# A President of One's Own?
## Regional Favoritism in Latin America's Federations*

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To what extent do presidents favor, and are favored by, their home state? While presidents may favor "their" state due to personal attachment or for sentimental reasons, such behavior is electorally costly in democracies where all votes are counted equally. Instead, we propose a *network mobilization* story in which presidents tend to disproportionately recruit collaborators from the state where they have their political base, and the prospect of cabinet appointments and increased access to the national executive induces these collaborators to mobilize voters at election time. Consistent with this explanation, in both Argentina (1983-2024) and Mexico (1988-2024), (a) presidential candidates over-perform electorally in the state where they have their political base; and (b) the president's state is over-represented in the national cabinet. In contrast, we document mostly null results for Brazil (1989-2024), and show that in neither country do presidents consistently affect fiscal transfers to their state.

**Keywords**: regional favoritism – cabinet appointments – political networks – Latin America

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> If successful [...], the director could expect to become a close collaborator of the new president. His subordinates were aware of the advantages [...] for their own careers. 'If he becomes a minister,' commented one respondent, 'then his entire *equipito* [inner circle; literally, "little team"] will follow him and we'll all have positions in the Ministry.'
> –Grindle (1977:52), quoted in Persico, Rodríguez-Pueblita and Silverman (2011:252)

In presidential regimes with a federal structure, the chief executive is often associated with a certain region or state. Jimmy Carter had the "Georgia Mafia" and Bill Clinton his group of friends and collaborators from Arkansas (Time 1977; Fineman 1992). In Brazil, Fernando Collor became president Brazil after serving as mayor, federal deputy and governor of Alagoas, where his family owned a media empire. During Carlos Menem's presidential stint in Argentina, the province of La Rioja –which he had governed for nine years– was present all over the administration. His hometown of Anillaco (population in 1991: 857) acquired a landing strip (allegedly to export olives) and a replica of the presidential palace (Clarín 2006). Julio Nazareno, an unremarkable lawyer who had been Menem's partner in his legal firm in La Rioja, became a Supreme Court Justice (Obarrio 2003).

In this paper we investigate whether these anecdotes are representative of a broader phenomenon and, if so, why. Are voters especially likely to support presidential candidates hailing from their own state? Do presidents favor "their" home state in nomination and spending decisions?

Students of autocracies have long documented the phenomenon of *regional favoritism*: the tendency of presidents to spend lavishly in their hometowns, culminating in egregious examples like an airstrip for the Concorde in the middle of the jungle or a replica of St. Peter's in the president's hometown (Hodler and Raschky 2014; Dreher et al. 2019). This makes political sense for rulers whose survival depends on the unwavering support of a small clique (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Roessler 2011), but democratically elected politicians face different opportunities: checks and

balances are more likely to bind; lavish spending in the president's hometown may attract negative publicity; and a vote in any district is as good as any other. Furthermore, when assembling their cabinet, presidents have to sop different national and regional constituencies, as well as recruiting technocrats who tend to reside in large urban centers.

Still, there are more roundabout reasons why even democratic presidents may disproportionately rely on the state where they have their political base. All rulers need close confidants and collaborators they can trust, and in federal countries a disproportionate share of these will come from the president's state –especially if (s)he previously served as governor. This will set a chain reaction because these collaborators have their own networks (Scherlis 2010) who expect to benefit handsomely if a candidate from their state captures the national executive. Intuitively, as a politician moves from the state to the national presidency, every member of his or her circle will move "one step up the ladder:" the top echelons of the subnational elite can expect appointments in the federal government (in the cabinet, as ambassadors, in state-owned enterprises, etc), while those one level below move one step up in the subnational hierarchy. In turn, subnational bureaucrats from the president's state may enjoy privileged access to the federal government, making it easier to lobby for public works, fiscal transfers, or bailouts (Persico, Rodríguez-Pueblita and Silverman 2011).

The point is that when a politician is running for the presidency, his or her political network has ample incentives to mobilize voters (Persico, Rodríguez-Pueblita and Silverman 2011; Rau, Sarkar and Stokes 2025): not because their state is pivotal (Shachar and Nalebuff 1999), but in order to show their superiors that they mobilized votes for them. Three implications follow from this.

First, presidential candidates will do especially well electorally in the state where they have their political base, especially if they have previous experience as governors –and thus a larger political network. But when a candidate was born in one state and developed his or her career in another, the effect should be limited to the second district: a politicians' place of birth should only matter when (s)he has a network there (Fabre and Sangnier 2025). Second, presidents will show a bias toward "their" state in cabinet appointments. Again, this effect should be stronger for former governors

–who have a larger pool of collaborators to draw on– but disappear for the president's state of birth. Finally, to the extent that the president's political network in the state is successful in lobbying the national government, we should see a pattern of regional favoritism in the disbursement of public works and federal funds. The magnitude of such disbursements can vary a lot depending on the mechanisms at work, however. If the favoritism towards the president's state is intended to reward voters for their electoral support, the amounts involved need to be large enough to benefit hundreds of thousands of people. But if the effect is indirectly driven by the lobbying effort of the president's political network, the effect should be much more limited: the president only has to reward loyal *elites* in his or her state, which are relatively reduced in number. The effect of having a president of one's own will only show up in more fine-grained measures of spending like public works projects.

We examine these claims with data from Argentina (1983-2024), Mexico (1988-2024) and Brazil (1985-2024). In the first two countries, we find compelling evidence that presidential candidates from major parties do disproportionately well electorally in the state where they have their political base, and the effect is larger for former governors. Furthermore, elected presidents disproportionately benefit their state in cabinet appointments, though former governors are no different in this regard. Placebo exercises show that the effect for the political base of the vice-president(ial candidate), the runner-up in the presidential election, or the state of *birth* of the president(ial candidate) as well as his or her ministers is much lower in magnitude when not directly zero.

We find no results for Brazil. This is probably due to the fact that 14 out of 17 presidential candidates from the two major parties came from São Paulo, which was thus almost guaranteed to capture the presidency. Furthermore, the extreme fragmentation of the Brazilian Congress forces presidents to use cabinet appointments to buy legislative support, resulting in cabinets that are much more balanced geographically (Bersch, Lopez and Taylor 2023). In addition, we find no evidence that having a president of one's own affects transfers from the federal government or spending at the state level. As noted above, this is inconsistent with a distributive politics story, which would require a sufficiently large transfers to be visible in the data. But it does not necessarily contradict a

network mobilization mechanism, under which the favoritism displayed toward the president's state is relatively limited. Unfortunately, the lack of more granular data on spending –such as the specific location of federal public works projects– prevent us from examining this possibility directly.

## Theoretical framework

**Existing literature.** This paper lies at the intersection of three literatures: the one on *friends-and-neighbors voting*, centered in developed democracies; that on *cabinet formation* in presidential systems in Latin America; and the one on *regional favoritism*, chiefly focused on Africa and Asia.

The "friends-and-neighbors" phenomenon refers to candidates' tendency to receive a disproportionate share of the vote where they were born, grew up, or have their political base (Key 1949). This could result from candidates with local roots activating a local identity (Schulte-Cloos and Bauer 2023), voters expecting candidates from "their" state to deliver pork and jobs (Saarimaa and Tukiainen 2016), or from candidates being in a better position to mobilize their political machines when they have their political base (Persico, Rodríguez-Pueblita and Silverman 2011; Fiva and Smith 2017; Poertner 2023). That said, credible causal estimates of friends-and-neighbors voting range between 2.5 and 7 percentage points (Meredith 2013; Heersink and Peterson 2016; Fiva and Smith 2017; Poertner 2023; Schulte-Cloos and Bauer 2023). This is not a trivial amount, but when the president is elected in a single nationwide district, as in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, such an increase in a single district is unlikely to sway the presidential election –in contrast to the US, where where winning a state by even a very small margin ensures all its electoral votes.

The chief concern of the literature on cabinet formation in Latin America has been how (and when) presidents opt for ministers with strong partisan ties versus technocrats and, sometimes, personal friends (Amorim Neto 2006; Martínez-Gallardo and Schleiter 2015). Cabinet reshuffles, ministerial resignations (Camerlo and Pérez-Liñán 2015) and the appointment of female ministers have also received interest (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2005; Arriola and Johnson

2014). Paniagua and Ricart-Huguet (2025) examine provincial (over-)representation in the cabinet, but their focus is on geographic balancing rather than the president's state.

Regional favoritism denotes the inclination of high-ranking officials to disproportionately benefit their birthplace and/or the place where they have their political base. In autocracies, the president's hometown experiences a (large) increase in economic activity when the local son becomes the country's ruler (Hodler and Raschky 2014). Projects financed with Chinese aid also display a bias towards the president's hometown (Dreher et al. 2019), and members of the president's ethnic group sometimes benefit in terms of road construction (Burgess et al. 2015) or access to education (Kramon and Posner 2016). Lower-level bureaucrats and legislators also favor their birthplaces or bailiwicks in Vietnam (Do, Nguyen and Tran 2017), China (Kung and Zhou 2021; Ji and Ma 2024)Italy (Carozzi and Repetto 2016), Japan (Hirano 2011) and Sweden (Folke et al. 2024).

**Argument.** The insights from these literatures are compatible with three alternative theoretical accounts, which make similar predictions for some outcomes but differ substantially on others. In a *home team* story, voters tend to prefer candidates hailing from their state for reasons that are not purely instrumental. For example, they may perceive these candidates as personally closer, perhaps because they share a regional identity (Schulte-Cloos and Bauer 2023). Presidents, in turn, may feel personally attached to "their" state, as Italian parliamentarians (Carozzi and Repetto 2016), Vietnamese bureaucrats (Do, Nguyen and Tran 2017) and Chinese revolutionaries (Kung and Zhou 2021; Ji and Ma 2024) do. Such an attachment can induce presidents to select ministers from their state, and may result in more generous transfers towards it –though these may be too small to show up in the aggregated data. More importantly, since the hypothesized tie is *personal* rather than political, the fact that a president(ial candidate) formerly served as a state governor should not matter. And when a politician was born in one state but developed his or her career in another, we should see an effect for their state of *birth* besides the one where they developed their political base.[1]

[1]In our sample, presidents who switched states generally moved later in life (e.g., to attend college).

The second possibility is a *distributive politics* story, in which candidates over-perform electorally in "their" state because voters expect to benefit disproportionately from having a president of one's own. In turn, presidents reciprocate by favoring their state with discretionary spending and transfers. But while some voters may believe in such a *quid pro quo* –and candidates may suggest it in the campaign trail–, presidents' incentives to act in such a way once in office is a different matter. The most egregious examples of favoritism come from African autocracies (Hodler and Raschky 2014), where presidents have substantial discretion over public spending and cultivating a loyal political base among co-ethnics is indispensable for survival (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Roessler 2011). The presidents in our sample are elected in a single nationwide district where even large states such as Buenos Aires, Mexico or São Paulo are unlikely to be decisive (see Figure A1). For them, it makes much more sense to favor those state(s) where the marginal vote can be bought most cheaply, regardless of their personal connection to it.[2] The fact that very large spending decisions typically require congressional approval further limits how much presidents can spend on a single state.

And yet, anecdotal evidence on regional favoritism –especially regarding the appointment of cabinet ministers and other close collaborators– is abundant. We already mentioned Carlos Menem's special relationship with La Rioja. A decade later, Néstor Kirchner's numerous appointees from the province of Santa Cruz were dubbed "the penguins" by the media –a reference to their Patagonian origins (Moreno 2005). In Brazil, president Fernando Collor's friends and allies from his home state became known as "the Republic of Alagoas" (Valença 2002:137-8). Political power in Mexico has long been structured along political factions known as *camarillas*: loose networks of allies and followers orbiting around an important politician (Smith 1979 [2023]; Persico, Rodríguez-Pueblita and Silverman 2011). President Enrique Peña Nieto's *Atlacomulco* group, named after a closely-knit faction based in his hometown, is a prime example (Hernández Rodríguez 1998).

Thus, our preferred explanation, which we call the *network mobilization* mechanism, emphasizes how the structure of power within the presidency may end up over-representing individuals

[2] Argentina's electoral college (1983-1989) allocated electors by proportional representation.

from the president's state in the cabinet, and how this may shape electoral mobilization at election time. Presidents do not govern alone: they are surrounded by a team of associates and collaborators (Persico, Rodríguez-Pueblita and Silverman 2011) who both provide advice and act as gatekeepers for the people, proposals and ideas that reach the chief executive. These collaborators in turn have friends, colleagues and allies of their own (Scherlis 2010), generating a chain in which all members of a politician's faction move "one step upon the ladder" when (s)he reaches the presidency. For example, provincial ministers who move with the president to the national capital will bring their own teams with them, opening a spot for ambitious politicians at the provincial level who occupy the (now empty) positions in the provincial cabinet. These new provincial authorities can exploit their ties to the national cabinet to lobby for funds or public works (Persico, Rodríguez-Pueblita and Silverman 2011). And given that presidents are more likely to know, trust, and owe favors to people from the district where they have their own political base, this will reinforce the influence of the president's state in national politics, *even when this is not electorally optimal* from the president's point of view (Persico, Rodríguez-Pueblita and Silverman 2011).

Of course, presidents have to diversify geographically: they have crucial allies (and have to sop important constituencies) elsewhere, and technocrats typically reside in large metropolises like Buenos Aires, São Paulo or Mexico City (Paniagua and Ricart-Huguet 2025). The point is not that, were it not for the mechanism we document, all states would be proportionately represented in the cabinet. Rather, we claim that to the extent that presidents are more likely to know and trust people from their own state, that state will end up disproportionately represented in the cabinet. And this can happen either because presidents actively *want* to put people from their home state in positions of power and influence, or as a by-product of their tendency to nominate ministers they *trust*.

This will have downstream electoral effects as well. Even if the president's state is unlikely to be pivotal in the presidential election, to the extent that a winning candidate may use the electoral results in his or her state as a basis for recruiting people for the national cabinet, the candidate's allies there will have strong incentives to mobilize voters on election day (Persico, Rodríguez-Pueblita and

Silverman 2011). Intuitively, showing the upcoming president (or their state-level principals) that they mobilized votes for him or her may increase the chance of landing a top cabinet position. Thus, we should expect (viable) presidential *candidates* to over-perform in their own state. Yet these effects should be limited to the state where the president(ial candidate) has his or her political network: for candidates who were born in one state but developed their base in another, the effect should be limited to the latter. And the effects on electoral mobilization and cabinet nominations should be especially strong for former governors, who have a larger political network to begin with, and have already assembled a cabinet that they can (partially) bring with them to the national capital.

**Empirical implications.** Table 1 summarizes these accounts' predictions across three dimensions: (a) how presidential candidates perform electorally in "their" state; (b) whether presidents should disproportionately draw from their state when selecting cabinet ministers; and (c) whether the president's state should benefit in terms of transfers and spending.

The second column shows that all three accounts predict that presidents should over-perform electorally in the state where they have their political base. But while the home team story (and, to a lesser extent, the distributive politics one) also predict an effect for the president's state of birth, the network mobilization story makes no such prediction, and instead expects a stronger effect for former governors. This account also makes an unambiguous claim that the state where the president has his or her political base should be over-represented in the cabinet, and this effect should be especially strong for former governors. The other two stories make no specific claims in this regard, though neither is incompatible with it.

The home team story makes no specific claim about transfers and spending (though finding a positive relationship is not inconsistent with it), but the distributive politics story clearly expects a positive effect in the state where the president has his or her political base. Importantly, since the idea is that voters should benefit from having a president of one's own, the effect should be sufficiently large to appear on relatively coarse measures of transfers and spending. But for the network mobilization story, the claim is weaker: it expects a positive effect on projects that are

Table 1: Three theoretical accounts and their implications

| | predictions regarding president's state | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **account** | electoral support | cabinet nominations | spending and transfers |
| support home team | ↑ political base<br>↑ state of birth | maybe (↑), but not required | maybe (↑), but not required |
| distributive politics | ↑ political base<br>↑ state of birth | maybe (↑), but not required | ↑ political base |
| network mobilization | ↑ political base<br>↑ former governors | ↑ political base<br>↑ former governors | ↑ political base*<br>↑ former governors* |

(*) For projects that disproportionately benefit local elites (e.g. pork, public works); should be "maybe (↑), but not required" for spending and transfers that benefit the electorate at large.

disproportionately beneficial to local elites, which are relatively few in number. But for the average voter, the benefit should be small, and thus it may not show up in relatively coarse indicators.

# Data

We combine data from multiple sources. Electoral returns, population figures and subnational state finances are from official agencies listed in Appendix A. Biographical data for 26 presidents, 78 presidential candidates and 1,084 ministers and secretaries with ministerial statuscomes mostly from Wikipedia.[3] While our argument applies to presidential appointments in general, we focus on ministers and secretaries with ministerial status because the universe of people comprising "the president's closest advisors" is hard to define systematically, both between countries and within the same polity over time. Biographical data for cabinet members is also much more widely available.

We conceptualize an individual's *political base* as the state where (s)he has his or her political (or professional) connections. Conceptually, we think of it as the place where they know people they

[3]For every individual, one of us or a research assistant hand-coded gender, portfolio, birthday, birthplace, political base and start and end dates. When needed, we complemented with a Google search.

may recruit for national positions. Empirically, we operationalize this as the last state where a given individual sought elected office, won it, or held a non-elected office. For the (few) people with no previous public sector experience, we tried to determine the state where they held their professional life before running as a candidate or assuming office. For individuals serving as ministers, national legislators and ambassadors –who reside in the capital city or abroad–, we coded their political base as the state where they were elected or had developed a career immediately before assuming the national office in question: such individuals typically retain deep connections to the state where they were initially elected or had developed their career. Note that this coding rule allows a politician to switch his or her political base: for example, in 1988 and 1994 the political base of Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas was Michoacán, where he had been senator (1976-80) and governor (1980-86); but in 1997 he was elected governor of Mexico City, and thus in 2000 we code his political base there.[4]

The analysis is divided in three parts. We first examine whether presidential candidates do better electorally in the state where they have their political base. Then, we look at the geographical connections of a president's cabinet appointments. Finally, we examine how a president affects financial transfers to, and public spending in, his or her state. Since each analysis employs different indicators, units of observations, and specifications, we discuss them separately.

## Analysis (I): Electoral results

**Empirical strategy.** To see whether presidential candidates increase their parties' vote share in the state where they have their political base, we estimate models of the form

$$\begin{aligned} \%votes_{s,t} &= \beta^{\mathrm{P}} \cdot base^{\mathrm{P}}_{s,t} + \gamma^{\mathrm{P}} \cdot former\ governor^{\mathrm{P}}_{s,t} \\ &\quad + \beta^{\mathrm{V}} \cdot base^{\mathrm{V}}_{s,t} + \gamma^{\mathrm{V}} \cdot former\ governor^{\mathrm{V}}_{s,t} + \mu_s + \delta_t + \varepsilon_{s,t}, \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

[4]Other cases include Cristina Fernández de Kirchner in Argentina (who switched from Santa Cruz to the province of Buenos Aires) and Felipe Calderón in Mexico (Mexico City to Michoacán).

where % *votes*$_{s,t}$ is the percentage of votes (excluding blank and null ballots) obtained by the party of interest in state $s$ in the first or only round of the election that took place in year $t$. $\mu_s$ and $\delta_t$ are state and election year fixed effects. *base*$_{s,t}$ and *former governor*$_{s,t}$ are dummies indicating whether the party's candidate in election year $t$ had his or her political base in state $s$ or was a former governor of state $s$, respectively. Note that it is not possible being a former governor of state $s$ without having a political base there, and thus the $\gamma$'s estimate an (implicit) interaction term. The P and V superscripts identify (vice-)presidential candidates, respectively; we include the latter as placebos. Standard errors are clustered by state.

Since each election features multiple candidates, some of which get very few votes, we only report results for a subset of 2-3 major reference parties in each country: the PJ[5] and UCR (plus allies in 1999 and 2015-2023) in Argentina; the PT and PSDB in Brazil; and the PRI,[6] PAN and PRD (replaced by MORENA since 2018)[7] in Mexico. We also report results for the incumbent president's party and the first- and second-placed parties in the first round of the election. Table A1 in the Appendix provides the full list of presidential candidates included in these samples.

**Results.** Figure 1 displays the raw data for each country's major reference parties. Specifically, for each country and election year we show the full distribution of state-level vote shares as well as the party's performance at the national level and in the state where its presidential candidate had his or her birthplace and political base. The solid blue line lies (well) above the broken black one for Argentina's PJ in 1989, 1995 and 2003 (and to a lesser extent in 2023), as well as for the UCR

[5]In 2003, the PJ fielded three candidates, two of which reached the runoff. We therefore included all three candidates in the sample with a weight of 1/3 each.

[6]In 2024 we only include the PAN in the sample because the PRI and the PAN formed a coalition backing a *panista*.

[7]The PRD fielded no candidate of its own in 2018 and 2024, but its former candidate in 2006 and 2012 became had become MORENA's founder and unquestioned leader.




Figure 1: Electoral results for each country's major reference parties. The broken **black** lines and the solid **blue** lines indicate the party's performance at the national level and in the state where its candidate had his or her political base, respectively. *All three candidates (Menem, Kirchner and R. Saá) included in 2003.

(plus allies) in 1989, 1995 and 2015-2023. While there are some exceptions (such as the PJ in 2019), these are rare and never of comparable magnitude. In Brazil the picture is somewhat different. The PT fielded the same candidate (Lula) in 6 out of 9 elections, and does not do remarkably well in São Paulo (where Fernando Haddad underperformed in 2018), nor in Rio Grande do Sul in 2010 and 2014. PSDB candidates overperformed in their states in 1989 and 2006-2014, though the effect

is relatively modest. Mexico's story is similar to Argentina's: the PRI underperformed each time it nominated a candidate from Mexico City, but its performance in Sinaloa (2000), Tabasco (2006) and the state of Mexico (2012) was well above average for the corresponding election years. The same can be said for the PAN when it nominated a candidate from Sinaloa (1988), Guanajuato (2000), Querétaro (2018) or Mexico City (2024). The PRD clearly overperformed in Michoacán in 1988-1994 and in Mexico City in 2000-2012. In 2018 MORENA had a slight advantage in there, but became relatively disadvantaged in 2024.

The regression estimates in Table 2(a) show that even when accounting for state and election year effects, PJ candidates in Argentina increase their party's vote share by 17 percentage points in the district where they have their political base. Column (2) shows that the increase is just 6.3 pp. for candidates who lacked experience as governors, but former governors bring an additional 18.5 percentage point advantage. Vice-presidential candidates also increase the party's performance in their state by 6-7 pp., though former governors do not make a difference. For the UCR, the average effect is sizable (a 7.4 pp increase), but if we distinguish according to former gubernatorial status the estimates are no longer significant. Vice-presidential candidates add nothing. Columns (7) and (8) show that the effect for the incumbent party is similar to the PJ's (even though the PJ was not the incumbent party in 1983, 1989 or 2019) and similar in magnitude for the candidates of the first and second-placed parties, though only the latter estimates are statistically significant.

For Brazil, the first four columns of Table 2(b) show mostly positive but small and insignificant effects for the PT and PSDB. As mentioned above, this probably reflects the fact that the overwhelming majority of candidates from both parties –which were the only serious contenders for the presidency for six straight elections between 1994 and 2014– had their political base in São Paulo. Indeed, columns (9) and (10) suggest that when a strong candidate from neither party ran for office –Collor in 1989 and Bolsonaro in 2018–, they overperformed (relative to other first-placed candidates) in their own state. Vice-presidential candidates do add (many) votes in their state, but the effect is restricted to former governors in the PSDB ticket.

Table 2: Electoral support by reference party

| | PJ | | UCR (+ allies) | | | | incumbent | | first | | second | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **(a) Argentina** | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) |
| presi: base | 16.99 | 6.33 | 7.42 | 4.64 | | | 19.81 | 7.00 | 15.25 | 4.68 | 14.64 | 1.61 |
| | (8.16) | (2.70) | (2.95) | (2.72) | | | (8.92) | (2.98) | (9.61) | (3.87) | (6.12) | (1.31) |
| presi: former gov. | | 18.46 | | 5.37 | | | | 16.35 | | 19.07 | | 17.68 |
| | | (8.63) | | (3.73) | | | | (6.07) | | (10.25) | | (5.61) |
| VP: base | 6.76 | 5.89 | 0.27 | -0.28 | | | 2.55 | 1.08 | 8.99 | 5.53 | 2.39 | 1.56 |
| | (2.35) | (2.25) | (1.89) | (2.16) | | | (2.45) | (2.35) | (2.62) | (4.07) | (2.69) | (3.34) |
| VP: former gov. | | 1.82 | | | | | | 7.82 | | 8.51 | | 4.55 |
| | | (4.79) | | | | | | (5.91) | | (4.73) | | (4.77) |
| $n$ obs. | 288 | 288 | 240 | 240 | | | 216 | 216 | 240 | 240 | 240 | 240 |
| **(b) Brazil** | PT | | PSDB | | | | incumbent | | first | | second | |
| presi: base | 6.34 | 4.01 | 0.97 | -3.65 | | | 5.73 | 5.76 | 13.26 | 12.66 | 3.04 | 0.19 |
| | (5.30) | (5.26) | (4.75) | (4.19) | | | (1.75) | (2.25) | (4.12) | (3.85) | (6.37) | (9.80) |
| presi: former gov. | | | | 4.57 | | | | | | 11.53 | | 9.30 |
| | | | | (2.49) | | | | | | (4.31) | | (6.20) |
| VP: base | 1.90 | -1.20 | 0.50 | -2.22 | | | -0.17 | -2.77 | 0.24 | 3.36 | -2.63 | -4.35 |
| | (5.04) | (4.91) | (1.40) | (1.70) | | | (2.90) | (3.91) | (4.18) | (5.83) | (6.69) | (6.53) |
| VP: former gov. | | 10.86 | | 11.74 | | | | 5.88 | | -9.29 | | 24.45 |
| | | (10.06) | | (2.60) | | | | (5.46) | | (5.64) | | (5.48) |
| $n$ obs. | 243 | 243 | 216 | 216 | | | 243 | 243 | 243 | 243 | 243 | 243 |
| **(c) Mexico** | PRI | | PAN | | PRD | | incumbent | | first | | second | |
| presi: base | 10.49 | 0.28 | 5.33 | 5.37 | 10.89 | 10.89 | 9.58 | 4.60 | 7.09 | -2.89 | 21.17 | 8.13 |
| | (4.88) | (0.91) | (3.26) | (3.85) | (10.03) | (10.03) | (6.24) | (2.93) | (5.58) | (6.71) | (6.04) | (4.84) |
| presi: former gov. | | 16.33 | | -0.24 | | | | 13.69 | | 16.63 | | 21.72 |
| | | (3.56) | | (3.59) | | | | (4.67) | | (5.60) | | (3.96) |
| $n$ obs. | 192 | 192 | 224 | 224 | 224 | 224 | 224 | 224 | 224 | 224 | 224 | 224 |

OLS regression estimates (except for the PJ models, where observations for 2003 have a weight of 1/3 each). PRI was part of a coalition with PAN in 2024 (which explains discrepancies in number of observations). All specifications include fixed effects by state and election year. Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses.

The bottom panel shows that the Mexican PRI overperforms in the state where its presidential candidate has his political base, but the 10.5 pp effect is basically driven by a large 16.3 pp. increase when the candidate was a former governor: Labastida (2000), Madrazo (2006) and Peña Nieto (2012). Surprisingly, given Fox's road to the presidency from the governorship of Guanajuato, the PAN does not benefit disproportionately in states where its candidate has his political base:

the 5 pp. increase is not statistically significant, and former governors do not matter at all. More surprisingly, the large effect for the PRD (and MORENA), 11 pp., is rendered statistically insignificant by its large standard error. This is possibly because we only have three candidates (Cárdenas 1988-2000, López Obrador 2006-2018, and Sheinbaum in 2024), all of whom were former governors and hailed from just two states (Michoacán and Mexico City). Indeed, the results for the first and second-placed parties suggest that former governors who do well in the election overall *do* overperform in their home states by between 16.6 and 21.7 percentage points. These cannot be explained by a single party's performance: as Appendix Table A1 shows, the first-place results are driven by Fox (PAN), Peña Nieto (PRI), and López Obrador (MORENA), while Labastida (PRI) and Cárdenas and López Obrador (PRD) are the corresponding second-placed candidates.

**Robustness.** The Appendix shows that excluding idiosyncratic observations or reference parties that obtained fewer than 5% of votes nationally weakens the findings for the PJ but produces stronger and statistically significant ones for Argentina's UCR, Brazil's PSDB and Mexico's PRD (Table A2). Coding candidates who switched states as having multiple political bases strengthens the estimates for Argentina's PJ, Brazil's PT and Mexico's PRD (Table A3). With the exception of the PRI and the incumbent party in Mexico –where birthplace and political base coincide perfectly–, including the candidates' birthplace as a control leaves the results mostly unchanged (Table A4). Including the candidate' state of birth as the only predictor leads to significantly smaller, and generally insignificant, estimates –again with the exception of the PRI and the incumbent party in Mexico (Table A5).

**Discussion.** These results indicate that parties in Argentina and Mexico do better electorally in the state where their presidential candidate has his or her political base. The effect is stronger for former governors, but the candidate's state of birth does not matter –even though the political base and the state of birth are positively correlated, Tables A4 and A5 indicates that only the former matters. These results thus count against the home team story, but are best explained by a network mobilization mechanism.

Note that neither selection into treatment nor heterogeneous effects across districts invalidates our findings. Governors who become presidential candidates typically have a strong political position in their state; indeed, locally powerful governors may be in a much better position to vie for their party's nomination (Gervasoni 2018). States where a party tends to do well electorally may also be more likely to have a presidential nominee. But while this makes these states unrepresentative, an average treatment effect *on the treated* (ATT) interpretation is still warranted: our estimates indicate the expected vote share premium that a party can expect from having a candidate whose political base is located in the state, after accounting for the impact of state and election-year characteristics. That is, we are not explaining why the PJ generally performs well in La Rioja or Santa Cruz, or the PRI in Sinaloa or the State of Mexico or Michoacán; what we are claiming –and what our estimates show– is that the PJ did *especially* well in La Rioja in 1989, 1995 and 2003 and in Santa Cruz in 2003, or the PRI in Sinaloa 2000, Tabasco 2006 or the state of Mexico 2012 because a candidate with strong ties to the state was in the ballot and had a realistic shot at winning the election.

Two factors strengthen the plausibility of this interpretation. First, since presidents are elected in a nationwide district, individual states are rarely decisive for the outcome, as is often the case in the US (Shachar and Nalebuff 1999; Heersink and Peterson 2016). The second is, paradoxically, the lack of results for Brazil. Since 14 out of 17 major presidential candidates there came from São Paulo, mobilization would not affect which state the president came from, and one campaign's mobilization effort would be counteracted by the other's. Indeed, maverick candidates like Collor in 1989 and Bolsonaro in 2018 and 2022 did disproportionately well in Alagoas and Rio.

## Analysis (II): Cabinet appointments

**Specification.** The unit of observation is now the president-state combination: if a president served multiple consecutive terms, we treat it as a single observation.[8] This is a conservative choice: the

[8]Only Lula appears twice in the sample: he sat out three periods between his second and third term.

president's political base can only change when the individual occupying the presidency changes, so counting consecutive terms separately would multiply the number of observations without increasing variation in the explanatory variable. We exclude acting vice-presidents and interims from the sample, bringing the number of presidents down to 21 (see Table A6). Specifications take the form

$$\begin{aligned} \textit{cabinet representation}_{s,t} \;=\; & \beta^{\text{P}} \cdot \textit{base}^{\text{P}}_{s,t} + \gamma^{\text{P}} \cdot \textit{former governor}^{\text{P}}_{s,t} \\ & + \beta^{\text{V}} \cdot \textit{base}^{\text{V}}_{s,t} + \gamma^{\text{V}} \cdot \textit{former governor}^{\text{V}}_{s,t} + \mu_s + \varepsilon_{s,t}, \end{aligned} \tag{2}$$

where the explanatory variables are defined similarly as before (though note the absence of a time fixed effect), and the outcome is a measure of state $s$'s representation in the cabinet during president $t$'s term: the difference between a state's percentage of seats in the cabinet and its percentage of the country's populationor the number of ministers per 10 million inhabitants. We measure these variables both for the *initial cabinet* –i.e., the first cabinet at inauguration– and for the president's *full term*, weighting minister according to how many days they served.[9] A minister's state is the one where (s)he developed his or her political career. Standard errors are clustered by state.

**Results.** Figure 2 compares a state's proportion of the national population with its share of seats in each president's initial cabinet. Observations above (below) the 45° line indicate a state is over-(under-)represented in the cabinet, respectively. The city of Buenos Aires, São Paulo and Mexico City tend to be over-represented in the cabinet regardless of the president's identity, which is unsurprising as elite universities, think tanks and major NGOs and advocacy groups are overwhelmingly concentrated there (Paniagua and Ricart-Huguet 2025). Conversely, the gray area in the bottom left indicates that most states have little or no representation in the cabinet. But even taking these factors into account, the observations in blue indicate that the state where the president has his or her political base tend to be substantially over-represented in the cabinet. This holds even for large states like Buenos Aires, São Paulo, Minas Gerais, Mexico City or the state of Mexico. This effect is

[9]For presidents currently in office, we consider the end of their term to be November 30, 2024.




Figure 2: Relationship between a state's percentage of the country population and its percentage of seats in each president's initial cabinet. The 45° line indicates the hypothetical situation of perfect representation.

driven by the states where presidents and ministers have their political bases (or developed their careers) rather than their birthplaces. Specifically, the Sankey diagrams in Appendix Figure A2 show that ministers whose state of birth does not coincide with the one where the president has his or her political base are disproportionately likely to have moved to the latter.

The estimates in Table 3(a) show that Argentine presidents heavily over-represented their state in the cabinet –by 25 pp. in the initial cabinet and a lower but still hefty 18 pp. during their full term. Former governors do not behave different from the rest, however. The vice-president's district is also over-represented, but the effect is less than half as large, and disappears for former governors. The results for the number of ministers per 10 million inhabitants in columns (5) and (7) are also positive, but the large standard errors render them insignificant. Columns (6) and (8) suggest this happens because the effect is particularly large for former governors, many (though not all) of which came from very small districts and nominated a relatively large number of ministers from their states. Vice-presidents make no different for this indicator.

Again, the results for Brazil are mostly positive but small in magnitude and insignificant (Table 3(b)); the vice-president's state is over-represented by between 2 and 6 percentage points, but the effect disappears for former governors. Panel (c) shows that, like their Argentinean peers, Mexican

Table 3: State representation in the cabinet, by president

| | DV: % min. − % pop. | | | | DV: min. per 10M | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | initial cabinet | | full term | | initial cabinet | | full term | |
| **(a) Argentina** | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| presi: base | 25.32 | 24.94 | 18.71 | 18.29 | 69.03 | 20.63 | 65.07 | 14.10 |
| | (0.86) | (1.20) | (1.98) | (1.33) | (37.41) | (13.70) | (41.89) | (10.36) |
| presi: former governor | | 0.27 | | 0.44 | | 95.25 | | 100.57 |
| | | (2.26) | | (2.82) | | (45.26) | | (48.38) |
| VP: base | 9.76 | 12.29 | 7.58 | 9.58 | 0.06 | -15.63 | -7.30 | -25.33 |
| | (4.54) | (4.29) | (2.55) | (1.71) | (10.57) | (10.83) | (14.23) | (16.04) |
| VP: former governor | | -15.29 | | -12.27 | | 12.90 | | 22.32 |
| | | (4.29) | | (1.71) | | (10.83) | | (16.04) |
| $n$ obs. | 192 | 192 | 192 | 192 | 192 | 192 | 192 | 192 |
| **(b) Brazil** | | | | | | | | |
| presi: base | 4.97 | 6.53 | 2.54 | 3.24 | 1.00 | 0.37 | 1.07 | 0.95 |
| | (2.65) | (4.48) | (2.19) | (3.56) | (0.77) | (0.91) | (1.09) | (1.64) |
| presi: former governor | | -2.85 | | -0.97 | | 2.97 | | 0.93 |
| | | (4.48) | | (3.56) | | (0.91) | | (1.64) |
| VP: base | 3.69 | 6.15 | 0.82 | 2.08 | 0.50 | 0.44 | 0.05 | 0.23 |
| | (1.20) | (1.96) | (0.56) | (0.82) | (0.31) | (0.18) | (0.56) | (0.95) |
| VP: former governor | | -6.93 | | -3.56 | | 0.11 | | -0.52 |
| | | (4.19) | | (2.95) | | (1.12) | | (2.29) |
| $n$ obs. | 162 | 162 | 162 | 162 | 162 | 162 | 162 | 162 |
| **(c) Mexico** | | | | | | | | |
| presi: base | 17.15 | 11.51 | 17.37 | 13.11 | 4.03 | 3.24 | 4.31 | 4.15 |
| | (5.71) | (4.89) | (4.18) | (3.19) | (1.27) | (0.99) | (0.70) | (0.29) |
| presi: former governor | | 9.40 | | 7.10 | | 1.32 | | 0.27 |
| | | (5.21) | | (3.87) | | (1.01) | | (0.72) |
| $n$ obs. | 224 | 224 | 224 | 224 | 224 | 224 | 224 | 224 |

OLS regression estimates. All specifications include state fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. Only elected presidents are included.

presidents draw disproportionately from their own state when assembling their cabinet: depending on the specification, the president's state is over-represented by between 11.5 and 17.4 percentage points, both highly significant estimates, and former governors bring about a further (but non-significant) 7.1–9.4 percentage point increase. The results are similar for the number of ministers per capita: an increase of between 3.2 and 4.3 per 10M, both highly significant. The effect of being a former governor is again positive but not significant.

**Robustness.** Cabinet appointments are not a mechanic consequence of electoral over-performance: except for Brazil, the president's vote share in a state is a weak predictor of how many appointments that state will get, and does not change the impact of the other predictors (see Table A7 in the Appendix). Including acting vice-presidents and interims in the sample strengthens the results for Argentina and makes Brazil's larger and significant (Table A8; the Mexican sample does not change). Accounting for the fact that a candidate may have multiple political bases leaves the results for Argentina unchanged but strengthens the results for Mexico –both Calderón and López Obrador recruited heavily from their "other" states (Table A9; the Brazilian sample remains identical). Grouping the observations by presidency instead of president (Table A10) –essentially duplicating the sample for two-term presidents– results in stronger estimates for Argentina. Looking at the president's birthplace results in smaller (but still significant) estimates for Argentina and Mexico (Table A11), which become even smaller if we also look at *ministers*'s birthplaces (Table A12); indeed, when both the president's birthplace and his or her political base are included in the same equation, it is the later that drives the results (Table A13). A placebo exercise replacing the (vice-)president's political base with that of the runner-up in the presidential election (Table A14) results in negative, smaller, and generally insignificant estimates.

**Discussion.** These results are strongly supportive of the network mobilization mechanism, which makes its relatively stronger predictions for cabinet nominations, and emphasizes the political base –rather than the state of birth– of both presidents and ministers (Table 1). Importantly, the effect is not restricted to presidents coming from small districts –like Menem or Kirchner–; their counterparts originating from large districts –Alfonsín, De la Rúa, Cristina Fernández, Macri, Fernández and Milei in Argentina; Peña Nieto and Sheinbaum in Mexico– tend to do the same. Indeed, with 20 out of 23 (87%) of cabinet members coming from Mexico City, Claudia Sheinbaum sets the absolute over-representation record for our sample.

That said, two issues merit further comment. One is why the effect of former governors is usually insignificant. In Argentina probably reflects the fact that the four elected presidents who were not

former governors –Alfonsín, Cristina and Alberto Fernández, Fernández, and Milei– came from the province or city of Buenos Aires, and relied heavily on these districts when assembling their cabinets. In Mexico, the situation is similar for Salinas and Zedillo, both from Mexico City. The other is what makes Brazil different. A major reason is the extreme fragmentation of the legislature: when the largest party rarely gets even 20% of seats, the cabinet becomes a source of patronage for buying legislative support (Bersch, Lopez and Taylor 2023). This results in both much larger cabinets –an average of 31 ministers and secretaries, compared with 17 for Argentina and 21 for Mexico– and strong incentives to balance the cabinet politically and geographically: São Paulo is much less over-represented than the City of Buenos Aires (CABA) and Mexico City (DF) (Figure 2).[10]

## Analysis (III): Subnational finances

**Empirical strategy.** When assessing whether the president's state receives material benefits during his or her tenure in office, we focus on the finances of state governments. The rationale behind this choice is twofold. At a practical level, these are the only variables for which we could obtain a sufficiently long time series; fine-grained data on, say, public works financed by the federal government is only available for short time periods, if at all. Thus, we are left with relatively coarse outcomes; as noted in Table 1, the distributive politics story expects to observe variation even in these, while our network mobilization account does not necessarily make the same prediction.

At a theoretical level, in all three countries state governments raise little revenue but have ample spending responsibilities, creating perverse incentives to over-spend (or over-borrow) and then seek relief from the national government (Rodden 2006; Wibbels 2005; Díaz-Cayeros 2006). If presidents are biased toward their state, authorities there may be especially reckless. We thus look at four indicators of fiscal profligacy: (i) consumption expenditures; (ii) current and (iii) capital transfers from

[10]This may have long-term roots; already in the early XIXth century, Brazilian elites were far less reliant on personal contacts than their Mexican counterparts (Musacchio and Read 2007).

the central government; and (iv) the primary balance of the state government, i.e. the difference between income and expenditures. We have yearly data for 1984-2022 for Argentina, 1985-2021 for Brazil and 1989-2022 for Mexico (see Appendix A). To prevent the bouts of hyperinflation in Argentina and Brazil from contaminating our results, for outcomes (i)-(iii) above we computed the natural logarithm of each state's per capita ratio relative to all other states:

$$\ln\left(\textit{ratio per capita}_{j,t,s}\right) \quad = \quad \ln\left(\frac{\textit{amount}_{j,t,s}}{\textit{population}_{t,s}} \Big/ \frac{\sum \textit{amount}_{j,t,-s}}{\sum \textit{population}_{t,-s}}\right) \tag{3}$$

Thus a value of $\ln(1) = 0$ indicates that in year $t$, state $s$ spent (or received as income) in category $j$ as much as the country average; positive and negative values indicate over or under-spending, respectively. The primary balance needs no transformation, as it is expressed as a percentage.

Since these outcomes are quite persistent over time, two-way fixed-effects specifications like the one displayed in Equation 1 are not advisable (Roth et al. 2023). We instead take advantage of the fact that only a single state is treated at a given moment to build a dataset of *transition events*, defined as moments in which the political base of the president changed.[11] We kept the four periods immediately before and after each transition event and created a new variable measuring the number of periods before and after the year $t = 0$, in which the president initiating the transition was elected:[12] $t-3, t-2, \ldots, t, t+1, \ldots, t+4$. We then "stacked" the observations one above the other to estimate an event-study specification of the form:

$$y_{i,s,t} \quad = \quad \sum_{t \in (-T:T)} \beta^t \cdot base_{i,s} \cdot I(t = T) + \mu_{i,s} + \delta_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,s,t}, \tag{4}$$

[11] A transition event implies that the identity of the individual occupying the presidency changed, but the reverse need not be true, as the new president may have the same political base as his or her predecessor. In 2015 the Argentine presidency switched from Cristina Fernández (Buenos Aires) to Macri (CABA); since the next two presidents came from CABA, no further transition took place.

[12] Argentinean and Mexican presidents typically assume office in December; Brazilian ones, on January 1st. Thus, presidents are elected in $t = 0$, but they can only affect outcomes since $t+1$.

where $I(\cdot)$ is the indicator function, $i$ indexes individual transition events, $s$ indexes states, and $t$ indexes periods around the transition window. The model produces one coefficient for each value of $t$. The goal is to see whether the state where the president has his or her political base already differed from the rest before the transition event, or began differing afterwards. State-transition and year-transition fixed effects mean that observations are compared to others from the same state and year *within the same transition event*. Standard errors are clustered by state-transition, as this is the unit at which the treatment is administered.

**Results.** Figure 3 displays the corresponding event study estimates. We do not report estimates for year $0$, as it is the baseline to which other estimates are compared. As in the previous section, we restrict the samples to elected presidents. To assuage concerns that our results may be sensitive to the set of states in the control group, we report three separate estimates for each outcome. In the *low strictness* estimates, all not currently treated states are included in the control group, maximizing sample size but including previously treated states. In the *medium strictness* estimates, we restrict the control group to never or not-yet-treated states, and the *high strictness* estimates limit the control group to states that never had a vice-president or a runner-up with a political base there.

In any case, the choice of control group makes little difference, and most estimates are insignificant. In Argentina the results for current transfers go up substantially, but only in the fourth year the president is in office; we thus do not want to read too much into it. In Mexico, consumption expenditures in the president's state go down by a nontrivial amount, though the effect is far from significant. The effect for states' primary balances are very close to zero overall.

Results are very similar if we include transition events involving acting vice-presidents and interims (see Figure A3 in the Appendix); if we focus on the president's state of birth (Figure A4); or if we look at the political base of the vice-president (Figure A5) or the runner-up in the presidential election (Figure A6). In Brazil the runner-up's state seems to receive fewer current and capital transfers from the federal government –and to have a larger deficit–, but we do not want to read too much into these results as the parallel trends assumption does not seem to hold.




Figure 3: Event study estimates and 95% CIs of the effect of having an *elected* president whose political base is on state $s$ on different financial indicators in $s$.

**Discussion.** These null findings clearly indicate that there is no financial benefit of having a president that hails from their district. This counts as strong evidence against the distributive politics story, especially since the parallel paths assumption seems to hold in many (though by no means all) cases, and the estimates are pretty insensitive to the choice of control group.

To be sure, the presidents in our sample have weak incentives to enact policies that affect such coarse indicators: when a vote in any state is worth the same, favoring their own state to such an extent is politically costly. Perhaps some marginal policy and financial decisions are decided in

favor of the president's state, but these are too small to show up in this type of data, and we have no information on the geographical distribution of *federal* spending. Unlike the distributive politics story, the network mobilization mechanism can account for such an effect. On the one hand, the electoral boost received by presidential candidates in their own state is not driven by voters expecting material benefits but rather by zealous local elites working hard "to put one connected to us" in the presidency. On the other, state elites are too few in number, so even if some individuals benefit handsomely from appointments, increased access to public goods projects in their bailiwicks, or corruption opportunities, these consequences need not be visible on coarsely aggregate outcomes, and as already noted, there is not enough data on more fine-grained measures.

## Conclusion

To govern effectively, presidents need close collaborators and colleagues they can trust. In this paper we showed that in Argentina and Mexico this translates into an electoral bonus for presidential candidates in the state where they have their political base, which later becomes over-represented in the cabinet. We attribute the null results for Brazil to the fact that the overwhelming majority of presidential candidates from major parties come from São Paulo; and Brazilian presidents have to trade cabinet appointments for legislative support (Bersch, Lopez and Taylor 2023). The fact that Brazilian (but neither Argentinean nor Mexican) presidents appoint more cabinet members from states where they over-performed electorally is also consistent with this. On the other hand, there is no evidence that the president's state is favored financially. This likely reflects both electoral concerns –when all votes are weighted equally, favoring some states at the expense of others is bad politics– and the lack of fine-grained data that may capture subtler forms of favoritism.

We expect future researchers to overcome this limitation by collecting more disaggregated data on spending on individual projects. It may be possible to compensate for the lack of long time series by exploiting the fact that our argument is "fractal:" the same logic that we document for presidents

and their states may apply to governors and their municipalities, for example. Another issue that merits further exploration is whether ministers who came from the state where the president has his or her political base behave differently from those who developed their career in the capital city. In particular, if their political socialization was different, or if they are (or feel) closer to the president, they may be more likely to become involved in scandals.

Presidents disproportionately recruiting collaborators from their own network is not necessarily bad for democratic representation. To act effectively, all leaders of large organizations –including firms and academic departments!– need close collaborators they can trust. But this does not preclude people who enjoy unrivaled access to the president from benefiting disproportionately from such a connection, either personally or politically. Furthermore, the fact that the city of Buenos Aires or Mexico City regularly get over 50% of cabinet seats with just 10% of the national population merits further attention. Why exactly are these places so overwhelmingly over-represented in the executive branch? Which barriers prevent comparable individuals from other jurisdictions to get into the national cabinet? Or do these individuals simply migrate to large urban centers? In the three countries in our sample, the president is elected in a single nationwide district where all votes are worth the same, but small states are heavily over-represented in the Senate –and in Argentina and Brazil, in the Chamber of Deputies as well (Samuels and Snyder 2001). Paniagua and Ricart-Huguet (2025) claim that Buenos Aires's over-representation in the cabinet is part of an implicit pact to counteract its under-representation in the legislature. Yet their analysis conflates the *city* and the *province* of Buenos Aires, when the latter is over-represented in both the cabinet (Figure 2) and (since 1983) the lower chamber as well. São Paulo is modestly over-represented in the cabinet, and Mexico City is highly over-represented in it (Figure 2), but not in the lower house. In any case, small (though not necessarily poor) states are disproportionately influential in shaping legislation that will be implemented by ministers who developed their careers in rich and heavily urban districts. How this lack of congruence between the geographical bases of different branches affects democratic representation and public policy is a fascinating area for future research.

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# Online Appendix

"A President of One's Own?"
(for online publication only)

# A Data Sources

### Biographical data

We created an individual level dataset of all presidents, presidential candidates, vice-presidents, vice-presidential candidates, and ministers for Argentina since 1983, Brazil since 1985 and Mexico since 1988. For each individual we downloaded his or her Wikipedia page to record the following variables: full name, time period (election year for candidates, presidencies for elected presidents and cabinet ministers), gender, birth date, city and state of birth, city and state in which his/her career was developed, year of election (for presidents and vice-presidents only), end year for their constitutional mandate (for presidents and vice-presidents only), date when they started and ended the position, type of office (minister, secretary, etc), and portfolio (finance, defense, etc). When Wikipedia did not provide the necessary information we relied on secondary sources, such as university websites, legislature lineup pages, news articles, or media interviews.

### Demographics

Population data comes from official census figures. For Argentina the census years are 1980, 1991, 2001, 2010 and 2022, publicly available at Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos (INDEC). For Mexico census years are 1980, 1990, 2000, 2010 and 2020, data is from Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (INEGI). And for Brazil census years are 1980, 1991, 2000, 2010 and 2022, data is also publicly available at Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE).

## Electoral results

Candidates' vote shares come from the Dirección Nacional Electoral (DINE) and the Cámara Nacional Electoral (CNE) for Argentina, the Centro de Estudios de la Democracia (CEDE) and Instituto Nacional Electoral (INE) for Mexico, and Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE) for Brazil. Presidential elections in Argentina were held in 1983, 1989, 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011, 2015, 2019 and 2023. In Mexico: 1988, 1994, 2000, 2006, 2012, 2018 and 2024. And in Brazil: 1989, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014, 2018 and 2022.

## Fiscal transfers

For Argentina we built our data on the basis of figures from the Dirección Nacional de Asuntos Provinciales (DNAP), with Fundación Norte y Sur as support. For Brazil we relied on the Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (IPEA), cross-checking with the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE) and Ministério da Economia. For Mexico we use data from the Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (INEGI).

# B Election Results

## Reference parties

Table A1 lists all candidates for each reference party, the district where they developed their career, and the % of positive votes they obtained at the national level in the first round of the election.

## States' electoral weights

Figure A1 shows each state's electoral weight as the proportion of positive votes cast nationally for every election included in the sample. The black squares indicates the actual margin of victory (in the first round) between the first-placed candidate and the runner-up –whose political bases are displayed in blue and pink, respectively.

## Robustness checks

- Table A2 replicates the estimations in Table 2 but excluding idiosyncratic observations the sample: (i) all PJ candidates for 2003 (there were three official candidates); (ii) the UCR (incumbent and second-placed) candidate for 1989 (the electoral college system allowed a candidate to have different vice-presidential candidates); and (iii) the PRD (first-placed) candidate since 2018 (i.e., not counting MORENA as a continuation of the PRD); and (iv) reference parties that received less than 5% of the national vote: the UCR in 2003, the PSDB in 2022, and the Brazilian incumbent in 1989 and 2018.
- Table A3 replicates the estimations in Table 2 but coding candidates who switched districts as having multiple political bases: Fernández's de Kirchner, Carrió and Scioli in Argentina; Brizola in Brazil; and Cárdenas, Calderón and López Obrador in Mexico.
- Table A4 replicates the estimations in Table 2 but controlling for candidates' state of birth.
- Table A5 reports the results using candidates' state of birth instead of political bases.

Table A1: List of reference parties and their presidential candidates

| **Argentina** | incumbent | 1st placed | 2nd placed | PJ | UCR (+ allies)* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1983 | ** | Alfonsín (PBA) 51.7 | Luder (PBA) 40.2 | Luder (PBA) 40.2 | Alfonsín (PBA) 51.7 |
| 1989 | Angeloz (CBA) 37.1 | Menem (LR) 47.5 | Angeloz (CBA) 37.1 | Menem (LR) 47.5 | Angeloz (CBA) 37.1 |
| 1995 | Menem (LR) 49.9 | Menem (LR) 49.9 | Bordón (MZA) 29.3 | Menem (LR) 49.9 | Massaccesi (RN) 17.0 |
| 1999 | Duhalde (PBA) 38.3 | De la Rúa (CABA) 48.4 | Duhalde (PBA) 38.3 | Duhalde (PBA) 38.3 | De la Rúa (CABA) 48.4 |
| 2003 | Kirchner (SC) 22.2 | Menem (LR) 24.5 | Kirchner (SC) 22.2 | CM/NK/ARS (LR/SC/SL) 24/22/14† | Moreau (PBA) 2.3 |
| 2007 | CFK (PBA) 45.3 | CFK (PBA) 45.3 | Carrió (CABA) 23.0 | CFK (PBA) 45.3 | Lavagna (CABA) 16.9 |
| 2011 | CFK (PBA) 54.1 | CFK (PBA) 54.1 | Binner (SFE) 16.8 | CFK (PBA) 54.1 | Alfonsín (h) (PBA) 11.1 |
| 2015 | Scioli (PBA) 37.1 | Scioli (PBA) 37.1 | Macri (CABA) 34.2 | Scioli (PBA) 37.1 | Macri (CABA) 34.2 |
| 2019 | Macri (CABA) 40.3 | Fernández (CABA) 48.2 | Macri (CABA) 40.3 | Fernández (CABA) 48.2 | Macri (CABA) 40.3 |
| 2023 | Massa (PBA) 36.8 | Massa (PBA) 36.8 | Milei (CABA) 30.1 | Massa (PBA) 36.8 | Bullrich (CABA) 23.7 |

| **Brazil** | incumbent | 1st placed | 2nd placed | PT | PSDB |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1989 | Guimaraes (SP) 4.7 | Collor (AL) 30.5 | Lula (SP) 17.2 | Lula (SP) 17.2 | Covas (SP) 11.5 |
| 1994 | Cardoso (SP) 54.3 | Cardoso (SP) 54.3 | Lula (SP) 27.0 | Lula (SP) 27.0 | Cardoso (SP) 54.3 |
| 1998 | Cardoso (SP) 53.2 | Cardoso (SP) 53.2 | Lula (SP) 31.8 | Lula (SP) 31.8 | Cardoso (SP) 53.2 |
| 2002 | Serra, Jose (SP) 23.2 | Lula (SP) 46.4 | Serra, Jose (SP) 23.2 | Lula (SP) 46.4 | Serra, Jose (SP) 23.2 |
| 2006 | Lula (SP) 48.6 | Lula (SP) 48.6 | Alckmin (SP) 41.6 | Lula (SP) 48.6 | Alckmin (SP) 41.6 |
| 2010 | Rousseff (RS) 46.9 | Rousseff (RS) 46.9 | Serra, Jose (SP) 32.6 | Rousseff (RS) 46.9 | Serra, Jose (SP) 32.6 |
| 2014 | Rousseff (RS) 41.6 | Rousseff (RS) 41.6 | Neves (MG) 33.5 | Rousseff (RS) 41.6 | Neves (MG) 33.5 |
| 2018 | Meirelles (GO) 1.2 | Bolsonaro (RJ) 46.0 | Haddad (SP) 29.3 | Haddad (SP) 29.3 | Alckmin (SP) 4.8 |
| 2022 | Bolsonaro (RJ) 43.2 | Lula (SP) 48.4 | Bolsonaro (RJ) 43.2 | Lula (SP) 48.4 | |

| **Mexico** | incumbent | 1st placed | 2nd placed | PRI | PAN | PRD‡ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1988 | Salinas (DF) 50.5 | Salinas (DF) 50.5 | Cárdenas (MI) 30.9 | Salinas (DF) 50.5 | Clouthier (SIN) 17.1 | Cárdenas (MI) 30.9 |
| 1994 | Zedillo (DF) 50.2 | Zedillo (DF) 50.2 | Cevallos (DF) 26.7 | Zedillo (DF) 50.2 | Cevallos (DF) 26.7 | Cárdenas (MI) 17.1 |
| 2000 | Labastida (SIN) 36.9 | Fox (GTO) 43.5 | Labastida (SIN) 36.9 | Labastida (SIN) 36.9 | Fox (GTO) 43.5 | Cárdenas (DF) 17.0 |
| 2006 | Calderón (MI) 37.0 | Calderón (MI) 37.0 | AMLO (DF) 36.4 | Madrazo (TAB) 22.9 | Calderón (MI) 37.0 | AMLO (DF) 36.4 |
| 2012 | V. Mota (DF) 26.0 | Peña Nieto (MEX) 39.2 | AMLO (DF) 32.4 | Peña Nieto (MEX) 39.2 | V. Mota (DF) 26.0 | AMLO (DF) 32.4 |
| 2018 | Meade (DF) 16.9 | AMLO (DF) 54.8 | Anaya (QRO) 22.9 | Meade (DF) 16.9 | Anaya (QRO) 22.9 | AMLO (DF) 54.8 |
| 2024 | Sheinbaum (DF) 61.3 | Sheinbaum (DF) 61.3 | Gálvez (DF) 28.1 | | Gálvez (DF) 28.1 | Sheinbaum (DF) 61.3 |

Presidential candidate, district where (s)he developed his or her career, and percentage of positive votes obtained at the national level, for all reference parties included in the sample. All percentages calculated over *positive* votes, i.e. excluding blank and null ballots. * *Alianza* in 1999; *Juntos por el Cambio* / *Cambiemos* since 2015. ** The outgoing military regime did not officially support any candidate. † The PJ officially fielded 3 candidates: Carlos Menem, Néstor Kirchner, and Adolfo Rodríguez Saá. ‡ FDN in 1988; MORENA since 2018.




Figure A1: States' electoral weight in national elections. The square **black** dots indicate the first-placed candidate's margin of victory at the *national* level (as a percentage of positive votes), while the small gray circles indicate each state's percentage of positive votes in the *national* election. When pink dots are not visible, it is because the first- and the second-placed candidate had the same political base.

Table A2: Electoral support by reference party: Excluding idiosyncratic observations

| | PJ | | UCR (+ allies) | | | | incumbent | | first | | second | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **(a) Argentina** | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) |
| presi: base | 7.47 | 2.81 | 9.58 | 5.91 | | | 20.27 | 8.17 | 15.25 | 4.68 | 16.04 | 2.50 |
| | (5.42) | (2.34) | (3.29) | (2.61) | | | (10.73) | (3.97) | (9.61) | (3.87) | (7.11) | (2.16) |
| presi: former gov. | | 8.06 | | 7.81 | | | | 15.99 | | 19.07 | | 19.18 |
| | | (4.85) | | (3.27) | | | | (6.66) | | (10.25) | | (5.98) |
| VP: base | 3.97 | 2.30 | -1.04 | -2.02 | | | 2.13 | 1.14 | 8.99 | 5.53 | 3.46 | 2.96 |
| | (2.76) | (2.40) | (2.51) | (2.76) | | | (2.83) | (2.73) | (2.62) | (4.07) | (2.70) | (3.57) |
| VP: former gov. | | 3.96 | | | | | | 7.23 | | 8.51 | | 2.73 |
| | | (5.84) | | | | | | (6.69) | | (4.73) | | (5.14) |
| $n$ obs. | 216 | 216 | 192 | 192 | | | 192 | 192 | 240 | 240 | 216 | 216 |
| **(b) Brazil** | PT | | PSDB | | | | incumbent | | first | | second | |
| presi: base | 6.34 | 4.01 | 1.23 | -5.31 | | | 9.11 | 9.17 | 13.26 | 12.66 | 3.04 | 0.19 |
| | (5.30) | (5.26) | (4.46) | (3.54) | | | (2.60) | (2.41) | (4.12) | (3.85) | (6.37) | (9.80) |
| presi: former gov. | | | | 7.01 | | | | | | 11.53 | | 9.30 |
| | | | | (3.11) | | | | | | (4.31) | | (6.20) |
| VP: base | 1.90 | -1.20 | 0.84 | -2.90 | | | -2.83 | -2.05 | 0.24 | 3.36 | -2.63 | -4.35 |
| | (5.04) | (4.91) | (1.92) | (1.60) | | | (2.20) | (2.97) | (4.18) | (5.83) | (6.69) | (6.53) |
| VP: former gov. | | 10.86 | | 13.65 | | | | -2.95 | | -9.29 | | 24.45 |
| | | (10.06) | | (2.85) | | | | (3.89) | | (5.64) | | (5.48) |
| $n$ obs. | 243 | 243 | 189 | 189 | | | 189 | 189 | 243 | 243 | 243 | 243 |
| **(c) Mexico** | PRI | | PAN | | PRD | | incumbent | | first | | second | |
| presi: base | 10.49 | 0.28 | 5.33 | 5.37 | 12.07 | 12.07 | 9.58 | 4.60 | 7.09 | -2.89 | 21.17 | 8.13 |
| | (4.88) | (0.91) | (3.26) | (3.85) | (4.77) | (4.77) | (6.24) | (2.93) | (5.58) | (6.71) | (6.04) | (4.84) |
| presi: former gov. | | 16.33 | | -0.24 | | | | 13.69 | | 16.63 | | 21.72 |
| | | (3.56) | | (3.59) | | | | (4.67) | | (5.60) | | (3.96) |
| $n$ obs. | 192 | 192 | 224 | 224 | 160 | 160 | 224 | 224 | 224 | 224 | 224 | 224 |

OLS regression estimates. All specifications include fixed effects by state and election year. Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. Specifications are identical to those reported in Table 2, but excluding the following country-election year-reference party combinations: Argentina 1989 (UCR, incumbent and second): two vice-presidential candidates (allowed by the electoral college system); Argentina 2003 (PJ): the party officially fielded three presidential candidates who competed against each other; Mexico 2018 and 2024 (PRD): the party officially supported the PAN's presidential candidate; and Argentina 2003 (UCR), Brazil 1989 (incumbent), and Brazil 2018 (PSDB and incumbent), which obtained less than 5% of the national vote.

Table A3: Electoral support by reference party: Allowing for multiple political bases

| | PJ | | UCR (+ allies) | | | | incumbent | | first | | second | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **(a) Argentina** | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) |
| presi: base | 14.55 | 7.07 | 7.42 | 4.64 | | | 15.86 | 5.71 | 14.21 | 7.15 | 13.87 | 3.05 |
| | (6.48) | (3.54) | (2.95) | (2.72) | | | (5.78) | (3.84) | (7.95) | (5.19) | (5.51) | (1.75) |
| presi: former gov. | | 18.03 | | 5.37 | | | | 17.90 | | 16.84 | | 16.33 |
| | | (8.29) | | (3.73) | | | | (7.13) | | (9.62) | | (5.71) |
| VP: base | 6.69 | 6.24 | 0.27 | -0.28 | | | 2.79 | 1.46 | 9.76 | 6.54 | 2.56 | 1.54 |
| | (2.31) | (1.97) | (1.89) | (2.16) | | | (2.62) | (2.50) | (2.49) | (3.82) | (2.82) | (3.37) |
| VP: former gov. | | 1.43 | | | | | | 7.46 | | 7.50 | | 4.75 |
| | | (4.71) | | | | | | (6.02) | | (4.40) | | (4.84) |
| $n$ obs. | 288 | 288 | 240 | 240 | | | 216 | 216 | 240 | 240 | 240 | 240 |
| **(b) Brazil** | PT | | PSDB | | | | incumbent | | first | | second | |
| presi: base | 8.84 | 5.56 | 0.97 | -3.65 | | | 5.73 | 5.76 | 13.26 | 12.66 | 2.97 | 0.07 |
| | (4.13) | (3.62) | (4.75) | (4.19) | | | (1.75) | (2.25) | (4.12) | (3.85) | (5.86) | (9.49) |
| presi: former gov. | | | | 4.57 | | | | | | 11.53 | | 9.38 |
| | | | | (2.49) | | | | | | (4.31) | | (6.05) |
| VP: base | 6.05 | 0.31 | 0.50 | -2.22 | | | -0.17 | -2.77 | 0.24 | 3.36 | -0.57 | -3.84 |
| | (2.75) | (3.63) | (1.40) | (1.70) | | | (2.90) | (3.91) | (4.18) | (5.83) | (4.93) | (6.20) |
| VP: former gov. | | 15.74 | | 11.74 | | | | 5.88 | | -9.29 | | 22.30 |
| | | (9.84) | | (2.60) | | | | (5.46) | | (5.64) | | (4.46) |
| $n$ obs. | 243 | 243 | 216 | 216 | | | 243 | 243 | 243 | 243 | 243 | 243 |
| **(c) Mexico** | PRI | | PAN | | PRD | | incumbent | | first | | second | |
| presi: base | 10.49 | 0.28 | 3.49 | 3.14 | 13.80 | 15.01 | 12.75 | 7.98 | 11.31 | 7.02 | 25.42 | 20.05 |
| | (4.88) | (0.91) | (4.33) | (5.10) | (6.83) | (0.80) | (5.76) | (2.53) | (6.32) | (9.30) | (6.15) | (9.98) |
| presi: former gov. | | 16.33 | | 2.05 | | -1.86 | | 12.02 | | 9.03 | | 11.97 |
| | | (3.56) | | (4.88) | | (10.34) | | (4.17) | | (7.13) | | (7.99) |
| $n$ obs. | 192 | 192 | 224 | 224 | 224 | 224 | 224 | 224 | 224 | 224 | 224 | 224 |

OLS regression estimates (except for the PJ models, where observations for 2003 have a weight of 1/3 each while the remaining ones have a weight of 1). All specifications include fixed effects by state and election year. Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. Specifications are identical to those reported in Table 2, but candidates who switched districts are coded as having multiple political bases. These individuals are: Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (ARG, presi, 2007 and 2011 and VP 2019): Santa Cruz in addition to the province of Buenos Aires; Elisa Carrió (ARG, presi, 2007): Chaco in addition to the City of Buenos Aires; Daniel Scioli (ARG, presi, 2015): the City of Buenos Aires in addition to the province of Buenos Aires; Leonel Brizola (BRA, VP, 1998): Rio Grande do Sul (incl. as a former governor) in addition to Rio de Janeiro; Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas (MEX, presi, 2000): Michoacán (incl. as a former governor) in addition to Mexico City; Felipe Calderón (MEX, presi, 2006): Mexico City in addition to Michoacán; and Andrés Manuel López Obrador (MEX, presi, 2006, 2012 and 2018): Tabasco in addition to Mexico City.

Table A4: Electoral support by reference party: Including birthplace as a control

| | PJ | | UCR (+ allies) | | | | incumbent | | first | | second | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **(a) Argentina** | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) |
| presi: birthplace | 6.20 | 6.67 | -1.13 | -0.40 | | | 2.39 | 5.55 | 5.97 | 13.00 | 2.71 | 0.69 |
| | (3.46) | (3.23) | (3.71) | (4.47) | | | (4.45) | (5.90) | (6.29) | (7.28) | (5.51) | (4.96) |
| presi: base | 11.81 | -0.19 | 7.98 | 4.73 | | | 19.22 | 1.50 | 10.90 | -9.83 | 13.55 | 1.46 |
| | (6.18) | (2.08) | (3.82) | (4.49) | | | (8.05) | (5.47) | (5.98) | (4.12) | (4.56) | (1.40) |
| presi: former gov. | | 19.13 | | 5.35 | | | | 18.45 | | 26.93 | | 18.14 |
| | | (8.86) | | (4.69) | | | | (5.94) | | (7.60) | | (5.15) |
| VP: birthplace | 1.37 | -1.66 | -0.36 | -0.89 | | | 3.72 | -1.17 | 1.33 | -3.01 | 1.21 | 3.87 |
| | (5.91) | (5.39) | (4.19) | (4.09) | | | (5.94) | (4.24) | (7.46) | (6.28) | (3.91) | (3.17) |
| VP: base | 5.32 | 6.01 | 0.32 | 0.25 | | | 0.51 | 1.99 | 8.53 | 8.50 | 1.51 | -1.18 |
| | (4.79) | (3.77) | (4.35) | (4.26) | | | (4.19) | (3.45) | (6.69) | (4.76) | (3.91) | (3.66) |
| VP: former gov. | | 3.39 | | | | | | 8.07 | | 8.55 | | 3.41 |
| | | (5.16) | | | | | | (6.33) | | (5.62) | | (4.84) |
| $n$ obs. | 288 | 288 | 240 | 240 | | | 216 | 216 | 240 | 240 | 240 | 240 |
| **(b) Brazil** | PT | | PSDB | | | | incumbent | | first | | second | |
| presi: birthplace | -1.72 | -1.87 | 2.03 | 0.58 | | | 2.15 | 1.72 | 3.64 | 3.22 | 7.94 | 5.69 |
| | (2.69) | (2.66) | (4.53) | (4.54) | | | (3.73) | (3.72) | (6.67) | (6.54) | (5.20) | (8.32) |
| presi: base | 7.31 | 5.00 | -0.75 | -3.92 | | | 4.38 | 4.11 | 14.13 | 13.98 | -0.97 | -0.33 |
| | (3.35) | (3.63) | (6.88) | (5.23) | | | (1.72) | (2.14) | (3.25) | (2.77) | (3.60) | (9.02) |
| presi: former gov. | | | | 4.27 | | | | | | 9.80 | | 5.45 |
| | | | | (4.10) | | | | | | (3.62) | | (10.59) |
| VP: hometown | 5.31 | 10.75 | 0.54 | -2.20 | | | -5.80 | -8.02 | 7.21 | 9.80 | -6.05 | -1.01 |
| | (15.06) | (13.08) | (1.41) | (1.80) | | | (3.99) | (5.65) | (3.86) | (4.92) | (8.05) | (6.65) |
| VP: base | -2.47 | -11.12 | | | | | 5.16 | 3.69 | -5.17 | -3.89 | 3.79 | -2.45 |
| | (17.19) | (15.30) | | | | | (3.51) | (4.34) | (2.87) | (3.13) | (12.07) | (11.89) |
| VP: former gov. | | 15.47 | | 11.73 | | | | 7.49 | | -10.82 | | 22.83 |
| | | (15.58) | | (2.63) | | | | (5.39) | | (5.69) | | (10.37) |
| $n$ obs. | 243 | 243 | 216 | 216 | | | 243 | 243 | 243 | 243 | 243 | 243 |
| **(c) Mexico** | PRI | | PAN | | PRD | | incumbent | | first | | second | |
| presi: hometown | 10.49 | 0.28 | 0.47 | 0.47 | 5.96 | 5.96 | 9.58 | 4.60 | 5.61 | 11.24 | 10.43 | 11.04 |
| | (4.88) | (0.91) | (2.40) | (2.20) | (8.31) | (8.31) | (6.24) | (2.93) | (8.54) | (7.24) | (8.70) | (8.88) |
| presi: base | | | 5.11 | 5.10 | 12.68 | 12.68 | | | 3.91 | -12.50 | 19.43 | 5.68 |
| | | | (2.13) | (2.60) | (10.63) | (10.63) | | | (7.62) | (7.18) | (5.39) | (6.22) |
| presi: former gov. | | 16.33 | | 0.04 | | | | 13.69 | | 22.03 | | 22.74 |
| | | (3.56) | | (2.42) | | | | (4.67) | | (6.71) | | (5.85) |
| $n$ obs. | 192 | 192 | 224 | 224 | 224 | 224 | 224 | 224 | 224 | 224 | 224 | 224 |

OLS regression estimates (except for the PJ models, where observations for 2003 have a weight of 1/3 each). All specifications include fixed effects by state and election year. Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses.

Table A5: Electoral support by reference party: Birthplace instead of political base

| | PJ | UCR (+ allies) | | incumbent | first | second |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **(a) Argentina** | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| presi: birthplace | 13.85 | 2.58 | | 14.29 | 14.01 | 9.02 |
| | (7.01) | (3.09) | | (8.75) | (9.66) | (6.74) |
| VP: birthplace | 3.86 | -1.24 | | 0.31 | 8.42 | -0.40 |
| | (3.14) | (1.49) | | (3.39) | (3.11) | (3.91) |
| $n$ obs. | 288 | 240 | | 216 | 240 | 240 |
| **(b) Brazil** | PT | PSDB | | incumbent | first | second |
| presi: birthplace | -1.75 | 1.78 | | 2.54 | 1.30 | 7.55 |
| | (2.62) | (2.94) | | (3.73) | (6.50) | (5.32) |
| VP: birthplace | 0.88 | 0.61 | | -1.91 | -0.46 | -3.19 |
| | (2.38) | (1.72) | | (2.92) | (4.53) | (3.23) |
| $n$ obs. | 243 | 216 | | 243 | 243 | 243 |
| **(c) Mexico** | PRI | PAN | PRD | incumbent | first | second |
| presi: birthplace | 10.49 | 2.88 | 2.79 | 9.58 | 7.83 | 12.98 |
| | (4.88) | (3.80) | (8.65) | (6.24) | (6.42) | (9.00) |
| $n$ obs. | 192 | 224 | 224 | 224 | 224 | 224 |

OLS regression estimates (except for the PJ models, where observations for 2003 have a weight of 1/3 each). All specifications include fixed effects by state and election year. Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses.

# C Cabinet composition

## List of presidents

Table A6 presents the list of presidents included in the cabinet sample.

## Birthplace vs. political base of ministers and presidents

The Sankey plots in Figure A2 shows the proportion of ministers whose birth and career states coincided with the president's political base. We see that it is more common for ministers who were born outside of the president's political base to move there than the other way round.

## Robustness checks

- Table A7 includes the percentage of the vote received by the president in the first round as a control; for (consecutively) reelected presidents, we only include the values for the first time they were elected.
- Table A8 includes acting vice-presidents and interims.
- Table A9 allows for multiple political bases for the president.
- Table A10 groups the observations by presidency instead of president.
- Table A11 reports estimates using birthplace as the only explanatory variable.
- Table A12 uses both the president's and the ministers' birthplaces instead of their political base.
- Table A13 includes both the president's birthplace and his or her political base.
- Table A14 is a placebo replacing the (vice-)president's base with that of the runner-up.

Table A6: Presidents included in the sample

| **Argentina** ($N = 10$) | type | $N_{\text{terms}}$ | election year | start date | end date | state of birth | political base | former gov. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Alfonsín, Raúl Ricardo | president | 1 | 1983 | 1983-12-10 | 1989-07-07 | BUENOS AIRES | BUENOS AIRES | NO |
| Menem, Carlos Saúl | president | 2 | 1989 | 1989-07-08 | 1999-12-09 | LA RIOJA | LA RIOJA | YES |
| De la Rúa, Fernando | president | 1 | 1999 | 1999-12-10 | 2001-12-20 | CORDOBA | CITY OF BUENOS AIRES | YES |
| Rodríguez Saá, Adolfo | interim | 1 | | 2001-12-23 | 2001-12-30 | SAN LUIS | SAN LUIS | YES |
| Duhalde, Eduardo Alberto | interim | 1 | | 2002-01-02 | 2003-05-24 | BUENOS AIRES | BUENOS AIRES | YES |
| Kirchner, Néstor Carlos | president | 1 | 2003 | 2003-05-25 | 2007-12-09 | SANTA CRUZ | SANTA CRUZ | YES |
| Fernández de Kirchner, Cristina | president | 2 | 2007 | 2007-12-10 | 2015-12-09 | BUENOS AIRES | BUENOS AIRES | NO |
| Macri, Mauricio | president | 1 | 2015 | 2015-12-10 | 2019-12-09 | BUENOS AIRES | CITY OF BUENOS AIRES | YES |
| Fernández, Alberto Ángel | president | 1 | 2019 | 2019-12-10 | 2023-12-09 | CITY OF BUENOS AIRES | CITY OF BUENOS AIRES | NO |
| Milei, Javier Gerardo | president | 1 | 2023 | 2023-12-10 | | CITY OF BUENOS AIRES | CITY OF BUENOS AIRES | NO |
| **Brazil** ($N = 9$) | | | | | | | | |
| Sarney de Araújo Costa, José | vice-president | 1 | 1985 | 1985-03-15 | 1990-03-14 | MARANHAO | MARANHAO | YES |
| Collor de Mello, Fernando Affonso | president | 1 | 1989 | 1990-03-15 | 1992-10-01 | RIO DE JANEIRO | ALAGOAS | YES |
| Cautiero Franco, Itamar Augusto | vice-president | 1 | 1989 | 1992-10-02 | 1994-12-31 | NONE (BRAZILIAN SEA) | MINAS GERAIS | NO |
| Cardoso, Fernando Henrique | president | 2 | 1994 | 1995-01-01 | 2002-12-31 | RIO DE JANEIRO | SAO PAULO | NO |
| Lula da Silva, Luiz Inácio (1) | president | 2 | 2002 | 2003-01-01 | 2010-12-31 | PERNAMBUCO | SAO PAULO | NO |
| Rousseff, Dilma Vana | president | 2 | 2010 | 2011-01-01 | 2016-05-11 | MINAS GERAIS | RIO GRANDE DO SUL | NO |
| Temer Lulia, Michel Miguel Elias | vice-president | 1 | 2014 | 2016-05-12 | 2018-12-31 | SAO PAULO | SAO PAULO | NO |
| Bolsonaro, Jair Messias | president | 1 | 2018 | 2019-01-01 | 2022-12-31 | SAO PAULO | RIO DE JANEIRO | NO |
| Lula da Silva, Luiz Inácio (2) | president | 1 | 2022 | 2023-01-01 | | PERNAMBUCO | SAO PAULO | NO |
| **Mexico** ($N = 7$) | | | | | | | | |
| Salinas de Gortari, Carlos | president | 1 | 1988 | 1988-12-01 | 1994-11-30 | MEXICO CITY | MEXICO CITY | NO |
| Zedillo Ponce de León, Ernesto | president | 1 | 1994 | 1994-12-01 | 2000-11-30 | MEXICO CITY | MEXICO CITY | NO |
| Fox Quesada, Vicente | president | 1 | 2000 | 2000-12-01 | 2006-11-30 | MEXICO CITY | GUANAJUATO | YES |
| Calderón Hinojosa, Felipe de Jesús | president | 1 | 2006 | 2006-12-01 | 2012-11-30 | MICHOACAN | MICHOACAN | NO |
| Peña Nieto, Enrique | president | 1 | 2012 | 2012-12-01 | 2018-11-30 | MEXICO | MEXICO | YES |
| López Obrador, Andrés Manuel | president | 1 | 2018 | 2018-12-01 | 2024-09-30 | TABASCO | MEXICO CITY | YES |
| Sheinbaum Pardo, Claudia | president | 1 | 2024 | 2024-10-01 | | MEXICO CITY | MEXICO CITY | YES |

For presidents currently in office (Milei, Lula and Sheinbaum) we consider their last day to be November 30, 2024. *Although he formally resigned on December 29, 1992, he had been suspended on October 1st, 1992, with vice-president Franco taking office and revamping the cabinet. We thus code Francos's term as beginning on October 2nd. †Although she was formally deposed on August 31, 2016, she had been suspended on May 12, 2016, with vice-president Temer taking office and revamping the cabinet. We thus code Temer's term as beginning on May 12.




Figure A2: Sankey diagrams showing the percentage of ministers (weighted by the length of their tenure) whose state of birth and the state where they developed their career coincided with the president's political base. It is more common for ministers who were born outside of the president's political base to move there than the other way round.

Table A7: State representation in the cabinet: Accounting for electoral performance

| | DV: % min. − % pop. | | | | DV: min. per 10M | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | initial cabinet | | full term | | initial cabinet | | full term | |
| **(a) Argentina** | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| presi: base | 25.07 | 24.88 | 18.32 | 18.20 | 65.97 | 20.30 | 59.77 | 13.35 |
| | (1.10) | (1.08) | (1.88) | (1.54) | (35.33) | (14.52) | (37.92) | (11.89) |
| presi: former governor | | -0.26 | | -0.29 | | 92.45 | | 94.23 |
| | | (2.42) | | (2.76) | | (44.99) | | (47.14) |
| VP: base | 9.62 | 12.26 | 7.36 | 9.53 | -1.66 | -15.81 | -10.27 | -25.75 |
| | (4.63) | (4.46) | (2.71) | (1.97) | (9.81) | (9.97) | (12.33) | (13.60) |
| VP: former governor | | -15.71 | | -12.86 | | 10.63 | | 17.18 |
| | | (4.58) | | (1.88) | | (9.34) | | (12.76) |
| % votes (first round) | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.21 | 0.12 | 0.37 | 0.27 |
| | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.15) | (0.11) | (0.26) | (0.23) |
| $n$ obs. | 192 | 192 | 192 | 192 | 192 | 192 | 192 | 192 |
| **(b) Brazil** | | | | | | | | |
| presi: base | 4.22 | 5.77 | 2.04 | 2.73 | 0.74 | 0.10 | 0.59 | 0.45 |
| | (2.82) | (4.67) | (2.30) | (3.68) | (0.81) | (0.97) | (1.19) | (1.76) |
| presi: former governor | | -2.90 | | -1.00 | | 2.96 | | 0.90 |
| | | (4.56) | | (3.65) | | (0.95) | | (1.73) |
| VP: base | 3.63 | 6.00 | 0.78 | 1.98 | 0.49 | 0.39 | 0.02 | 0.13 |
| | (0.97) | (1.77) | (0.54) | (0.89) | (0.29) | (0.28) | (0.69) | (1.14) |
| VP: former governor | | -6.65 | | -3.37 | | 0.21 | | -0.34 |
| | | (3.98) | | (2.86) | | (1.08) | | (2.22) |
| % votes (first round) | 0.06 | 0.05 | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.04 | 0.03 |
| | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| $n$ obs. | 162 | 162 | 162 | 162 | 162 | 162 | 162 | 162 |
| **(c) Mexico** | | | | | | | | |
| presi: base | 16.94 | 11.59 | 17.24 | 13.16 | 3.98 | 3.26 | 4.24 | 4.18 |
| | (5.68) | (4.87) | (4.17) | (3.18) | (1.25) | (0.98) | (0.68) | (0.28) |
| presi: former governor | | 8.98 | | 6.86 | | 1.22 | | 0.11 |
| | | (5.36) | | (3.93) | | (1.03) | | (0.71) |
| % votes (first round) | 0.03 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 |
| | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| $n$ obs. | 224 | 224 | 224 | 224 | 224 | 224 | 224 | 224 |

OLS regression estimates. All specifications include state fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. Samples are restricted to elected presidents; multiple *consecutive* terms are treated as a single one.

Table A8: State representation in the cabinet, by president: Including acting VPs and interims

| | DV: % min. − % pop. | | | | DV: min. per 10M | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | initial cabinet | | full term | | initial cabinet | | full term | |
| **(a) Argentina** | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| presi: base | 30.37 | 26.48 | 26.53 | 20.34 | 72.44 | 24.75 | 71.17 | 20.60 |
| | (1.50) | (2.09) | (2.27) | (5.32) | (34.04) | (10.72) | (37.15) | (9.17) |
| presi: former governor | | 5.72 | | 9.48 | | 75.91 | | 80.70 |
| | | (4.77) | | (9.82) | | (28.80) | | (31.96) |
| VP: base | 10.47 | 12.58 | 8.24 | 9.39 | -0.97 | -8.20 | -6.95 | -15.84 |
| | (4.95) | (4.61) | (3.10) | (3.14) | (13.01) | (15.65) | (16.01) | (19.68) |
| VP: former governor | | -16.49 | | -12.45 | | 4.67 | | 12.64 |
| | | (4.61) | | (3.14) | | (15.65) | | (19.68) |
| $n$ obs. | 240 | 240 | 240 | 240 | 240 | 240 | 240 | 240 |
| **(b) Brazil** | | | | | | | | |
| presi: base | 6.83 | 9.36 | 4.74 | 5.80 | 1.15 | 0.79 | 1.54 | 1.39 |
| | (2.62) | (3.20) | (1.74) | (2.39) | (0.41) | (0.46) | (0.58) | (0.84) |
| presi: former governor | | -7.06 | | -2.77 | | 1.43 | | 0.78 |
| | | (3.31) | | (2.52) | | (0.84) | | (0.90) |
| VP: base | 3.06 | 5.48 | 1.55 | 2.75 | 0.35 | 0.39 | 0.51 | 0.72 |
| | (2.06) | (3.27) | (0.84) | (1.68) | (0.15) | (0.30) | (0.42) | (0.84) |
| VP: former governor | | -6.76 | | -3.36 | | -0.16 | | -0.62 |
| | | (2.82) | | (2.01) | | (0.70) | | (1.89) |
| $n$ obs. | 243 | 243 | 243 | 243 | 243 | 243 | 243 | 243 |
| **(c) Mexico** | | | | | | | | |
| presi: base | 17.15 | 11.51 | 17.37 | 13.11 | 4.03 | 3.24 | 4.31 | 4.15 |
| | (5.71) | (4.89) | (4.18) | (3.19) | (1.27) | (0.99) | (0.70) | (0.29) |
| presi: former governor | | 9.40 | | 7.10 | | 1.32 | | 0.27 |
| | | (5.21) | | (3.87) | | (1.01) | | (0.72) |
| $n$ obs. | 224 | 224 | 224 | 224 | 224 | 224 | 224 | 224 |

OLS regression estimates. All specifications include state fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. Samples include elected presidents, acting vice-presidents, and interims, but multiple *consecutive* terms are treated as a single one.

Table A9: State representation in the cabinet, by president: Allowing for multiple political bases

| | DV: % min. − % pop. | | | | DV: min. per 10M | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | initial cabinet | | full term | | initial cabinet | | full term | |
| **(a) Argentina** | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| presi: base | 26.94 | 26.32 | 20.54 | 20.25 | 84.80 | 54.92 | 110.01 | 94.52 |
| | (0.72) | (1.06) | (3.03) | (2.48) | (43.59) | (38.84) | (70.99) | (83.93) |
| presi: former governor | | 1.23 | | 0.51 | | 67.86 | | 35.40 |
| | | (1.37) | | (2.93) | | (31.57) | | (44.94) |
| VP: base | 8.20 | 9.89 | 6.01 | 7.39 | -5.65 | -16.02 | -18.38 | -26.10 |
| | (4.25) | (4.10) | (2.74) | (2.66) | (12.21) | (11.88) | (21.30) | (21.03) |
| VP: former governor | | -12.89 | | -10.08 | | 13.29 | | 23.10 |
| | | (4.10) | | (2.66) | | (11.88) | | (21.03) |
| $n$ obs. | 192 | 192 | 192 | 192 | 192 | 192 | 192 | 192 |
| **(b) Brazil** | | | | | | | | |
| presi: base | 4.97 | 6.53 | 2.54 | 3.24 | 1.00 | 0.37 | 1.07 | 0.95 |
| | (2.65) | (4.48) | (2.19) | (3.56) | (0.77) | (0.91) | (1.09) | (1.64) |
| presi: former governor | | -2.85 | | -0.97 | | 2.97 | | 0.93 |
| | | (4.48) | | (3.56) | | (0.91) | | (1.64) |
| VP: base | 3.69 | 6.15 | 0.82 | 2.08 | 0.50 | 0.44 | 0.05 | 0.23 |
| | (1.20) | (1.96) | (0.56) | (0.82) | (0.31) | (0.18) | (0.56) | (0.95) |
| VP: former governor | | -6.93 | | -3.56 | | 0.11 | | -0.52 |
| | | (4.19) | | (2.95) | | (1.12) | | (2.29) |
| $n$ obs. | 162 | 162 | 162 | 162 | 162 | 162 | 162 | 162 |
| **(c) Mexico** | | | | | | | | |
| presi: base | 11.64 | 4.24 | 14.49 | 9.28 | 2.68 | 1.24 | 3.90 | 3.31 |
| | (4.86) | (2.58) | (4.41) | (3.36) | (0.93) | (0.62) | (0.70) | (0.50) |
| presi: former governor | | 15.74 | | 11.08 | | 3.06 | | 1.25 |
| | | (4.78) | | (3.90) | | (1.05) | | (0.84) |
| $n$ obs. | 224 | 224 | 224 | 224 | 224 | 224 | 224 | 224 |

OLS regression estimates. All specifications include state fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. Samples are restricted to elected presidents; multiple *consecutive* terms are treated as a single one. However, presidents who switched districts are coded as having multiple political bases. These are: Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (ARG; president 2007-2015 and VP 2019-2023): Santa Cruz in addition to the province of Buenos Aires; Felipe Calderón (MEX, president 2006-2012): Mexico City in addition to Michoacán; and Andrés Manuel López Obrador (MEX, president 2018-2024): Tabasco in addition to Mexico City.

Table A10: State representation in the cabinet, by *presidency* instead of president

| | DV: % min. − % pop. | | | | DV: min. per 10M | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | initial cabinet | | full term | | initial cabinet | | full term | |
| **(a) Argentina** | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| presi: base | 21.30 | 20.20 | 17.72 | 16.99 | 54.69 | 14.43 | 53.90 | 13.42 |
| | (1.69) | (0.87) | (2.06) | (1.80) | (27.88) | (10.33) | (30.76) | (10.15) |
| presi: former governor | | 1.72 | | 1.05 | | 78.89 | | 79.42 |
| | | (2.44) | | (3.16) | | (30.38) | | (37.62) |
| VP: base | 5.40 | 6.50 | 4.45 | 5.49 | -3.76 | -12.15 | -5.77 | -14.51 |
| | (4.53) | (5.03) | (2.82) | (3.24) | (7.56) | (8.42) | (8.96) | (11.13) |
| VP: former governor | | -8.94 | | -8.09 | | 10.02 | | 12.17 |
| | | (5.03) | | (3.24) | | (8.42) | | (11.13) |
| $n$ obs. | 240 | 240 | 240 | 240 | 240 | 240 | 240 | 240 |
| **(b) Brazil** | | | | | | | | |
| presi: base | 5.22 | 6.77 | 2.83 | 3.48 | 0.94 | 0.64 | 0.68 | 0.39 |
| | (2.40) | (3.94) | (1.72) | (2.78) | (0.49) | (0.51) | (0.48) | (0.56) |
| presi: former governor | | -3.26 | | -1.03 | | 2.45 | | 1.86 |
| | | (3.94) | | (2.78) | | (0.51) | | (0.56) |
| VP: base | 2.98 | 5.72 | 0.85 | 2.14 | 0.42 | 0.61 | 0.15 | 0.15 |
| | (0.89) | (1.74) | (0.27) | (1.19) | (0.13) | (0.20) | (0.17) | (0.30) |
| VP: former governor | | -7.34 | | -3.49 | | -0.67 | | -0.10 |
| | | (3.58) | | (3.20) | | (0.49) | | (0.55) |
| $n$ obs. | 243 | 243 | 243 | 243 | 243 | 243 | 243 | 243 |

OLS regression estimates. All specifications include state fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. Samples are restricted to elected presidents; multiple terms, consecutive or not, are treated as separate observations. Results for Mexico are not reported because they would be identical to those shown in Table 3.

Table A11: State representation in the cabinet: President's birthplace only

| | DV: % min. − % pop. | | DV: min. per 10M | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | init. cabinet | full term | init. cabinet | full term |
| **(a) Argentina** | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| presi: birthplace | 14.04 | 11.69 | 53.57 | 54.42 |
| | (2.87) | (3.06) | (34.36) | (36.85) |
| VP: birthplace | 5.70 | 4.16 | 1.53 | -3.23 |
| | (6.50) | (3.87) | (1.48) | (5.27) |
| $n$ obs. | 192 | 192 | 192 | 192 |
| **(b) Brazil** | | | | |
| presi: birthplace | -4.22 | -0.66 | -0.19 | 0.17 |
| | (4.02) | (3.05) | (0.73) | (1.10) |
| VP: birthplace | 2.52 | 0.69 | 0.46 | 0.26 |
| | (1.82) | (1.26) | (0.51) | (0.94) |
| $n$ obs. | 162 | 162 | 162 | 162 |
| **(c) Mexico** | | | | |
| presi: hometown | 14.48 | 12.38 | 3.10 | 3.41 |
| | (5.18) | (3.81) | (0.94) | (0.28) |
| $n$ obs. | 224 | 224 | 224 | 224 |

OLS regression estimates. As in Table 3, the minister's state is defined as that in which (s)he developed his or her political career. All specifications include state fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. Samples include elected presidents; multiple *consecutive* terms are treated as a single one.

Table A12: State representation in the cabinet: President's and ministers' birthplaces

| | DV: % min. − % pop. | | DV: min. per 10M | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | init. cabinet | full term | init. cabinet | full term |
| **(a) Argentina** | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| presi: birthplace | 6.53 | 5.34 | 12.88 | 16.53 |
| | (1.08) | (1.49) | (7.93) | (14.04) |
| VP: birthplace | 1.13 | -0.21 | -0.84 | -5.92 |
| | (4.45) | (1.77) | (1.22) | (4.74) |
| $n$ obs. | 192 | 192 | 192 | 192 |
| **(b) Brazil** | | | | |
| presi: birthplace | -1.66 | -0.04 | 0.12 | 0.21 |
| | (2.74) | (2.48) | (0.64) | (0.82) |
| VP: birthplace | 7.32 | 2.79 | 1.24 | 1.07 |
| | (0.82) | (1.32) | (0.65) | (1.47) |
| $n$ obs. | 162 | 162 | 162 | 162 |
| **(c) Mexico** | | | | |
| presi: birthplace | 0.40 | -0.15 | 0.36 | 0.81 |
| | (2.50) | (2.81) | (0.99) | (0.89) |
| $n$ obs. | 224 | 224 | 224 | 224 |

OLS regression estimates. Unlike in Table 3, the minister's state is defined as that in which (s)he was born, even if (s)he developed his or her political career elsewhere. All specifications include state fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. Samples include elected presidents; multiple *consecutive* terms are treated as a single one.

Table A13: State representation in the cabinet, by president: Controlling for president's birthplace

| | DV: % min. − % pop. | | | | DV: min. per 10M | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | initial cabinet | | full term | | initial cabinet | | full term | |
| **(a) Argentina** | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| presi: birthplace | -2.12 | -1.17 | 4.60 | 5.96 | 15.31 | 47.01 | 21.35 | 54.73 |
| | (3.93) | (3.74) | (4.26) | (4.00) | (12.35) | (34.19) | (13.98) | (37.31) |
| presi: base | 26.69 | 25.97 | 14.05 | 12.00 | 57.50 | -25.63 | 48.64 | -39.83 |
| | (3.87) | (4.27) | (4.76) | (4.83) | (31.52) | (33.22) | (35.25) | (38.08) |
| presi: former governor | | -0.46 | | 1.54 | | 112.33 | | 120.28 |
| | | (2.72) | | (3.41) | | (28.61) | | (31.82) |
| VP: birthplace | -2.24 | -2.03 | -8.01 | -7.96 | 3.74 | -3.77 | 2.56 | -5.58 |
| | (7.18) | (7.06) | (5.73) | (5.69) | (11.85) | (30.32) | (13.29) | (35.42) |
| VP: base | 11.20 | 13.78 | 15.66 | 17.83 | 0.50 | -1.72 | -4.37 | -8.10 |
| | (5.15) | (4.14) | (5.11) | (4.35) | (13.69) | (34.05) | (17.03) | (39.37) |
| VP: former governor | | -14.75 | | -12.57 | | 2.76 | | 10.67 |
| | | (4.20) | | (1.42) | | (4.80) | | (8.29) |
| $n$ obs. | 192 | 192 | 192 | 192 | 192 | 192 | 192 | 192 |
| **(b) Brazil** | | | | | | | | |
| presi: birthplace | -3.20 | -3.17 | -0.13 | -0.11 | 0.03 | -0.10 | 0.37 | 0.32 |
| | (3.50) | (3.17) | (2.71) | (2.52) | (0.68) | (0.71) | (1.04) | (1.05) |
| presi: base | 4.28 | 5.81 | 2.51 | 3.31 | 1.01 | 0.35 | 1.16 | 1.11 |
| | (2.17) | (3.96) | (1.99) | (3.36) | (0.80) | (0.87) | (1.13) | (1.69) |
| presi: former governor | | -2.12 | | -1.04 | | 2.99 | | 0.77 |
| | | (3.96) | | (3.36) | | (0.87) | | (1.69) |
| VP: hometown | 0.67 | 3.13 | 0.83 | 2.13 | 0.31 | 0.27 | 1.18 | 1.45 |
| | (1.23) | (1.46) | (0.57) | (0.75) | (0.28) | (0.17) | (0.58) | (1.03) |
| VP: base | 2.35 | 2.98 | 0.09 | 0.41 | 0.25 | 0.21 | -0.86 | -0.81 |
| | (0.92) | (0.75) | (0.76) | (0.59) | (0.24) | (0.18) | (0.36) | (0.35) |
| VP: former governor | | -7.63 | | -4.04 | | 0.05 | | -0.85 |
| | | (3.67) | | (3.00) | | (1.13) | | (2.50) |
| $n$ obs. | 162 | 162 | 162 | 162 | 162 | 162 | 162 | 162 |
| **(c) Mexico** | | | | | | | | |
| presi: hometown | 7.01 | 10.68 | 3.74 | 6.30 | 1.21 | 1.75 | 1.42 | 1.69 |
| | (3.88) | (4.48) | (2.66) | (2.31) | (0.72) | (0.93) | (0.42) | (0.44) |
| presi: base | 13.18 | 2.48 | 15.25 | 7.79 | 3.34 | 1.76 | 3.51 | 2.72 |
| | (5.19) | (6.07) | (4.44) | (4.74) | (1.25) | (1.07) | (0.87) | (0.55) |
| presi: former governor | | 14.36 | | 10.02 | | 2.13 | | 1.05 |
| | | (4.09) | | (2.88) | | (1.06) | | (0.79) |
| $n$ obs. | 224 | 224 | 224 | 224 | 224 | 224 | 224 | 224 |

OLS regression estimates. All specifications include state fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. Samples are restricted to elected presidents; multiple *consecutive* terms are treated as a single one.

Table A14: State representation in the cabinet: Runner-up instead of elected (vice-)president

| | DV: % min. − % pop. | | | | DV: min. per 10M | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | initial cabinet | | full term | | initial cabinet | | full term | |
| **(a) Argentina** | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| runner-up (P): base | -3.91 | -2.58 | -5.62 | -9.33 | -4.08 | -6.50 | -4.02 | -7.20 |
| | (2.82) | (10.45) | (3.07) | (9.41) | (3.51) | (4.49) | (2.57) | (4.52) |
| runner-up (P): former governor | | -1.96 | | 4.88 | | 2.70 | | 3.84 |
| | | (12.38) | | (11.03) | | (6.28) | | (5.72) |
| runner-up (VP): base | -2.31 | -3.24 | -2.50 | -3.50 | -8.36 | -12.04 | -7.02 | -10.00 |
| | (1.03) | (1.32) | (1.84) | (2.54) | (6.71) | (9.54) | (7.24) | (10.41) |
| runner-up (VP): former governor | | 3.03 | | 3.13 | | 11.79 | | 9.49 |
| | | (1.33) | | (2.55) | | (9.54) | | (10.42) |
| $n$ obs. | 240 | 240 | 240 | 240 | 240 | 240 | 240 | 240 |
| **(b) Brazil** | | | | | | | | |
| runner-up (P): base | 2.09 | 0.72 | 0.86 | 1.82 | 0.48 | 0.40 | 0.25 | 0.29 |
| | (0.50) | (1.07) | (0.23) | (0.58) | (0.23) | (0.39) | (0.13) | (0.14) |
| runner-up (P): former governor | | 3.26 | | -2.73 | | 0.25 | | -0.14 |
| | | (1.94) | | (0.76) | | (0.35) | | (0.13) |
| runner-up (VP): base | 4.21 | 4.61 | 2.89 | 3.05 | 0.44 | 0.39 | 0.21 | 0.25 |
| | (1.50) | (1.82) | (1.84) | (1.88) | (0.37) | (0.37) | (0.33) | (0.38) |
| runner-up (VP): former governor | | -1.73 | | -3.63 | | 0.69 | | -0.43 |
| | | (1.43) | | (1.45) | | (0.28) | | (0.29) |
| $n$ obs. | 243 | 243 | 243 | 243 | 243 | 243 | 243 | 243 |
| **(c) Mexico** | | | | | | | | |
| runner-up (P): base | -5.42 | 7.24 | -1.87 | 8.82 | -1.53 | 1.43 | -0.72 | 2.02 |
| | (2.90) | (3.96) | (0.21) | (5.19) | (0.43) | (1.48) | (0.50) | (1.95) |
| runner-up (P): former governor | | -21.11 | | -17.82 | | -4.93 | | -4.57 |
| | | (9.53) | | (7.39) | | (2.60) | | (2.14) |
| $n$ obs. | 224 | 224 | 224 | 224 | 224 | 224 | 224 | 224 |

OLS regression estimates. All specifications include state fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. The explanatory variables are measured for the runner-up (as well as his or her vice-presidential candidate) who *failed* to win the election rather than for the actual (vice-)president.

# D Subnational finances

- Figure A3 replicates the estimations in Figure 3 but including all acting presidents in the sample.
- Figure A4 replicates the estimations in Figure 3 but identifying the "treated" state according to the president's birthplace instead of his or her political base.
- Figures A5 and A6 replicate Figure 3 but looking at the effect of having a vice-president or a runner-up instead of an elected president, respectively.




Figure A3: Event study estimates of the effect of having a president whose political base is on state $s$ on different financial indicators in state $s$: including acting vice-presidents and interims. Coefficients are calculated by stacking state-year observations by presidential transition, then running an OLS model with state-transition and year-transition fixed effects. 95% CIs constructed using standard errors clustered by state-transition, and adjusting for the number of clusters in the sample. (a) **Low strictness** estimates: the control group includes all not-currently-treated states. (b) **Medium strictness** estimates: the control includes never- or not-yet-treated states, but not already-treated states. (c) **High strictness** estimates: the control group only includes states where neither a president, a vice-president nor a runner-up presidential candidate ever had a political base.




Figure A4: Event study estimates of the effect of having an *elected* president who was **born** in state $s$ on different financial indicators in state $s$. Coefficients are calculated by stacking state-year observations by presidential transition, then running an OLS model with state-transition and year-transition fixed effects. 95% CIs constructed using standard errors clustered by state-transition, and adjusting for the number of clusters in the sample. (a) **Low strictness** estimates: the control group includes all not-currently-treated states. (b) **Medium strictness** estimates: the control includes never- or not-yet-treated states, but not already-treated states. (c) **High strictness** estimates: the control group only includes states where neither a president, a vice-president nor a runner-up presidential candidate ever had a political base.




Figure A5: Event study estimates of the effect of having an *elected* **vice-president** whose political base is on state $s$ on different financial indicators in state $s$. Coefficients are calculated by stacking state-year observations by presidential transition, then running an OLS model with state-transition and year-transition fixed effects. 95% CIs constructed using standard errors clustered by state-transition, and adjusting for the number of clusters in the sample. (a) **Low strictness** estimates: the control group includes all not-currently-treated states. (b) **Medium strictness** estimates: the control includes never- or not-yet-treated states, but not already-treated states. (c) **High strictness** estimates: the control group only includes states where neither a president, a vice-president nor a runner-up presidential candidate ever had a political base.




Figure A6: Event study estimates of the effect of having a **runner-up** in the presidential election whose political base is on state $s$ on different financial indicators in state $s$. Coefficients are calculated by stacking state-year observations by presidential transition, then running an OLS model with state-transition and year-transition fixed effects. 95% CIs constructed using standard errors clustered by state-transition, and adjusting for the number of clusters in the sample. (a) **Low strictness** estimates: the control group includes all not-currently-treated states. (b) **Medium strictness** estimates: the control includes never- or not-yet-treated states, but not already-treated states. (c) **High strictness** estimates: the control group only includes states where neither a president, a vice-president nor a runner-up presidential candidate ever had a political base.