	(1.42)	(1.45)	(0.10)	(1.12)	(0.48)	(0.40)	(0.56)	(1.83)	(0.54)	(0.45)
test p-val.		0.187	0.348	0.348		0.159	0.894	0.894		0.970	0.695	0.695		0.986	0.851	0.851
(d) Brazil: base + governor																
presi: base	6.70	7.04	8.04	8.04	3.24	3.78	5.56	5.56	0.31	0.41	0.80	0.80	0.95	1.12	1.73	1.73
	(4.69)	(1.66)	(2.87)	(2.89)	(3.56)	(1.50)	(2.43)	(2.63)	(0.68)	(1.35)	(0.38)	(0.40)	(1.64)	(2.22)	(0.87)	(0.84)
presi: former gov.	−3.01	−3.47	−4.77	−4.77	−0.97	−1.61	−3.67	−3.67	3.03	2.77	1.62	1.62	0.93	0.53	−1.20	−1.20
	(4.69)	(3.61)	(2.77)	(2.81)	(3.56)	(3.24)	(2.36)	(2.53)	(0.68)	(2.91)	(0.28)	(0.31)	(1.64)	(4.79)	(1.02)	(1.02)
VP: base	5.84	5.31	3.85	3.85	2.08	1.87	0.74	0.74	0.56	0.55	0.46	0.46	0.23	0.26	0.28	0.28
	(1.93)	(1.70)	(2.94)	(2.95)	(0.82)	(1.53)	(1.87)	(1.83)	(0.19)	(1.37)	(0.49)	(0.38)	(0.95)	(2.26)	(0.57)	(0.44)
VP: former gov.	−7.44	−7.12	−6.32	−6.32	−3.56	−3.28	−2.00	−2.00	−0.52	−0.56	−0.74	−0.74	−0.52	−0.56	−0.62	−0.62
	(3.96)	(2.87)	(2.85)	(3.18)	(2.95)	(2.56)	(1.87)	(1.76)	(0.48)	(2.30)	(0.29)	(0.25)	(2.29)	(3.79)	(1.62)	(1.37)
test p-val.		0.348	0.670	0.670		0.308	0.985	0.985		0.990	0.940	0.940		0.996	0.987	0.987
n obs.	162	162	162	162	162	162	162	162	162	162	162	162	162	162	162	162
(e) Mexico: base																
presi: base	17.15	17.91	45.37	45.37	17.37	17.78	45.64	45.64	4.03	4.98	11.65	11.65	4.31	5.04	11.64	11.64
	(5.71)	(1.61)	(13.98)	(16.28)	(4.18)	(1.20)	(13.60)	(15.65)	(1.27)	(0.87)	(3.52)	(4.11)	(0.70)	(0.77)	(3.24)	(3.69)
test p-val.		0.000	0.000	0.000		0.000	0.000	0.000		0.000	0.000	0.000		0.000	0.000	0.000
(f) Mexico: base + governor																
presi: base	11.51	12.36	46.29	46.29	13.11	13.57	48.25	48.25	3.24	4.34	12.17	12.17	4.15	5.02	12.85	12.85
	(4.89)	(2.20)	(19.77)	(21.43)	(3.19)	(1.63)	(18.75)	(20.29)	(0.99)	(1.23)	(4.83)	(5.24)	(0.29)	(1.09)	(4.15)	(4.49)
presi: former gov.	9.40	9.16	−1.62	−1.62	7.10	6.97	−4.57	−4.57	1.32	1.06	−0.90	−0.90	0.27	0.05	−2.13	−2.13
	(5.21)	(2.57)	(27.02)	(25.05)	(3.87)	(1.90)	(26.08)	(24.10)	(1.01)	(1.46)	(6.66)	(6.04)	(0.72)	(1.29)	(6.07)	(5.52)
test p-val.		0.332	0.000	0.000		1.000	0.000	0.000		0.000	0.000	0.000		0.000	0.000	0.000
n obs.	224	224	224	224	224	224	224	224	224	224	224	224	224	224	224	224
sample	FE (original)	RE	DK(AR(0))	DK(AR(1))	FE (original)	RE	DK(AR(0))	DK(AR(1))	FE (original)	RE	DK(AR(0))	DK(AR(1))	FE (original)	RE	DK(AR(0))	DK(AR(1))

FE (respectively, RE) specifications include fixed (respectively, random) effects by state. DK and DK(AR(1)) models are estimated by pooled OLS. In FE and RE specifications, standard errors are clustered by state. DK specifications use Driscoll-Kraay standard errors (Driscoll and Kraay 1998). In RE specifications, p-values correspond to a Hausman test of the null hypothesis that state-level effects are uncorrelated with the regressors. In DK and DK(AR(1)) specifications, the p-values correspond to a Breusch-Pagan test of the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity across states.

Table A13: State representation in the cabinet: Distinguishing by portfolio type

	DV: % ministers − % population								DV: ministers per 10M population							
	initial cabinet				full term				initial cabinet				full term			
(a) Argentina: base	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
presi: base	25.36	11.29	27.38	20.79	18.71	8.19	16.62	21.44	69.02	0.87	41.80	26.34	65.07	1.53	31.88	31.65
	(0.95)	(9.01)	(1.36)	(8.69)	(1.98)	(5.46)	(3.38)	(7.57)	(37.41)	(0.40)	(24.85)	(15.00)	(41.89)	(1.60)	(22.46)	(19.33)
VP: base	9.80	23.55	10.67	2.61	7.58	20.56	3.94	16.96	0.23	2.75	−0.74	−1.79	−7.30	1.14	−4.26	−4.19
	(4.38)	(11.35)	(4.26)	(3.95)	(2.55)	(8.55)	(2.31)	(8.48)	(10.54)	(2.10)	(6.91)	(5.15)	(14.23)	(0.89)	(7.06)	(7.78)
(b) Argentina: base + governor																
presi: base	24.68	16.88	19.16	19.54	18.29	9.62	9.15	25.99	20.63	0.54	9.95	10.14	14.10	−0.62	4.56	10.16
	(1.28)	(15.77)	(4.22)	(14.72)	(1.33)	(11.16)	(3.19)	(15.47)	(13.70)	(0.76)	(6.95)	(7.89)	(10.36)	(1.58)	(4.09)	(8.18)
presi: former gov.	0.89	−12.08	15.69	2.35	0.44	−3.63	14.39	−9.65	95.25	0.51	62.77	31.98	100.57	4.18	53.92	42.47
	(2.39)	(14.14)	(6.80)	(19.53)	(2.82)	(10.96)	(4.88)	(17.19)	(45.26)	(0.70)	(28.82)	(20.91)	(48.38)	(1.88)	(24.95)	(25.53)
VP: base	12.06	31.33	10.63	2.73	9.58	25.54	3.13	22.23	−15.63	3.42	−11.45	−7.60	−25.33	0.75	−13.96	−12.12
	(4.22)	(10.92)	(3.73)	(3.94)	(1.71)	(8.25)	(1.42)	(9.30)	(10.83)	(2.23)	(7.87)	(5.52)	(16.04)	(0.77)	(8.52)	(8.27)
VP: former gov.	−14.17	−36.09	−13.00	−2.72	−12.27	−26.55	−7.33	−23.20	13.91	−4.43	10.74	7.60	22.32	−1.21	12.22	11.31
	(4.22)	(10.92)	(3.73)	(3.94)	(1.71)	(8.25)	(1.42)	(9.30)	(10.83)	(2.23)	(7.87)	(5.52)	(16.04)	(0.77)	(8.52)	(8.27)
n obs.	192	192	192	192	192	192	192	192	192	192	192	192	192	192	192	192
(c) Brazil: base																
presi: base	5.03	0.99	7.64	3.13	2.54	4.98	3.07	1.03	0.87	−0.02	0.83	0.06	1.07	−0.06	0.80	0.33
	(2.81)	(2.93)	(3.67)	(1.99)	(2.19)	(3.94)	(1.79)	(4.02)	(0.70)	(0.06)	(0.63)	(0.21)	(1.09)	(0.16)	(0.45)	(0.70)
VP: base	3.20	13.06	2.58	−0.33	0.82	5.61	−0.09	−0.67	0.40	0.32	−0.07	0.15	0.05	0.05	−0.01	0.01
	(1.19)	(12.35)	(2.32)	(2.87)	(0.56)	(4.80)	(1.23)	(2.13)	(0.10)	(0.34)	(0.11)	(0.34)	(0.56)	(0.10)	(0.48)	(0.26)
(d) Brazil: base + governor																
presi: base	6.70	7.12	8.63	3.74	3.24	8.70	2.26	2.08	0.31	0.10	0.23	−0.03	0.95	0.01	0.38	0.56
	(4.69)	(4.85)	(6.49)	(2.78)	(3.56)	(4.79)	(2.50)	(5.95)	(0.68)	(0.11)	(0.32)	(0.29)	(1.64)	(0.24)	(0.47)	(1.03)
presi: former gov.	−3.01	−7.23	0.84	−3.85	−0.97	−9.20	3.41	−2.19	3.03	−0.10	3.11	0.03	0.93	−0.13	1.61	−0.56
	(4.69)	(4.85)	(6.49)	(2.78)	(3.56)	(4.79)	(2.50)	(5.95)	(0.68)	(0.11)	(0.32)	(0.29)	(1.64)	(0.24)	(0.47)	(1.03)
VP: base	5.84	24.76	5.50	−0.78	2.08	10.23	−0.38	0.83	0.56	0.57	0.04	−0.06	0.23	0.17	−0.24	0.29
	(1.93)	(17.24)	(5.06)	(3.41)	(0.82)	(6.67)	(2.02)	(2.29)	(0.19)	(0.46)	(0.20)	(0.47)	(0.95)	(0.12)	(0.55)	(0.47)
VP: former gov.	−7.44	−33.11	−8.33	1.39	−3.56	−12.94	0.75	−4.21	−0.52	−0.72	−0.38	0.58	−0.52	−0.33	0.60	−0.79
	(3.96)	(15.92)	(6.15)	(5.22)	(2.95)	(5.84)	(4.44)	(3.67)	(0.48)	(0.42)	(0.24)	(0.61)	(2.29)	(0.13)	(1.36)	(0.91)
n obs.	162	162	162	162	162	162	162	162	162	162	162	162	162	162	162	162
(e) Mexico: base																
presi: base	17.15	2.74	17.44	38.67	17.37	3.27	19.51	32.98	4.03	0.02	1.96	2.04	4.31	0.13	2.29	1.89
	(5.71)	(3.29)	(6.50)	(12.78)	(4.18)	(4.47)	(6.49)	(8.06)	(1.27)	(0.18)	(0.74)	(0.70)	(0.70)	(0.19)	(0.66)	(0.56)
(f) Mexico: base + governor																
presi: base	11.51	−1.09	9.63	41.26	13.11	−5.87	14.94	39.04	3.24	−0.06	1.76	1.54	4.15	−0.34	2.66	1.82
	(4.89)	(1.37)	(6.35)	(11.96)	(3.19)	(3.78)	(8.03)	(2.51)	(0.99)	(0.08)	(1.07)	(0.26)	(0.29)	(0.20)	(1.26)	(0.88)
presi: former gov.	9.40	6.39	13.02	−4.31	7.10	15.24	7.63	−10.10	1.32	0.15	0.33	0.84	0.27	0.78	−0.61	0.10
	(5.21)	(2.79)	(5.05)	(12.07)	(3.87)	(3.41)	(5.57)	(8.16)	(1.01)	(0.16)	(0.69)	(1.01)	(0.72)	(0.13)	(0.97)	(1.35)
n obs.	224	224	224	224	224	224	224	224	224	224	224	224	224	224	224	224
sample	original	high rank	med. rank	low rank	original	high rank	med. rank	low rank	original	high rank	med. rank	low rank	original	high rank	med. rank	low rank

OLS regression estimates. All specifications include state fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. Columns (1), (5), (9) and (13) replicate the original estimates from Table 2. In the remaining specifications, the outcome variables are measured separately for ministers classified as being of "high," "medium" and "low" rank, respectively.

D Subnational finances

- Figure A3 replicates the estimations in Figure 3 but including all vice-presidents and interims.
- Figure A4 replicates the estimations in Figure 3 but identifying the "treated" state according to the president's birthplace instead of his or her political base.
- Figure A5 replicate Figure 3 including controls: population density, reference party vote share in the previous gubernatorial elections, and level of subnational democracy.
- Figure A6 replicate Figure 3 but including elected vice-presidents.
- Figure A7 replicate Figure 3 but reports the effects of having a presidential runner-up.



Figure A3: Event study estimates of the effect of having a president whose political base is on state s on different financial indicators in state s: including acting vice-presidents and interims. Coefficients are calculated by stacking state-year observations by presidential transition, then running an OLS model with state-transition and year-transition fixed effects. 95% CIs constructed using standard errors clustered by state-transition, and adjusting for the number of clusters in the sample. (a) **Low strictness** estimates: the control group includes all not-currently-treated states. (b) **Medium strictness** estimates: the control includes never- or not-yet-treated states, but not already-treated states. (c) **High strictness** estimates: the control group only includes states where neither a president, a vice-president nor a runner-up presidential candidate ever had a political base.



Figure A4: Event study estimates of the effect of having an *elected* president who was **born** in state s on different financial indicators in state s. Coefficients are calculated by stacking state-year observations by presidential transition, then running an OLS model with state-transition and year-transition fixed effects. 95% CIs constructed using standard errors clustered by state-transition, and adjusting for the number of clusters in the sample. (a) **Low strictness** estimates: the control group includes all not-currently-treated states. (b) **Medium strictness** estimates: the control includes never- or not-yet-treated states, but not already-treated states. (c) **High strictness** estimates: the control group only includes states where neither a president, a vice-president nor a runner-up presidential candidate ever had a political base.



Figure A5: Event study estimates and 95% CIs of the effect of having an *elected* president whose political base is on state s on different financial indicators in s –including **controls**. Coefficients are calculated by stacking state-year observations by presidential transition, then running an OLS model with state-transition and year-transition fixed effects. 95% CIs constructed using standard errors clustered by state-transition, and adjusting for the number of clusters in the sample. Time-varying controls include population density (logged), the reference party's vote % in the previous gubernatorial election, an incumbency dummy, the level of subnational democracy from Giraudy, González and Urdinez (2025), and the interaction between the last two. (a) **Low strictness** estimates: the control group includes all not-currently-treated states. (b) **Medium strictness** estimates: the control includes never- or not-yet-treated states, but not already-treated states. (c) **High strictness** estimates: the control group only includes states where neither a president, a vice-president nor a runner-up presidential candidate ever had a political base.



Figure A6: Event study estimates of the effect of having an *elected* **vice-president** whose political base is on state s on different financial indicators in state s. Coefficients are calculated by stacking state-year observations by presidential transition, then running an OLS model with state-transition and year-transition fixed effects. 95% CIs constructed using standard errors clustered by state-transition, and adjusting for the number of clusters in the sample. (a) **Low strictness** estimates: the control group includes all not-currently-treated states. (b) **Medium strictness** estimates: the control includes never- or not-yet-treated states, but not already-treated states. (c) **High strictness** estimates: the control group only includes states where neither a president, a vice-president nor a runner-up presidential candidate ever had a political base.



Figure A7: Event study estimates of the effect of having a **runner-up** in the presidential election whose political base is on state s on different financial indicators in state s. Coefficients are calculated by stacking state-year observations by presidential transition, then running an OLS model with state-transition and year-transition fixed effects. 95% CIs constructed using standard errors clustered by state-transition, and adjusting for the number of clusters in the sample. (a) **Low strictness** estimates: the control group includes all not-currently-treated states. (b) **Medium strictness** estimates: the control includes never- or not-yet-treated states, but not already-treated states. (c) **High strictness** estimates: the control group only includes states where neither a president, a vice-president nor a runner-up presidential candidate ever had a political base.

Appendix References

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