Three Is a Crowd
Information and Electoral Coordination in Argentina*

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Successful coordination around a Duvergerian equilibrium requires accurate and consistent information about parties' expected electoral support. In practice, such information is often unreliable and rarely available at the local level, thus hindering voters' coordination. In this paper we leverage Argentina's Open, Mandatory and Simultaneous Primary Elections as a large-scale survey of voter preferences. Using data from 135 municipalities in the province of Buenos Aires (2011-2023), we show that a narrower margin between the top-two placed parties in the primary increases both turnout and the proportion of positive votes in the general election, while decreasing electoral fragmentation. In line with Cox's (1997) expectations, we further show that the second-placed party in the primary is substantially more likely to win the election than the third-placed one. Consistent with theoretical predictions, these effects are more pronounced (a) in concurrent elections; (b) in smaller municipalities; and (c) when the second-placed party is closer to the first-placed one.

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> ... electors soon realize that their votes are wasted if they continue to give them to the third party: whence their natural tendency to transfer their vote to the less evil of its two adversaries in order to prevent the success of the greater evil.
> — Duverger (1951 [1967]), quoted in Fey (1997:135-6)

How does electoral competitiveness affect voter mobilization and electoral outcomes? Parties, brokers and voters would like to exert more effort in those races where a few additional votes can make a difference between success and defeat. But if they do not *know* which these races are, they may spend scarce resources on elections that they are going to lose (or win) anyway (Shachar and Nalebuff 1999). Similarly, voters who dislike a given option must agree on which alternative to support against it. Otherwise, they may end in a non-Duvergerian equilibrium, splitting their votes between two losing parties that they all prefer to the election winner (Cox 1997; Fey 1997).

In practice, voters, party strategists and donors are hampered by the fact that precise information about parties' electoral strength is hard to come by. Surveys can be unreliable (Kenett, Pfeffermann and Steinberg 2018), and their cost restricts them to high-level elections (Fredén, Rheault and Indridason 2022). Candidates, brokers and activists may "get a sense" of how well they are doing from what they hear "in the street," but such perceptions are vulnerable to confirmation biases, preference falsification, and information bubbles. Researchers cannot measure these perceptions anyway.

But what if voters had fine-grained information about parties' relative strengths? Would knowing that an election is likely to be competitive –rather than decided in a landslide– affect participation and voting behavior? In this paper we exploit the Open, Mandatory and Simultaneous Primary Elections (henceforth EPAOS, after its Spanish initials) to study how variation in electoral competitiveness affects municipal elections in the province of Buenos Aires, Argentina, between 2011 and 2023. Unlike typical intra-party primaries, EPAOS function more like "mock" elections that take place 9 to 11 weeks before the general election, using the same voting roll. Participation is manda-

tory for both parties and voters, who can only choose a single list within a single party (including the only official list if a party features no internal competition). All parties whose combined vote total reaches 1.5% of positive votes[1] –that is, votes for *parties*, excluding blank and null ballots from the denominator– qualify to participate in the general election. Since barely a quarter of parties field two or more lists, in practice the EPAOS function less as a primary than as a major survey of electoral preferences at the municipal level. This allows us, for the first time, to examine how voters behave in a setting with systematic and easily accessible information on parties' relative strengths.[2]

We document three main results. First, the increase in turnout and positive votes (that is, excluding blank and null ballots) between the primary and the general election is larger when the distance between the leading and trailing parties in the primary is small. Second, the closer the primary result, the more likely voters are to abandon third- and lower-placed parties in favor of the two largest political forces. Third, and consistent with the second-placed party becoming the focal alternative against the top-placed one (Cox 1997; Fey 1997; Anagol and Fujiwara 2016), the second-placed party in the primary is much more likely to win the general election than the third-placed one. Finishing first rather than second, in contrast, provides no comparable advantage.

These effects are much stronger in concurrent elections –in which the mayor is elected via plurality and half of the local council via proportional representation using a fused ballot– than in midterm ones –in which only half of the local council is up for election. Mayors are stronger political players, and furthermore the use of a fused ballot in concurrent elections –that is, voters must cast a whole party ticket; they cannot support a mayor from one party and a list of councilors from another– means that the mayoral race dominates voters' choices. This is consistent with the expectation that incentives to coordinate and mobilize are stronger under plurality rule and in higher-stakes elections

[1] We speak of *positive* rather than *valid* votes because in Argentina the latter also include blank (but not null) ballots.

[2] Bursztyn et al. (2024) only have one or two national polls per election and their focus is on referenda, where there are only two choices.

(Cox 1997, ch. 4; Shachar and Nalebuff 1999; Feierherd and Lucardi 2023). The results are also stronger in small municipalities, where fewer vote changes are needed to alter the outcome. And consistent with a coordination story, the advantage of finishing second rather than third is larger when the second-placed party is closer to the first-placed one –i.e., when the second-placed party has a better chance of winning.

While we cannot adjudicate between the relative role of elites *vis-à-vis* voters on mobilization and coordination, the evidence we have suggests that voters' role may be relatively more important. Finding stronger results in smaller districts is consistent with voters believing that they are more likely to make a difference in smaller electorates –individuals only have one vote, but elites in larger districts may mobilize a comparable *share* of voters as their peers in smaller places. More importantly, actions by elites are more likely to affect turnout, which is directly observable, than actual voter behavior, which is secret (Nichter 2008). Yet our results show that closeness in the primary matters more for positive votes –that is, from voters switching from blank or null ballots to actual party ballots– than for turning out. Finally, the fact that few parties drop out between the primary and the general election further highlights the importance of voters' decisions.

Our paper contributes to a large body of literature on the role of information on voting behavior. Most importantly, we provide a direct test of the empirical expectations of established theories of voter coordination (Forsythe et al. 1993; Cox 1997; Fey 1997).[3] Consistent with Alvarez and Nagler (2000) and Plutowski, Weitz-Shapiro and Winters (2021), we find that when voters receive information about parties' relative standings, they become more inclined to support the two largest parties in order to avoid wasting their votes. Unlike Abramson et al. (2010), however, we find less strategic voting in proportional representation than in first-past-the-post elections.

[3]Cf. Myatt (2007), who offers a model with private but no public information. When information is public, however, his model's predictions become similar to those of models with public information (pp. 264-5).

In contrast to previous studies that show a first-place effect in the lab (Hix, Hortala-Vallve and Riambau-Armet 2017), in two-round elections in France (Granzier, Pons and Tricaud 2023) or in municipal elections in Brazil (Lucardi, Micozzi and Vallejo 2023), but in line with previous results from India (Chatterjee and Kamal 2021), Swiss referenda (Bursztyn et al. 2024) or two-round presidential elections around the world (Lucardi, Micozzi and Vallejo 2023), we find no evidence that finishing first in the primary confers an electoral advantage in the general election. However, our finding that finishing in the *second* rather than the third place confers an advantage in the general election is consistent with Anagol and Fujiwara's (2016) model, in which anti-incumbent voters face a coordination problem that can be solved by looking at candidate rankings from previous elections. Our results are also consistent with studies showing how information can affect individual voter behavior, both in the lab (Forsythe et al. 1993; Agranov et al. 2018; Fredén, Rheault and Indridason 2022) and in real-world presidential elections in Argentina (Weitz-Shapiro and Winters 2019), Brazil (Plutowski, Weitz-Shapiro and Winters 2021) or Mexico (Castro Cornejo 2022).

We also extend the "closeness and turnout" literature (see Blais 2006 and Aytaç and Stokes 2019, ch. 2 for reviews). Intuitively, turnout should be higher when an election is expected to be close, as the chance that an additional vote may make a difference for the outcome is larger (Shachar and Nalebuff 1999). But the *expected* closeness of an election is hard to measure. Previous authors have taken advantage of national-level polls coupled with mail-in ballots measured daily (Bursztyn et al. 2024), as well as two-round elections in Bavaria (Arnold 2018), France (Fauvelle-Aymar and François 2006; Indridason 2008), Hesse (Garmann 2014), Hungary (Simonovits 2012), Italy (De Paola and Scoppa 2014) and Norway (Fiva and Smith 2017) to show that the closer the margin between the leading and trailing candidate in the first round, the higher the turnout in the runoff. This limits samples to relatively competitive contests and reduces the number of alternatives to two. In contrast, we examine the full set of municipalities in the sample, and in a multiparty context.

Background: Elections in the province of Buenos Aires

The party system. With nearly 40% of Argentina's population, the Province of Buenos Aires (PBA) is the largest unit in Argentina's federation and a central battleground in national politics. Its 135 municipalities vary significantly in size and influence: in 2011, the population of La Matanza (890,000 registered voters) and Lomas de Zamora (451,000) exceed that of several Argentine provinces, while the smallest municipality had just 1,701 registered voters.[4]

Argentina's party system has long been defined by a persistent divide between Peronists and non-Peronists –two broad, heterogeneous, and highly factionalized camps that have shaped the country's politics since the 1940s. But while the two major political vehicles for these camps –the Peronist *Partido Justicialista* (PJ) and the non-Peronist *Unión Cívica Radical* (UCR)– have historically dominated, voter backlashes and internal crises have periodically created openings for third-party competition, and rival factions have sometimes opted to compete outside the main party structures.

After regaining control of the province in 1987, the PJ established one of the largest clientelistic networks in the country (Palermo and Novaro 1996; Levitsky 2001), which persisted despite significant transformation in the provincial and national party systems (Calvo and Escolar 2005; Leiras 2007). The 2001 economic crisis was especially dramatic for the non-Peronist space (Torre 2003; Lupu 2016), as some of the most popular UCR politicians left the party to create their own forces, while new challengers emerged on the center-right. Controlling the presidency allowed the PJ to remain relatively united in Buenos Aires (Cherny, Feierherd and Novaro 2010), while the UCR formed a coalition with *Propuesta Republicana* (PRO), a center-right party founded after 2001, to beat the PJ in 2015, 2017 and 2021. The rise of Javier Milei's *La Libertad Avanza* (LLA) in 2023 introduced a new political force, but this party has struggled to establish a solid organizational structure and remains weak at the municipal level.

[4]The median and mean values were 25,200 and 82,600, respectively.

Yet despite losing the national presidency in 1999, 2015 and 2023, the PJ only relinquished control of the provincial governorship during 2015-2019. Its dominance is especially marked in the *Conurbano*, the densely populated industrial belt surrounding the City of Buenos Aires that is home to ≈ 75% of the province's population. Nonetheless, competitive races in the *Conurbano* are not uncommon, especially in years when the non-Peronist camp has an attractive presidential candidate. And the UCR remains a strong competitor in the province's Interior –a region comprising a rural hinterland and mid-sized cities–, where elections were highly contested between both major parties.

In sum, municipal elections in Buenos Aires are characterized by intense electoral competition, driven by both the presence of third-party forces and episodic splits within the two major parties. While the PJ and UCR (plus allies) typically secure around 80% of the vote (see the bottom left panel of Figure A2 in the Appendix) and the margin between the first- and second-placed party ranges from 15 to 20 percentage points (Table A1), the largest party often falls short of an outright majority, many races are decided by narrow margins, and the "effective" number of parties measured by the Golosov index (Golosov 2010) ranges between 2.2 and 2.8 on average (Figure A2). Third parties rarely win mayoral elections –just 8%, compared to the PJ's 56.1% and the UCR's 35.9%–, but they can tip the balance in favor of (or against) one of the two major parties, making coordination essential.

Electoral rules. Municipalities are governed by a mayor and between 6 and 24 councilors who serve 4-year periods and will first face term limits in 2025. Local councils are renewed by halves every two years: in *concurrent* years (2011, 2015, 2019 and 2023), both the mayor and half of the council are elected simultaneously; two years later, the other half of the council is elected in a *midterm* election (2013, 2017 and 2021). Mayors are elected by plurality rule, whereas council seats are allocated using the largest remainders method with a Hare quota. The combination of small districts (see Figure A1) with a high threshold (one Hare quota) means that the two or three largest parties often capture most of the seats. The use of a fused ballot –i.e., voters are forced to support a mayor and a list of councilors from the same party– further advantages large parties in concurrent years.

Voting is mandatory; sanctions are rarely enforced, but turnout is generally upwards of 75% (see Figure 2). Between 2005 and 2023, municipal elections always took place in the same day as national and provincial races. Thus, while mayors are well-known and important political players, municipal elections are often shadowed by national (and in particular presidential and gubernatorial) contests. This logic is strengthened by an electoral technology that discourages split-ticket voting (Barnes, Tchintian and Alles 2017): parties print their own ballots, and often distribute very long sheets of paper listing the party's candidates for all offices. While voters may physically cut these in order to vote for different parties for different offices, many simply vote for all the candidates aligned with the presidential (or gubernatorial) candidate of their choice. The point is that voters probably pay more attention to national and provincial elections than to municipal ones, and therefore our estimates should be interpreted as a lower bound.

During 2011-2023, the adoption of the Open, Mandatory and Simultaneous Primaries (EPAOS), which take place a couple of months before the general election, significantly altered electoral dynamics at the national, provincial and municipal levels (Vallejo 2025). Only parties whose combined vote share surpasses 1.5% of positive votes are entitled to contest the general election. Voting is mandatory, with voters restricted to selecting a single party and a single list, including the sole official list if the voter's preferred party features no internal competition.[5] Only the most popular (or the only) list of each party may advance to the general election. Intra-party competition is thus allowed but not mandated: just 23.3% of parties in our sample featured a competitive primary, and in half of those cases the most voted faction won by an intra-party margin of at least 25 percentage points.[6] Provincial and national primaries take place in the same day following similar rules.

[5]Between 2011 and 2015, the number of registered voters varied by -0.72% to 1.04% between the primary and the general election. during 2017-2023, the number of registered voters has been identical in both instances.

[6]The two largest factions in the primary belonged to the same party in only 7% of elections. In those cases the margin between the top-two placed *parties* was much larger than usual: 36.8% vs. 15.6%.



Figure 1: Proportion of parties participating in the primary that contested the general election. "Qualified" means that a party obtained at least 1.5% of positive votes in the primary.

Roughly a third of parties fail to pass the 1.5% barrier, but their *combined* vote share falls below 2.5% of positive votes (see Figure 1). Voluntarily dropping out is rare: just 1.8% of the 4,421 parties that surpassed the threshold withdrew from the race.[7] The EPAOs are thus quite different from runoff systems, in which the election may be decided in the first round or in a second round that is restricted to the top-2 (sometimes the top-3 or top-4) vote getters. The point is that EPAOs are more like a comprehensive and easily available pre-election poll than a mechanism for filtering out parties: the combination of mandatory participation with a structured format serves to forecast the front-runner, the (most) viable challenger, and the distribution of electoral support among parties more generally. Parties generally retain their primary-election ranking in the general election or move at most just one position up or down (see Figure A3). But this also means that primary results are not fate, and voters and party elites have room for adjusting their behavior and strategies.

Information, electoral participation and strategic coordination

Seventy years ago, Duverger (1951 [1967]) noted that voters' awareness of the "mechanical" effect of electoral rules may induce them to abandon parties with little chance of being elected, giving

[7] A handful of parties participated in the general election despite not surpassing the threshold. In a couple of instances this seems due to a rounding error, but in other cases it is unclear why they were allowed to run in the general election.

rise to what he called the "psychological" effect of electoral systems. This phenomenon is rooted in the desire to avoid wasting votes. Deriving Duverger's propositions from a coordination game, Cox (1997, ch. 4) showed that in single-member districts, a Duvergerian equilibrium in which only the top two parties receive a meaningful number of votes requires four assumptions: (a) that small-party supporters are not indifferent between the top-two placed options; (b) that parties and voters seek to maximize their seat share in the current election (rather than sometime in the future); (c) that there is no obvious winner; and (d) that "*the identity of the leading and trailing candidates are common knowledge*" (see also Myatt 2007, 264-5).

The first two assumptions are not information-related and are reasonable for a nontrivial proportion of the electorate in the province of Buenos Aires. However, assumptions (c) and (d) are highly information-sensitive. It is in this context that results from the EPAOS, which provide perfect information about party strength for all parties a couple of months before the general election, can make a difference.[8] On the one hand, the perceived *closeness* between the top-placed parties may affect the incentives to both turn out to vote, and to do so strategically. Intuitively, the closer the race, the more likely that the effort of turning out will affect the outcome (Shachar and Nalebuff 1999), and that voting for a second-best alternative will prevent the victory of the most disliked option (Cox 1997). Closeness may also heighten emotional engagement –by amplifying enthusiasm, anxiety, or anger– which lowers the psychological cost of voting (Aytaç and Stokes 2019). The implication is that electoral *participation* should go up, and electoral *fragmentation* should go down, as the competitiveness of the election increases (Blais 2006). It follows that:

- **H_1. Electoral participation.** A smaller margin between the first and the second-placed party in the primary will increase both (a) turnout; and (b) the proportion of positive votes (i.e., excluding blank and null ballots) in the general election.

[8] In contrast, polling is prohibitively expensive in small districts or low-stakes elections (Fredén, Rheault and Indridason 2022), and sources like newspapers or word-of-mouth channels are unlikely to be accurate.

- **H_2. Electoral concentration.** A smaller margin between the first and the second-placed party in the primary will (a) increase the combined vote share of the top-two placed parties; and (b) decrease the effective number of parties in the general election.

In addition, primary results also provide information about parties' ranks: which is placed first, second, and so on. Ranks matter for two distinct theoretical reasons. The first is the coordination mechanism central to Duvergerian theory: in order to vote strategically, voters must agree on which are the most viable options. Voters who prefer the third- (or lower-) placed alternative but intensely dislike the frontrunner may strategically shift to the second-placed party (Cox 1997; Fey 1997). For these voters, the runner-up becomes the focal alternative: the option that everyone perceives (and everyone perceives that everyone else perceives, and so on) as the most viable challenger to the frontrunner (Anagol and Fujiwara 2016). Conversely, third-party supporters who dislike the runner-up more than the frontrunner may instead desert to the frontrunner –not out of a desire of supporting the winner, but because a vote for the frontrunner offers the best chance to beat their least-preferred competitor. In both cases, the incentives to abandon the third-placed party intensify as the race between the top-two placed parties tightens.

Therefore, finishing third rather than second –even by a single vote– should be especially costly: it generates the expectation that the runner-up is the most viable challenger against the frontrunner, prompting voters who dislike it to support the second-placed party instead of the third-placed one (Cox 1997). Thus, other things equal finishing second rather than third in the primary should provide a boost in the general election:

- **H_3. Focalness.** The third-placed party in the primary will (a) suffer an electoral penalty in the general election vis-à-vis the second-placed one; and (b) this penalty will increase the closer the race is between the first- and second-placed parties.

A second, distinct mechanism is rooted not in coordination but in the psychology of ranks: voters may favor higher-ranked options simply because of their position. This may reflect a heuristic through which voters interpret rank as a signal of inherent quality, even when substantive differences between the n^{th}- and $n+1^{\text{th}}$-placed options are minimal (Anagol and Fujiwara 2016). Another possibility is a bandwagon effect: voters may align with the frontrunner not because they see it as better, but because of the instrumental or psychological benefits of supporting the likely winner. Both experimental studies (Hix, Hortala-Vallve and Riambau-Armet 2017; Agranov et al. 2018) and observational evidence (Morton et al. 2015; Anagol and Fujiwara 2016; Granzier, Pons and Tricaud 2023; Lucardi, Micozzi and Vallejo 2023) show a tendency to prefer the first-placed party, though this tendency is far from universal (Chatterjee and Kamal 2021; Bursztyn et al. 2024), and weakens or disappears in polarized contests (Granzier, Pons and Tricaud 2023; Lucardi, Micozzi and Vallejo 2023). In any case, this mechanism predicts a positive effect of finishing first rather than second, but not necessarily of finishing second rather than third, or third rather than fourth, etc. Therefore:

- **H_4. Bandwagon effect.** The first-placed party in the primary will enjoy an electoral boost in the general election.

We finally consider heterogeneous effects. The predictions from Duverger's (1951 [1967]) propositions are starkest for plurality elections in which there is a single office at stake, and therefore voting for a third party results in a wasted ballot. Under proportional representation (PR), in contrast, voting for a third party does not necessarily mean wasting one's vote. Municipal elections in Buenos Aires alternate between midterm elections, in which only councilors are elected by PR, and concurrent ones, in which the mayor and half of the local council are elected using a fused ballot –that is, voters are forced to select a mayor and councilors from the same party. Therefore, in concurrent elections strategic behavior tends to follow the logic of the mayoral race, transforming the entire election into a *de facto* plurality contest. The fact that mayors are more visible political figures and that the fused vote attach councilors' electoral fates to that of their mayoral candidate further rein-

force this logic. Even if voters are not aware of the incentives provided by the electoral rules, they certainly see the mayoral election as the highest-stakes one, and the implication is the same.

We also expect to see stronger effects in smaller municipalities. Intuitively, a single individual is more likely to be pivotal in a small district than in a large one (Shachar and Nalebuff 1999). Thus, voters in smaller districts should be more sensitive to electoral closeness and party rankings, either because they realize that by themselves, or because party elites are more persuasive in their mobilization efforts when fewer votes are needed to alter the outcome.[9] In contrast, the bandwagoning logic does not depend on the probability of being pivotal, and thus should not change based on municipality size. Accordingly:

- **H_5. Heterogeneous effects.** The relationships predicted in $H_1 - H_3$ should be stronger (a) in concurrent election years; and (b) in smaller municipalities.

Closeness, coordination and concentration

Graphical analysis. Figure 2 shows the evolution over time of both the two margins of interest (1 vs 2 and 2 vs 3) as well as the outcome variables: turnout; the proportion of positive votes; the combined vote share of the two largest parties; and the Golosov (2010) index.[10] On average, the leading party surpasses the trailing one by 17 percentage points, with substantial variation between municipalities. The difference is somewhat larger in the primary. In contrast, the 2 vs 3 difference increases in the general election, especially during 2001-2017, when there was more uncertainty about the identity of the second-placed party. Turnout and the proportion of positive votes are noticeably lower in the primary. The combined vote share of the two largest parties and the Golosov index indicate that

[9] We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this possibility.

[10] Table A1 and Figure A2 in the Appendix show the descriptive statistics and the corresponding density plots.



Figure 2: Evolution of the main variables over time: margins between the most voted parties on top; outcomes in the middle and below. The wider vertical lines indicate concurrent elections.

electoral fragmentation is larger in the primary, especially between 2011 and 2017. This is consistent with voters using primary results to identify, and vote for, the two front-runners.

Figure 3 examines how the margin between the leading and trailing parties in the primary affects the *change* in outcome variables between the primary and the general. A closely fought primary increases both turnout and the share of positive votes, though the first relationship is limited to concurrent elections. A smaller margin between the two most voted parties also increases support for the two largest parties: in concurrent years, their combined vote share increases by 4.2 percentage points if they received the same number of votes, but this decreases by 0.13 pp. for every percentage point difference between them (see Figure 3(c)). In concurrent years, the effect is smaller (3.4 and



Figure 3: Primary closeness and change in outcome values between the primary and the general.

minus 0.093 pp, respectively), but still substantial. In very close elections there are between 0.33 and 0.38 fewer effective parties, but this number increases by 0.012-0.013 for every percentage-point difference between the frontrunner and the runner-up.

Regression analysis. By looking at the *change* between the primary and the general election, the plots in Figure 3 account for the fact that outcome values in a given municipality-year may be abnormally high (or low) for reasons that have already manifested in the primary. An alternative strategy is to include municipality and year fixed effects, and thus we estimate models of the form

$$y^{\mathrm{G}}_{m,t} \quad = \quad \beta \cdot \mathrm{margin}^{\mathrm{P}}_{m,t} + \mu_m + \delta_t + \varepsilon_{m,t}, \tag{1}$$

Table 1: Between-party closeness in the primary and general election outcomes

	% *turnout*^{G}		% *positive*^{G}		% *first two*^{G}		*Golosov*^{G}	
(a) Overall effect	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
margin^{P}	-0.021	-0.022	-0.065	-0.048	-0.068	-0.122	-0.012	0.007
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.026)	(0.013)	(0.001)	(0.001)
(b) Marginal effects in Concurrent vs. Midterm elections								
margin^{P} (concurrent)	-0.025	-0.025	-0.072	-0.053	-0.103	-0.152	-0.008	0.009
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.029)	(0.014)	(0.001)	(0.001)
margin^{P} (midterm)	-0.011	-0.013	-0.044	-0.032	0.024	-0.043	-0.021	0.002
	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.017)	(0.011)	(0.040)	(0.022)	(0.002)	(0.002)
p-value of the difference (concurrent vs. midterm)	0.093	0.065	0.147	0.072	0.003	0.000	0.000	0.000
Municipality FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Outcome in primary	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	945	945	945	945	945	945	945	945

OLS regression estimates. Each panel-column combination reports a different specification. The outcome is always measured in the general election. *margin*^{P} is the difference between the % of votes of the leading and trailing parties in the primary election, including only parties that classified to the general election in the denominator. Panel (b) reports separate *marginal* effects for concurrent and midterm elections; the "p-value of the difference" indicates whether these are statistically different from each other. Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses.

where $y^{G}_{m,t}$ is the outcome (in levels) measured in the general election in municipality m in election year t, $margin^{P}_{m,t}$ is the percentage point difference between the leading and trailing parties in the primary, and μ_m and δ_t are municipality and election year fixed effects. Since the set of parties participating in the primary and the general election may differ, when computing vote percentages and victory margins in primary we only include the vote totals of the parties that qualified to take part in the general election (i.e., that surpassed the 1.5% threshold) in the denominator.[11] To account for floor and ceiling effects, in some specifications we control for the outcome value in the primary, $y^{P}_{m,t}$. We cluster standard errors by municipality. All data comes from the province's electoral authority.[12]

[11] That is, the vote share of small parties does not appear in the denominator in the primary, increasing the margin between the most voted parties, as well as their combined vote percentage.

[12] *Junta Electoral de la Provincia de Buenos Aires*.

Table 1(a) shows the overall effect for the entire sample. For every percentage point increase in the margin between the leading and trailing parties in the primary, turnout in the general election goes down by 0.021 percentage points –0.022 if controlling for the lagged outcome–, both statistically significant estimates. These effects may seem comparatively small (cf. Fauvelle-Aymar and François 2006; Indridason 2008; Simonovits 2012; De Paola and Scoppa 2014; Garmann 2014; Arnold 2018), but this is likely due to the baseline turnout already being high.[13] The effect on positive votes in columns (3) and (4) is also negative and significant, but between two and three times larger in size. This is confirmed by the standardized estimates reported in Appendix Table A3: the effect of a (within-municipality)[14] standard deviation increase in the margin of victory in the primary is two to three times larger for positive votes than for turnout.

Where do these additional votes go? Columns (5) and (6) show that for every percentage point increase in the margin between the leading and trailing parties, the combined vote percentage of the two largest parties goes down by between 0.07 and 0.12 percentage points, depending on whether the outcome in the primary is included as a control. Surprisingly, column (7) indicates that this results in a *smaller* Golosov index –that is, lower electoral concentration in the general election as the primary becomes less competitive–, but column (8) indicates that when accounting for the level of concentration in the primary the sign switches and the effect becomes positive as expected. The standardized results in Appendix Table A3(a) lead to similar conclusions.

Panel (b) compares concurrent vs. midterm elections. To make the results more intuitive, we report the *marginal* effects of the margin of victory in concurrent and midterm elections, as well as the p-values for the difference between the two. The results are much larger –and more likely to be significant– in concurrent elections. That said, the *difference* in the marginal effect between concur-

[13] The most credible of these estimates is from Bursztyn et al. (2024), who also find a relative small effect: an increase of just 0.4 percentage points in turnout in each of the three days following the release of a close poll.

[14] Following Mummolo and Peterson (2018), we normalize the variables after subtracting their within-municipality means, to account for the fact that our analyses only exploit variation within municipalities rather than across them.

rent and midterm years is only statistically significant at conventional levels for the combined vote share of the largest parties and the Golosov index. Using council size as a proxy for municipality size, Table A2(d) in the Appendix further shows that voters in small districts are more responsive to electoral closeness: in municipalities with 6 councilors, the impact of closeness on turnout is two to three times larger than in the overall sample. This effect diminishes almost monotonically with increasing council size and becomes negligible in municipalities with 16 or more councilors. The relationship between council size and positive votes is less predictable, however, and there is no clear pattern between council size and the magnitude of the estimated effect for the other two outcomes. The standardized estimates in Appendix Table A3 also support this interpretation.

Robustness. Table A4 in the Appendix shows that for all the variables of interest, the value observed in the primary is a much better predictor than the values from the the general elections that took place two or four years before. Looking at the *change* in the outcome variable between the primary and the general election (Table A5); measuring vote percentages in the primary without removing parties that did not pass the 1.5% threshold from the denominator (Table A6); or taking the natural logarithm of raw votes or the Golosov index instead of vote percentages (Table A7) does not change our findings either. Accounting for intra-party competition in the primary by either (a) splitting the sample depending on which of the top-two parties had multiple lists (Table A8), or (b) defining the explanatory variable as the margin between the biggest *factions* within each top-two parties (Table A9) produces similar findings as well. Neither the incumbent party's distance to a majority in the council (Table A10) nor district magnitude (Table A11) change the result for midterm elections.[15]

[15] We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting these possibilities.

Party ranks and coordination

Identification. Determining if a party does better in the general election *solely by virtue of having finished in a higher-ranked position in the primary* is problematic insofar as better-ranked parties are more popular, nominate more attractive candidates, or control more resources. We thus employ a regression discontinuity (RD) design, comparing parties who finished first instead of second (or second instead of third) by a small margin. Following Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014), we estimate this effect non-parametrically, fitting a separate regression at each side of the cutoff point of zero and weighting observations close to the cutoff more heavily. For a given outcome variable, we choose the bandwidth that minimizes the estimates' asymptotic mean squared error. Since we include two observations for every election, both the density of the running variable and all election-specific characteristics are perfectly balanced by design. We cluster the standard errors by election year to account for the dependency across observations.

Graphical evidence. The regression discontinuity plots in Figure 4 show the relationship between a party's margin of victory in the primary and its probability of winning or its vote percentage in the general election. The plots on the left show that the larger the first-placed party's margin, the more likely it is to win the election and the higher its expected vote share, but there is no visible "jump" at the discontinuity: finishing first in the primary does not confer an electoral advantage of its own in the general election. In contrast, the plot on the top right corner shows that there is an advantage of finishing second: the third-placed party rarely wins the election, but the second-placed one emerges the winner between 10% and 20% of the time, and the difference begins to show up right at the discontinuity. There is no visible effect for vote shares, however. Figures A9 and A10 in the Appendix suggest that these results are driven by concurrent elections and small municipalities.

RD results. Table 2(a) presents the results for the full sample. Finishing first in the primary has a negative and sizable –minus 9 percentage points– effect on the probability of winning the general



Figure 4: Mimicking variance RD plots with quantile-spaced bins (Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik 2015) showing the relationship between the margin in the primary and the probability of winning (top) or the expected vote share (bottom) in the general election.

election. The estimate is not statistically significant, probably due to low statistical power: as the last three columns of the table show, we generally have 80% power to find an effect as large as a standard deviation of the outcome in the control group (SD_C) and sometimes one half as large ($\text{SD}_C/2$), but our RD estimates ($|\hat{\tau}_{\text{RD}}|$) are usually much smaller than that.

In any case, the first-place advantage documented in municipal elections in Brazil (Lucardi, Micozzi and Vallejo 2023) or in legislative elections in France and other European countries (Granzier, Pons and Tricaud 2023) does not extend to Buenos Aires. But in line with Anagol and Fujiwara's (2016) findings for Brazil, Canada and India, finishing second instead of third provides a 9 pp. increase in the probability of winning the general election ($p = 0.04$). The estimates for vote shares go in the expected direction –a 1.1 pp. decrease and increase, respectively–, though the small effect

Table 2: RD estimates: Effect of primary ranking on general election outcomes

								power against		
(a) Overall effect	outcome	estim.	95% CI	p-val.	bwd.	$N^-\|N^+$	SD_C	SD_C	$\frac{SD_C}{2}$	$\|\hat{\tau}_{RD}\|$
1 vs 2	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	-9.00	[-36.54 : 8.96]	0.23	13.2	443 | 443	45.06	1.00	0.78	0.20
2 vs 3	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	9.02	[0.66 : 19.14]	0.04	15.6	423 | 423	13.64	0.98	0.53	0.77
1 vs 2	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	-1.11	[-6.19 : 2.73]	0.45	14.1	469 | 469	8.75	1.00	0.78	0.11
2 vs 3	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	1.09	[-7.20 : 9.12]	0.82	16.1	439 | 439	7.09	0.67	0.23	0.07
(b) Concurrent elections										
1 vs 2	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	-4.73	[-44.98 : 23.99]	0.55	22.6	339 | 339	45.12	0.95	0.44	0.07
2 vs 3	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	11.15	[-0.71 : 29.34]	0.06	12.7	196 | 196	14.18	0.74	0.26	0.54
1 vs 2	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	-1.47	[-7.91 : 3.41]	0.44	15.1	249 | 249	8.48	0.99	0.55	0.11
2 vs 3	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	1.88	[-11.56 : 16.53]	0.73	17.1	247 | 247	7.69	0.33	0.12	0.07
(c) Midterm elections										
1 vs 2	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	-3.51	[-24.62 : 10.27]	0.42	10.5	179 | 179	44.42	1.00	0.94	0.09
2 vs 3	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	2.17	[-8.94 : 8.41]	0.95	8.7	114 | 114	16.08	1.00	0.73	0.11
1 vs 2	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	0.12	[-2.52 : 2.61]	0.97	8.8	152 | 152	8.30	1.00	0.99	0.05
2 vs 3	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	-0.64	[-3.64 : 1.67]	0.47	12.8	163 | 163	6.46	1.00	0.92	0.10

Sharp (conventional) RD estimates, with robust CIs and p-values based on the MSE-optimal bandwidth proposed by Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014), using a triangular kernel and clustering the standard errors by election year. The running variable is the primary election margin between the first- and second-placed parties (odd-numbered rows) or the second- and third-placed ones (even-numbered rows). Only parties that classified to the general election are included in the denominator. The last three columns report how much statistical power the model has to detect an effect that is as large as (a) a standard deviation of the outcome variable in the control group (SD_C); (b) half as much; or (c) equal in absolute value to the one we actually estimated ($|\hat{\tau}_{RD}|$).

sizes and insufficient power means that neither effect is significant. Finding stronger regression discontinuity estimates for winning probabilities than for vote shares is common (see Granzier, Pons and Tricaud 2023; Lucardi, Micozzi and Vallejo 2023). On the one hand, we are comparing higher- and lower-ranked parties with very similar vote percentages, and thus even a small change in vote shares may translate into an appreciable increase in winning probabilities. Alternatively, if only a few cases experience large increases in vote shares, the (local) *average treatment effect* –which is what we estimate– on vote shares may not be that large, but the impact on *winning probabilities* can be substantial.

The next two panels of Table 2 indicate that the (insignificant) effect of finishing first instead of second does not vary with the electoral calendar, but the second-placed advantage is five times as large in concurrent (11.2 pp.) than in midterm years (2.2 pp.), with a p-value of 0.06 despite the much

smaller sample size. This is consistent with theoretical expectations founded on the higher visibility and winner-takes-all nature of mayoral elections *vis-à-vis* midterm ones. Appendix Table A13 shows that the second-place advantage is larger in the Interior and in small municipalities, with highly significant effect sizes of 14.5 and 20.3 percentage points, respectively. The results for vote shares remain insignificant. This is consistent with expectations, but given the substantial overlap between a municipality's location and its size –the Interior is home to 88% of small municipalities but just 41% of large ones; 74% of the Interior's municipalities (but only 20% of the *Conurbano*'s) are small–, we cannot determine if these results are driven by municipality size *per se* or by the political and demographic differences between the *Conurbano* and the Interior.

We also expect a larger electoral advantage of finishing second (rather than third) when the first-placed party is within reach –that is, when there is no obvious winner. Figure 5 shows that this is indeed the case: when the distance between the first- and second-placed parties is small –less than 7 percentage points–, the premium of finishing second rather than third is around 50 pp., far more than the 9 pp. reported in Table 2(a). Adding less competitive elections reduces this advantage almost monotonically. Figure 5(b) shows that the second-placed party receives a 3-5 pp. boost to its vote share when it is close to the first-placed party, though these estimates are not significant.

Robustness. Again, calculating the running variable using all parties that contested the primary rather than just the ones surpassing the 1.5% threshold does not change the results, though the reduction in power leads to mostly insignificant estimates (Table A14). Another concern is that while we have perfect balance for *election*-level characteristics, the parties (and candidates) that fall above or below the threshold may differ, for instance in terms of incumbency, alignment with the president (or the provincial governor), or whether they faced a competitive primary. Figure A8 documents some imbalance, especially for party ID characteristics.[16] This may be due to chance: with 112 tests, we expect 5.6 significant estimates due solely to chance, and find a total of 10. The differ-

[16] We cannot compare candidate characteristics like gender because we do not have the names of losing candidates.



Figure 5: Sharp RD estimates (points) and 95% robust CIs (vertical lines) showing the effect of finishing second (rather than third) in the primary on (a) the probability of winning; and (b) the vote percentage in the general election, depending on the distance between the leading and trailing party in the primary. The red horizontal lines display the RD estimates and CIs reported in Table 2(a).

ence is not worrisome, and in any case Table A15 shows that controlling for all variables included in the balance checks does not change the results. Using a CER-optimal instead of a MSE-optimal bandwidth (Table A16) or fitting second-order polynomials (Table A17) produces similar estimates, though the latter are much more variable. The effect of finishing first rather than second is sensitive to bandwidth choice: it begins negative at small bandwidths and then becomes zero or positive, depending on the outcome, though the estimates are never significant. In contrast, the estimate for finishing second rather than third remains pretty stable over bandwidths ranging between 5 and 35 percentage points, though the coefficients are sometimes insignificant (Figure A11).

Documenting voters' attention in municipal races

To what extent are these results actually capturing strategic mobilization, rather than just picking up some correlated, but different, phenomena? Insofar as (a) voters care more about national or provincial elections than local ones; and (b) the electoral technology used in Buenos Aires discourages split-ticket voting (Barnes, Tchintian and Alles 2017), outcomes for national, provincial and



Figure 6: Relative popularity of the Spanish terms for "president," "governor," "mayor" and "councilor" in Google searches in the province of Buenos Aires, 2011-2023. The dashed vertical line indicates the primary election date.

municipal elections will be positively correlated. If voters first make a decision about the national or provincial race and then vote similarly in the municipal one, the previous results may be an artifact of the fact that municipal, provincial and national elections are held on the same day.

In this section we offer evidence in the contrary. As Argentina's largest province, elections in Buenos Aires receive substantial media attention. National newspapers like *Clarín*, *La Nación*, *Página/12* and *Perfil* typically provide detailed infographics and interactive maps through which readers can easily access electoral results, even at the local level. Local media like *La Noticia 1*, *El Día* and *Radio Provincia* offer thorough local-level reporting both before and after election day. Figure 6 validates this interest using Google Trends to measure the relative popularity of the Spanish terms for "presi-

dent," "governor," "mayor" and "councilor" between January 1st and December 31st of each election year.[17] Search popularity clearly peaks around the primary and the general elections. Consistent with the assumption that voters do not care much about the local council, interest in "councilor" is low throughout the year and only peaks modestly in some midterm years (2013 and 2017). Searches for "mayor," in contrast, clearly peak around the primary and the general election, but only in concurrent years. Interest in "governor" is comparable to that of "mayor," only without the peaks, while searches for "president" are naturally much more numerous and peak both at election time and when a new president assumes office. While illustrative, these trends support the assumption that voters are informed about the competitiveness of the local race, especially in concurrent elections. The list of top ten searches in the seven days immediately after the primary displayed in Appendix Figure A6 is populated by election- and politician-related terms, further strengthening this claim.

More systematically, we used precinct-level data from 2013 to 2023 to construct a "municipal," "provincial" and "national" version of each of our explanatory and dependent variables.[18] The former are similarly defined as before (though using provisional precinct-level data; see fn. 18); the latter are similarly constructed, but using results from provincial and municipal elections. For example, $margin^{P}_{provincial}$ is the percentage point difference between the two parties that received the

[17] Google Trends values reflect how frequently a specific term is searched compared to the total volume of searches across all terms during the same place and period. For each election year in our sample, we conducted a simultaneous search for all four terms of interest.

[18] "Resultados Electorales," Dirección Nacional Electoral. We look at 2013-2023 because we lack precinct-level data for the 2011 municipal primaries. Note that these are *provisional* results sent directly from polling stations on election night, not the *definitive* (and legally binding) results that we have been used so far. In practice, the two rarely differ by more than a couple of *tenths* of a percentage point; in municipal elections, for which we have both provincial and definitive values, the within-municipality correlation is often upwards of 0.95 (see Figure A7 in the Appendix).

Table 3: Between-party closeness in the primary and general election outcomes –"Horse race" between variables measured at the municipal, provincial and national levels

	% *turnout*^{G}		% *positive*^{G}		% *first two*^{G}		*Golosov*^{G}	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$margin^{P}_{municipal}$	-0.038	-0.037	-0.037	-0.050	-0.015	-0.114	-0.009	0.009
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.008)	(0.042)	(0.021)	(0.002)	(0.002)
$margin^{P}_{provincial}$	-0.020	-0.017	0.007	0.043	-0.121	-0.022	-0.005	-0.003
	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.030)	(0.020)	(0.097)	(0.049)	(0.006)	(0.003)
$margin^{P}_{national}$	0.038	0.032	-0.030	-0.035	0.132	0.038	-0.002	-0.001
	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.024)	(0.017)	(0.084)	(0.045)	(0.005)	(0.003)
Municipality FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Outcome in primary	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	810	810	810	810	810	810	810	810

OLS regression estimates. Each column reports a different specification. The outcome always corresponds to the municipal results measured in the general election. $margin^{P}$ is the difference between the % of votes of the leading and trailing parties in the primary election, including only parties that classified to the general election in the denominator; the *municipal*, *provincial* and *national* subscripts indicate to which election the values correspond to. Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses.

most votes in the provincial primary in a given municipality –which may not correspond to the two most voted parties *in the province*. $margin^{P}_{national}$ and the outcome variables are similarly defined.[19]

Figure A7 in the Appendix shows that with the exception of turnout, the within-municipality correlation between these variables is positive, but not overwhelmingly so. If anything, results for provincial and national elections are much more strongly correlated between them than with municipal values. A higher correlation for turnout makes sense, as voters who show up at an election precinct are counted as voting for all offices simultaneously; the only way to participate in one election but not another is if voter rolls are not identical –for example, foreigners who are permanent residents may vote in municipal elections but not in national or provincial ones.

[19] For comparability, we used presidential and gubernatorial results in concurrent years, and results for national deputies and provincial legislators (senators or deputies, as Buenos Aires's multi-member districts alternate between the two; see Lucardi and Micozzi 2022) in midterm years.

The weaker correlation for the other variables suggest that the transmission between different level of election is not automatic. Indeed, the "horse race" regressions in Table 3 show that when the margin of victory in the municipal, provincial and national election are included simultaneously, only the former have a meaningful and statistically significant impact on the outcome; the latter are smaller in magnitude, insignificant, or have the wrong sign. Furthermore the point estimates for the municipal margin differ little from those of Table 1(a) –with the exception of turnout, where the effect is much larger. In other words: municipal primary results do a good job at explaining municipal outcomes in the general election, but results from the provincial and national primaries do not. Furthermore, the last two panels of Appendix Table A12 show that they do not even do a good job of explaining outcomes in the provincial or national election. This is not surprising: while being the most voted candidate in the municipal race determines who will govern a district, in the gubernatorial and presidential races a vote in any municipality is as good as any other: coordination should arise at the provincial (or national) level, not at the municipal one. For the same reason, the municipal margin in the primary has little effect on the outcomes in the provincial or national races, with the exception of turnout. As we just noted, this happens because voting in the municipal but not the provincial or national election is almost impossible. Importantly for our purposes, however, rather than provincial or national mobilization mechanically explaining the correlations observed in Table 1, it is municipal elections affecting turnout in these races "from the bottom up."

As a final check, in Appendix Table A19 we report regression discontinuity estimates like those of Table 2(a) separately for the municipal, provincial and national races.[20] The municipal results are very similar to the original ones –in fact they are actually a bit stronger, but this is entirely due to the fact that we do not have data for 2011 (see fn. 18). The provincial and national estimates reported in panels (b) and (c), in contrast, are much closer to zero in absolute value, sometimes have the opposite sign, and always fall short of statistical significance even at the 0.10 level.

[20] A "horse race" is unfeasible here, as we cannot include three running variables in the same specification.

Conclusion

Unlike media coverage, opinion polls, personal networks or simply "vibes," which can be biased, too expensive, consciously motivated, or manipulated, the EPAOS provide information about parties' electoral strength that is both widely accessible and immune to the distortions commonly found seen other tools. In this paper we show that voters in Buenos Aires use them to make marginal decisions regarding whether to turn out and cast a positive ballot, as well as for whom to vote.

The effects we find are subject to alternative interpretations regarding both *who* is behind these participation efforts –individual voters vs. partisan elites– and *whether* they reflect a strategic coordination or a naive preference for higher-ranked options. While we cannot give a definitive answer, our findings are consistent with the claim that they are driven by (a) *individual voters* (b) *coordinating* behind more viable alternatives. Finding a stronger effect for positive votes –which, unlike turnout cannot be observed by party operatives (Nichter 2008)– is consistent with voters', rather than elites, making the relevant decisions. So is the fact that many hopeless parties contest the primary (compare the weighted vs. the unweighted values in Figure 1), that voluntary dropouts are rare, and that the incumbent party's distance to a council majority does not matter. The finding that the frontrunner in the primary is *dis*advantaged (though the effect is not significant) while the runner-up enjoys a boost, fits nicely with a coordination story. The Google Trends data (Figure 6), the "horse race" results from Table 3, and individual-level data from the 2015 presidential election (Weitz-Shapiro and Winters 2019) show that Argentine voters are informed and sophisticated enough to distinguish between different levels of election as well as to infer the identity of the second-placed candidate from primary results.

That said, the fact that voters pay more attention to the national president than to the local mayor (see Figure 6) introduces the issue of the scope conditions of our argument and findings: in what contexts should information matter for electoral engagement and coordination? The existing literature has paid particular attention to electoral rules (Cox, Fiva and Smith 2016; Fiva and Hix 2021;

Figueroa 2025) as well as the ideological configuration between the top-placed alternatives (Tsebelis 1988; Willis and Indridason 2025) and the degree of polarization between them (Murias Muñoz and Meguid 2021; Granzier, Pons and Tricaud 2023; Lucardi, Micozzi and Vallejo 2023). Our finding suggest that (perceptions of) the distribution of votes between parties also play a crucial role, and highlight the importance of measuring these accurately before election day.

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Supplementary Materials

for "Three Is a Crowd: Information and Electoral Coordination in Argentina" (for online publication only)

Table of Contents

1 Descriptive statistics

Council sizes. Figure A1 shows the distribution of council seats in 2011. Since then, some municipalities have overseen (modest) increases in council size, but we keep the 2011 values to ensure a cleaner within-municipality comparison in the analysis.

Descriptive statistics

- Table A1 presents the descriptive statistics for variables measured at the municipal level: the 1 vs 2 and 2 vs 3 margins; the % of turnout and positive votes; the Golosov index; and the combined vote share of the top-two and top-three placed parties, as well as the first-, second- and third-placed parties, respectively. The table contains three panels, corresponding to (a) the primary election; (b) the general election; and (c) the difference between the general and the primary election. For each panel, we report separate values for concurrent and midterm elections, on the one hand, and *Conurbano* and Interior municipalities, on the other.
- Figure A2 presents the density plots for the vote margin between the first- and second-placed party, as well as of the four outcomes we use in the closeness models: (a) the proportion of registered votes who turned out; (b) the proportion of voters who cast a positive ballot; (c) the combined vote share of the two largest parties; and (d) the Golosov index.
- *Party ranks.* Figure A3 shows how a party's primary rank predicts its general election rank.

Scatterplots. We replicate Figure 3 but (a) splitting the sample between "small" (14 councilors or less in 2011; see Figure A1) or "large" (16 or more councilors in 2011) municipalities (Figure A4); or (b) keeping the split between concurrent and midterm elections, but using logged vote totals or margins instead of vote shares (Figure A5).

Media coverage of elections. Figure A6 displays the relative popularity of the top ten Google Trends *News* searches in the province of Buenos Aires in the week immediately following the primary elections. The red bars show that a large proportion of these, and especially a large proportion of the most searched terms, are election-related.



Figure A1: Number of council seats in 2011. Note that half of council seats are elected every two years, so district magnitude in councilor elections is half the value reported in the x axis.

Table A1: Descriptive statistics (I): Municipality-level outcomes, 2011-2023

	concurrent elections					midterm elections					*Conurbano*					Interior				
(a) Primary election	*N*	mean	SD	min	max	*N*	mean	SD	min	max	*N*	mean	SD	min	max	*N*	mean	SD	min	max
margin 1st vs 2nd (%)	540	19.8	14.7	0.1	71.3	405	14.1	10.4	0.0	63.6	308	19.9	14.3	0.0	67.7	637	16.1	12.7	0.1	71.3
margin 2nd vs 3rd (%)	493	18.2	12.4	0.2	46.3	392	16.6	10.9	0.2	43.4	307	15.7	10.6	0.2	41.8	578	18.5	12.3	0.2	46.3
turnout (%)	540	76.1	5.1	59.7	88.0	405	74.0	6.1	54.4	86.0	308	74.6	5.6	58.3	87.0	637	75.5	5.7	54.4	88.0
positive votes (%)	540	89.4	3.8	72.3	97.3	405	89.9	2.7	79.1	95.7	308	88.2	3.2	72.3	95.1	637	90.3	3.2	74.7	97.3
Golosov index	540	2.3	0.6	1.2	6.0	405	2.8	0.8	1.3	6.4	308	2.6	0.7	1.5	6.4	637	2.4	0.7	1.2	6.2
vote 1st + 2nd (%)	540	83.0	11.4	47.1	100.0	405	75.3	12.0	41.2	100.0	308	76.3	10.2	42.6	100.0	637	81.3	12.9	41.2	100.0
vote 1st + 2nd + 3rd (%)	540	94.4	7.2	63.1	101.5	405	88.5	8.8	56.5	100.0	308	88.8	8.4	57.3	101.5	637	93.4	8.1	56.5	101.4
vote 1st (%)	540	51.4	9.5	24.7	84.6	405	44.7	8.7	22.4	78.2	308	48.1	9.5	23.8	73.3	637	48.7	9.8	22.4	84.6
vote 2nd (%)	540	31.6	9.1	5.6	49.9	405	30.6	7.1	12.2	49.7	308	28.2	8.0	5.6	44.9	637	32.6	8.1	10.0	49.9
vote 3rd (%)	493	12.5	6.9	0.0	32.9	392	13.7	6.3	2.3	29.5	307	12.5	6.0	1.5	27.6	578	13.3	7.0	0.0	32.9
(b) General election																				
margin 1st vs 2nd (%)	540	17.9	13.3	0.0	67.2	405	14.6	10.4	0.0	52.6	308	18.9	13.9	0.1	67.2	637	15.3	11.2	0.0	56.0
margin 2nd vs 3rd (%)	478	20.4	13.3	0.0	47.6	391	18.2	10.9	0.1	45.2	306	17.9	11.5	0.1	45.2	563	20.3	12.7	0.0	47.6
turnout (%)	540	81.2	3.5	68.6	90.1	405	77.9	4.9	60.9	89.2	308	78.9	4.3	64.6	87.0	637	80.2	4.5	60.9	90.1
positive votes (%)	540	91.7	3.2	76.9	97.6	405	93.9	2.2	82.2	97.3	308	92.4	3.1	79.1	97.3	637	92.8	3.0	76.9	97.6
Golosov index	540	2.2	0.4	1.4	3.7	405	2.6	0.7	1.3	6.3	308	2.4	0.5	1.5	4.9	637	2.3	0.6	1.3	6.3
vote 1st + 2nd (%)	540	84.7	11.0	55.9	100.0	405	77.4	11.2	39.4	100.0	308	78.0	9.5	48.9	100.0	637	83.2	12.2	39.4	100.0
vote 1st + 2nd + 3rd (%)	540	95.1	6.6	65.8	100.0	405	89.7	8.0	57.3	100.0	308	89.5	7.7	61.5	100.0	637	94.4	7.2	57.3	100.0
vote 1st (%)	540	51.3	8.1	32.9	73.4	405	46.0	8.0	20.0	76.3	308	48.5	8.2	28.9	73.1	637	49.3	8.6	20.0	76.3
vote 2nd (%)	540	33.4	9.2	6.0	50.0	405	31.4	7.3	15.0	49.5	308	29.6	8.6	6.0	47.5	637	33.9	8.0	13.2	50.0
vote 3rd (%)	478	11.8	7.2	0.0	31.3	391	12.8	5.9	2.0	29.2	306	11.6	5.9	1.8	29.6	563	12.6	7.0	0.0	31.3
(c) Δ: General − Primary																				
margin 1st vs 2nd (%)	540	-1.9	11.4	-57.7	32.3	405	0.5	6.8	-30.5	18.1	308	-1.0	8.3	-36.4	18.8	637	-0.8	10.4	-57.7	32.3
margin 2nd vs 3rd (%)	478	2.7	7.3	-19.9	39.8	391	1.7	5.5	-13.9	19.5	306	2.3	5.2	-12.5	23.7	563	2.3	7.2	-19.9	39.8
turnout (%)	540	5.1	3.1	-1.3	18.0	405	3.9	2.1	1.1	13.2	308	4.3	2.7	-0.1	18.0	637	4.7	2.8	-1.3	13.2
positive votes (%)	540	1.3	2.1	-5.4	13.2	405	2.4	1.7	-7.2	12.5	308	1.7	1.7	-7.2	10.5	637	1.8	2.1	-5.4	13.2
Golosov index	540	-0.1	0.4	-2.8	1.1	405	-0.2	0.4	-1.7	1.1	308	-0.2	0.4	-2.8	0.9	637	-0.1	0.4	-1.7	1.1
vote 1st + 2nd (%)	540	1.6	5.1	-15.1	25.8	405	2.1	4.4	-12.1	14.9	308	1.7	4.3	-13.5	25.6	637	1.9	5.0	-15.1	25.8
vote 1st + 2nd + 3rd (%)	540	0.7	2.6	-10.8	21.1	405	1.2	2.7	-5.8	10.7	308	0.7	2.9	-10.8	21.1	637	1.0	2.5	-6.7	13.9
vote 1st (%)	540	-0.1	6.8	-30.2	18.9	405	1.3	4.5	-18.2	14.1	308	0.3	5.2	-19.3	13.8	637	0.6	6.3	-30.2	18.9
vote 2nd (%)	540	1.7	5.6	-16.6	28.9	405	0.8	3.6	-11.4	12.2	308	1.4	4.1	-9.6	17.1	637	1.3	5.2	-16.6	28.9
vote 3rd (%)	478	-1.0	4.2	-23.6	17.2	391	-0.9	3.3	-12.4	10.4	306	-1.0	2.8	-9.2	9.0	563	-0.9	4.2	-23.6	17.2



Figure A2: Distribution of the municipal-level margins and outcome variables in the primary election, the general, and the difference between the two.



Figure A3: Probability that a party will end up in a given rank in the general election (on the x-axis) conditional on its rank in the primary (on the y-axis). Percentages add up to 100 *by row* (with discrepancies due to rounding). Only parties that contested the general election are included.



Figure A4: Relationship between closeness in the primary (measured as the difference in vote percentage between the leading and trailing party) and the change in outcome values between the primary and the general election. The gray lines indicate the OLS relationship for the whole sample; green and red lines do so for small (14 councilors or less in 2011) or large (16 or more councilors in 2011) municipalities, respectively.



Figure A5: Relationship between the logged closeness in the primary (measured as the natural logarithm of the ratio between the vote total of the leading and trailing party) and the natural logarithm of the ratio between the value in the general and the primary election. The gray lines indicate the OLS relationship for the whole sample; green and red lines do so for concurrent and midterm elections, respectively.



Figure A6: Top ten Google search queries in the week immediately following the primary, 2011–2023. Queries are ranked by relative popularity in the *News* category.

2 Robustness and alternative explanations (I): Closeness

Robustness checks

- The first two panels of Table A2 replicate the results from Table 1. Panels (c) and (d) report additional results disaggregating by geographical region (*Conurbano* vs Interior) and council size in 2011, respectively.
- Table A3 replicates the models reported in Table A2 but standardizing all variables (both dependent and explanatory) according to their within-municipality standard deviations (Mummolo and Peterson 2018). Estimates can thus be interpreted as the effect of a standard deviation increase in *closeness* on each outcome.
- Throughout the paper we measure the outcomes of interest in the general election, and the explanatory and running variables in the primary immediately preceding it. But in principle, we could use data from the previous *general* election, as authors sometimes do when there are no primaries. In Table A4, we regress the six variables listed in Figure 2 on (a) the same variable measured in the primary; (b) the same variable measured in the immediately preceding general election, two years before; (c) the same variable measured in the general election that took place four years before (thus accounting for concurrent vs. midterm dynamics); or (d) all three variables simultaneously. The explanatory power of the lagged value as measured in the primary is consistently statistically significant and clearly superior to the other two, regardless of whether we include municipality or municipality and year fixed effects.
- Table A5 replicates the models reported in Table A2, but measuring the outcome variable in first differences, i.e. as the value in the general election minus the value in the primary.
- Table A6 replicates the models reported in Table A2, but including all parties that participated in the primary (instead of only those parties that qualified for the general election) in the denominator when measuring (i) the margin of victory (in all models) and (ii) the lagged outcome value (in columns (6) and (8)).
- Table A7 replicates the models reported in Table A2 but using the logged version of the raw vote totals of interest (or of the Golosov index) instead of vote shares. The estimates can thus be interpreted as elasticities.
- *Intra-party competition.* Table A8 examines whether the results from Table 1(a) change depending on whether neither, one of the two largest parties in the primary featured multiple lists. Alternatively, in Table A9 we calculate the margin between the first- and second-placed party using only the largest *list* within each of the two largest parties, rather than the parties' combined vote total.

- *Council majority*. Incentives to mobilize –especially on the part of elites– may be stronger when the incumbent party is close to win (or lose) a majority of seats in the council.[21] Thus, we first calculated how many seat each party would have obtained if the primary's results persisted in the general election, then computed how many seats the incumbent party would have obtained in the council,[22] and created a dummy indicating whether the incumbent party was "near" or "away" from a majority in the local council. Councils always have an even number of members (see Figure A1), and in practice the incumbent party controls a majority in the council by controlling just half of seats.[23] Thus, we coded the incumbent party as being "near" a majority if it either (a) had exactly half of the council seats; or (b) had half of the council seats minus one. Table A10 presents the results, reporting separate results for incumbent parties near or away from a majority.
- *District magnitude in midterms*. Table A11 replicates the estimates from Table A2(d) but restricting the sample to midterm elections; and displaying with the municipality's district magnitude in 2011 (which is half the number of seats in the municipal council listed in Figure A1).

Which elections? Comparing the predictive power of different measures. Table A12 reports the results of a "horse race" comparing whether municipal, provincial or national-level results –all aggregated at the municipal level– have more explanatory power over the outcome in the general election.[24] To show that these variables are positively but not perfectly correlated, Figure A7 presents the pairwise correlations between them, net of municipality fixed effects (i.e., subtracting the municipality mean before calculating the correlations) to get a better sense of the actual variation in the data (Mummolo and Peterson 2018).

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[21] We thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this point.

[22] In midterm elections, the incumbent party was the one that had won the previous concurrent election; in concurrent elections, the "incumbent" party would be determined in the general election so we assumed it to be the most voted party in the primary. Since we can only identify the incumbent party across two consecutive elections in the case of the PJ or the UCR, the number of observations falls from 945 to 863.

[23] In case of a tie, the Council's president votes twice, and in case of a tie when designating the Council's president, the advantage goes to the most voted party in the immediately preceding election (see the updated text of the provincial Decree-Law 6769/58).

[24] When calculating vote shares, only parties that surpassed 1.5% of positive votes at the municipal level are included in the denominator.

Table A2: Between-party closeness in the primary and general election outcomes

	% *turnout*^{G}		% *positive*^{G}		% *first two*^{G}		*Golosov*^{G}	
(a) Overall effect	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
margin^{P}	-0.021	-0.022	-0.065	-0.048	-0.068	-0.122	-0.012	0.007
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.026)	(0.013)	(0.001)	(0.001)
(b) Marginal effects in Concurrent vs. Midterm elections								
margin^{P} (concurrent)	-0.025	-0.025	-0.072	-0.053	-0.103	-0.152	-0.008	0.009
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.029)	(0.014)	(0.001)	(0.001)
margin^{P} (midterm)	-0.011	-0.013	-0.044	-0.032	0.024	-0.043	-0.021	0.002
	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.017)	(0.011)	(0.040)	(0.022)	(0.002)	(0.002)
p-value of the difference (concurrent vs. midterm)	0.093	0.065	0.147	0.072	0.003	0.000	0.000	0.000
(c) Marginal effect in *Conurbano* vs. Interior municipalities								
margin^{P} (*Conurbano*)	0.003	-0.002	-0.065	-0.043	-0.120	-0.144	-0.014	0.009
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.044)	(0.023)	(0.002)	(0.002)
margin^{P} (Interior)	-0.034	-0.033	-0.065	-0.050	-0.040	-0.110	-0.011	0.006
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.033)	(0.014)	(0.001)	(0.001)
p-value of the difference (*Conurbano* vs. Interior)	0.000	0.000	0.982	0.484	0.145	0.192	0.328	0.116
(d) Marginal effects by council size (as measured in 2011)								
margin^{P} (council size = 6)	-0.073	-0.063	-0.108	-0.088	-0.152	-0.165	-0.003	0.006
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.049)	(0.034)	(0.003)	(0.002)
margin^{P} (council size = 10)	-0.045	-0.056	-0.024	-0.043	-0.076	-0.094	-0.005	0.007
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.029)	(0.018)	(0.100)	(0.032)	(0.003)	(0.002)
margin^{P} (council size = 12)	-0.033	-0.026	-0.092	-0.065	-0.051	-0.104	-0.009	0.007
	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.016)	(0.011)	(0.047)	(0.023)	(0.002)	(0.002)
margin^{P} (council size = 14)	-0.023	-0.027	-0.071	-0.051	-0.031	-0.135	-0.013	0.007
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.054)	(0.023)	(0.003)	(0.002)
margin^{P} (council size = 16)	-0.008	-0.009	-0.055	-0.033	-0.011	-0.039	-0.019	0.003
	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.012)	(0.076)	(0.046)	(0.003)	(0.002)
margin^{P} (council size = 18)	-0.009	-0.017	-0.047	-0.034	0.030	-0.146	-0.021	0.007
	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.015)	(0.009)	(0.074)	(0.045)	(0.004)	(0.003)
margin^{P} (council size = 20)	0.004	0.003	-0.089	-0.043	-0.196	-0.169	-0.012	0.010
	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.054)	(0.023)	(0.003)	(0.002)
margin^{P} (council size = 24)	0.007	0.007	-0.041	-0.027	-0.083	-0.129	-0.016	0.009
	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.016)	(0.011)	(0.075)	(0.036)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Municipality FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Outcome in primary	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	945	945	945	945	945	945	945	945

OLS regression estimates. Each panel-column combination reports a different specification. The outcome is always measured in the general election. *margin*^{P} is the difference between the % of votes of the leading and trailing parties in the primary election, including only parties that classified to the general election in the denominator. The sample is the same in all panels, but panels (b) through (d) report *marginal* effects for different subsets of the sample; the "*p*-value of the difference" indicates whether these are statistically different from each other. Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses.

Table A3: Between-party closeness in the primary and general election outcomes –Standardized estimates

	% $turnout^{G}_{STD}$		% $positive^{G}_{STD}$		% $first\ two^{G}_{STD}$		$Golosov^{G}_{STD}$	
(a) Overall effect	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$margin^{P}_{STD}$	-0.076	-0.075	-0.243	-0.174	-0.088	-0.145	-0.281	0.158
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.030)	(0.023)	(0.029)	(0.017)	(0.028)	(0.024)
(b) Marginal effects in Concurrent vs. Midterm elections								
$margin^{P}_{STD}$ (concurrent)	-0.101	-0.104	-0.290	-0.232	-0.106	-0.182	-0.192	0.224
	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.036)	(0.027)	(0.037)	(0.023)	(0.035)	(0.028)
$margin^{P}_{STD}$ (midterm)	-0.028	-0.020	-0.150	-0.060	-0.052	-0.074	-0.452	0.018
	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.054)	(0.042)	(0.047)	(0.028)	(0.052)	(0.045)
p-value of the difference (concurrent vs. midterm)	0.001	0.000	0.032	0.009	0.366	0.011	0.000	0.000
(c) Marginal effect in *Conurbano* vs. Interior municipalities								
$margin^{P}_{STD}$ (*Conurbano*)	-0.035	-0.034	-0.270	-0.179	-0.171	-0.194	-0.303	0.155
	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.048)	(0.036)	(0.060)	(0.031)	(0.056)	(0.042)
$margin^{P}_{STD}$ (Interior)	-0.094	-0.094	-0.231	-0.172	-0.052	-0.124	-0.271	0.158
	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.035)	(0.027)	(0.034)	(0.020)	(0.031)	(0.026)
p-value of the difference (*Conurbano* vs. Interior)	0.003	0.006	0.484	0.858	0.083	0.062	0.610	0.942
(d) Marginal effects by council size (as measured in 2011)								
$margin^{P}_{STD}$ (council size = 6)	-0.277	-0.287	-0.326	-0.273	-0.135	-0.180	-0.252	0.168
	(0.065)	(0.082)	(0.155)	(0.104)	(0.136)	(0.127)	(0.099)	(0.105)
$margin^{P}_{STD}$ (council size = 10)	-0.138	-0.165	-0.170	-0.189	-0.130	-0.117	-0.197	0.212
	(0.040)	(0.044)	(0.103)	(0.058)	(0.086)	(0.047)	(0.094)	(0.067)
$margin^{P}_{STD}$ (council size = 12)	-0.077	-0.074	-0.290	-0.218	-0.055	-0.114	-0.253	0.194
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.057)	(0.043)	(0.057)	(0.032)	(0.047)	(0.044)
$margin^{P}_{STD}$ (council size = 14)	-0.093	-0.086	-0.262	-0.203	-0.071	-0.169	-0.303	0.140
	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.069)	(0.076)	(0.058)	(0.038)	(0.050)	(0.047)
$margin^{P}_{STD}$ (council size = 16)	-0.034	-0.040	-0.228	-0.097	-0.028	-0.038	-0.325	0.070
	(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.073)	(0.051)	(0.077)	(0.066)
$margin^{P}_{STD}$ (council size = 18)	-0.021	-0.035	-0.191	-0.145	0.055	-0.135	-0.341	0.093
	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.065)	(0.042)	(0.080)	(0.049)	(0.054)	(0.038)
$margin^{P}_{STD}$ (council size = 20)	-0.036	-0.015	-0.341	-0.164	-0.310	-0.285	-0.280	0.178
	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.042)	(0.029)	(0.091)	(0.051)	(0.081)	(0.049)
$margin^{P}_{STD}$ (council size = 24)	-0.037	-0.015	-0.163	-0.092	-0.116	-0.164	-0.318	0.151
	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.072)	(0.046)	(0.095)	(0.036)	(0.103)	(0.071)
Municipality FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Outcome in primary	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	945	945	945	945	945	945	945	945

OLS regression estimates. All variables are normalized using their within-municipality standard deviation. Each panel-column combination reports a different specification. The outcome is always measured in the general election. $margin^{P}$ is the difference between the % of votes of the leading and trailing parties in the primary election, including only parties that classified to the general election in the denominator. The sample is the same in all panels, but panels (b) through (d) report *marginal* effects for different subsets of the sample; the "p-value of the difference" indicates whether these are statistically different from each other. Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses.

Table A4: Comparing the predictive power of the primary vs. previous general elections

	% *margin 1 vs. 2*^{G}			% *margin 2 vs. 3*^{G}			% *turnout*^{G}			% *positive*^{G}			% *first two*^{G}			*Golosov*^{G}		
(a) Lag, primary	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)
lagged DV^{P}	0.66	0.64	0.61	0.90	0.88	0.85	0.69	0.60	0.46	0.75	0.75	0.68	0.87	0.82	0.79	0.70	0.68	0.61
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.010)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Observations	945	945	945	869	869	869	945	945	945	945	945	945	945	945	945	945	945	945
R^2	0.51	0.61	0.63	0.73	0.78	0.80	0.77	0.84	0.95	0.62	0.67	0.75	0.85	0.87	0.89	0.75	0.79	0.81
(b) Lag from previous general election $(t-2)$																		
lagged DV^{G-2}	0.13	-0.12	-0.06	0.13	-0.09	-0.15	0.39	0.009	0.29	0.17	-0.04	-0.03	0.26	-0.05	-0.02	0.14	-0.06	0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Observations	944	944	944	829	829	829	944	944	944	944	944	944	944	944	944	944	944	944
R^2	0.02	0.25	0.32	0.02	0.24	0.46	0.16	0.39	0.93	0.03	0.19	0.49	0.09	0.38	0.67	0.04	0.31	0.57
(c) Lag from previous concurrent or midterm general election $(t-4)$																		
lagged DV^{G-4}	0.22	0.03	0.05	0.24	0.10	0.12	0.75	0.36	0.28	0.30	0.20	0.14	0.44	0.26	0.09	0.30	0.20	0.07
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Observations	942	942	942	824	824	824	943	943	943	943	943	943	943	943	943	943	943	943
R^2	0.05	0.24	0.32	0.06	0.24	0.47	0.34	0.42	0.93	0.11	0.23	0.50	0.29	0.45	0.67	0.22	0.38	0.57
(d) All three lags simultaneously																		
lagged DV^{P}	0.64	0.63	0.61	0.90	0.90	0.85	0.61	0.61	0.43	0.74	0.75	0.68	0.87	0.83	0.80	0.67	0.66	0.62
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
lagged DV^{G-2}	0.05	-0.07	-0.06	-0.07	-0.13	-0.10	-0.04	-0.09	0.08	-0.05	-0.10	-0.0004	-0.04	-0.10	-0.08	-0.02	-0.06	-0.05
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
lagged DV^{G-4}	0.08	-0.03	0.02	0.04	-0.01	0.01	0.43	0.33	0.10	0.08	0.04	0.04	0.04	-0.01	0.03	0.06	0.03	0.04
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Observations	942	942	942	792	792	792	943	943	943	943	943	943	943	943	943	943	943	943
R^2	0.52	0.62	0.64	0.73	0.79	0.80	0.86	0.88	0.95	0.63	0.68	0.75	0.85	0.88	0.89	0.76	0.80	0.82
Municipality FEs	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Year FEs	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	Y

OLS regression estimates. Each panel-column combination reports a different specification. The outcome is always measured in the general election. The explanatory variables consist of the same indicator, but measured either (a) in the primary election; (b) in the previous general election, two years before; or (c) in the general election four years before (so that concurrency status is kept unchanged). Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses.

Table A5: Between-party closeness in the primary and first-differenced outcomes

	Δ *turnout*$^{G-P}$		Δ *positive*$^{G-P}$		Δ *first two*$^{G-P}$		Δ *Golosov*$^{G-P}$	
(a) Overall effect	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
margin^{P}	-0.023	-0.022	-0.038	-0.048	-0.135	-0.122	0.015	0.007
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.0010)	(0.001)
(b) Marginal effects in Concurrent vs. Midterm elections								
margin^{P} (concurrent)	-0.026	-0.025	-0.043	-0.053	-0.163	-0.152	0.016	0.009
	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.001)	(0.001)
margin^{P} (midterm)	-0.016	-0.013	-0.025	-0.032	-0.059	-0.043	0.012	0.002
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.002)	(0.002)
p-value of the difference (concurrent vs. midterm)	0.274	0.065	0.116	0.072	0.000	0.000	0.014	0.000
(c) Marginal effect in *Conurbano* vs. Interior municipalities								
margin^{P} (*Conurbano*)	-0.009	-0.002	-0.031	-0.043	-0.150	-0.144	0.018	0.009
	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.002)	(0.002)
margin^{P} (Interior)	-0.031	-0.033	-0.043	-0.050	-0.126	-0.110	0.013	0.006
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.0009)	(0.001)
p-value of the difference (*Conurbano* vs. Interior)	0.015	0.000	0.369	0.484	0.354	0.192	0.023	0.116
(d) Marginal effects by council size (as measured in 2011)								
margin^{P} (council size = 6)	-0.052	-0.063	-0.078	-0.088	-0.168	-0.165	0.010	0.006
	(0.017)	(0.008)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.041)	(0.034)	(0.002)	(0.002)
margin^{P} (council size = 10)	-0.068	-0.056	-0.054	-0.043	-0.098	-0.094	0.011	0.007
	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.028)	(0.032)	(0.002)	(0.002)
margin^{P} (council size = 12)	-0.019	-0.026	-0.051	-0.065	-0.117	-0.104	0.014	0.007
	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.001)	(0.002)
margin^{P} (council size = 14)	-0.031	-0.027	-0.040	-0.051	-0.158	-0.135	0.015	0.007
	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.025)	(0.017)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.002)	(0.002)
margin^{P} (council size = 16)	-0.010	-0.009	-0.020	-0.033	-0.045	-0.039	0.011	0.003
	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.043)	(0.046)	(0.002)	(0.002)
margin^{P} (council size = 18)	-0.026	-0.017	-0.027	-0.034	-0.186	-0.146	0.018	0.007
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.004)	(0.003)
margin^{P} (council size = 20)	0.002	0.003	-0.018	-0.043	-0.163	-0.169	0.018	0.010
	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.002)	(0.002)
margin^{P} (council size = 24)	0.007	0.007	-0.019	-0.027	-0.140	-0.129	0.018	0.009
	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Municipality FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Outcome in primary	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	945	945	945	945	945	945	945	945

OLS regression estimates. Each panel-column combination reports a different specification. *margin*^{P} is the difference between the % of votes of the leading and trailing parties in the primary election, including only parties that classified to the general election in the denominator. Outcomes are measured as the difference between the value measured in the general election and the one measured in the primary. The sample is the same in all panels, but panels (b) through (d) report *marginal* effects for different subsections of the sample; the "p-value of the difference" indicates whether these are statistically different from each other. Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses.

Table A6: Between-party closeness in the primary and general election outcomes –Including all parties in the denominator

	% *turnout*^{G}		% *positive*^{G}		% *first two*^{G}		*Golosov*^{G}	
(a) Overall effect	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
margin^{P}	-0.021	-0.022	-0.066	-0.048	-0.069	-0.131	-0.012	0.007
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.026)	(0.013)	(0.001)	(0.001)
(b) Marginal effects in Concurrent vs. Midterm elections								
margin^{P} (concurrent)	-0.025	-0.026	-0.073	-0.054	-0.103	-0.161	-0.008	0.009
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.029)	(0.014)	(0.001)	(0.001)
margin^{P} (midterm)	-0.010	-0.012	-0.048	-0.033	0.022	-0.050	-0.022	0.002
	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.017)	(0.011)	(0.041)	(0.021)	(0.002)	(0.002)
p-value of the difference (concurrent vs. midterm)	0.060	0.035	0.201	0.083	0.004	0.000	0.000	0.000
(c) Marginal effect in *Conurbano* vs. Interior municipalities								
margin^{P} (*Conurbano*)	0.004	-0.002	-0.067	-0.043	-0.122	-0.168	-0.014	0.010
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.044)	(0.023)	(0.002)	(0.002)
margin^{P} (Interior)	-0.035	-0.033	-0.066	-0.051	-0.041	-0.111	-0.011	0.006
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.034)	(0.014)	(0.002)	(0.001)
p-value of the difference (*Conurbano* vs. Interior)	0.002	0.033	0.743	0.388	0.023	0.000	0.266	0.000
(d) Marginal effects by council size (as measured in 2011)								
margin^{P} (council size = 6)	-0.073	-0.063	-0.108	-0.089	-0.152	-0.166	-0.003	0.006
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.050)	(0.034)	(0.003)	(0.002)
margin^{P} (council size = 10)	-0.045	-0.056	-0.024	-0.044	-0.076	-0.090	-0.005	0.007
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.029)	(0.018)	(0.100)	(0.031)	(0.003)	(0.002)
margin^{P} (council size = 12)	-0.033	-0.026	-0.092	-0.066	-0.051	-0.108	-0.009	0.007
	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.016)	(0.011)	(0.048)	(0.023)	(0.002)	(0.002)
margin^{P} (council size = 14)	-0.023	-0.027	-0.071	-0.051	-0.031	-0.142	-0.013	0.007
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.054)	(0.024)	(0.003)	(0.002)
margin^{P} (council size = 16)	-0.007	-0.009	-0.056	-0.033	-0.012	-0.041	-0.019	0.003
	(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.013)	(0.077)	(0.043)	(0.003)	(0.002)
margin^{P} (council size = 18)	-0.009	-0.017	-0.047	-0.034	0.030	-0.161	-0.021	0.008
	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.015)	(0.009)	(0.074)	(0.047)	(0.004)	(0.003)
margin^{P} (council size = 20)	0.006	0.004	-0.092	-0.045	-0.198	-0.195	-0.012	0.010
	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.054)	(0.023)	(0.003)	(0.002)
margin^{P} (council size = 24)	0.007	0.007	-0.043	-0.027	-0.089	-0.151	-0.016	0.009
	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.076)	(0.036)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Municipality FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Outcome in primary	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	945	945	945	945	945	945	945	945

OLS regression estimates. Each panel-column combination reports a different specification. The outcome is always measured in the general election. *margin*^{P} is the difference between the % of votes of the leading and trailing parties in the primary election, but unlike the case of Tables 1 and A2, all parties that participated in the primary are included in the denominator. The sample is the same in all panels, but panels (b) through (d) report *marginal* effects for different subsets of the sample; the "p-value of the difference" indicates whether these are statistically different from each other. Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses.

Table A7: Between-party closeness in the primary and general election outcomes –logged values

	log(*turnout*^{G})		log(*positive*^{G})		log(*first two*^{G})		log(*Golosov*^{G})	
(a) Overall effect	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
log (*margin*^{P})	-0.022	-0.010	-0.045	-0.025	-0.104	-0.085	-0.151	0.115
	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.018)	(0.014)
(b) Marginal effects in Concurrent vs. Midterm elections								
log (*margin*^{P}) (concurrent)	-0.022	-0.010	-0.049	-0.027	-0.123	-0.102	-0.115	0.141
	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.014)	(0.009)	(0.018)	(0.017)
log (*margin*^{P}) (midterm)	-0.022	-0.010	-0.034	-0.020	-0.051	-0.039	-0.250	0.035
	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.011)	(0.005)	(0.023)	(0.013)	(0.030)	(0.021)
p-value of the difference (concurrent vs. midterm)	0.969	0.908	0.208	0.201	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000
(c) Marginal effect in *Conurbano* vs. Interior municipalities								
log (*margin*^{P}) (*Conurbano*)	-0.026	-0.004	-0.049	-0.018	-0.129	-0.091	-0.154	0.100
	(0.009)	(0.003)	(0.010)	(0.004)	(0.023)	(0.013)	(0.029)	(0.022)
log (*margin*^{P}) (Interior)	-0.019	-0.015	-0.042	-0.031	-0.085	-0.081	-0.148	0.127
	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.017)	(0.010)	(0.021)	(0.016)
p-value of the difference (*Conurbano* vs. Interior)	0.537	0.011	0.539	0.056	0.114	0.522	0.864	0.295
(d) Marginal effects by council size (as measured in 2011)								
log (*margin*^{P}) (council size = 6)	-0.049	-0.028	-0.090	-0.064	-0.177	-0.138	-0.067	0.151
	(0.023)	(0.009)	(0.025)	(0.014)	(0.027)	(0.017)	(0.059)	(0.050)
log (*margin*^{P}) (council size = 10)	-0.019	-0.029	-0.025	-0.046	-0.081	-0.089	-0.091	0.146
	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.047)	(0.022)	(0.053)	(0.030)
log (*margin*^{P}) (council size = 12)	-0.026	-0.011	-0.057	-0.033	-0.111	-0.084	-0.138	0.142
	(0.013)	(0.004)	(0.016)	(0.006)	(0.023)	(0.015)	(0.028)	(0.026)
log (*margin*^{P}) (council size = 14)	-0.023	-0.016	-0.048	-0.028	-0.096	-0.093	-0.149	0.135
	(0.012)	(0.004)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.028)	(0.020)	(0.040)	(0.029)
log (*margin*^{P}) (council size = 16)	-0.001	-0.004	-0.023	-0.016	-0.056	-0.038	-0.241	0.045
	(0.034)	(0.008)	(0.037)	(0.014)	(0.064)	(0.031)	(0.049)	(0.029)
log (*margin*^{P}) (council size = 18)	-0.008	-0.009	-0.024	-0.020	-0.044	-0.088	-0.226	0.113
	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.013)	(0.005)	(0.038)	(0.028)	(0.058)	(0.048)
log (*margin*^{P}) (council size = 20)	-0.043	-0.005	-0.075	-0.018	-0.178	-0.102	-0.128	0.109
	(0.014)	(0.004)	(0.016)	(0.006)	(0.026)	(0.011)	(0.033)	(0.025)
log (*margin*^{P}) (council size = 24)	-0.013	0.003	-0.028	-0.006	-0.091	-0.068	-0.168	0.078
	(0.010)	(0.003)	(0.010)	(0.004)	(0.028)	(0.017)	(0.046)	(0.031)
Municipality FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Outcome in primary	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	945	945	945	945	945	945	945	945

OLS regression estimates. Each panel-column combination reports a different specification. The (logged) outcome is always measured in the general election. log(*margin*^{P}) is the difference between the logged vote total of the leading party minus the logged vote total of the trailing party in the primary election. When calculating the (pre-logged) primary outcome control in column (8), only parties that classified to the general election are included in the denominator. The sample is the same in all panels, but panels (b) through (d) report *marginal* effects for different subsets of the sample; the "p-value of the difference" indicates whether these are statistically different from each other. Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses.

Table A8: Between-party closeness in the primary and general election outcomes –Heterogeneity depending on which of the two-placed parties faced a competitive primary

	% *turnout*^{G}		% *positive*^{G}		% *first two*^{G}		*Golosov*^{G}	
(a) Single vs. multiple lists	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
margin^{P} (neither)	-0.031	-0.029	-0.056	-0.022	-0.048	-0.053	-0.017	0.001
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.035)	(0.016)	(0.002)	(0.001)
margin^{P} (first-placed only)	-0.019	-0.022	-0.057	-0.045	-0.050	-0.110	-0.009	0.009
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.032)	(0.014)	(0.001)	(0.001)
margin^{P} (second-placed only)	-0.036	-0.032	-0.089	-0.054	-0.033	-0.118	-0.023	-0.002
	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.018)	(0.010)	(0.044)	(0.024)	(0.002)	(0.001)
margin^{P} (both)	-0.014	-0.016	-0.080	-0.068	-0.118	-0.195	-0.011	0.009
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.029)	(0.016)	(0.001)	(0.002)
(b) Counting multiple lists only if the margin between the two largest ones is lower than 25 pp.								
margin^{P} (neither)	-0.023	-0.022	-0.067	-0.042	-0.068	-0.103	-0.014	0.005
	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.032)	(0.014)	(0.001)	(0.001)
margin^{P} (first-placed only)	-0.019	-0.023	-0.053	-0.049	-0.058	-0.133	-0.006	0.012
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.030)	(0.018)	(0.001)	(0.002)
margin^{P} (second-placed only)	-0.018	-0.019	-0.081	-0.056	-0.062	-0.133	-0.020	0.001
	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.007)	(0.036)	(0.020)	(0.001)	(0.001)
margin^{P} (both)	-0.018	-0.025	-0.071	-0.071	-0.124	-0.201	-0.007	0.012
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.052)	(0.025)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Municipality FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Outcome in primary	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	945	945	945	945	945	945	945	945

OLS regression estimates. Each panel-column combination reports a different specification. The outcome is always measured in the general election. *margin*^{P} is the difference between the % of votes of the leading and trailing parties in the primary election, including only parties that classified to the general election in the denominator. Estimate report separate *marginal* effects depending on whether (i) neither of the two largest parties in the primary; (ii) only the largest party in the primary; (iii) only the second largest party in the primary; or (iv) the two largest parties in the primary featured multiple lists, respectively. In panel (a) all instances of intra-party competition are treated as such; in panel (b), only cases in which the largest faction win by a margin of 25 percentage points or lower are treated as instances of intra-party competition. Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses.

Table A9: Between-party closeness in the primary and general election outcomes –Calculating margin using largest faction only

	% *turnout*^{G}		% *positive*^{G}		% *first two*^{G}		*Golosov*^{G}	
(a) Overall effect	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
margin^{P}	-0.027	-0.024	-0.060	-0.035	-0.044	-0.092	-0.016	-0.005
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.027)	(0.014)	(0.001)	(0.001)
(b) Marginal effects in Concurrent vs. Midterm elections								
margin^{P} (concurrent)	-0.033	-0.028	-0.087	-0.048	-0.095	-0.124	-0.014	-0.004
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.029)	(0.016)	(0.001)	(0.001)
margin^{P} (midterm)	-0.015	-0.014	-0.006	-0.010	0.063	-0.025	-0.020	-0.009
	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.036)	(0.023)	(0.002)	(0.001)
p-value of the difference (concurrent vs. midterm)	0.060	0.044	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.005	0.001
(c) Marginal effect in *Conurbano* vs. Interior municipalities								
margin^{P} (*Conurbano*)	-0.001	0.000	-0.031	-0.020	-0.082	-0.110	-0.016	-0.003
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.047)	(0.025)	(0.002)	(0.002)
margin^{P} (Interior)	-0.042	-0.037	-0.078	-0.045	-0.021	-0.081	-0.016	-0.007
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.033)	(0.016)	(0.001)	(0.001)
p-value of the difference (*Conurbano* vs. Interior)	0.000	0.000	0.002	0.027	0.287	0.320	0.825	0.039
(d) Marginal effects by council size (as measured in 2011)								
margin^{P} (council size = 6)	-0.075	-0.055	-0.188	-0.125	-0.040	-0.157	-0.014	-0.004
	(0.032)	(0.024)	(0.050)	(0.039)	(0.093)	(0.070)	(0.003)	(0.004)
margin^{P} (council size = 10)	-0.088	-0.080	-0.090	-0.063	-0.055	-0.113	-0.011	-0.003
	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.108)	(0.033)	(0.003)	(0.002)
margin^{P} (council size = 12)	-0.042	-0.034	-0.084	-0.056	-0.026	-0.069	-0.013	-0.006
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.017)	(0.012)	(0.060)	(0.029)	(0.002)	(0.002)
margin^{P} (council size = 14)	-0.028	-0.025	-0.086	-0.043	-0.043	-0.100	-0.016	-0.007
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.058)	(0.028)	(0.003)	(0.002)
margin^{P} (council size = 16)	-0.018	-0.005	-0.040	-0.012	0.098	-0.030	-0.024	-0.011
	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.031)	(0.019)	(0.090)	(0.058)	(0.003)	(0.002)
margin^{P} (council size = 18)	-0.009	-0.015	-0.029	-0.007	0.032	-0.054	-0.024	-0.011
	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.014)	(0.009)	(0.068)	(0.047)	(0.004)	(0.003)
margin^{P} (council size = 20)	-0.008	-0.008	-0.035	-0.013	-0.156	-0.112	-0.014	-0.004
	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.059)	(0.022)	(0.003)	(0.002)
margin^{P} (council size = 24)	0.007	0.007	-0.010	-0.013	-0.087	-0.120	-0.016	0.000
	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.073)	(0.039)	(0.004)	(0.002)
Municipality FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Outcome in primary	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	945	945	945	945	945	945	945	945

OLS regression estimates. Each panel-column combination reports a different specification. The outcome is always measured in the general election. *margin*^{P} is the absolute value of the difference between the % of votes of the largest faction of the leading and trailing parties in the primary election, including only parties that classified to the general election in the denominator. The sample is the same in all panels, but panels (b) through (d) report *marginal* effects for different subsets of the sample; the "p-value of the difference" indicates whether these are statistically different from each other. Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses.

Table A10: Between-party closeness in the primary and general election outcomes –Heterogeneity by distance to council majority

	% *turnout*^{G}		% *positive*^{G}		% *first two*^{G}		*Golosov*^{G}	
(a) Distance to majority	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
margin^{P} (near majority)	-0.015	-0.019	-0.066	-0.050	-0.085	-0.119	-0.012	0.008
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.012)	(0.008)	(0.035)	(0.018)	(0.002)	(0.002)
margin^{P} (away from majority)	-0.024	-0.023	-0.069	-0.049	-0.097	-0.119	-0.010	0.007
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.025)	(0.013)	(0.001)	(0.001)
(b) Marginal effects by distance to majority in Concurrent vs. Midterm elections								
margin^{P} (concurrent, near)	-0.023	-0.025	-0.077	-0.064	-0.122	-0.154	-0.008	0.009
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.042)	(0.023)	(0.002)	(0.002)
margin^{P} (concurrent, away)	-0.026	-0.025	-0.076	-0.055	-0.121	-0.142	-0.007	0.008
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.028)	(0.014)	(0.001)	(0.001)
margin^{P} (midterm, near)	0.003	-0.004	-0.039	-0.019	0.003	-0.036	-0.021	0.004
	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.020)	(0.011)	(0.056)	(0.030)	(0.003)	(0.002)
margin^{P} (midterm, away)	-0.017	-0.019	-0.050	-0.034	-0.031	-0.055	-0.018	0.003
	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.018)	(0.012)	(0.038)	(0.022)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Municipality FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Outcome in primary	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	863	863	863	863	863	863	863	863

OLS regression estimates. Each panel-column combination reports a different specification. The outcome is always measured in the general election. *margin*^{P} is the difference between the % of votes of the leading and trailing parties in the primary election, including only parties that classified to the general election in the denominator. Distance to a majority in the council is always measured for the party expected to be the incumbent after the general election. In concurrent elections, this is the most voted party in the primary; in midterm elections, this is the party that won thre previous mayoral election. Due to data limitations, the sample is restricted to cases where either the PJ and the UCR are or are expected to be the incumbent. The incumbent party is coded as being "near" to a council majority if the number of seats obtained in the previous general electios plus the number of seats expected on the basis of the primary results add up to 50% of seats in the council, or 50% minus one seat. In all other cases, the incumbent is coded as "away" from a majority –it either has a very comfortably majority that is not at risk, or it is far away from obtaining one. Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses.

Table A11: Between-party closeness in the primary and general election outcomes: District magnitude in midterm elections

	% *turnout*^{G}		% *positive*^{G}		% *first two*^{G}		*Golosov*^{G}	
Marginal effect by district magnitude	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
margin^{P} (district magnitude = 3)	-0.047	-0.033	-0.188	-0.147	-0.092	-0.169	-0.006	0.005
	(0.041)	(0.010)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.065)	(0.029)	(0.004)	(0.003)
margin^{P} (district magnitude = 5)	-0.035	-0.042	0.034	0.010	-0.067	0.000	-0.013	0.001
	(0.037)	(0.018)	(0.076)	(0.034)	(0.139)	(0.056)	(0.007)	(0.003)
margin^{P} (district magnitude = 6)	-0.008	-0.010	-0.068	-0.035	-0.009	-0.046	-0.016	0.001
	(0.018)	(0.010)	(0.024)	(0.014)	(0.069)	(0.049)	(0.003)	(0.003)
margin^{P} (district magnitude = 7)	-0.031	-0.038	-0.011	0.002	0.053	-0.023	-0.025	0.004
	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.052)	(0.032)	(0.140)	(0.077)	(0.011)	(0.007)
margin^{P} (district magnitude = 8)	-0.055	-0.025	-0.088	-0.032	-0.082	-0.106	-0.015	0.009
	(0.075)	(0.022)	(0.052)	(0.043)	(0.161)	(0.065)	(0.012)	(0.008)
margin^{P} (district magnitude = 9)	0.014	-0.005	-0.040	-0.005	0.233	0.088	-0.050	-0.014
	(0.032)	(0.013)	(0.031)	(0.019)	(0.167)	(0.092)	(0.017)	(0.009)
margin^{P} (district magnitude = 10)	-0.046	-0.024	0.022	0.008	-0.077	-0.131	-0.021	0.008
	(0.039)	(0.018)	(0.039)	(0.021)	(0.157)	(0.052)	(0.009)	(0.005)
margin^{P} (district magnitude = 12)	0.032	0.008	-0.016	-0.006	0.429	0.114	-0.051	-0.007
	(0.018)	(0.008)	(0.019)	(0.012)	(0.098)	(0.042)	(0.011)	(0.005)
Municipality FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Outcome in primary	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	405	405	405	405	405	405	405	405

OLS regression estimates. Each column reports a different specification. The outcome is always measured in the general election. The sample is limited to midterm elections. *margin*^{P} is the difference between the % of votes of the leading and trailing parties in the primary election, including only parties that classified to the general election in the denominator. District magnitude is measured in 2011. Estimates report *marginal* effects for different subsets of the sample. Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses.



Figure A7: Pairwise correlations of eight different measures of the six variables involved in the closeness analysis: (a) *definitive* results in local elections (the data used in Table 1); and *provisional* results (i.e. those assembled from precinct-level data) in (b) local; (c) provincial; and (d) national elections, measured in both the EPAOS and the general election. Prior to calculating the correlations, all variables were demeaned by municipality, i.e. only within-municipality variation was preserved.

Table A12: Between-party closeness in the primary and general election outcomes –"Horse race" between variables measured at the municipal, provincial and national levels

	% *turnout*^{G}		% *positive*^{G}		% *first two*^{G}		*Golosov*^{G}	
(a) Original results (2013-23)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$margin^{P}$	-0.024	-0.027	-0.050	-0.044	-0.016	-0.096	-0.013	0.007
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.027)	(0.014)	(0.001)	(0.001)
(b) Outcome measured in **MUNICIPAL** elections								
$margin^{P}_{municipal}$	-0.038	-0.037	-0.037	-0.050	-0.015	-0.114	-0.009	0.009
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.008)	(0.042)	(0.021)	(0.002)	(0.002)
$margin^{P}_{provincial}$	-0.020	-0.017	0.007	0.043	-0.121	-0.022	-0.005	-0.003
	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.030)	(0.020)	(0.097)	(0.049)	(0.006)	(0.003)
$margin^{P}_{national}$	0.038	0.032	-0.030	-0.035	0.132	0.038	-0.002	-0.001
	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.024)	(0.017)	(0.084)	(0.045)	(0.005)	(0.003)
(c) Outcome measured in **PROVINCIAL** elections								
$margin^{P}_{municipal}$	-0.039	-0.039	0.005	0.018	-0.040	-0.050	0.005	0.003
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.008)	(0.025)	(0.017)	(0.002)	(0.001)
$margin^{P}_{provincial}$	-0.018	-0.017	-0.031	-0.019	0.004	-0.005	-0.012	0.013
	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.040)	(0.023)	(0.070)	(0.036)	(0.004)	(0.003)
$margin^{P}_{national}$	0.042	0.038	-0.008	-0.022	0.082	-0.004	-0.011	-0.012
	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.033)	(0.021)	(0.057)	(0.035)	(0.004)	(0.003)
(d) Outcome measured in **NATIONAL** elections								
$margin^{P}_{municipal}$	-0.033	-0.031	0.011	0.013	-0.032	-0.041	0.004	0.003
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.023)	(0.015)	(0.001)	(0.001)
$margin^{P}_{provincial}$	-0.018	-0.013	0.002	0.018	-0.041	-0.038	0.007	0.008
	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.027)	(0.018)	(0.066)	(0.035)	(0.003)	(0.003)
$margin^{P}_{national}$	0.042	0.032	-0.026	-0.038	0.093	-0.006	-0.028	-0.009
	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.022)	(0.017)	(0.051)	(0.035)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Municipality FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Outcome in primary	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	810	810	810	810	810	810	810	810

OLS regression estimates. Each panel-column combination reports a different specification. The outcome is always measured in the general election. $margin^{P}$ is the difference between the % of votes of the leading and trailing parties in the primary election, including only parties that classified to the general election in the denominator. Since primary results for the municipal races were not available for 2011, the top panel employs the same data as Table 1(a), but for 2013-2023 only. The next three panels employ provisional results aggregated from precinct-level data, measured separately for municipal, provincial and national elections. Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses.

3 Additional results and robustness (II): RD results

Balance checks. Figure A8 displays the robust p-values showing the effect of finishing first (vs. second) or second (vs. third) in the primary on a set of predefined party-specific outcomes.

RD plots and tables

- Figure A9 shows the mimicking variance RD plots for 1 vs 2 and 2 vs 3, comparing midterm and concurrent elections. Figure A10 compares small (14 or fewer councilors in 2011) vs. large municipalities (more than 14 councilors).
- The first two panels of Table A13 replicate the results from Table 2. Panels (c) through (g) report additional results, disaggregating by geographical region (*Conurbano* vs Interior) and small vs large municipalities.

Robustness checks

- The specifications in Table A14 include all parties that participated in the primary (instead of only those parties that qualified for the general election) in the denominator when measuring the margin of victory.
- The estimates in Table A15 include controls for (i) council size; (ii) % turnout in the primary; (iii) a midterm dummy; a set of dummies indicating (iv) the president's party (which was perfectly collinear with the governor's during 2011-2023), (v) the incumbent party at the local level, (vi) the PJ and (vii) the UCR; (viii) a dummy indicating the party held a competitive primary; (ix) the number of factions participating in the primary; (x) the % of (intra-party) votes obtained by the largest faction; and (xi) the within-party Golosov index in the primary.
- The specifications in Table A16 employ CER-optimal instead of MSE-optimal bandwidths, which may produce different results (de Magalhães et al. 2025).
- Table A17 reports results using second-order polynomials instead of a local linear regression.
- Figure A11 shows that the findings reported in Table 2 are not overly sensitive to bandwidth choice. The two left panels show the effect of finishing first in the primary instead of second, while the panels on the right show the effect of finishing second instead of third.

Additional results

- Table A18 replicates the models from Table 2 but conducts subsample analysis for three different reference parties. Panel (a) calculates the estimations for incumbent parties, panel (b) for the PJ, and panel (c) for the UCR.
- Using 2013-23 data only, Table A19 exploits the fact that municipal, provincial and national elections were always concurrent to compare how well (i) municipal results in the primary explain municipal results in the general election; (ii) provincial results (aggregated at the municipal level) in the primary explain provincial results in the general election; and (iii) national results (aggregated at the municipal level) in the primary explain national results in the general election.



Figure A8: RD balance checks: robust p-values of the effect of a party finishing first (instead of second) or second (instead of third) in the primary on a set of predefined party-specific outcomes, by (sub)sample. The underlying RD estimates are computed using the MSE-optimal bandwidth proposed by Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014), using a triangular kernel and clustering the standard errors by election year. The running variable is the primary election margin between the first- and second-placed (respectively, second- and third-placed) parties in the primary election. When computing these margins, only parties that classified to the general election are included in the denominator.



Figure A9: Concurrent vs. midterm years: Mimicking variance RD plots with quantile-spaced bins (Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik 2015) showing the relationship between the margin in the primary and the probability of winning (top) or the expected vote share (bottom) in the general election.



Figure A10: Large (16 or more councilors in 2011) vs. small (14 or fewer councilors in 2011) municipalities: Mimicking variance RD plots with quantile-spaced bins (Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik 2015) showing the relationship between the margin in the primary and the probability of winning (top) or the expected vote share (bottom) in the general election.

Table A13: RD estimates: Effect of primary ranking on general election outcomes

								power against		
(a) Overall effect	outcome	estim.	95% CI	p-val.	bwd.	$N^-\|N^+$	SD_C	SD_C	$\frac{SD_C}{2}$	$\|\hat{\tau}_{RD}\|$
1 vs 2	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	-9.00	[-36.54 : 8.96]	0.23	13.2	443 | 443	45.06	1.00	0.78	0.20
2 vs 3	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	9.02	[0.66 : 19.14]	0.04	15.6	423 | 423	13.64	0.98	0.53	0.77
1 vs 2	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	-1.11	[-6.19 : 2.73]	0.45	14.1	469 | 469	8.75	1.00	0.78	0.11
2 vs 3	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	1.09	[-7.20 : 9.12]	0.82	16.1	439 | 439	7.09	0.67	0.23	0.07
(b) Concurrent elections										
1 vs 2	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	-4.73	[-44.98 : 23.99]	0.55	22.6	339 | 339	45.12	0.95	0.44	0.07
2 vs 3	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	11.15	[-0.71 : 29.34]	0.06	12.7	196 | 196	14.18	0.74	0.26	0.54
1 vs 2	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	-1.47	[-7.91 : 3.41]	0.44	15.1	249 | 249	8.48	0.99	0.55	0.11
2 vs 3	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	1.88	[-11.56 : 16.53]	0.73	17.1	247 | 247	7.69	0.33	0.12	0.07
(c) Midterm elections										
1 vs 2	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	-3.51	[-24.62 : 10.27]	0.42	10.5	179 | 179	44.42	1.00	0.94	0.09
2 vs 3	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	2.17	[-8.94 : 8.41]	0.95	8.7	114 | 114	16.08	1.00	0.73	0.11
1 vs 2	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	0.12	[-2.52 : 2.61]	0.97	8.8	152 | 152	8.30	1.00	0.99	0.05
2 vs 3	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	-0.64	[-3.64 : 1.67]	0.47	12.8	163 | 163	6.46	1.00	0.92	0.10
(d) *Conurbano*										
1 vs 2	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	-3.75	[-38.03 : 20.32]	0.55	17.8	160 | 160	44.47	0.99	0.56	0.06
2 vs 3	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	0.03	[-4.72 : 3.56]	0.78	7.4	91 | 91	0.00	0.05	0.05	0.05
1 vs 2	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	-0.98	[-3.04 : 0.91]	0.29	20.7	182 | 182	7.66	1.00	1.00	0.28
2 vs 3	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	0.59	[-10.33 : 10.01]	0.97	17.2	172 | 172	6.11	0.38	0.13	0.05
(e) Interior										
1 vs 2	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	-8.76	[-51.82 : 20.52]	0.40	13.3	324 | 324	44.39	0.93	0.40	0.10
2 vs 3	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	14.47	[2.16 : 31.05]	0.02	15.5	264 | 264	16.10	0.87	0.34	0.79
1 vs 2	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	-0.97	[-7.08 : 3.91]	0.57	13.6	330 | 330	9.31	1.00	0.65	0.08
2 vs 3	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	1.42	[-2.07 : 5.15]	0.40	12.0	220 | 220	7.32	1.00	0.80	0.19
(f) Small municipalities										
1 vs 2	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	-9.00	[-39.41 : 10.77]	0.26	12.8	265 | 265	45.66	1.00	0.71	0.17
2 vs 3	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	20.27	[5.04 : 39.26]	0.01	12.0	159 | 159	7.93	0.25	0.10	0.91
1 vs 2	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	-1.44	[-7.39 : 3.46]	0.48	15.6	308 | 308	8.59	0.99	0.59	0.11
2 vs 3	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	2.96	[-2.71 : 8.48]	0.31	13.8	175 | 175	7.12	0.94	0.42	0.31
(g) Large municipalities										
1 vs 2	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	-5.08	[-37.71 : 18.90]	0.51	14.6	189 | 189	45.30	0.99	0.60	0.08
2 vs 3	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	2.00	[-14.23 : 15.27]	0.94	13.9	207 | 207	18.12	0.93	0.40	0.07
1 vs 2	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	0.47	[-4.29 : 5.20]	0.85	18.9	232 | 232	8.70	1.00	0.72	0.06
2 vs 3	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	-0.18	[-10.61 : 9.87]	0.94	14.7	219 | 219	6.88	0.46	0.15	0.05

Sharp (conventional) RD estimates, with robust CIs and p-values based on the MSE-optimal bandwidth proposed by Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014), using a triangular kernel and clustering the standard errors by election year. The running variable is the primary election margin between the first- and second-placed parties (odd-numbered rows) or the second- and third-placed ones (even-numbered rows). Only parties that classified to the general election are included in the denominator. The last three columns report how much statistical power the model has to detect an effect that is as large as (a) a standard deviation of the outcome variable in the control group (SD_C); (b) half as much; or (c) equal in absolute value to the one we actually estimated ($|\hat{\tau}_{RD}|$). Reported number of observations indicate *effective* sample sizes.

Table A14: RD estimates: Including all parties in the denominator

								power against		
(a) Overall effect	outcome	estim.	95% CI	p-val.	bwd.	$N^-\|N^+$	SD_C	SD_C	$\frac{SD_C}{2}$	$\|\hat{\tau}_{RD}\|$
1 vs 2	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	-10.02	[-33.76 : 4.96]	0.14	12.2	418 | 418	45.63	1.00	0.90	0.30
2 vs 3	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	8.08	[-0.57 : 18.78]	0.07	21.1	554 | 554	11.94	0.93	0.40	0.64
1 vs 2	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	-1.03	[-6.53 : 3.20]	0.50	14.3	478 | 478	8.79	1.00	0.71	0.09
2 vs 3	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	1.03	[-6.72 : 8.69]	0.80	17.3	471 | 471	7.11	0.72	0.25	0.07
(b) Concurrent elections										
1 vs 2	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	-5.56	[-45.84 : 23.03]	0.52	21.8	339 | 339	45.12	0.95	0.44	0.07
2 vs 3	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	10.38	[-3.87 : 31.41]	0.13	13.9	208 | 208	15.35	0.67	0.23	0.37
1 vs 2	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	-1.49	[-7.97 : 3.63]	0.46	15.0	252 | 252	8.57	0.98	0.54	0.11
2 vs 3	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	1.79	[-11.70 : 16.59]	0.73	17.2	251 | 251	7.67	0.32	0.12	0.06
(c) Midterm elections										
1 vs 2	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	-1.70	[-27.58 : 15.07]	0.57	11.3	201 | 201	43.34	1.00	0.80	0.06
2 vs 3	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	3.24	[-9.57 : 11.64]	0.85	9.9	130 | 130	15.07	0.98	0.50	0.14
1 vs 2	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	0.07	[-2.27 : 2.13]	0.95	9.8	170 | 170	8.30	1.00	1.00	0.05
2 vs 3	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	-0.86	[-4.65 : 2.08]	0.45	11.9	155 | 155	6.52	1.00	0.77	0.11
(d) *Conurbano*										
1 vs 2	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	-3.56	[-38.85 : 21.60]	0.58	16.4	155 | 155	44.92	0.98	0.54	0.06
2 vs 3	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	0.00	[-4.37 : 2.96]	0.71	7.2	90 | 90	0.00	0.05	0.05	0.05
1 vs 2	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	-1.02	[-3.70 : 1.13]	0.30	16.6	156 | 156	7.32	1.00	0.99	0.22
2 vs 3	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	0.61	[-10.40 : 10.14]	0.98	17.1	176 | 176	6.07	0.37	0.13	0.05
(e) Interior										
1 vs 2	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	-8.11	[-49.52 : 20.21]	0.41	13.8	335 | 335	44.55	0.94	0.43	0.10
2 vs 3	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	14.48	[2.15 : 31.14]	0.02	15.1	263 | 263	16.13	0.87	0.34	0.79
1 vs 2	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	-0.85	[-6.94 : 4.02]	0.60	14.4	348 | 348	9.44	1.00	0.67	0.07
2 vs 3	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	1.38	[-2.17 : 5.14]	0.43	11.9	217 | 217	7.33	1.00	0.79	0.18
(f) Small municipalities										
1 vs 2	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	-8.89	[-38.83 : 10.48]	0.26	13.1	272 | 272	45.31	1.00	0.72	0.17
2 vs 3	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	20.24	[2.79 : 41.54]	0.02	12.1	159 | 159	7.93	0.21	0.09	0.83
1 vs 2	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	-1.21	[-6.84 : 3.31]	0.50	17.3	335 | 335	8.88	1.00	0.68	0.10
2 vs 3	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	2.97	[-2.61 : 8.46]	0.30	14.5	185 | 185	6.99	0.94	0.42	0.32
(g) Large municipalities										
1 vs 2	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	-3.64	[-36.35 : 19.89]	0.57	14.7	197 | 197	44.97	0.99	0.60	0.06
2 vs 3	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	2.36	[-11.56 : 15.68]	0.77	14.6	223 | 223	17.48	0.94	0.43	0.08
1 vs 2	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	0.44	[-4.38 : 4.98]	0.90	18.5	232 | 232	8.69	1.00	0.73	0.06
2 vs 3	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	-0.18	[-10.26 : 9.43]	0.93	14.4	222 | 222	6.88	0.49	0.16	0.05

Sharp (conventional) RD estimates, with robust CIs and p-values based on the MSE-optimal bandwidth proposed by Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014), using a triangular kernel and clustering the standard errors by election year. The running variable is the primary election margin between the first- and second-placed parties (odd-numbered rows) or the second- and third-placed ones (even-numbered rows). All parties that participated in the primary are included in the denominator. Reported number of observations indicate *effective* sample sizes.

Table A15: RD estimates: Including controls

								power against		
(a) Overall effect	outcome	estim.	95% CI	p-val.	bwd.	$N^-\|N^+$	SD_C	SD_C	$\frac{SD_C}{2}$	$\|\hat{\tau}_{RD}\|$
1 vs 2	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	-10.16	[-34.03 : 4.66]	0.14	11.7	400 | 400	45.06	1.00	0.80	0.24
2 vs 3	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	8.73	[0.49 : 18.99]	0.04	18.6	495 | 495	13.64	0.97	0.47	0.74
1 vs 2	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	-0.92	[-5.66 : 2.85]	0.52	15.2	498 | 498	8.75	1.00	0.79	0.09
2 vs 3	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	1.21	[-6.92 : 8.73]	0.82	16.8	454 | 454	7.09	0.68	0.23	0.07
(b) Concurrent elections										
1 vs 2	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	-7.22	[-43.12 : 18.08]	0.42	21.4	329 | 329	45.12	0.95	0.45	0.09
2 vs 3	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	10.97	[-0.71 : 28.97]	0.06	12.8	197 | 197	14.18	0.83	0.31	0.53
1 vs 2	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	-1.62	[-6.03 : 2.30]	0.38	14.9	247 | 247	8.48	0.99	0.55	0.12
2 vs 3	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	1.85	[-12.28 : 16.43]	0.78	17.8	258 | 258	7.69	0.33	0.12	0.07
(c) Midterm elections										
1 vs 2	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	-4.76	[-26.26 : 9.58]	0.36	9.9	168 | 168	44.42	1.00	0.95	0.12
2 vs 3	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	3.51	[-8.20 : 10.12]	0.84	8.9	118 | 118	16.08	1.00	0.71	0.20
1 vs 2	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	-0.07	[-3.03 : 2.57]	0.87	10.9	189 | 189	8.30	1.00	0.99	0.05
2 vs 3	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	-0.64	[-2.94 : 1.05]	0.35	10.4	134 | 134	6.46	1.00	0.91	0.10
(d) *Conurbano*										
1 vs 2	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	-0.28	[-33.43 : 22.98]	0.72	17.7	160 | 160	44.47	0.99	0.56	0.05
2 vs 3	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	0.14	[-4.93 : 3.88]	0.81	7.8	94 | 94	0.00	0.05	0.05	0.05
1 vs 2	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	-0.63	[-2.86 : 1.53]	0.55	22.9	200 | 200	7.66	1.00	1.00	0.14
2 vs 3	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	0.33	[-9.85 : 9.64]	0.98	17.4	173 | 173	6.11	0.38	0.13	0.05
(e) Interior										
1 vs 2	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	-12.81	[-53.76 : 14.14]	0.25	11.7	292 | 292	44.39	0.94	0.42	0.17
2 vs 3	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	14.94	[2.12 : 31.96]	0.03	16.7	282 | 282	16.10	0.85	0.32	0.82
1 vs 2	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	-1.32	[-7.27 : 3.55]	0.50	13.7	331 | 331	9.31	1.00	0.65	0.10
2 vs 3	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	1.92	[-1.18 : 5.24]	0.22	14.4	252 | 252	7.32	1.00	0.79	0.31
(f) Small municipalities										
1 vs 2	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	-11.04	[-42.28 : 9.68]	0.22	12.5	260 | 260	45.66	1.00	0.72	0.23
2 vs 3	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	20.60	[4.95 : 40.25]	0.01	11.8	154 | 154	7.93	0.26	0.10	0.92
1 vs 2	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	-1.65	[-7.56 : 3.34]	0.45	18.6	348 | 348	8.59	1.00	0.63	0.13
2 vs 3	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	3.29	[-2.07 : 8.62]	0.23	14.7	186 | 186	7.12	0.93	0.41	0.37
(g) Large municipalities										
1 vs 2	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	-2.48	[-31.72 : 18.96]	0.62	14.2	185 | 185	45.30	0.99	0.60	0.06
2 vs 3	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	2.11	[-12.25 : 13.35]	0.93	14.4	212 | 212	18.12	0.92	0.39	0.07
1 vs 2	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	0.83	[-4.09 : 5.67]	0.75	18.4	228 | 228	8.70	1.00	0.72	0.08
2 vs 3	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	-0.21	[-9.73 : 8.97]	0.94	14.6	218 | 218	6.88	0.46	0.15	0.05

Sharp (conventional) RD estimates, with robust CIs and p-values based on the MSE-optimal bandwidth proposed by Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014), using a triangular kernel and clustering the standard errors by election year. The running variable is the primary election margin between the first- and second-placed parties (odd-numbered rows) or the second- and third-placed ones (even-numbered rows). Only parties that classified to the general election are included in the denominator. Specifications include controls for: council size; % turnout in the primary; a midterm dummy; a set of dummies indicating the president's party (which was perfectly collinear with the governor's during 2011-2023), the incumbent party at the local level, the PJ and the UCR; a dummy indicating the party held a competitive primary; the number of factions participating in the primary; the % of (intra-party) votes obtained by the largest faction; and the within-party Golosov index in the primary. Reported number of observations indicate *effective* sample sizes.

Table A16: RD estimates: CER-optimal bandwidths

								power against		
(a) Overall effect	outcome	estim.	95% CI	p-val.	bwd.	N^- | N^+	SD_C	SD_C	$\frac{\text{SD}_C}{2}$	$\lvert\hat{\tau}_{\text{RD}}\rvert$
1 vs 2	*winner*$^{\text{G}}$ (0/100)	-11.12	[-37.34 : 7.55]	0.19	11.6	399 | 399	46.02	1.00	0.80	0.27
2 vs 3	*winner*$^{\text{G}}$ (0/100)	8.99	[0.33 : 18.99]	0.04	13.7	379 | 379	14.39	0.99	0.58	0.77
1 vs 2	% *vote*$^{\text{G}}$ (0:100)	-1.35	[-6.44 : 2.76]	0.43	12.4	419 | 419	8.78	1.00	0.78	0.13
2 vs 3	% *vote*$^{\text{G}}$ (0:100)	1.00	[-7.30 : 9.11]	0.83	14.2	385 | 385	7.04	0.67	0.22	0.06
(b) Concurrent elections										
1 vs 2	*winner*$^{\text{G}}$ (0/100)	-6.68	[-46.11 : 23.43]	0.52	20.3	317 | 317	45.60	0.96	0.45	0.08
2 vs 3	*winner*$^{\text{G}}$ (0/100)	11.91	[-1.06 : 30.18]	0.07	11.5	183 | 183	14.66	0.77	0.27	0.59
1 vs 2	% *vote*$^{\text{G}}$ (0:100)	-1.91	[-8.16 : 3.05]	0.37	13.6	228 | 228	8.29	0.98	0.53	0.16
2 vs 3	% *vote*$^{\text{G}}$ (0:100)	2.01	[-11.50 : 16.47]	0.73	15.4	221 | 221	7.58	0.32	0.12	0.07
(c) Midterm elections										
1 vs 2	*winner*$^{\text{G}}$ (0/100)	-4.71	[-26.77 : 11.23]	0.42	9.6	161 | 161	45.02	1.00	0.95	0.12
2 vs 3	*winner*$^{\text{G}}$ (0/100)	0.87	[-9.82 : 7.41]	0.78	7.9	105 | 105	16.74	1.00	0.76	0.06
1 vs 2	% *vote*$^{\text{G}}$ (0:100)	0.15	[-2.66 : 2.82]	0.95	8.0	140 | 140	8.20	1.00	0.99	0.05
2 vs 3	% *vote*$^{\text{G}}$ (0:100)	-0.89	[-3.85 : 1.48]	0.38	11.7	150 | 150	6.48	1.00	0.92	0.15
(d) *Conurbano*										
1 vs 2	*winner*$^{\text{G}}$ (0/100)	-5.33	[-40.29 : 21.73]	0.56	15.6	144 | 144	45.92	0.99	0.59	0.08
2 vs 3	*winner*$^{\text{G}}$ (0/100)	-0.19	[-4.70 : 3.44]	0.76	6.5	79 | 79	0.00	0.05	0.05	0.05
1 vs 2	% *vote*$^{\text{G}}$ (0:100)	-0.98	[-3.11 : 1.00]	0.32	18.2	161 | 161	7.41	1.00	1.00	0.28
2 vs 3	% *vote*$^{\text{G}}$ (0:100)	0.37	[-10.44 : 10.09]	0.97	15.1	154 | 154	5.99	0.37	0.13	0.05
(e) Interior										
1 vs 2	*winner*$^{\text{G}}$ (0/100)	-10.94	[-52.95 : 20.04]	0.38	11.7	291 | 291	45.55	0.94	0.42	0.13
2 vs 3	*winner*$^{\text{G}}$ (0/100)	15.00	[2.19 : 31.13]	0.02	13.6	243 | 243	16.76	0.90	0.36	0.82
1 vs 2	% *vote*$^{\text{G}}$ (0:100)	-1.07	[-7.23 : 4.10]	0.59	11.9	295 | 295	9.43	1.00	0.66	0.08
2 vs 3	% *vote*$^{\text{G}}$ (0:100)	1.48	[-2.17 : 5.34]	0.41	10.5	201 | 201	7.34	1.00	0.80	0.21
(f) Small municipalities										
1 vs 2	*winner*$^{\text{G}}$ (0/100)	-10.84	[-40.32 : 10.33]	0.25	11.2	234 | 234	46.93	1.00	0.74	0.22
2 vs 3	*winner*$^{\text{G}}$ (0/100)	21.14	[3.82 : 41.35]	0.02	10.5	139 | 139	8.48	0.28	0.11	0.93
1 vs 2	% *vote*$^{\text{G}}$ (0:100)	-1.56	[-7.55 : 3.58]	0.48	13.7	278 | 278	8.61	0.99	0.60	0.13
2 vs 3	% *vote*$^{\text{G}}$ (0:100)	2.87	[-2.96 : 8.59]	0.34	12.1	159 | 159	7.30	0.95	0.44	0.30
(g) Large municipalities										
1 vs 2	*winner*$^{\text{G}}$ (0/100)	-10.79	[-44.07 : 15.83]	0.36	12.8	163 | 163	44.84	0.99	0.59	0.18
2 vs 3	*winner*$^{\text{G}}$ (0/100)	1.40	[-14.61 : 15.15]	0.97	12.2	186 | 186	17.72	0.91	0.38	0.06
1 vs 2	% *vote*$^{\text{G}}$ (0:100)	0.20	[-4.55 : 4.91]	0.94	16.5	213 | 213	8.72	1.00	0.72	0.05
2 vs 3	% *vote*$^{\text{G}}$ (0:100)	-0.34	[-10.74 : 9.79]	0.93	12.9	193 | 193	6.81	0.45	0.15	0.05

Sharp (conventional) RD estimates, with robust CIs and p-values based on the CER-optimal bandwidth proposed by Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014), using a triangular kernel and clustering the standard errors by election year. The running variable is the primary election margin between the first- and second-placed parties (odd-numbered rows) or the second- and third-placed ones (even-numbered rows). Only parties that classified to the general election are included in the denominator. Reported number of observations indicate *effective* sample sizes.

Table A17: RD estimates: Second-order polynomials

								power against		
(a) Overall effect	outcome	estim.	95% CI	p-val.	bwd.	$N^-\|N^+$	SD_C	SD_C	$\frac{SD_C}{2}$	$\|\hat{\tau}_{RD}\|$
1 vs 2	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	-17.75	[-42.72 : 1.23]	0.06	18.4	573 | 573	43.41	1.00	0.78	0.61
2 vs 3	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	9.31	[-2.27 : 20.83]	0.12	16.0	433 | 433	13.48	0.90	0.37	0.61
1 vs 2	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	-1.15	[-5.89 : 2.84]	0.49	25.6	729 | 729	9.18	1.00	0.83	0.11
2 vs 3	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	0.95	[-7.91 : 9.68]	0.84	21.9	564 | 564	7.24	0.63	0.21	0.06
(b) Concurrent elections										
1 vs 2	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	-26.48	[-63.09 : 4.01]	0.08	16.8	274 | 274	46.78	0.97	0.49	0.59
2 vs 3	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	14.76	[1.00 : 34.83]	0.04	18.0	260 | 260	13.76	0.62	0.20	0.68
1 vs 2	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	-2.32	[-8.98 : 3.09]	0.34	22.2	338 | 338	9.39	0.99	0.58	0.19
2 vs 3	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	2.13	[-12.69 : 17.64]	0.75	23.4	313 | 313	7.86	0.30	0.11	0.07
(c) Midterm elections										
1 vs 2	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	-6.73	[-30.17 : 10.45]	0.34	21.9	319 | 319	38.10	1.00	0.74	0.15
2 vs 3	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	-3.14	[-15.47 : 5.51]	0.35	10.7	138 | 138	14.64	0.97	0.49	0.13
1 vs 2	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	0.16	[-2.85 : 3.16]	0.92	15.2	246 | 246	8.29	1.00	0.97	0.05
2 vs 3	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	-2.05	[-7.28 : 2.26]	0.30	12.5	160 | 160	6.46	0.96	0.47	0.22
(d) *Conurbano*										
1 vs 2	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	-10.14	[-49.90 : 23.79]	0.49	29.1	233 | 233	40.84	0.87	0.34	0.12
2 vs 3	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	0.35	[-5.43 : 5.30]	0.98	9.7	105 | 105	0.00	0.05	0.05	0.05
1 vs 2	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	-2.76	[-7.22 : 1.03]	0.14	17.8	160 | 160	7.43	1.00	0.70	0.46
2 vs 3	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	0.11	[-10.54 : 10.21]	0.97	24.6	233 | 233	6.36	0.40	0.14	0.05
(e) Interior										
1 vs 2	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	-19.11	[-61.84 : 14.23]	0.22	19.5	426 | 426	42.72	0.88	0.34	0.29
2 vs 3	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	17.39	[1.68 : 34.33]	0.03	17.2	291 | 291	15.35	0.74	0.26	0.84
1 vs 2	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	-1.29	[-7.29 : 3.83]	0.54	22.4	468 | 468	9.58	1.00	0.67	0.10
2 vs 3	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	1.51	[-2.90 : 5.78]	0.52	17.6	293 | 293	7.39	1.00	0.66	0.16
(f) Small municipalities										
1 vs 2	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	-14.50	[-43.75 : 8.94]	0.20	23.9	408 | 408	42.16	0.99	0.60	0.33
2 vs 3	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	23.59	[1.30 : 47.74]	0.04	16.1	199 | 199	7.09	0.14	0.07	0.80
1 vs 2	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	-1.65	[-7.48 : 3.66]	0.50	26.3	432 | 432	9.12	0.99	0.62	0.13
2 vs 3	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	2.70	[-4.46 : 9.19]	0.50	17.9	227 | 227	7.14	0.83	0.31	0.20
(g) Large municipalities										
1 vs 2	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	-25.29	[-72.81 : 11.63]	0.16	16.8	214 | 214	44.06	0.82	0.30	0.38
2 vs 3	*winner*^{G} (0/100)	2.00	[-12.28 : 16.04]	0.79	21.2	286 | 286	15.48	0.86	0.33	0.07
1 vs 2	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	-2.57	[-10.60 : 3.71]	0.35	15.3	198 | 198	8.74	0.92	0.39	0.17
2 vs 3	% *vote*^{G} (0:100)	-0.22	[-10.66 : 10.20]	0.97	22.2	298 | 298	7.10	0.47	0.16	0.05

Sharp (conventional) RD estimates, with robust CIs and p-values based on the MSE-optimal bandwidth proposed by Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014), using a second-order polynomial with a triangular kernel and clustering the standard errors by election year. The running variable is the primary election margin between the first- and second-placed parties (odd-numbered rows) or the second- and third-placed ones (even-numbered rows). Only parties that classified to the general election are included in the denominator. Reported number of observations indicate *effective* sample sizes.



Figure A11: Sharp (conventional) RD estimates, with robust 95% CIs. The running variable is the margin of victory in the primary. To calculate the estimates, we fitted a separate local linear regression at both sides of the threshold, using a triangular kernel and clustering the standard errors by election year. The CCT-optimal bandwidth is the (MSE-optimal) bandwidth reported in Table 2(a); to set the bias bandwidth, we use the value of ρ used to calculate the original estimates.

Table A18: RD estimates: For different reference parties

								power against		
(a) Incumbent	outcome	estim.	95% CI	p-val.	bwd.	$N^-\|N^+$	SD_C	SD_C	$\frac{\text{SD}_C}{2}$	$\lvert\hat{\tau}_{\text{RD}}\rvert$
1 vs 2	*winner*$^{\text{G}}$ (0/100)	-4.63	[-50.71 : 29.61]	0.61	14.1	162 | 268	49.29	0.93	0.40	0.06
2 vs 3	*winner*$^{\text{G}}$ (0/100)	15.50	[-17.49 : 53.18]	0.32	7.6	28 | 27	18.90	0.30	0.11	0.22
1 vs 2	% *vote*$^{\text{G}}$ (0:100)	-2.50	[-10.66 : 3.56]	0.33	12.6	154 | 239	8.88	0.93	0.41	0.16
2 vs 3	% *vote*$^{\text{G}}$ (0:100)	-0.26	[-8.00 : 7.34]	0.93	10.4	31 | 45	8.10	0.81	0.29	0.05
(b) Reference party: PJ										
1 vs 2	*winner*$^{\text{G}}$ (0/100)	-7.00	[-40.06 : 15.51]	0.39	13.4	216 | 183	41.36	0.98	0.54	0.11
2 vs 3	*winner*$^{\text{G}}$ (0/100)	0.50	[-21.00 : 24.03]	0.89	16.9	49 | 186	19.99	0.66	0.22	0.05
1 vs 2	% *vote*$^{\text{G}}$ (0:100)	-0.41	[-5.20 : 5.22]	1.00	18.1	269 | 244	8.10	0.99	0.58	0.06
2 vs 3	% *vote*$^{\text{G}}$ (0:100)	-0.76	[-6.31 : 5.78]	0.93	7.6	35 | 82	7.01	0.87	0.34	0.06
(c) Reference party: UCR										
1 vs 2	*winner*$^{\text{G}}$ (0/100)	-6.31	[-52.73 : 24.17]	0.47	12.8	154 | 202	47.45	0.93	0.40	0.07
2 vs 3	*winner*$^{\text{G}}$ (0/100)	7.89	[-4.05 : 17.90]	0.22	10.5	79 | 92	0.00	0.05	0.05	0.48
1 vs 2	% *vote*$^{\text{G}}$ (0:100)	-2.61	[-10.81 : 3.32]	0.30	12.4	150 | 199	9.14	0.95	0.43	0.18
2 vs 3	% *vote*$^{\text{G}}$ (0:100)	3.76	[-5.93 : 12.25]	0.50	17.9	101 | 159	7.08	0.55	0.18	0.20

Sharp (conventional) RD estimates, with robust CIs and p-values based on the MSE-optimal bandwidth proposed by Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014), using a triangular kernel and clustering the standard errors by municipality. Only pre-determined reference parties (the incumbent party at the moment of the primary, the PJ or the UCR, respectively) are included in the sample. The running variable is the primary election margin between the first- and second-placed parties (odd-numbered rows) or the second- and third-placed ones (even-numbered rows). Only parties that classified to the general election are included in the denominator. Reported number of observations indicate *effective* sample sizes.

Table A19: RD estimates: Comparing municipal, provincial and national results

									power against		
(a) Municipal (2013-23)	outcome	estim.	95% CI	p-val.	bwd.	N^- | N^+	SD_C	SD_C	$\frac{\text{SD}_C}{2}$	$\lvert\hat{\tau}_{\text{RD}}\rvert$
1 vs 2	*winner*$^{\text{G}}$ (0/100)	-21.47	[-35.86 : -13.64]	0.00	9.4	286 | 288	47.06	1.00	1.00	1.00
2 vs 3	*winner*$^{\text{G}}$ (0/100)	11.27	[0.16 : 24.35]	0.05	16.3	382 | 384	13.43	0.87	0.34	0.73
1 vs 2	% *vote*$^{\text{G}}$ (0:100)	-1.98	[-8.12 : 2.36]	0.28	12.8	394 | 396	8.74	1.00	0.64	0.18
2 vs 3	% *vote*$^{\text{G}}$ (0:100)	0.98	[-1.70 : 3.79]	0.46	21.4	475 | 478	6.76	1.00	0.93	0.17
(b) Provincial results (aggregated at the municipal level) (2011-23)										
1 vs 2	*winner*$^{\text{G}}$ (0/100)	-0.33	[-12.80 : 8.25]	0.67	12.7	459 | 459	46.00	1.00	1.00	0.05
2 vs 3	*winner*$^{\text{G}}$ (0/100)	-6.32	[-27.83 : 9.60]	0.34	10.6	319 | 322	16.58	0.69	0.23	0.15
1 vs 2	% *vote*$^{\text{G}}$ (0:100)	-0.97	[-5.90 : 4.02]	0.71	16.2	580 | 580	7.29	0.98	0.53	0.08
2 vs 3	% *vote*$^{\text{G}}$ (0:100)	0.38	[-7.56 : 8.18]	0.94	18.1	517 | 523	7.91	0.80	0.29	0.05
(c) National results (aggregated at the municipal level) (2011-23)										
1 vs 2	*winner*$^{\text{G}}$ (0/100)	4.61	[-11.39 : 17.72]	0.67	11.1	427 | 427	45.66	1.00	0.99	0.14
2 vs 3	*winner*$^{\text{G}}$ (0/100)	-9.67	[-29.64 : 3.09]	0.11	8.2	354 | 356	23.66	0.98	0.52	0.37
1 vs 2	% *vote*$^{\text{G}}$ (0:100)	-0.09	[-5.93 : 6.29]	0.95	18.5	634 | 634	7.10	0.90	0.36	0.05
2 vs 3	% *vote*$^{\text{G}}$ (0:100)	-1.20	[-11.88 : 8.07]	0.71	21.2	677 | 679	8.56	0.66	0.22	0.06

Sharp (conventional) RD estimates, with robust CIs and p-values based on the MSE-optimal bandwidth proposed by Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014), using a triangular kernel and clustering the standard errors by election year. The running variable is the primary election margin between the first- and second-placed parties (odd-numbered rows) or the second- and third-placed ones (even-numbered rows). Each panels report results for a different type of election: (a) municipal (2013-23 only); (b) provincial (with values aggregated by municipality, 2011-23); and (c) national (with values aggregated by municipality, 2011-23). Only parties that surpassed the threshold of 1.5% of positive votes in the municipality are included in the denominator. Reported number of observations indicate *effective* sample sizes.

Appendix References

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